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Hi all,

This may have been the most challenging volume of the *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History* ever produced. However, I have been delighted to oversee the production of this fourth volume. The articles in this edition are so diverse- from Roman Triumph under Augustus, to witchcraft in *the Arabian Nights*, to the contemporary challenge posed by Al Qaeda, there should be something for everyone within these pages, allowing for a historical escape from our current, testing, times.

In the contemporary climate, my wholehearted gratitude goes to my markers, who, despite a closed campus, managed to select the best articles which make up this volume, so thank you: Adam Jackson, Rebecca Williams, Maya Prior, Anna Hubbard, Mazzy Westwood and James Evans. An extra special thanks should be extended to my Assistant Editor Rebecca Williams, who has always been on hand for helpful advice and was a massive help in organising our first 'Journal in a Day' workshop, from which many of the high-quality articles in this volume have come. I would also like to thank Dr Christopher Prior for being a great advocate of the journal and an ever-reliable helping hand from within the History Department.

This volume of the *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History* is slightly different and starts with an editorial on the impact of the current pandemic on historical study. After that, the papers will take you through almost 2000 years of human history. Happy reading!

Nico Blackstock

Editor-in-Chief

Editorial: Past, Present, and Future: The Study of History after Coronavirus.

Nico Blackstock

The *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History* has always been led by new and original research from across the History Department at the University of Southampton. The research-led environment of the Department allows for undergraduate students of all years to engage with ground-breaking and innovative explorations, which in turn create high-quality articles for the journal. These new avenues explored in the current volume are, in part, indictive of wider trends emerging from historiography, either within the specific historical subject area (such as Otto Cooper's article on Stolypin) or in terms of broader changes in historiography (illustrated by the focus on marginalised voices in multiple papers). The diverse nature of historiography, especially since the rise of postmodernism in the 1980s, has influenced, often unconsciously, all the papers published across the four volumes of this journal.

When I was appointed as Editor-in-Chief of the *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History* last summer, it would have been fancifully incomprehensible to believe that this fourth volume would be published in the midst of a global pandemic, unlike any seen before in the lifetimes of most people. An extended period of reflection (an overly optimistic synonym for 'lockdown') has accompanied what *Sapiens* author Yuval Noah Harari has described as 'the biggest crisis of our generation'.[1] In many ways, it has felt like a purgatory between epochs, a long voyage between the Old and the New. There can be little doubt that, as Harari predicts, when the pandemic passes, 'we will inhabit a different world'.[2] Here, the present will dramatically affect our future. Yet, paradoxically, this present will also alter our understanding of the past. The study of history will be fundamentally transformed. From new research avenues to a possible disintegration of historical determinism, post-Covid historiography will mirror the fundamental changes in our society. An editorial like this is intrinsically illogical; historians, of course, suffer from the same inability to predict the future, with which all humans struggle. However, I hope this editorial can, tentatively, indicate some possible movements in the study of history, to which future editions of the *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History* can hope to contribute.

The research topics, with which historians engage, will change given the global pandemic. A possible reinvigoration of the history of science is one such example. Trends in historiography before the pandemic indicate that public interaction with science, especially in medical fields, will be the

[1] Yuval Noah Harari, 'The World After Coronavirus', *Financial Times Online*, 20 March 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75 [accessed on 2 June 2020].
[2] Ibid.

focus of a new generation of historians of science, exemplified in part by the controversy surrounding Norman Ohler's 2016 work *Blitzed: Drugs in Nazi Germany*. Ohler's extensive investigation of cocaine and methamphetamine use in both the civilian and military populations of the Third Reich was labelled as 'dangerous' by Richard Evans, because of the implications of arguments surrounding the intoxication of Hitler and his consequent responsibility in the atrocities which followed.[3] However, the intrinsic nature of Ohler's research means that its repercussions may be much wider. Ohler produced a scientific history, in which the main historical actors were not only chemists like Theodore Morell, but also regular soldiers and workers. It is a history of the public responses to science, specifically the use of medically manufactured narcotics. Such a trend can also be detected in the optional modules offered by the History Department at Southampton, namely 'Science on the Streets', in which students investigate how the urban Western Europeans engaged with nineteenth-century scientific discoveries, such as the rise of zoos and natural history museums. Our lives (in Britain at least) since mid-March 2020 have, in many ways, been dominated by the populace's reaction to science, albeit in a much more passive way than the active taking of drugs or going to a zoological park. Coronavirus, hence, may accelerate burgeoning trends in specific areas of historical study.

Consequently, these trends may lead to a revival of environmental history, a product of the 1970s environmentalist movement. The focus on how the environment, from climate to natural hazards, impacted upon human history and vice versa will only be exacerbated by the experiences of a global pandemic. Coupled with an escalation in the public understanding of the environment over the past decade, Bruce Campbell is correct in speculating that 'the fledgling subject of environmental history may win new converts among the Covid-19 generation of students.'[4] Yet, the difference between the pandemic and these aforementioned trends in scientific and environmental historiography is the notion of human agency. Ohler argues that 'the doping mentality spread to every corner of the Reich', indicating the active engagement with these substances.[5] Fundamentally, humans choose to take or prescribe drugs, which more often than not are produced, in some form, by humans. Humans, of course, affect the environment; there can be no doubt that the Industrial Revolution is one of the root causes of the climate crisis today. However, the inanimate forces of the environment can also indiscriminately affect humans in a way totally beyond their own control.

[3] Richard Evans, 'Blitzed: Drugs in Nazi Germany by Norman Ohler review- a crass and dangerously inaccurate account', *Guardian*, 16 November 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/nov/16/blitzed-drugs-in-nazi-germany-by-norman-ohler-review [accessed on 5 June 2020].
[4] Bruce Campbell, 'The Black Death and the future of history after Covid-19', *History Workshop Online,* 26 May 2020, http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/black-death-future-of-history/ [accessed on 5 June 2020].
[5] Norman Ohler, *Blitzed: Drugs in Nazi Germany* (London: Penguin, 2017), p. 48.

This fundamental difference may transform the way we understand causation in history, by emphasising the importance of natural, not human, agency, as tentatively discussed by Campbell.[6] In his seminal work, E.H. Carr argued that determinism, the notion that every event has a cause and would not have been different unless the causes were altered, is a 'problem of all human behaviour'.[7] Richard Evans notes that postmodernism has led to a move away from determinism (which is most often associated with Marxist and neo-Weberian historiography), although causation is still understood within the paradigms of human experiences.[8] Yet, the Covid-19 pandemic cannot be explained by conscious human actions, but rather by inanimate environmental factors. Humans, after all, are merely vessels, over which the viral pathogens take control. Human agency, consequently, can only allow the historian to ask 'why?' so many times, especially in the field of environmental history. Humans, of course, are intrinsically reciprocally linked with the environment and often environmental catastrophes can be partially attributed to human action (like the Bengal Famine of 1943). Yet, an investigation of environmental factors could help historians further explain both events, but significantly, processes which impacted humans, such as urbanisation. Moreover, these environmental forces act on both local and global levels, allowing for a dynamic, yet nuanced, understanding of inanimate causation to emerge. Coupled with the rise of interdisciplinary approaches, such as the investigations of biologists and ecologists into the Black Death, the elementary basis of causation in history may dramatically shift.

In years to come, as the *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History* continues to thrive, articles will be written about the present pandemic. Although it may not seem like it now, coronavirus will, one day, be history. The status-quo of historiography may be fundamentally transformed by it. Yet, only when the medium-term social, political, cultural and environmental impacts are understood will it be possible to comprehensively argue that coronavirus changed the course of world history. It still might not, although that is increasingly unlikely. Peter Hennessey, the esteemed modern British historian, argued that post-war Britain will be demarcated in the future using 'BC' and 'AC': 'Before Corona' and 'After Corona'.[9] In some ways, coronavirus will impact on twenty-first century understandings of British (and world) history in the same way that the Second World War did in the twentieth-century. Yet, 'the war', as it is so often referred to, did not change British society in of itself. Moreover, it was the total changes to British society that occurred after

[6] Campbell, 'The Black Death and the future of history after Covid-19', *History Workshop Online,* http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/black-death-future-of-history/.
[7] E.H. Carr, *What is History?* (1961; London: Penguin, 2018), p. 89.
[8] Richard Evans, *In Defence of History* (London: Granta Books, 1997), p 159.
[9] Jon Kelly, 'Coronavirus: The Month that Changed Everything', *BBC News*, 28 March 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-52066956 [accessed on 5 June 2020].

1945 which meant that post-war Britain was fundamentally different to pre-war Britain, like the Welfare State and consensus politics. Hence, it is only after this interregnum is over that historians will be able to assess the virus's imprint on British society and only with fundamental changes to this very fabric will Hennessey's prediction come to fruition.

Historians study the past. They do not possess a crystal ball through which they can view a post-Covid future. Like all other humans, they can merely predict what might happen. This is what this editorial has attempted to do. These predictions might, by all means, be totally incorrect. The advancements may be even more radical than I have anticipated; very few French historians in 1914 would have predicted the rise of the *Annales* school in the 1920s, which has fundamentally altered all historical research since. The virus has opened avenues for historians, which may not have existed before. Campbell argues that 'curiosity about the lessons to be learned from past interactions between climate, disease and society has never been greater'.[10] This public understanding of science and greater historical attention towards environmental causes are only two such avenues. Yet, the virus is merely one important socio-political context, with which historians will engage. In the short term, the tremendous impact of the Black Lives Matter movement, especially in regards to British conversations about the legacies of imperialism, may cause an even more significant vicissitude in historical study. Regardless of what emerges, the History Department at the University of Southampton will continue to be at the forefront of this research and, as a result, so will the *Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History*. The world will, eventually, emerge from this, with so much more to be uncovered about the past. In the darkness of 2020, this is the light at the end of the tunnel.

Acknowledgments

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Pealing back the Façade: What *Res Gestae divi Augusti* says about the Roman Triumph under Augustus

James Evans

Abstract

The Roman Triumph was not the same after Augustus' reign. What had previously been the epitome of Republican prestige and power amongst the aristocracy became a mechanism of the Imperial family to confirm their own power and preserve their legacy. It was a shadow of its former self as a result of the Augustan project to create a Roman dynasty, under which the manipulation of the triumph was only one way that he incrementally increased his power. This article focusses on the ways in which the triumph changed in light of the power of Augustus and what his own version of events, Res Gestae divi Augusti, can reveal about his quest for a monopoly of power. Ultimately, it becomes clear that Augustus developed a façade that explicitly avoided connotations with absolutism, while he slowly increased his own power behind the scenes. This is what helped to lay the foundations for the Roman Empire, and the augmentation of the triumph was a means to this end.

> *'I celebrated two ovations and three curule triumphs (29 BC) and was acclaimed imperator on twenty-one occasions. The senate voted more triumphs to me, all of which I declined. I deposited the laurel leaves which decorated my fasces in the Capitol, after fulfilling the vows which I had undertaken in each war… (Section 3) In my triumphs nine kings or children of kings were led in front of my chariot.'*[1]
>
> Augustus, Res Gestae 4. 1; 3.

Written before his death in 14 CE, *Res Gestae divi Augusti* (*Res Gestae*) is a first-hand account of the achievements made by Emperor Augustus during his fifty-seven-year political career that began in 44 BCE.[2] It recounts everything that he was proud of and that was worth remembering, showing exactly what he wanted his legacy to be. By nature, this is Augustan propaganda in its purest form, but nevertheless provides an excellent insight into the mind of the *Princeps* as he established the

[1] "Augustus, Res Gestae 4. 1; 3" in Brian Campbell, *The Roman Army, 31BC- AD 337: A Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 74-75.
[2] Ibid., pp. 74-75.

framework for the Roman Empire. Initially the Latin text was inscribed on bronze pillars at the entrance to the Mausoleum of Augustus in Rome and, although this has not survived, several stone copies were also made and found across the territories of the old Empire.[3] Displaying the *Res Gestae* on his tomb served as a reminder to Romans in all proceeding epochs that the victories of Augustus were crucial to the foundations of the Empire that they lived in.

Chapter four of the *Res Gestae* is concerned with the triumphal achievements of Augustus throughout his rule.[4] This is the most explicitly relevant part of the document, which also contains information about military alliances and financial donations and is beyond the scope of this essay. The Roman triumph is an extravagant victory parade for a successful General (*triumphator*) through the streets of Rome, accompanied with his troops, spoils of war and prisoners. Subsequently, it was the greatest honour for Roman Generals to have bestowed upon them. However, it is clear that Augustus' rule was the epicentre of reformation to the triumph ceremony. No longer would anyone outside of the Imperial family celebrate a triumph, and very scarcely would they triumph themselves; only thirteen of the 320 known triumphs occur in the 100 years after Augustus' triple triumph in 29 BCE.[5] By extension, the role of Augustus in establishing the Principate after almost 500 years of Republican tradition shows a shift in the public perception of Roman leaders. The triumph was one avenue that Augustus utilised to steadily increase his grip on power, ultimately establishing the Roman Empire as a dynasty, despite fiercely avoiding such absolutist associations at the time.

Augustus writes with little expression, retaining a flat tone throughout the extract and recounting his accolades in a list.[6] This implies that his triumphs speak for themselves and that the Roman people will understand their significance. It also alludes to the fact that he never overstated his glory in fear of associations with autocracy. However, it is also a stark contrast to the manor that the *Res Gestae* was displayed. The grandeur of the monument is far from modest and serves to elevate Augustus to the level of other great Roman Generals. The juxtaposition between these two aspects display the political acuteness of Augustus, who recognised that, while opulence was sometimes necessary, persistent exaggeration of his own achievements could be perceived as tyrannical and therefore detrimental to his power and the stability of Rome.[7]

[3] Arthur E. Gordon "Notes on the Res Gestae of Augustus", *California Studies in Classical Antiquity Vol. 1* (1968), 127-128.
[4] Augustus, Res Gestae, pp. 74-75.
[5] Mary Beard, *The Roman Triumph* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 69.
[6] Gordon, 132-133.
[7] Erich S. Gruen, "*Augustus and the Making of the Principate*" in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Augustus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp. 38-39.

The underlying theme of this extract is military success that resulted in the public expressions of victory mentioned.[8] Augustus notes that he triumphed three times in his life, for victories in Illyricum (35-33 BCE) and Egypt, firstly at the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE before their overall defeat a year later.[9] Uniquely, he celebrated these three triumphs on consecutive days, hinting at his aim to break with Roman tradition and re-establish it, not in his own image, but as a mechanism to incrementally gain and secure power. Augustus also mentions having two ovations (40 BCE and 36 BCE), a form of triumph that celebrated smaller achievements without the procession, chariot and extravagance, as well as twenty-one acclamations to "*Imperator*". This title would be awarded to a victorious General by his troops after a battle and was the necessary qualification for him to apply to the Senate for a triumph. There is no evidence to evaluate the truth of this claim.[10]

Augustus also evokes imagery of his military success by concluding the extract with a reference to the nine members of royalty that led his chariot during his triumphal processions.[11] In conjunction with his other honours, it serves to remind everyone the amplitude of the victories and the individual power of the Emperor. Aside from dedicating the *spolia opima*, the armour stripped from the opposing general in battle, having the defeated royalties walk in your triumph was the biggest achievement for a General.[12] It held great political significance, portraying the *triumphator*, and more broadly Rome, as dominant over its opponents who were humiliated. Augustus had to triumph in 29 BCE to highlight his own military prominence and therefore gain political legitimacy with the public, whilst remaining respectful to the Senate and Republic. By securing this relationship, and steering clear of any despotic connotations, Augustus was able to begin restoring order to Rome after years civil war.[13] Optimising the triumph ceremony in this way contributed to the security of Augustus' power and the constitution, which was cemented by the Second Settlement of 23 BCE. Citing this achievement in the *Res Gestae* meant it also resonated with future generations of Romans. By the time it was written, Augustus had been able to secure his succession, and he had provided political stability to Rome. He is over-zealous with his description though, with a religious reference to the gifting of laurel leaves in triumph [to a God] in the Capitol balancing the individual glory with the traditions of Roman culture.[14] The triumphal honours preserve Augustus' place

[8] Augustus, Res Gestae, pp. 74-75.
[9] Jonathan Edmundson, *Augustus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 156.
[10] Beard, p. 296.
[11] Augustus, Res Gestae, pp. 74-75.
[12] Beard, p. 120.
[13] Werner Eck, *The Age of Augustus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 45-46.
[14] H. S. Versnel, *Triumphus: An Inquiry into the Origin, Development and Meaning of the Roman Triumph* (Leiden: BRILL, 1970), p. 378.

amongst the great Roman Generals, but he also gives subtle acknowledgement to the fragility of his power by retaining the values of Roman religion, exemplifying that he was not in a position to abolish all Roman tradition and to do so would be met with considerable resistance and hostility.

Paradoxically, whilst flaunting his triumphal prestige, Augustus follows by claiming that he declined the opportunity to hold more triumphs, representing a massive cultural shift.[15] This initially appears to be counter-intuitive because of the contemporary perception of a triumph as the pinnacle for a Roman General. On the contrary, it showcases how the triumph was merely one way in which Augustus was able to establish a *de facto* monarchy using all Republican means possible, avoiding anything new or in bad taste.[16] The infrequency of triumphs and the limitations to those who could have them during Imperial Rome originate from this politicisation. Augustus' triple triumph in 29 BCE marked his emergence as the leading power in Rome by defeating Mark Anthony. *Res Gestae* leaves the reason for rejecting more triumphs to our imagination. Mary Beard proposes that Augustus realised that it was safer to memorialise his reign "in marble, bronze and ink" than in a public display where there was political treachery.[17] This practicality certainly makes sense, but I contest that it is only true in conjunction with the desire to avoid accusations of imperialism that characterised large parts of Augustan Rome to the extent that Ovid, a poet who repeatedly praised him, was forced into exile.[18] In this context, it is easy to see how numerous triumphs could derail the meticulous plan.

The extract does not paint the full picture of attitudes to the triumph. Others too began to refuse or be denied triumphs during the rule of Augustus. Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa declined several triumphs, namely after a heavy naval defeat to Sextus Pompey in Sicily when he felt it to be inappropriate to triumph at a time of trouble for Augustus. In 12 BCE, Augustus blocked the triumph of his stepson and eventual successor Tiberius, despite the approval of the Senate.[19] Instead, he was granted *insignia triumphalia*, the right to wear triumphal dress in public and the erection of a statue in the Forum of Augustus.[20] These examples show that Augustus took his public image seriously, taking all necessary steps to ensure that his grip on power was not jeopardised. Agrippa arguably benefitted more out of refusing a triumph than if he had accepted; he was elected consul upon his return from the Battle of Actium and married Augustus' daughter in 23 BCE, ready to succeed as his

[15] Augustus, Res Gestae, pp. 74-75.
[16] Gordon, 136.
[17] Beard, p. 301.
[18] Gordon, 135-136.
[19] Beard, p. 288.
[20] Valerie A. Maxfield, *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) p. 105.

heir.[21] From this period, it was no longer the case that triumphs were necessary to define glory. A precedent was set that military successes could be acknowledged through other means such as architecture, statues and political ascension, thus contributing to the decline of the triumph.

Chapter four from *Res Gestae* tells us about the triumphal honours of Augustus, leaving us with several questions and no further detail.[22] It appears that he took his calculated political rhetoric to the grave, writing with the purpose of recording his legacy. Historians therefore heavily rely on ancient commentators such as Cassius Dio, Suetonius and Tacitus who wrote long after the rule of Augustus. They mostly confirm Augustus' claims, and fill in the details that he omits. Nonetheless, it remains extremely useful to have a first-hand account of the *Princeps* life. We know by the fact that stone copies were made of the bronze original that this was important, and that Romans knew about it, giving weight to the idea that this text was written for purposes of legacy. Scholarly debate around this extract largely revolves around two aspects; the reasons for which Augustus had to tread so carefully during his pursuit of power (to evade legislature or uphold principles and culture outlined by the constitution), or translations- each of which are unique but show the text to be broadly similar.[23] Nevertheless, there is a consensus that Augustus' reign had significant implications for the way that the triumph was understood throughout the Roman Empire.

Analysis of the *Res Gestae* addresses two key aspects of the Triumphal context; the extent that Roman leadership impacted the politicisation of the triumph and the extent to which triumphs changed between Republic and Empire. The pride that Augustus shows in his triumphal honours, while simultaneously referring to instances in which he declined more indicates that he saw triumphs in a different way than anyone had before. The way the triumph was manipulated, along with several other means, to slowly gain power whilst upholding a façade of Republican values to minimise the risk of collapse is something that is unique to Augustus. The triumph was never the same after his reign. The source conveys the complications of Augustan politics and has shown that investigation of this period is crucial to understanding the reformation of triumphal perception under the Roman Empire. However, it is limited by a lack of almost any detail. We do not know where, when or with whom Augustus fought. There is a subsequent reliance on other primary sources to fill in the blanks, making the ancient commentators key influences, along with any physical commemorations of Augustan military might- such as the Forum of Augustus. Its usefulness

[21] Gruen, p. 44.
[22] Augustus, Res Gestae, pp. 74-75.
[23] A. H. M. Jones, "The Imperium of Augustus", *The Journal of Roman Studies 41* (1951), 112.

is epitomised by the confirmation that Augustus did not believe it was always politically effective to triumph, revolutionising the performance and perception of triumphs thereafter.

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Witches, Victims and Sluts: the relationship between women, the supernatural and Islam in The Arabian Nights

Yumnah Awan

Abstract

The Arabian Nights is a beloved collection of Middle Eastern and Persian folktales that have long fascinated European and Asian audiences alike. Originating sometime around the 8th century CE, the Nights tell tales of kings, demons, beautiful maidens and talking animals, ranging in style from nursery tales and fables to pornography. However, the stories of the Arabian Nights did not simply appear in isolation in the Islamic Golden Age, but are reflections of the societies they came from and were popularised in during this lengthy period. What all these societies had in common – despite the regional and political disparities between the likes of Fatimid Egypt and Abbasid Basra – is Islam. It is a socio-theistic religion, informing (and in turn being influenced by) cultural anxieties, of which a considerably large one was the status and conduct of women. The Nights therefore convey intrinsic messages warning people of the dangers of social matters – such as unchecked female sexuality – and in doing so simultaneously act as a form of catharsis for these male fears, while also upholding Islamic patriarchal interests.

While supernatural entities and occult practices exist within the Islamic cosmology, their practice by Muslims is strictly forbidden. Allah is the only god, and he is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent; as part of this, he has complete knowledge of the past, present and future, so nothing happens without his permission and awareness. To doubt his power by attempting to manipulate the future or one's fortunes (by harnessing the power of other supernatural beings, as his power is impossible to influence) is inherently blasphemous and one of the greatest sins in Islam. There exists in many cultures around the world an inextricable link between women and the supernatural, and the Islamic world and its culture are no exception, even in the medieval period. This link is reflected in the *Arabian Nights*, a collection of Middle Eastern and Persian folktales from the Islamic Golden Age (8th to 14th centuries). At some point, these various oral stories were compiled into manuscripts, and the collection was immensely popular throughout and across the Abbasid caliphate (mid-700s to 1200s), and the Mamluk sultanate (mid-1200s to 1500s), with many of the stories being set during the early periods of these dynasties. The stories in the *Arabian Nights* are filled with characters of all genders, social standings, and moral alignments, although the most memorable tend to be those who engage with some iteration of the supernatural – from literal demons (and a passing reference to angels) to

human practitioners of the occult.[1] While there are recognisably male characters that do interact with the supernatural, they are largely inconsequential in comparison to their female counterparts, who have a much greater role in driving the plots and moral messages of the numerous tales. For example, it is Shahrayar and Shahzaman's encounter with the demon and his 'wife' that provides the impetus for Shahrayar's misogynistic murderous rampage, as prior to this he had merely resigned himself to depression and abdication from the crown.[2]

However, if occult practices are strictly prohibited in Islam (which they undoubtedly are), then why do the *Arabian Nights* feature so many tales that include and feature it? This paper will explore the associations between gender and the supernatural in Hussain Haddawy's translation of the *Arabian Nights*, initially explaining the Islamic philosophical rationale as to why it is women who are more likely to be entangled with these kinds of powers, but also identifying the types of relationships that women have with the supernatural throughout this translation of Muhsin Mahdi's version of the 14th century manuscript.

Before the link between women and the supernatural in the *Arabian Nights* can be explored, it is necessary to explain *why* it is women who are more likely to be associated with the supernatural in Islamic thought and therefore in the *Nights*. There is no single reason why this is the case, but at least in part this belief can be traced back to Hawa's (Eve) submission to the Devil's temptation in the Garden of Eden, which contributed to the belief that women's self-control is weaker than men's.[3] Additionally, the Qur'an presents witchcraft – *sihr* – as one of Shaytan's many temptations taught to humanity by demons to turn humans against Allah,[4] as the invocation of powers other than God demonstrates a lack of faith. The Qur'an also includes a surah in which the reciter beseeches Allah for refuge from "*al-naffithat fi l-'uqad*"; some translations record this as meaning "the women who blow on knots", while others argue that it refers to "those who practice sorcery".[5] Zadeh argues that "*al-naffithat"* is a *hapax legomenon* (a phrase which only appears once in the entirety of its context), but it is possible to discern its meaning from regionally specific ancient religious rituals relating to knot-tying.[6] Furthermore, there exists in Islamic knowledge of the supernatural the distinction between

[1] Practitioners of the occult will feature in this paper, however to avoid superfluous wording, morally good ones will be referred to as 'magicians' while morally bad ones will be 'witches', regardless of their gender
[2] 'The Story of King Shahrayar and Shahrazad' in *The Arabian Nights* trans. Husain Haddawy (W. W. Norton and Company: New York and London, 1995), pp.11-14.
[3] T. Shamma, 'Women and Slaves: Gender Politics in the *Arabian Nights*' in *Marvels & Tales: Journal of Fairy-Tale Studies*, vol. 31 no.2 (2017), p253; P. B. Lewicka, 'The Woman as a Construct' in *Mamluk Studies Review* vol. 21 (2017), p.108.
[4] Qur'an 2.102
[5] Qur'an 113.4
[6] T. Zadeh, 'Magic, Miracle and Marvel in Early Islamic Thought' in ed. D. J. Collins, *The Cambridge History of Magic and Witchcraft in the West* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015), p.240.

miracles and sorcery: the former is good or 'praiseworthy' magic that is done by sanction of Allah to reveal the divine truth of the one true faith; while the latter refers to witchcraft and magic as we understand them, and is strictly prohibited as it is inauthentic.[7] Effectively, magic was defined in opposition to Islam, as initially the non-believers had called the true message the work of a sorcerer, so sorcery itself was then vilified.[8] The difference between the two – for hypothetically one could perform the same act in the name of good or evil – ultimately lies in who is doing the act, for what purpose, and when.[9] Miracles were done *to* support or advocate belief in Islam, *by* Allah's messengers (the Prophets), and *before* the death of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as he was the Seal of the Prophets and therefore the last one able to do praiseworthy (sanctioned) magic.[10] By default, anyone after his time is inherently performing *sihr* as it is without the permission of Allah. There exists no known precedent in Islam of a woman conducting praiseworthy magic (there were no female prophets), and so fundamentally any woman practicing magic is practicing prohibited magic and is a *sahira* (a female practitioner of magic [i.e.: a witch]). There is no masculine equivalent of *sahira*, and by the absence of semantics, there is yet another link between the feminine and the (misuse of) the supernatural. Brown additionally argues that the cultural hangover from pre-Islamic Arabian religions may have contributed to the feminine aspect of Islamic esotericism;[11] while Azad argues that the high frequency of female mystics in Islamic scholarship during the eighth century has painted an image of the field of esoteric knowledge being dominated by women.[12] Overall, women and the supernatural are primarily linked in Islamic thought through a belief in witchcraft and the greater likelihood of women to succumb to temptation.

One variation of the relationship between women and the supernatural in the *Arabian Nights* is the aforementioned cultural anxiety and therefore literary presence of witchcraft (which is by far the most frequently recurring form of the "magical female character"). There are eleven characters in the *Arabian Nights* who are depicted as having any involvement with witchcraft – 6 witches and 5 magicians, of whom 3 are female and 2 are male. I would argue that it is extremely significant that women have the monopoly of being witches in the *Nights*, as it implies that while there are male magicians, engagement with occultic forces is a predominantly feminine occupation, and of those the

[7] Zadeh (2015), p247; T. Zadeh, 'Commanding Demons and Jinn: The Sorcerer in Early Islamic Thought,' in *No Tapping around Philology: A Festschrift in Honour of Wheeler McIntosh Thackston Jr.'s 70th Birthday*, eds. A. Korangy and D. Sheffield (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), p.137.
[8] Qur'an 11.7 and 27.13; Zadeh (2015), p239; Zadeh (2014), p.132.
[9] Zadeh (2014), p.137.
[10] Qur'an 33.40; Zadeh (2014), p.137.
[11] D. Brown, 'The Feminine Dimension in Islamic Esotericism' in *Esoteric Quarterly* vol.14. no.4 (Spring 2019), pp.64-65.
[12] A. Azad, 'Female Mystics in Medieval Islam' in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 56 no. 1 (2013), pp.54-56.

majority of those engagements are evil. This is reiterated by the types of witchcraft that is practiced: each of the witches commit a spell of transfiguration, altering reality and interfering with the natural order of God's creation, and it is implied that they live by witchcraft. For example, the enchanted king's wife is said to have been consistently drugging her husband with a sleeping potion over an extended period of time,[13] and Queen Lab is a known witch, the length of time she ruled the City of Magicians being undetermined but it can be inferred that it has been a while.[14] In comparison, magicians are generally shown as merely dabbling in sorcery, and usually do so to right the wrongs that have been committed against the natural order (e.g.: the shepherd's daughter and Jullanar both reverse enchantments on men that have changed them into animals, and the Envied is a pious man who sought to free an innocent princess from possession by a demon)[15]. The witches who practice sorcery in the *Arabian Nights* do so to retain their power and their preferred lifestyle that they would not have otherwise, while magicians merely do so to restore balance to the cosmos. Sorcery is the main way that female rule is achieved in the *Nights* (and the accusation was also levelled at some historical female rulers, such as the Queen of Sheba). Witchcraft is ultimately tied up in the *Arabian Nights* and Islamic philosophy as falsehood and deception, and so poses a threat to the truth and the natural order as God created it.

An extension of this cultural anxiety and therefore literary presence of witchcraft is its presentation in the *Arabian Nights* of its interference in sanctioned sexual relations. This particular aspect of the fear of witchcraft is one of the few ones specifically mentioned in the Qur'an – in Surah al-Baqarah, it is said that witchcraft is a "means to cause separation between man and wife"[16] – and in a treatise on subjugating demons from the late eleventh century, al-Tabasi actually lists a number of love and sex spells.[17] The interference of witchcraft in permitted sexual relations appears throughout the *Nights*, even in the frame story, and in the circumstances of both the pursuit of illicit sexual encounters and sexual jealousy. Witches are portrayed as unfaithful and lacking control in their emotions. The enchanted king's wife, for example, turns her husband into a half-stone man so she can continue to have extramarital relations with her lover, [18] and when she refuses to stop she is killed, seemingly within the bounds of Islamic marital law;[19] and the first old man's wife, overcome by sexual jealousy, transforming her love rival into a cow and having her slaughtered.[20] Polygyny with up to four

[13] 'The Tale of the Enchanted King' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), pp.68-69.
[14] 'The Story of Jullanar of the Sea' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), pp.501-502.
[15] 'The First Old Man's Tale', p30; 'The Story of Jullanar of the Sea', p.516; and 'The Tale of the Envious and the Envied', p124, in *The Arabian Nights* (1995)
[16] Qur'an 2.102
[17] Zadeh (2014), p.140.
[18] 'The Enchanted King' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), p.73.
[19] Qur'an 4.34
[20] 'The First Old Man's Tale' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), p.27.

wives is allowed in Islam,[21] under the condition that all are treated equally, and as the story makes it clear that the old man continued to treat his first wife with kindness even after the second one bore him a son,[22] the first wife's anger and jealousy is depicted as wrong and unjust. This view of a woman's perceived right to a monogamous marriage as being incorrect is supported in scholarship, in an incident recounted by Rapoport, in which the Mamluk Sultan Qaitbay refused a woman's petition to request the sultan prevent her husband from taking another wife.[23] The epitome of a witch's hypersexuality *and* excessive jealousy is characterised by Queen Lab, who not only turns her ex-lovers into mules,[24] but also regularly transforms herself into a bird so she can have sex with another one of her lovers who she turned into a bird after she caught him looking at another woman (who she killed)[25]. Oversexed women were of particular concern to men both in the *Nights* and in reality, as women were supposed to be effectively sexually subservient to men, and sexually voracious woman was overstepping her natural role and was therefore in pursuit of more power and ultimately sought the downfall of known masculine power in society.[26] In this way, the *Nights* explore the realistic and fantastical implications of cultural anxieties and bring about a sense of catharsis for the (male) audience: each of these domineering women are either killed (the enchanted king's wife and Queen Lab) or reduced to a non-risk (the First Old Man's first wife).

The link between women and the supernatural in the *Arabian Nights* additionally takes an unexpected form in the numerous instances of relationships existing *between* women and demons. While there appears to be no precedent or corroboration of this in either contemporary or later Islamic literature, the (usually) sexual fixation of women by demons recurs throughout the *Nights*. There are two instances of women being possessed by demons that are supposedly in love with them;[27] and an additional two incidents of women being kidnapped by demons on their wedding nights and forced into sexual slavery as their 'mistresses'.[28] What is interesting about the latter kind of 'relationship' between women and demons is that it neatly plays into male anxieties (of both fictional and real men) about their inability to perform sexually and their subsequent usurpation by another man. It is no accident, either, that demons in the *Nights* are frequently described as black, as

[21] Qur'an 4.3
[22] 'The First Old Man's Tale' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), p.27.
[23] Y. Rapoport, 'Women and Gender in Mamluk Society: An Overview' in *Mamluk Studies Review* vol. 11 no. 2 (2007), pp.31-32.
[24] 'The Story of Jullanar of the Sea' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), pp.501-2.
[25] 'The Story of Jullanar of the Sea' in *The Arabian Nights* (1995), pp.509-510.
[26] Shamma (2017), p.254.
[27] 'The First Dervish's Tale', p109; and 'The Tale of the Envious and the Envied', p.124, in *The Arabian Nights* (1995)
[28] 'The Story of King Shahrayar and Shahrazad', pp12-13; and 'The Second Dervish's Tale', pp.114-116 in *The Arabian Nights* (1995); Shamma (2017), p.244.

this additionally plays into what Irwin calls "the Arab man's fear of black men's virility".[29] Black male slaves are frequently posed as threats to the sexual relations of Arab men with their wives, and appear not only in the *Nights* but also in other contemporary Islamic literature.[30] The myth of the black stud therefore represents the racist fear of being cuckolded by a lesser man, a realistic concerns in the Islamic Golden Age which are also present in the *Arabian Nights*. The 'artistic license' taken in making the 'black studs' take the form of demons additionally makes the stories more fantastical and therefore even more divorced from reality. There is a sense of security for the male audience of the *Nights* by having married Arab women 'sleep' with black *demons*, as it is unlikely to happen in reality and therefore not be a situation that the average man in Islamic medieval Arabia would have had to face. The sense of catharsis is still present, though, as with the exception of the woman-in-the-box in the frame story, all adulterous women receive their justice and are eventually *killed* by the men they have wronged.

Overall, throughout the *Arabian Nights*, the relationship between women and the supernatural is explored through the literary presence of witches, sex magic and relations between women and demons. Each of these iterations of the connection between the feminine and the occult ultimately tie back to the (related) anxieties surrounding sex and gender in the medieval Islamic Middle East. The *Arabian Nights* are fundamentally folk tales that have become literature, and as folk tales they are a reflection of the societies in which they were created and popularised: the Islamic medieval Middle East. While there were numerous dynasties and societies that existed during this time, what binds them all together is Islam. Islam is a socio-theistic religion, meaning that it governs more than spiritual belief, and extends to almost every aspect of life, from dress and behavioural conduct to food. Religious anxieties would therefore become cultural ones, which are reflected in the cultural output of the society, including in its entertainment. As all entertainment is intrinsically political, despite being received by men *and* women, the messages conveyed in the *Nights* – warning of the dangers of unchecked female sexuality, female power, etc. – represent male fears while also upholding Islamic patriarchal interests, ensuring that women's behaviour is regulated and poses no threat to the established order.

[29] R. Irwin, *The Arabian Nights: A Companion* (Tauris Parke Paperbacks: London and New York, 2004), p.175; Shamma (2017), p.243.
[30] 'The Story of the Three Apples', pp185-186; and 'The Tale of the Enchanted King', p70, in *The Arabian Nights* (1995); *Delectable Conversations* by Al-Tanukhi, cited in Shamma (2017), p.243.

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Origins of Parliamentary Democracy: The Reign of Edward II

Rebecca Williams

Abstract

The English Parliament is a unique institution almost a thousand years old, changing and growing significantly in its lifetime. Most of these developments have been a response to crisis or tyranny, of which Edward II's reign provided in great quantities. Whilst some of these developments occurred as a direct response to Edward IIs actions, it would be inaccurate to call any contemporaries radical constitutionalists, including the Ordainers. Most of these were in fact, accidental developments stemming from neglect or the forced use of Parliament for political redress due to the denial of any other legitimate channels. Unfortunately for the monarchy, these changes became a permanent feature of Parliament and served to limit monarchical despotism and increase accountability, preventing England to follow France on the path of absolutism. This article will explain what these developments are, how they emerged and how fundamentally important Edward IIs reign was for the further development of Parliamentary Democracy.

Parliament by the time of Edward II's reign was already a sophisticated institution for legal, fiscal and political matters. By the end of the reign it had still not reached its final form, nor would it for centuries to come, but the developments that occurred under Edward II were many and significant enough to have lasting effects on royal governance and the future developments of the institution. Due to the failures of Edward's kingship and the political turmoil of the reign, Parliament was forced to become the platform in which both king and opposition sought legitimacy for their actions through public endorsement, leading to major developments in the function and powers of the representatives in Parliament. Furthermore, the emphasis on consent through parliament and curbing royal power not only prevented absolute kingship from taking hold in England but also led to the idea and practice of using Parliament to depose an anointed monarch.

The developments in Parliament under Edward II occurred simply due to his failures as a ruler, forcing Parliament to become the platform of the opposition to voice their grievances under the veil of legitimacy. The importance of the legitimacy provided through Parliament cannot be overstated, as aptly described by Gwilym Dodd: "The indispensability of Parliament lay … in the

authority the institution could lend to political action."[1] The exclusivity of Edward's advisors and favourites forced many of the magnates to act through arliament to be heard, as the king had no control over those allowed to attend. That Edward had excluded so many notable barons from royal council, especially the Earl of Lancaster, the king's cousin, led to the opposition demanding that Edward be bound by Parliamentary consent in a range of matters. This manifested itself in the Ordinances, published in the August 1311 Parliament, enforcing the necessity of baronial consent in Parliament for some of the most important acts of kingship.[2] However, the Ordainers were by no means medieval constitutionalists and acted through parliament only because it served their needs, even to the exclusion of the Commons which the Ordinances almost entirely overlooked.[3]

The barons in this period became increasingly distant from the Commons, more focused on political issues than their own responsibilities, resulting in the emergence of distinct identities of both magnates and commons in parliament. The term 'peerage' began to be used in Parliamentary documents from 1312, intending to standardise and expand the list of those eligible to attend - a response to the exclusive private councils of the King.[4] Furthermore, the 'peers' took their rights further by asserting for the first time in 1321 that "they had the power, since they were peers of the realm, to promulgate and establish a new law in parliament".[5] The importance of this lay not only in their use of 'peers' now synonymously with magnates in Parliament but also in saying that their special status gave them this right. Despite the revocation of the Ordinances and the cowing of the barons by the end of the reign, the impact of the reign on the identity of the peers and the precedent they had set in emphasising the role of consent through Parliament to rule had major long-term implications. Whilst the idea of Parliamentary consent had been raised since 1295 under the principle "what touches all should be approved by all", it could never be properly implemented under the autocratic rule of Edward I.[6] Due to the ineffectiveness of Edward and national abhorrence in the face of his tyranny, England was prevented from becoming a despotism following Edward I and forcing future kings to work much more closely with parliament than before.[7]

The greatest Parliamentary developments of Edward's reign occurred in the lower house, consisting of a mix of elected knights, burgesses and lower clergy. The Commons had control over

[1] Gwilym Dodd, 'Parliament and Political Legitimacy in the Reign of Edward II', in *The Reign of Edward II: New Perspectives*, G. Dodd and A. Musson (eds.), (York: York Medieval Press, 2006), p.186.
[2] John Robert Maddicott, *The Origins of the English Parliament 924-1327*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.332.
[3] Dodd, 'Parliament and Political Legitimacy', pp.174-5.
[4] Ibid, p.175-6.
[5] Michael Prestwich, *Plantagenet England, 1225-1360*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.206.
[6] Derek Wilson, *The Plantagenets: The Kings that made Britain*, (London: Quercus, 2011), p.116.
[7] John R.S Philips, 'The place of the reign of Edward II', in *The Reign of Edward II: New Perspectives*, G. Dodd and A. Musson (eds.), (York: York Medieval Press, 2006), p.220.

granting taxation since Edward I's reign and therefore, had a primarily fiscal role at the beginning of Edward II's reign. The Commons were summoned to only two of eight parliaments between October 1307 and April 1309 and their involvement was limited to the granting of taxation, which they seemed to have little choice in accepting.[8] By the end of the reign the Commons seem to have greater agency over accepting legislation but also, they developed a role in Parliament with more responsibilities and power beyond fiscal interests. The early Parliaments were largely taken up with political contentions over Gaveston and so the Commons were ignored. The more frequent summoning of the commons from 1311 after Gaveston's death coincides with the phase in which Parliament was primarily the arena of Edward and opposition seeking validation and legitimacy for their actions.[9] The importance in the barons and king seeming to consult with Parliament lay not necessarily in the powers of consent of the Commons – the Commons had no real powers of consent beyond taxation- but in the appearance of having the approval of the community of the realm either faction could claim legitimacy. This was especially important for the opposition barons to avoid charges of treason by working within a legitimate political framework.

From August 1311 to May 1322, the Commons were summoned to every Parliament except one and a total of seventeen out of the twenty-seven Parliaments of the reign.[10] The summoning of the Commons is at a much higher proportion than the Parliaments of Edward I's reign but also significant is that only seven of these Parliaments dealt with tax grants, suggesting that the role of the Commons was shifting towards a more regular and less narrowly fiscal role.[11] The notion of the consent of representatives, not only for taxation but other matters too, was also beginning to form as a method of legitimising political action, albeit with little real power behind it at first. The *Modus Tenendi Parliamentum* quite radically suggests that the Commons "have a greater voice in parliament in agreeing or dissenting than an earl", such was their apparent role by 1321.[12] Representation and consent is depicted by the *Modus* as an integral part of Parliament and therefore as essential to good governance too.[13] How real this ideal was is debatable but the ideas behind it are significant because of how much attitudes had changed towards the role of the representatives in less than fifteen years. It is important to note that the burgesses were the largest

[8] Maddicott, *Origins of Parliament*, p.332.
[9] Ibid, p.337.
[10] Ibid, p.335.
[11] Ibid, p.336.
[12] Thomas Duffus Hardy (ed.), *Modus Tenendi Parliamentum: An Ancient Treatise on the Mode of Holding the Parliament in England*, (London: George Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1846), p.40; John Taylor, The Manuscripts of the 'Modus Tenendi Parliamentum', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 83, No. 329, (1968), p. 687.
[13] Robert Livingston Schuyler, 'Review: Medieval Representation and Consent by M.V Clarke', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.52, No.4, (1937), p.609.

group in Parliament when summoned and the attendance record of the representatives was much higher than that of the magnates.[14] Furthermore, more frequent summons increased the probability of re-election, creating a more coherent body of representatives with experience and a practical knowledge of the institution. Increased local elections gave parliament a greater local prominence too, stimulating political consciousness of politics on a scale unseen before, especially as constituents would bear the burden of their MPs wages and travel expenses.[15] Moreover, the abnormal length of Edward II's Parliaments, prolonged by political tensions, further served to solidify a corporate identity of the commons.[16] This coherent and unified identity of the commons signified a significant development that occurred under and because of Edward, namely because of how fragmented they were at the beginning of the reign.

Much as the 'peers' were breaking away to establish their own identity based around their interests, the representatives were establishing themselves as the champions of the community of the realm. The Ordinances, compiled without input or consideration for the Commons, were the physical proof that the barons could no longer claim to speak on their behalf.[17] Furthermore, the weakness of the crown in this period allowed for greater exploitation in the localities by the barons, provoking a backlash and for the first time, demands from the Commons for good governance.[18] It is from this that possibly the greatest Parliamentary innovations of the reign emerged: the common petition. Private petitions were already well established by 1307 but common petitions were now being proposed by the community to seek changes to benefit the common interest. Previously, as the Commons had no collective voice, petitions made in the name of the community of the realm were largely presented through the nobility, but by 1315, petitions began to be presented by the Commons on their own impetus[19] A petition in 1315 from 'the community of the people' against 'the great lords of the land' accused them of 'abusing and subverting the course of justice', providing a key early example of the commons adopting an agenda in opposition to the barons and holding them accountable.[20] The desire to hold the barons accountable and the development of a mechanism to do so demonstrated an important shift in parliamentary focus and in the interests of the commons in a short period of time.

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[14] Michael Prestwich, *Three Edwards: War and State in England 1272–1377*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p.116-118.
[15] Maddicott, *Origins of Parliament*, p.376-9.
[16] Ibid, p.338.
[17] Michael Prestwich, 'The Ordinances of 1311 and the Politics of the early Fourteenth Century' in *Politics and Crisis in Fourteenth Century England*, J. Taylor and W. Childs (eds.), (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1990), p.12.
[18] Maddicott, *Origins of Parliament*, p.349.
[19] Gwilym Dodd, *Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English Parliament in the Late Middle Ages*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.128-130.
[20] Ibid, p.130.

Between 1316 and 1322, the representatives began collating common grievances into single schedules of petitions to be presented direct to the king.[21] The significance of this development is huge, and for several reasons. The initiative shown by the representatives to cooperate not only contributed to the growing unification and cohesion of the commons, but it symbolised that the commons were increasingly the champions of the common interest. The change in administrative procedure is also significant, since it relied on cooperation of the crown to work – it is likely that the success of the schedules arose from the political expedience shown in seeming more sympathetic to the Commons. By being presented directly to the king's council, the collated schedules also increased the likelihood of redress over individual petitions, whilst further excluding the barons from the process. Furthermore, it showed a remarkable shift in the attitude of the representatives; they were showing initiative, carving out a role for themselves more proactive than simply resisting taxation.[22]

The gains of the commons were being explicitly recognised by the end of Edward's reign. The Statute of York 1322 was intended to crush baronial opposition, annul the Ordinances and re-establish royal authority. Yet it gave recognition to the special political and legislative authority of Parliament, stating that matters regarding "the estate of the realm and the people, are to be discussed, agreed and ordained in Parliaments by our lord the King and with the assent of the prelates, earls and barons and the community of the realm."[23] This is notable as Edward seemingly appreciated that many royal acts must in future go through parliament to enjoy full political legitimacy. Moreover, the representatives are referred to as the 'community of the realm', not only recognising their newfound possession of the mantle but their presence in the statement assumes the community now had a permanent role in Parliament. The *Modus* takes this one step further by suggesting that Parliament could even be conducted without the barons with only the king and representatives present.[24] That the *Modus* was written in this period is itself significant as it demonstrates a previously unseen interest in having a codified method of practicing parliament in a standardised and correct way. Furthermore, in the January 1327 Parliament, the crown acknowledged the possibility that common petitions could form the basis of new legislation, a major step which would eventually lead to the commons becoming the legislative body we know it as today.[25]

[21] Ibid, p.133.
[22] Maddicott, *Origins of Parliament*, p.342.
[23] Mark Ormrod, 'Agenda for Legislation', *The English Historical Review*, Vol.105, No.414, (1990), pp.1-4.
[24] Michael Prestwich, *Three Edwards: War and State in England 1272–1377*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p.107.
[25] Dodd, *Justice and Grace*, p.135.

The Parliamentary developments under Edward II were evidently extensive and significant. From the conflict between king and magnates emerged new distinct identities for both Commons and the emerging peers, with separate interests and especially for the Commons, more power in asserting them. The pattern emerging of more frequent parliaments in which the commons were becoming a permanent feature of forced future kings to work more closely with Parliament if they were to enjoy full political legitimacy. Parliament had stopped functioning in the king's interest alone, holding the barons accountable and at least limiting what the king could and could not do to some extent. The implications of this Edwardian Constitutionalism were long lasting, limiting the possibility of an English despotism and laying the foundations for Parliamentary democracy.

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Angry or Hungry? Causes of Rebellion among the Tudor commons.

Esme Henry

Abstract

Thomas More made the important point in his Utopia *that "they are much mistaken that think the poverty of a nation is a mean of the public safety" for "who run to create confusions with so desperate a boldness as those who, having nothing to lose, hope to gain by them?"[1]. The same may be written over the rebellions of the Tudor period. Although on the surface it may seem that the commons rebelled for a wide variety of reasons, due in part to the rebels' own presentation of their grievances and in part to the response of the ruling monarch, it may be submitted that the underlying cause was firmly rooted in economic concerns. This essay seeks to analyse the primary causes of the commons' discontent with reference to four separate rebellions across the Tudor period, and to prove the accuracy of More's conclusion that poverty will drive men to desperation.*

It can be argued that economic insecurity was the most important cause of rebellion among the common people during the Tudor period. This is due simply to the fact that economic circumstance affected every aspect of the common people's lives regardless of religious belief, ethnic divisions or ruling monarch. A brief survey of four distinct rebellions that occurred during this period, each having on the surface the differing motivations of religion, xenophobia, class and economics, is enough to demonstrate the all-pervading nature of economic fears which lay beneath the commons' desire to rebel.

The first rising we will turn to is that of the Cornish rebels in 1497. Carew in his *Survey of Cornwall* suggests that the motivation of the rebels was based solely upon the request for a subsidy made that year, however this fails to reveal the economic hardship the region faced.[2] Royal demands for two 15ths and 10ths to be paid in May and November of that year had already been issued, as had a forced loan and an attack on the traditional rights of the Stannaries two years previously. The influence of such demands for taxation amounting to £120,000 upon a people whom Polydore Vergil called "the wretched men of Cornwall" is not difficult to imagine.[3] Added to this is

[1] Thomas More, *Utopia*, ed. by Stephen Duncombe (New York: Minor Compositions, 2012), p.67
[2] Richard Carew, *The Survey of Cornwall* (1603), pp. 97-98
[3] Philip Payton, '"A concealed envy against the English?" : A note on the aftermath of the1497 rebellions in Cornwall', *Cornish studies*, 1 (1993), 4-13 (p.5).

the fact that many Cornish miners depended on the privileges the Stannaries had enjoyed in order to support their living. It is then perhaps unsurprising that fifteen thousand men made the march of around three hundred miles from Cornwall to Kent and thence to London. Stoyle in his book *West Britons* suggests the rising was in part motivated by a desire to defend a sense of Cornish identity, of which the quasi-autonomous status offered by the Stannaries was an integral part.[4] However, whilst such cultural motivations are undeniably significant, the attack on the Stannaries had occurred in 1495 and it was not until 1497 that the men of Cornwall rose up. It can therefore be argued that there was a necessity for economic motivation in order to cause a rebellion. Further, it can be suggested that, although the rebels were defeated by the king's forces at Blackheath and their leaders executed, resentment remained present. Ian Arthurson has shown that of the three thousand men who joined the pretender Perkin Warbeck at Penzance, over one third came from the Cornish-speaking hundreds of Kerrier and Penwith, suggesting that the citizens of those areas were still willing to rebel.[5] This may be an example of political or dynastic motivation among the commons but it is far more likely to be motivated by ongoing resentment at the economic situation which many found themselves in. The fact too that the rebels faced little resistance in their march across the south of England suggests that their cause was widely accepted to be justified, presenting the view that substantial economic grievances were accepted as a legitimate reason for rebellion, and one with which the majority of the commons could relate.

The second rising that merits discussion is the events of the aptly named 'Evil May Day' which occurred in the spring of 1517. On the surface this appears to be a purely xenophobic rising, with Dr Bele's inflammatory sermon calling the people to "hurte and greve aliens for the common weale", however it is clear that this too had roots in economic fears.[6] Henry VIII's court was full of continental financiers who helped to negotiate loans abroad. One such loan of £30,000 to the Emperor Maximillian fell through after one of the principle agents went bankrupt, ruining many London merchants who had supplied goods on credit to foreign traders. Added to this is the fact that foreign merchants were able to undercut domestic prices and thus take control of markets across London. The threat that this posed to London merchants and housewives alike was substantial and a feeling of anger was only added to by reports of foreign courtiers who, it was alleged, thought themselves above the law, such as the merchant Francesco de' Bardi who had taken both an Englishman's wife and plate. This combination of economic discontent and racially charged anger led

[4] Mark Stoyle, *West Britons: Cornish Identities and the Early Modern British State* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), p.21
[5] Ian Arthurson, *The Perkin Warbeck Conspiracy 1491-99* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1994), p.181
[6] Account of Bele's sermon, cited in C. Whibley (ed.), *Henry VIII, by Edward Hall* (two volumes, London, 1904), Volume I, p. 157.

to the riots on Mayday of that year. This event is worth noting not only because it was the largest riot to affect London for over one hundred years, but also because it demonstrates the connection between economic resentment and xenophobia as a cause for rebellion among the commons. It is interesting to note that in the memorandum John Lincoln prepared for Dr Bele to preach from, he laments the actions of "aliens and strangers … whereby poverty is so much increased that every man bewaileth the misery of other" clearly evidencing the cause of the people's anger.[7]

The next rebellion which demands attention is that of the Pilgrimage of Grace, arguably the most serious domestic threat experienced by a Tudor monarch when assessed by sheer numbers alone. The causes of the rebellion are perhaps easier to ascertain due to the creation of both the York and Pontefract Articles. It is clear from looking at the Pontefract articles that the rebels had various strains of grievances which can be roughly divided into political, economic and religious motivations. However, since the eight articles mentioned of a political nature were not included in the original list of grievances presented to the mayor of York, it may be suggested that these were of lesser importance and therefore can be discounted as prime motivator for rebellion among the commons. Of the remaining sixteen articles, nine are religious in nature. This clearly presents the importance of religion as a motivator for rebellion, there is no doubt that the Pilgrims were marching because they were fundamentally opposed to the religious changes Henry VIII had implemented, culminating in the 1534 Act of Supremacy and the dissolution of the smaller monasteries in 1536. However, it may be argued that religion was not the sole cause of their discontent, and that temporal concerns weighed heavily on their minds as well. The oath sworn by the Pilgrims places great emphasis on religion, highlighting the concerns of the largely Catholic rebels towards the reforms the king had made and calling them to "take afore you the Cross of Christ" in opposition to them, however it is clear that this is not the full story.[8] The oath makes no mention of the socioeconomic effects of the dissolution of the monasteries which had a considerable impact on the commons, particularly in the north where poor harvests and rising inflation meant vagrancy and starvation were prevalent. The role of monasteries as distributors of poor relief and their function in maintaining local infrastructure meant they played a key role in the economic welfare of their parishes. The removal of this support doubtless affected the livelihoods of many members of the commons, especially given the fact that a not inconsiderable number of peasant farmers relied on land rented from the Church to provide for their families. In addition to this, the 1534 subsidy caused widespread resentment as it was the first subsidy to be levied in

[7] Martin Holmes 'Evil May Day 1517: the story of a riot' *History Today* Vol. 15, Iss. 9, (1965), pp. 642-650 (p.642)

[8] The Oath of the Honourable men, cited in A. Fletcher and D. MacCulloch, *Tudor Rebellions* (1997), p.132

peacetime. That these economic grievances are not voiced in the Pilgrims' oath perhaps suggests that the rebels were more concerned with their spiritual welfare, however it is just, if not more, likely that the rebel leaders sought to present a more sanctified version of their grounds for rebellion in the hope that it would attract greater levels of sympathy for their cause. If this is the case, it may be that articles four and six of the Pontefract Articles which call for the restoration of the abbeys and the "Freres Observauntes" are in fact based upon more secular and economic reasoning than may at first be supposed.[9]

The final rebellion to which we will refer is the 1549 rebellion led by Robert Kett. This rebellion is significant for the opposition directed towards, and distinct lack of involvement of, the gentry. Current historiography is divided in its opinion on the influence of class conflict on the rebellion with S.T. Bindoff emphasising the radical character of the rebels and Julian Cornwall concluding that "Kett's people wanted to preserve, indeed, restore, traditional society".[10] Given that the term 'class' is a nineteenth century creation, the existence of class conflict under the Tudors is not easy to prove. In addition to this, adherence to ideas such as the great chain of being, and their promotion by the Church as a way to maintain control from the pulpit - usually through the oft repeated admonition that 'we ought to obey God rather than men'- meant that the commons very rarely attempted to subvert the social order.[11] About a third of the rebels' grievances set out in 'Kett's demands being in rebellion' (the only surviving record of the views of the rebels gathered at Mousehold heath) deal with abuses of power by the local nobility and gentry. For example, article three asks that "no lord of no mannor shall common upon the Comons", presumably referring to the practice of some local lords of grazing their livestock on the common land which was reserved for the use of landless peasants.[12] Another issue which they raise is that of rack-renting (see article fourteen) whereby landlords had increased rents until tenant farmers were unable to pay and thus had to forfeit the lands. It is clear from an examination of these demands that in many cases social and economic grievances went hand in hand for the rebels. This is presented most clearly in the issue of enclosures which after all was the starting point for Kett's leadership of the rebellion. The enclosing of land by local gentry, most often as pasture land for the keeping of sheep to tap into the profitable wool trade which was growing due to Antwerp's burgeoning cloth markets, meant that the people were unable to graze their animals on common lands and thus in many cases were in

[9] The Pontefract Articles, cited in Fletcher and MacCulloch, *Tudor Rebellions*, p.136
[10] S.T. Bindoff, *Ket's Rebellion* (London, 1949), p.9; G.R. Elton, *England under the Tudors,* 2nd ed., (London, 1975), p.207, cited in B.L. Beer, *Rebellion and Riot: Popular Disorder in England during the Reign of Edward VI* (Kent University Press, 1982), p.108
[11] Acts 5.29
[12] Kett's demands being in Rebellion, cited in Fletcher and MacCulloch, *Tudor Rebellions*, p.144

danger of starvation. In addition to this, the enclosure of lands for sheep farming meant that less corn was being grown, adding to the already pressing problem of inflated food prices which again led to the possibility of starvation for peasants who could not afford to buy food. Throughout the rebellion the rebels sought to improve their economic condition by addressing what they saw as failings on the part of the gentry to fulfil their role as protectors of the 'Godly commonwealth'.

Economic factors were by far the most prevalent cause of rebellion during the Tudor period. This is unsurprising given the fact that contentious issues such as tax affected most if not all of the commons. Economic factors fed into every aspect of day to day life - the Pilgrims opposed the dissolution of the monasteries because they feared for their souls, but also because they depended upon the temporal assistance that monasteries provided in the shape of alms and education. The Evil May Day riots were occasioned by xenophobic feeling which had its origins in exaggerated fears of foreigners taking over the markets of London and thus displacing English workers. Kett's rebels looked for an economic security that would protect their place in the world just as the Cornish sought to defend their autonomy along the same lines. Simply put, when the livelihood of the commons was threatened, it rose up.

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The Purpose of Marriage Formation in Early Modern England in Reference to Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew

Sarah Hickman

Abstract

Modern societal standards portray marriage as a union of love, but early modern England held marriage in a much more practical manner. This essay uses Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew to challenge the notion that marriage was primarily formed for love in upper-class unions. First published in Shakespeare's first folio in 1623, this comedy provides a caricature of early modern attitudes towards marriage formation, with the protagonist, Petruchio, marrying Katherine for financial gain. The notion of love is presented as a comedic tool. This essay uses evidence from aristocratic conduct literature to debate that while the situation is exaggerated for entertainment purposes, the underlying attitudes are typical of aristocratic marriage formation. Ultimately, upper-class marriage was primarily formed for economic gain, with the notion of love being a secondary and much less important factor.

Evidence indicates that marriages in early modern England were primarily formed in consideration of familial benefits, but also saw a trend in the growing emphasis on the individual's desires by the end of the period. This essay will demonstrate that economic considerations were the dominant feature of upper-class marriage formation at the beginning of the early modern period, but will also acknowledge the benefit of love and political alliances when choosing a partner. These factors are all demonstrated in William Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew,* which will be the focal point of this essay. Written in 1590[1], the play focuses on Katherine, a headstrong shrew who needed to be tamed in the eyes of early modern society, and the only way that could be achieved was through marriage. Petruchio marries and abuses her into submitting to feminine ideals. Both of these characters are members of the elite aristocracy, which will also be the main class discussed in this essay. It is crucial to accept that the purpose of Shakespeare's plays was to entertain, so it is difficult to interpret to what extent his writing represented real life. This is particularly the case with *Taming of the Shrew* as it was a comedy, therefore certain elements have been exaggerated for satirical purposes. The

[1] "Dates And Sources | The Taming Of The Shrew | Royal Shakespeare Company*", Rsc.Org.Uk,* <https://www.rsc.org.uk/the-taming-of-the-shrew/about-the-play/dates-and-sources> [Accessed 7 December 2018].

extent to which this play was a manipulation of early modern society will be discussed and taken into consideration when arguing that marriages were primarily formed for economic reasons. The use of contemporary conduct books and case studies will be used to evaluate the typicality of Shakespeare's economic interpretation of marriage formation.

Successful marriage negotiations benefited both parties economically in the long run, and for males in the short term. For the husband, a dowry would be given, typically in the form of a large sum of money. The wife would receive long term financial stability through her union to her husband. Petruchio marries Katherine in the *Taming of the Shrew* for short term economic benefits. He states, "if thou know, one rich enough to be Petruchio's wife" then he'll live happily.[2] While it can be assumed that this language was used to exaggerate Petruchio's money-driven character, it cannot be ignored that this perception of marriage is supported by historical evidence. Long term masculine economic benefit is seen through the commonality of apprentices marring older women, particularly widows, as it was perceived to be their "only chance of establishing themselves in business"[3], emphasising that men marry for potential financial gain they could make in the future. Short term financial gain was also a key consideration, particularly in Petruchio's mind. Houlbrooke argues that dowries were used to alleviate mortgages and accumulated debt.[4] This highlights the financial importance of the dowry, and it was consistently the focal point of marriage negotiations, with the significance of the dowry clearly being seen through torturously long negotiations.[5] The financial benefit explicitly incentivises men, but women also receive more subtle financial gain from marriage. Through good negotiation, they would receive security in widowhood, as can be seen in *Taming of the Shrew* from Petruchio's marriage negotiation with Katherine's father as he promises Katherine all his "lands and leases"[6] should he leave her a widow. This is further supported by other historians such as Stone, who argues that a woman's only viable future lay in marriage.[7] This implies that her economic dependency during and after marriage is decided during dowry negotiations, which emphasises the importance of finances as part of the dowry. If love was indeed the primary factor in forming a marriage, then the weighting of the financial aspect of the dowry not be portrayed as prominently as it was in contemporary sources. It is clear that the dowry proves that the fundamental role of marriage formation was economic gain for both the husband and wife on

[2] William Shakespeare, 'Taming of the Shrew' in *The Staunton Shakespeare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 237.
[3] Ralph Houlebrooke*, The English* Family 1450-1700 (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 74.
[4] Ibid, p. 74.
[5] Ibid, p. 84.
[6] Shakespeare, 'Taming of the Shrew' in *The Staunton Shakespeare*, p. 243.
[7] Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex And Marriage In England, 1500-1800* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 312.

the long run and short term. If marriage were for love or political alliances, then the financial aspect of the dowry would be redundant.

Furthermore, the negotiations between Petruchio and Katherine's father are very telling of the expectations of the dowry in early modern society. The fact that Katherine wasn't present during the negotiation of her future highlights the financial importance of the dowry, as it was believed that a woman was not capable of such great decisions due to her biological weakness which constrained her to domestic life.[8] It was therefore the role of the father to undertake dowry negotiations. This was particularly the case with upper class society, as it was the parents who arranged the details of the dowry.[9] In the case of the *Taming of the Shrew,* Petruchio and Baptista discuss the terms of the dowry without Katherine being present, highlighting the accepted view that women should be centred in the domestic sphere, and the men the public and political sphere. Furthermore, Baptista uses the metaphor, "now I play a merchant's part"[10] when initiating dowry negotiations. This implies that Baptista views his daughter as a commodity which he needs to sell with the intent of creating profit, therefore proving that within this play the head of the household only cares about economic gain. It can be argued that the excessive emphasis on economic benefit isn't representative of typical upper-class society, as there is evidence from moralists opposing marriage for financial gain.[11] The moralists condemned the excessive pursuit of financial gain through marriage, and therefore that the use of excessive financial pursuit can be interpreted as satirical content in *The Taming of the Shrew*. However, the moralist movement gained popular traction in the 18th century, implying that the majority of people were not on board with their ideology until later, which tells us that society were accepting, or at least tolerant, of marriage for financial gain during the late 16th to early 17th centuries.

It can be argued that Baptista did acknowledge the importance of love in a marriage, as he tells Petruchio that the only way he would consent to moving forward the marriage would be if Petruchio gained Katherine's affection. This appears to be superficial for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the lack of consultation between Baptista and Katherine can be used to discredit that love was the most important consideration in marriage, because if Baptista truly cared about Katherine's compatibility then he would have insured he had Katherine's consent prior to undertaking dowry negotiations. Secondly, and more notably, it must be remembered that this is a comedic play. The after thought of Baptista making love necessary for the marriage is used for comedic effect, as the

[8] Robert Shoemaker, *Gender In English Society, 1650-1850* (London: Longman, 1998), p. 30.
[9] Stone, *The Family, Sex And Marriage In England*, p. 312.
[10]Shakespeare, 'Taming of the Shrew' in *The Staunton Shakespeare*, p. 246.
[11]Houlebrooke, *The English Family 1450-1700*, p. 74.

whole plot of the play is taming Katherine's outspokenness, and allows for the progression of the story. similarly, it can also be inferred that Baptista is mocking the institution of love for comedic purposes. The implied ridiculousness of love contrasted with the seriousness of which the dowry negotiations are discussed paint a clear picture of what the typical standard of marriage formation was during the early modern period. The lack of prior knowledge of Petruchio and Katherine's compatibility contrasts with Contemporary conduct books, such of that as William Gouge's *Domesticall Duties* (1622). Gouge advises readers that marriages should be based on mutual compatibility, and supports that love should be the most important factor in marriage formation, stating that "they must see something in them, to move them to love"[12]. This primary source was written in 1622[13], prior to the general shift towards prioritising economic benefits above love. This means that conduct books may have had an impact on readers and influenced the later shift to prioritising the individual, however, it shows that the 16th and 17th centuries had another driving force behind marriage formation: economic incentives. This is shown when Gouge writes "they shall purchase much dignity or riches, and after a while be free again"[14], telling us that those who married for wealth would die early at the hands of god. This encapsulates his moralistic view, and shows that his opinions were not the norm because he felt obliged to emphasis not marrying for wealth in his writing. The aim of his writing was to change behaviour, particularly the behaviour of those at the upper end of society, as they were his intended audience. However, it must not be forgotten that this is a conduct book, and therefore is the idealised representation of what marriage should be in the eyes of the single individual. The expectations set by Gouge are not realistic of the typical marriage. This is further supported by Gowing, who argued that *Domesticall Duties* was met with "a distinctly frosty reception"[15] despite its popularity,[16] particularly when Gouge reminded women that their property was at the disposal of the husband. This suggests that Gouge's book does not accurately represent the beliefs of early modern society. The popularity of *Taming of the Shrew,* seen through its many contemporary successful adaptions, suggests acceptance of the theme of marriage for economic benefit while mocking the concept of love.

It is important to consider the extent and necessity of love within marriage formation. It is clear that there are always economic considerations, but it was also beneficial to have an element of

[12] William Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties*. (London: John Haviland for William Bladen, 1622). Online pdf: https://www.chapellibrary.org/files/archive/pdf-other/otddu1.pdf p. 27.
[13]"Of Domesticall Duties By William Gouge, 1622", *The British Library*, 2018 <https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/of-domesticall-duties-by-william-gouge-1622#> [Accessed 12 December 2018].
[14] William Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties*. Online pdf: https://www.chapellibrary.org/files/archive/pdf-other/otddu1.pdf p. 95.
[15] Laura Gowing, *Gender Relations In Early Modern England* (Routledge, 2014), p. 46.
[16]Robert Shoemaker, *Gender In English Society*, 1650-1850 (London: Longman, 1998), p. 21.

affection between matches. What was meant when using the term love varied in the early modern period. Generally, love was viewed on a spectrum, with passionate love being perpetuated as a negative trait,[17] being described as an "irrational and disruptive"[18] force. Men deemed to be afflicted were given the derogatory term of "cunt struck",[19] emphasising the negative connotations of being submissive to a woman. This blindness in love was believed to lead to tragedy as portrayed in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*.[20] This suggests that Shakespeare viewed love negatively, so it can therefore be inferred that the use of love within *The Taming of the Shrew* is purely to make a mockery of the concept, in turn validating the interpretation that the *Taming of the Shrew* shows the normalised view of emphasising economic gain during marriage formation. Gouge suggests that love can develop from mutual compatibility[21] during marriage which on the surface implies that a degree of compatibility was necessary to form a marriage. However, there is contemporary evidence which emphasises how Gouge's opinions are idealistic and not representative of reality. Stone demonstrates this when discussing Mrs Chapone in Richardson's novel *Clarissa Harlow*, where she "firmly rejected the older idea that love could and should follow marriage"[22], supporting that love wasn't necessary in formation, unlike financial gain. These factors show that small personal affection was ideal in early marriage, but it was not a necessity, and that is was better to have no love, as in *Taming of the Shrew,* as opposed to an abundance of passion, as consistently described by contemporary advice literature, historians and Shakespeare's plays.

The last factor to be discussed in this essay is the potential advancement of the family's political interest. The importance of family ties is shown to be important in *Taming of the Shrew,* as Petruchio reminds Baptista that he "knew my father well"[23], by saying which Petruchio hopes to fall in good favour with Baptista. Stone references a case in which a groom "married for a fortune, she for a title"[24], which shows that status was important for the upper class, but it further supports the abundance of evidence in favour of economic gain as the key driving force behind marriage formation. The case of Alice Wandesford, a woman who married a man of different "religious and political sympathies" in order to retrieve her family's land from sequestration, shows the grey area

[17] Stone, *The Family, Sex And Marriage In England,* p. 313.
[18] Houlebrooke, *The English Family 1450-1700*, p. 77.
[19] Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex And Marriage In England*, p. 272.
[20] William Shakespeare, *The Bowdler Shakespeare: In Six Volumes; In which Nothing Is Added to the Original Text; but those Words and Expressions Are Omitted which Cannot with Propriety Be Read Aloud in a Family.* Edited by T. Bowdler. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[21]Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties*. Online pdf: https://www.chapellibrary.org/files/archive/pdf-other/otddu1.pdf p. 55
[22] Stone, *The Family, Sex And Marriage In England*, p. 280.
[23] Shakespeare, 'Taming of the Shrew' in *The Staunton Shakespeare*, p. 243
[24] David Garrick. *Lethe* (1740*) in Dramatic Works* (London 1798) I, p. 17. As cited in Stone*, The Family, Sex And Marriage In England*, p. 277.

between political alliances and economic gain. This is due to the fact that forming the correct alliances lead to financial benefit, and therefore it can be argued that political alliances are an extension of economic gain, and shouldn't be considered as a single stand-alone factor.

To conclude, economic gain was by far the most important factor when forming a marriage agreement. It is shown consistently through contemporary plays as a social norm among the upper class, and shown through alliances in case studies. While an element of personal affection was desirable in a relationship, it was by no means a requirement for marriage. The *Taming of the Shrew,* despite its purpose of comedic entertainment, accurately presents early modern attitudes towards marriage formation, particularly in terms of prioritising financial gain over affection. This social norm was the driving force behind conduct books, which caused the later 18th century paradigm shift in moral standards, which prioritised individual attraction over economic benefits, and is what the driving force of marriage formation is to this day.

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Women and Nationalism: Re-examining the Presentation of Ideal Womanhood in Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's novel *Anandamath* (1882)

Emma Ward

Abstract

When considering the presentation of women and their link to the nationalist struggle in Bankim Chandra Chatterjee novel Anandamath (1882), scholars typically take a stance that the story is 'progressive' in its criticism of traditional female gender roles. This reassessment of Bankim's novel would argue that he fails to critique and even affirms traditional gender ideologies through the presentation of the Indian nation, which is personified as a woman (Mother India/Bharat Mata). Bankim's two other female protagonists are used as each other's foils in a critique over traditional womanhood and wifehood, but this is overshadowed by the regressive presentation of the Indian nation.

There is no scarcity of academic works examining Bankim Chandra Chatterjee novel *Anandamath* (1882), in particular on the roles of women in the story and how they were connected to the nationalist struggle. Uma Chakravarti argued that Bankim was the first person to construct a new nationalist identity for women in the face of the aggressive development of Kshatriya values and nationalist regeneration programmes. Chakravarti maintained that Bankim upheld the nonconventional woman as the model to emulate, as opposed to the traditional passive wife and mother through his characters.[1] Other academics, such as Sangeeta Ray and Suman Chakraborty, have been more critical when examining the gender relations in the novel. Ray argued that it was a woman who affirmed male privilege in the novel and Chakraborty argued that the anti-colonial Hundi nationalist discourse was patriarchal at its root, thus Bankim's use of women to symbolise the nationalist struggle (Mother India/Bharat Mata) represented the regressive aspects of Indian society.[2] There are three major female protagonists in the novel: Santi, Kalyani and the personification of the nation as a woman. I would argue that Bankim presented Santi's

[1] U. Chakravarti, 'What ever happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, nationalism and a script for the past', in *Recasting women: essays in Indian colonial history*, by S. Kumkum (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), pp. 52-53.
[2] S. Ray cited in S. Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast of Nation, Gender and Desire in Anandamath', *South Asian Review*, 29:2 (2008), p. 43; S. Chakraborty, 'Construction of Ideal Womanhood through Naturalisation in the National Song *Vandemataram*: An Ecocritical Study of Identity Construction of Women in India', *Journal of the Department of English*, 12 (2014-2015), p. 152.

nonconventional character as the model to emulate for womanhood and critiqued Kalyani's character who embodied traditional motherhood and wifehood because it acted as a 'stumbling block' to the Children's anti-colonial nationalist mission against the Muslim 'invaders' and British colonists.[3] Nonetheless, presentations of women are still problematic in the novel. Political motherhood in the personification of Mother India is presented in the shape of an idealised woman and is not critiqued, but used as a motif for a male nationalist fraternity.

One significant presentation of women in *Anandamath* was the labelling of the nation as a sometimes helpless and sometimes vengeful mother, first violated by Muslim invaders and then by British colonists, who upheld the virtues and traditions of the ideal woman.[4] Ketu H. Katrak argued that women were upheld as the 'guardians of tradition' in particular against foreign invaders because they existed in the uncolonized space.[5] The nationalists of the Swadeshi movement who engaged in intense confrontations with the British made used of the motherland as a force of mobilization.[6] Bankim blends nationalism and religion by using the imagery of the motherland as a Hindu goddess. Through this he invokes the spirit of militant nationalism in the Children. In Chapter Eleven, Mother India is shown to have been once glorious through the imagery of the goddess Jagaddhatri: 'she trampled under her feet the lion, the tusker and other beasts… [and] stood in the shape of protectress of the world'.[7] Due to invaders and colonists, the Mother has been reduced to a shame and misery, in the shape of Kali: 'the world of the country is a land of death and so the Mother has no better ornament than a garland of skulls'.[8] Her sons must return her traditional grandeur in the shape of the ten handed goddess Durga, presented killing her enemies. Durga is also shown surrounded by her children Knowledge and Science, Luck-giving, Strength and Success.[9] The only way for Mother India to be turned from Kali to Durga is if the Children maintained their vows of self-discipline, which would rid the nation of the foreign invaders. The presentation of Mother India plays a critical role in maintaining gender ideologies: women maintain the virtues of tradition, and men (her sons) re-construct the nation to return the nation-state to her old glory and independence.

[3] Chatterjee, B. C., *The Abby of Bliss*, trans. by N. C. Sen-Gupta (Calcutta: The Cherry Press, 1906), p. 51.
[4] P. Ray, 'Thinking Gender, Thinking Nation: an Introduction', *South Asian History and Culture*, 9:4 (2018), pp. 374-5.
[5] K. H. Katrak cited in Chakraborty, 'Ideal Womanhood', p. 152.
[6] I. Tirkey, 'Understanding Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's Views on Nationalism', *International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities*, 4:3 (2019), p. 89.
[7] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 40.
[8] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 40.
[9] R. F. McDermott, L. A. Gordon, A. T. Embree, F. W. Pritchett, D. Dalton (ed.), *Sources of Indian Traditions: Modern India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh,* 3rd edn, 2 vols (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 254.

Additionally, Panchali Ray noted over the last few decades academics have examined the use of idealised woman as signifiers of the nation-state.[10] It is not uncommon to see India personified as a beautiful woman so that male Hindu's are simulated to protect the honour of Hindu woman who may be defiled by foreign invaders. Vinayak Savarkar linked woman, honour and rape:

> 'Do not forget...Shivaji Maharaj… the unutterable atrocities committed on us by... Muslim noblemen and thousands of others, big and small. …in the event of a Hindu victory our molestation and detestable lot shall be avenged on the Muslim women…'[11]

Savarkar suggested that Muslim men were not masculine enough to save their woman in contrast to the Hindus. This Epoch also has the cold suggestion that Hindu men should liberate their woman from dishonour by raping Muslim women.[12]

In the novel, Mother India is described as a mother to the children originally by the monk Mahendra.[13] Sharon Pillai argued that from her iconographic presentation as a goddess she was also presented as upper-caste, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied as well as a mother to the Children.[14] Her iconographic and imagined presentation reinforces community dynamics. As an upper-caste woman, her legitimate children would be the upper-caste community of the Children. As it is revealed, the Children are all men: 'We have no mother… no wife, no child… no home, we have only got the Mother.'[15] Hindu mothers would have daughters as well, but because the nation's offspring are the Children there is a gender coding. Ray has examined the 'idea' woman issue with particular focus on the contemporary feminist perspective, suggesting that 'perfect' imagined woman deflects any attention away from other struggles, and that the restoration of the nation is a male mission as demonstrated in the novel.[16] Even Santi has to cross-dress as a man to be accepted into the male-fraternity of the Children to fight for the nation. Near the end of the novel, Santi stated 'she had determined to die in a woman's dress… her male costume was a mask… she would not carry it on to death'.[17] However, at the end of the chapter, Bankim then makes her revert back into Nabinananda Goswami (her male disguise), so that she can complete a mission for the

[10] Ray, 'Thinking Gender', p. 373.
[11] V. D. Savarkar, 'Chapter VIII: Perverted Conception of Virtues' in *Glorious Epochs of Indian History* by V. D. Savarkar, trans. by S. T. Godbole (ed.), 1st edn (Bombay: Bal Savarkar, 1971), p. 179.
[12] S. Banerjee, 'Gender and Nationalism: The Masculinization of Hinduism and Female Political Participation in India', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 174-175.
[13] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 32.
[14] Pillai, 'Re-addressing the cast', p. 39; Ray, 'Thinking Gender', p. 378.
[15] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 41; Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 32.
[16] Ray, 'Thinking Gender', p. 378.
[17] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 181.

Children.[18] Thus gender ideologies also have a role in the reproduction of the nation. Bankim presents Mother India as an imagined 'ideal' woman and a mother to a nation of sons, embodying very narrow identity politics.

Another central character who is presented as a mother by Bankim is Kalyani. Sikita Banerjee argued that the most common trope women took in the anti-colonial struggle was to take on the role of the 'passive mother', which was safer then shedding femininity and internalising aspects of militant nationalism (like Santi). The passive mother contributes to the nationalist struggle through motherhood: she can contribute her sons, she raises and nourishes children and lastly, she teaches her children nationalist values.[19] Therefore, traditional womanhood was interwoven into the Hundi nationalist discourse. Nonetheless, Bankim did not demonstrate this in his novel. Kalyani demonstrated aspects of a traditional Hindu woman, wife and mother. In her interaction with the Abby Monk, Kalyani refused to drink before a man (a point of etiquette in Bengali Hindu society for women), she refused to eat before knowing her husband had eaten and also refused to use her husbands name believing there may be a chance that he had died.[20] Chakravarti noted that the passive mother figure does not work in the crisis situation due to her passivity; heroic actions were needed from both men and woman.[21] In the novel, this is as simple as women supressing their sexuality to free men from their marriage bonds so they can restore grandeur to the Mother, like Santi does when she restores her husband's faith in his vow: 'Do not love me – I don't want the pleasure, – but grant me this that you will never swerve from the path of a hero's duty'.[22] In the anti-colonist discourse, Kalyani is presented as a 'stumbling block'.[23] Kalyani understands the importance of her husbands' mission, but sees no place for herself and is presented as unable to contribute anything to the Children's mission. Bankim does not uphold her as a good example of womanhood and 'punishes' her by letting her self-destruct (commit suicide) near the end of Part One so that her husband can take a vow of self- discipline.[24] Therefore, whilst Kalyani's character symbolises the traditional Hindu mother and wife, Bankim presented her negatively because she acts as a barrier to the to the anti-colonial nationalist mission of the Children.

In contrast to Kalyani, Santi is upheld by Bankim as the prototype of womanhood in the anti-crisis. She embodies aspects of femininity and masculine militant nationalism, and surpasses the

[18] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 185.
[19] S. Banerjee cited in Chakraborty, 'Ideal Womanhood', p. 153.
[20] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 17-18.
[21] Chakravarti, 'What ever happened to the Vedic Dasi?', pp. 52-53.
[22] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 73.
[23] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 51.
[24] Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast', p. 45.

confines of her sexuality by fighting alongside her husband to restore the Mother and finally by giving up her 'householder' identity. The only represented public space in *Anandamath* is the fraternity of the Children, but is not complementary with the private and domestic sphere which operates under an ideal of the *pativrata* (because husbands were expected to give up their wives). Santi is the wife of Jivananda, but unlike Kalyani, she was not portrayed as piteously succumbing to the fate of self-destruction when it appears that her husband may leave her. Instead she reinforces his determination to fight for restoration of the Mother: 'You are a hero and my greatest pride in life is that I am a hero's spouse. Don't forsake the hero's duty for the petty sake the trifle that a woman is!'[25] Later in her novel, Santi's cross-dressing allowed her to join her husband as one of the Children. Bankim presented her as her husband's equal. She is not lacking in strength or initiative and is cable of holding her own in verbal contests: 'If you really do take me for a woman – and indeed people of often make such mistakes, for instance, when a rope is, mistaken for a snake – then you ought to sit on a separate seat'.[26] Her ability to move between the private sphere and the public makes a mockery of the established conventual gendered spaces and their validity.[27] At the end of the novel, Santi gives up her *pativrata* identity for asceticism with her husband: 'We can no more be housekeepers'.[28] Santi merges the masculine and the feminine spaces. Unlike Kalyani she is cable of contributing to the nationalist mission through supporting her husband as a good wife and in a male disguise fighting alongside him.

Additionally, Ray noted it was a woman's role to affirm male privilege in the novel, citing Santi's speech: 'To me my husband is great, by greater is my duty, and greater still to me is my husband's Duty'.[29] Whilst the presence of male privilege and Santi's speech cannot be disputed, Santi's role subverts some of the patriarchal notions which are established at the beginning of the novel.[30] For instance, the Children represented a male-only nation dedicated to restoring glory to the Indian motherland, which implies the subordination of its 'female Other'.[31] Santi overrules this by stepping between the two spheres as previously discussed. Additionally, Santi destroys the vision of the Children by displaying superior wisdom then their visionary leader, Satyananda:

[25] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 73.
[26] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 112.
[27] Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast', p. 42.
[28] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 196.
[29] Ray cited in Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast, p. 43; Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 145.
[30] Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast, p. 43.
[31] Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast, p. 43.

> 'Why, Sire!' Santi retorted, 'I and my husband are but one soul… He may die [for the Mother] if he must. There would be no harm done to me, for I shall die with him…'

The Celibate [Satyananda] answered, 'I have never been worsted before, I am your child. – Be kind to your child…'[32]

Satyananda symbolises the chief patriarchal authority in the novel; he would have Santi 'doomed' to vocation of widowhood if her husband died in battle with the invaders. Santi, who has already been established as her husbands equal in marriage and in battle, argues that she would rather die with Jivananda as one of the Children. This dialogue demonstrates Satyananda bowing to her superior wisdom, threatened by her willingness to fight and die alongside her husband.[33] He is also treating Santi like a physical version of Mother India, because he calls himself her child.[34] Therefore, some patriarchal notions are dismantled by Santi, who is demonstrated to be superior in both wit and wisdom.

Bankim presented women through his two main female protagonists and the personification of the nation of a woman in his novel *Anandamath*. Chakravarti's argument that Bankim upheld the unconventional woman as opposed to the traditional passive wife and mother is a theory which has been maintained throughout this paper.[35] Kalyani was unable to contribute to the nationalist struggle and was presented as a barrier to her husband; whilst her foil, Santi, embodied femininity and masculinity, and heroically gave to the anti-colonial mission by supporting her husband as a wife and then in her male disguise. Santi finally surpasses gender coding by giving up her role as a 'housekeeper' and living an ascetic lifestyle with her husband. Thus, Bankim is critiquing traditional Hindu wifehood, which does not work within the context of the anti-colonial nationalist struggle. Nonetheless, Bankim's presentation of Mother India to represent the nationalist struggle and to motivate the all-male fraternity of the Children (excluding Santi, the only woman allowed into the 'brotherhood') to restore the decayed nation demonstrates regression rather than progression.

[32] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 144.
[33] Pillai, 'Re-addressing the Cast', p. 43.
[34] Chatterjee, *Abby*, p. 145; Thank you to Dr Pritipuspa Mishra for your feedback on this essay.
[35] Chakravarti, 'What ever happened to the Vedic Dasi?', pp. 52-53.

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An unforgiving task: An assessment of Pyotr Stolypin, 1906-11

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Abstract

This article assesses Pyotr Stolypin's time as Russian Prime Minister, between 1906, and his 1911 assassination. This period proved incredibly turbulent, being sandwiched between the 1905 Revolution, and the horrors of World War One, which precipitated the overthrow of the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty, in 1917. Stolypin was, subsequently, assigned with the unenviable responsibility of managing an Empire flirting with collapse. It is, therefore, necessary to take this context into account, before rendering him a failure, as many historians have done, particularly in terms of his handling of domestic politics. Stolypin's vision for Russia proved his political qualities, with the aim of developing a backward country, whilst removing any obstacles. Indeed, his agricultural reforms were successful in setting Russia on the path to modernisation, as the peasantry, constituting most of the population, were allowed to advance. Stolypin ensured the Empire's development went uninterrupted, through a peaceful foreign policy that avoided the repercussions international conflict brought, with his ruthless but clever repression also crushing governmental opposition. Therefore, this article demonstrates Stolypin's political qualities, in that despite being left with one of history's most enduring tasks, he dragged Russia towards stability, only to be undone by forces out of his control.

Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin was Russia's Prime Minister, between 1906 until his assassination in 1911, coming to office during a turbulent period in Russian history, characterised by the 1905 Revolution. The first two Dumas failing, subsequently, highlighted the unmanageable domestic political condition. Rising revolutionary sentiment was also rife, and needing to be tempered. Meanwhile, the peasantry typified Russia's need to reform, as they constituted Russia's population, possibly up to 90% of Russia's population,[1] and persisted in backward agricultural methods. Adding to Stolypin's concerns, were the threats and consequences of Russia being globally embarrassed, due to her underdevelopment, as in the 1905 Russo-Japanese war, leaving the incentive of pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. Therefore, the vast array of problems Stolypin faced, revealed the extreme difficulty of his position.

[1] Brian Moynahan, *The Russian Century: A History of the last Hundred Years,* (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 23.

Historical assessments of Stolypin's time in power vary dramatically. Soviet historians, such as A. Ia. Avrekh, held the view Stolypin was merely attempting to consolidate the Romanov regime, which was destined for downfall, whilst revisionism is diverse. However, Soviet historiography evidently attempted to serve the political aim of denouncing Stolypin, to uphold the legitimacy of Russia's Communist regime, whilst minimising individual roles in order to promote collectivism.[2] Therefore, to accurately assess Stolypin's character means focusing on revisionism, over Soviet historiography. Richard Pipes leads the defence of Stolypin, remarking on him as Russia's most outstanding statesman.[3] Simultaneously, Abraham Ascher, alongside Dietrich Geyer, Sheila Fitzpatrick and Peter Oxley paint positive portrayals. Brian Moynahan also draws on the complexity of the problems Stolypin inherited, particularly in terms of rural Russia.[4] Ian Thatcher, however, presents conflicting interpretations of Stolypin, leading the praise for his foreign policy, yet attacking his agricultural reforms.[5] Orlando Figes supports Thatcher on the latter, but also focuses broad criticism on Stolypin.

Overall, Stolypin's image can be painted largely positively, with a focus on his rural reforms, handling of repression, as well as both his domestic and foreign dealings. His qualities as a statesman are underlined by the extent to which Stolypin stabilised Russia, following the turbulent period the Empire had faced. His reforms had helped Russia develop, whilst a peaceful foreign policy, and effective repression tactics created the conditions necessary in allowing them to thrive. This take-off was eventually halted by matters out of Stolypin's hands, most notably his own assassination, as well as World War One.[6] Though critics, such as Figes, draw on Stolypin's 'poor' handling of domestic politics, this is without thoroughly considering the perilous position he had been condemned to. Coming to this conclusion is not only enabled through observing his direct success, therefore, but also an examination of the pre-existing conditions Stolypin faced, as well as those out of his hands. This proves the tough situation he had been placed in, adding further credence. Consequently, placing Stolypin as a symbol of the Romanov regime's failure, is unfair. This was owed not only to his personal success, but also to the complicated circumstances of Late Imperial Russia.

Assessing Stolypin's personality remains crucial in analysing his political effectiveness. His character differed incredibly to other politicians, catching international admiration. Sir Arthur

[2] Abraham Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia,* (California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-7.
[3] Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution,* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 166.
[4] Brian Moynahan, *The Russian Century*, pp. 23-27.
[5] Ian Thatcher, *Regime & Society in Twentieth Century Russia,* (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), pp. 54-63, p. 48.
[6] Dietrich Geyer, *The Russian Revolution,* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), pp. 8-9.

Nicholson, Britain's ambassador to Russia declared him as the "most remarkable figure in Europe",[7] while many drew comparisons to Von Bismarck.[8] This positive external view of Stolypin was earned, however, through some exceptional traits, being able to understand all elements of Russia, for example. His daughter recalled Stolypin's time in Saratov, where he "arranged […] a banquet for about sixty zemstvo workers", as he endeavoured to unite conflicting components.[9] This sort of course of action was something not unusual to Stolypin, who regularly met with the leader of the socialist Trudoviks, S.V. Anikin, to discuss political differences.[10] He was also the only minister, under Nicholas II, to attend debates in the legislature, and not delegate these tasks, as others did.[11] This proved how in touch Stolypin was with Russia itself, adding to his extraordinary character.

Placing Stolypin's own political position is necessary in assessing his own character, as well as success, though historiography remains divided on this. Figes places him as a 'conservative liberal', subsequently criticising the 'narrow path' he trod between appeasing both left and right-wing.[12] However, Ascher recognised Stolypin as a pragmatist, with a political position impossible to confine.[13] Indeed, while he was a monarchist and nationalist, Stolypin desired to advance the rights of the heavily repressed Jewish people, adding to his political pragmatism.[14] Additionally, he was renowned for harshness in repressing radicals,[15] yet sought to introduce a national health programme alongside compulsory primary schooling.[16] Ascher subsequently discovered Lenin feared the 'double-edged' sword of reform and repression, significant of Stolypin's pragmatism.[17] An analysis of Stolypin himself subsequently complements Ascher's notion he was a political pragmatist, with positive consequences, over Figes' undeveloped argument he was merely a 'conservative liberal'.

A major feature of Stolypin's time in power was his reforms, with the success of these dividing historiography. In one school, historians such as Richard Pipes, Sheila Fitzpatrick and

[7] Harold Nicolson, *Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart*, (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1930), p. 225.
[8] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, p. 2.
[9] Mary Stolypin Bock, *Stolypin in Saratov,* 1953; Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt, *The Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Accounts,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 18.
[10] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, p. 39.
[11] Ibid, p. 98.
[12] Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), p. 224, p. 222.
[13] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, p. 11.
[14] Ibid, p. 12, p. 23.
[15] Ibid, p. 35, p. 59.
[16] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 177-178.
[17] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, p. 3.

Dietrich Geyer express optimism, while Ian Thatcher and Orlando Figes remain critical. Something both schools agree on, however, was the need for reforms.

Russian peasantry and agriculture provided a major stumbling block to progress. Peasants, firstly, made up the bulk of Russia's population. Estimates for this percentage vary between historians on this number, Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt putting it at 80%,[18] with Brian Moynahan placing it as high as 90%.[19] However, despite their numbers the government had continually neglected them, none more so the case in the early 1900s. Bernard Pares recalled a peasant admitting, shortly after the 1905 Revolution that "Five years ago there was a belief [in the Tsar] as well as fear. Now […] only the fear remains".[20] Meanwhile, western travellers often associated an 'awful sadness' with the Russian countryside.[21] These depictions were reflected in the peasants' dissatisfaction, as they continued in their historical trend of being unruly. Indeed, they showed this as far back as the 1770s, with the Pugachev revolt,[22] the 647 anti-emancipation protests in 1861,[23] and 1902, when 300 infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons were required to supress an uprising.[24] Reforms were, subsequently, needed to temper this activism.

Furthermore, agriculture itself was in a dire condition in the early 1900s. The failure of emancipating the serfs, combined with population growth had exacerbated land hunger. Abraham Ascher found a 'hand-to-mouth' existence created by the 1861 emancipation, as it left each peasant an average of fifteen acres.[25] Combined with insufficient land availability, the peasant population increased by 50%, in the late 19th Century, causing land holdings to halve. Households were subsequently deprived to the extent members would, often, be forced to find external work.[26] With survival as their only objective, Russia's peasantry were, therefore, not in the position to better themselves. Furthermore, inefficient farming methods persisted, with up to 80% of the European Russian, and almost all non-European peasants living in communes. The virtual absence of private land destroyed incentive, evident in the low production level, less than one-third of Germany's, despite the difference in population.[27] Moreover, farming in much of the Empire was physically challenging. For example, in northern Russia, the growing season lasted only four months, with a

[18] Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt, *The Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Accounts,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 28.
[19] Moynahan, *The Russian Century*, p. 23.
[20] Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memoirs*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1931), pp. 161-162.
[21] Moynahan, *The Russian Century*, p. 23.
[22] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) (2nd edition), pp. 20-21.
[23] Peter Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1964: From Tsars to Commissars,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 27.
[24] Moynahan, *The Russian Century*, p. 27.
[25] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, pp. 34-35.
[26] Graeme Gill, *Peasants & Government in the Russian Revolution,* (London: MacMillan Press, 1974), pp. 8-10.
[27] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 167-177.

labour force four-times that of the American Great Plains required to fulfil the area's production-potential.[28] In 1891, Russia's problems were compounded, with a devastating famine covering an area double France's size, with hundreds-of-thousands dying.[29] This underlined the significance of Russia's agricultural problems, and the difficulties facing any sort of attempt at reform. In hindsight, World War One rapidly approaching, added to the unfavourable conditions facing Russia's modernisation.

It was Pyotr Stolypin who set aside fears of a tarnished reputation, committing himself to improving rural Russia. Stolypin had continually seen reforms as necessary to not only improving agricultural production, but ending unrest. He warned shortly before the 1905 Revolution, that if the Zemstvo were only repressed, they would grow in revolutionary strength, for example. Stolypin, additionally, recognised their large numbers, adding to their potential to cause trouble, with 1,000 peasants for every Russian sergeant or constable.[30] Therefore, following his appointment as Prime Minister in 1906, Stolypin advocated transforming agrarian life. Firstly, he sought to privatise land, in order to allow peasants opportunities to create wealth, and increase their loyalty to the Tsar. This would also allow them to work more efficiently, whilst affording poorer peasants the chance to move to the cities and expand Russia's industrial workforce.[31] Vasily Maklakov, a rival of Stolypin, even went about praising these reforms in his memoirs. He remarked on the Duma making "no trouble to consider" his reforms, as they "abolished […] restrictions of the peasant class", as well as arguing his "agrarian policy […] was on the right track".[32] This suggested Stolypin accurately recognised Russia's agricultural issues, with his reforms seeking to overturn an unfavourable situation, in modernising, as well as stabilising the country.

With an understanding of Russia's situation at the start of the 20th Century, one can assess how successful Stolypin's rural reforms proved. As previously mentioned, this has divided schools of historians, between those who believed Stolypin maximised Russia's agricultural potential, and those who maintained their failure, and short-sightedness. In terms of land hunger, Ian Thatcher noted Stolypin's failure, arguing this still persisted by 1917.[33] However, this was far from the case, as Richard Pipes discovered. All crown and state lands (6 million arable hectares) were made available, for example, while 2.5 million peasants resettled from European Russia to the sparsely populated

[28] Moynahan, *The Russian Century*, p. 26.
[29] U.S. Department of State, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,* no. 120, 22 October, 1891, p. 746.
[30] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, pp. 54-57.
[31] Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 36.
[32] Vasily Maklakov, 'The Agrarian Problem in Russia before the Revolution'*, The Russian Review,* (Jan, 1950), pp. 13-14.
[33] Thatcher, *Regime & Society in Twentieth Century Russia*, p. 48.

territories of Siberia and Central Asia.[34] This proves the great extent to which Stolypin halted land hunger, contradicting Ian Thatcher's notion this existed on a large scale, by 1917.

Additionally, the extent to which Stolypin's reforms fundamentally affected the peasant's lives, is another area debated. Figes attempts to portray Stolypin's short-sightedness, in that he ignored the peasants' conservatism, with their subsequent 'opposition' to his reforms resulting in half of households, who tried to leave the commune, failing.[35] However, he neglects the fact that 20% of households successfully left, significant for the ten years his reforms lasted,[36] as property had to be relocated, resettled and colonised.[37] With the physical, and subsequently unavoidable difficulties associated with relocating property, it is unfair to criticise Stolypin This was something unavoidable, and would inevitably limit the number of peasants who left the commune, within ten years, so cannot be used to argue Stolypin failed. Overall, therefore, Figes' own argument is widely unconvincing.

Pipes, on the other hand, portrays the broad argument that Stolypin's reforms gave Russia 'national purpose and hope'. Indeed, between 1906-13 cultivated-land surface increased 16%, and crop production 41%, meaning Russia exported a record 13.5 million tons of cereal in 1911, proving the general success.[38] Moreover, internal migration left areas achieving an 'American' rate of development, with Siberia's population doubling, and production alongside cultivation trebling from 1905-14. Meanwhile, Siberian butter exports to the UK, non-existent in 1900, amounted to 100,000 tons in 1915, even more impressive considering the economic damage World War One inflicted globally.[39] With exports doubling between 1900-13, Russia's debt decreased substantially, as they were no longer required to rely on foreign loans,[40] with their 1907-14 GDP growth, of 6% per-year, surpassing any other western power.[41] French economist Edmond Thèry consequently forecast in 1912, Russian political and economic dominance of Europe, by 1950.[42] Moreover, the success of Stolypin's reforms not only improved the Russian economy, but also dramatically decreased rural unrest. Indeed, unrest not only decreased but was non-revolutionary, pre-1914,[43] leaving Lenin fearful peasants would cease to be a revolutionary class further indicating the success of Stolypin's

[34] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 171.
[35] Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, pp. 238-241.
[36] Gill, *Peasants & Government in the Russian Revolution*, pp. 12-13.
[37] Geyer, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 21.
[38] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 177-190.
[39] Von Mohrenschildt, *The Russian Revolution of 1917*, p. 55.
[40] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 191-192.
[41] Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1964*, pp. 64-80.
[42] Edmond Thèry, *La Transformation Economique de la Russie*, (Paris: Économiste européen, 1914), p.17.
[43] Geyer, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 33.

reforms.[44] Overall, Pipes' notion is subsequently very convincing in demonstrating the success of Stolypin's agrarian policies.

Overall, therefore, Pipes, Fitzpatrick and Geyer successfully contradict Figes and Thatcher's negative portrayal of Stolypin's rural policies. Considering the context of Russia's early 20th Century agricultural situation paints Stolypin's reforms as even more impressive, as does the limited time they had to take effect.

Stolypin famously acknowledged repression itself, without reform, as ineffective. However, he did not view this as ineffective, reform requiring repression just as much as the other way around. Early 20th Century Russia was a hotbed for revolutionary activity, with the requirement to not just repress this, but to do so effectively. Russia's failure to do so was compounded by the 1905 Revolution, but Stolypin was to prove decisive in crushing post-1905 opposition. He did this not only by brute force, but devised clever tactics, which limited the success of his revolutionary opponents dramatically. In this field, too, however, historiography has remained divided. Fitzpatrick and Pipes, added to Oxley, depict Stolypin in a positive light, whilst Figes again scrutinises his success in repression.

An understanding of opposition in this period, must once more be observed to understand the situation Stolypin faced. The poet, Alexander Blok, summarised Russia at the start of the 20th Century; "We do not know […] what events await us, but in our hearts the needle of the seismograph has already stirred".[45] Although Blok was a radical, and therefore inclined to support the revolution's inevitability, Russia was still on course for revolution, without extreme intervention.[46] 1908, for example, was considered a quiet year, despite 1,800 officials being killed, and 2,000 wounded in politically motivated attacks.[47] Stolypin was subsequently dealing with an extreme level of opposition.

However, Stolypin's character certainly proved his capability, in dealing with opposition, as he earned this reputation during his governorship of Saratov.[48] His daughter recalled "with my father's arrival in Saratov, the adherents of law and order recovered their spirits".[49] Ascher supports this, drawing on the ability he gained as Governor of one of Russia's most turbulent regions; Saratov,

[44] Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 36.
[45] "Stikiia i kultura" (1908) in his 'Sobranie Sochinenii v vos'mi tomakh, V (Moscow-Leningrad: Pravda, 1962), p.359.
[46] White, Duffield, *Blok's Nechaiannaia Radost, Slavic Review*. 50 (4), 1991, pp. 779–791.
[47] Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 35.
[48] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, p. 1,
[49] Account from Mary Stolypin Bock, *Stolypin in Saratov,* 1953; Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt, *The Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Accounts,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 21.

in tempering radicalism, leaving 1905 'tailor-made' for Stolypin.[50] Alongside his ability to crush opposition, he was also very quick to recognise where this might arise, and to what degree. As Minister of Internal Affairs, for example, he had observed Okhrana reports to find revolution nearer than it appeared, with half of Kronstadt's sailors supporting it.[51] Stolypin, subsequently, had the ability and character to counteract opposition.

Stolypin succeeded in crushing the spirit of revolution, post-1905, with both harsh force, and clever tactics, and succeeded to a large degree before dying in 1911. Alexander Kerensky, contrastingly, portrayed a very different view of the success of his harsh repression, stating, "the sterner his attitude, the louder grew the people's protest".[52] However, whilst repression intensified, unrest certainly did not. 'Stolypin's necktie', is the term used to describe the wave of repression that swept Russia after 1905. Estimates vary on the precise figures of this period, once again. Oxley places the number of political opponents executed at 1,500,[53] whilst Pipes calculates that nearly 1,000 were executed during the period of martial law, between 1906-7, and over 16,000 were convicted of political crimes between 1908-9.[54] Leaders of radical parties, such as Lenin himself, were also outlawed, with this limiting the revolutionaries to a "handful of cocks, fighting abroad", as German revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg remarked.[55] Under Stolypin's leadership, the Okhrana also successfully infiltrated the both Lenin's circle and the SR Combat Organisation, with a spy, 'Azef', eventually rising to the ranks of leader.[56] This, subsequently, demonstrates the extent of the crackdowns on opposition to the Romanov regime, issued by Stolypin.

This repression, subsequently, helped Russia stabilise, exemplifying Stolypin's positive effect. Indeed, as the revolutionaries declined in strength, the number of provinces under 'reinforced' or 'extraordinary' protection fell dramatically between 1906-13.[57] Additionally, the number of people on strike dropped from 2.8 million, to just 47,000, from 1905-10.[58] This proved the positive impact of Stolypin's approach, as both blunt force, and intelligent manoeuvres combined to stabilise Russia, contradicting Kerensky's argument, that the people's unrest 'grew stronger', as repression grew stronger. However, following Stolypin's assassination, his forms of repression were phased out, with

[50] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, pp. 35-39.
[51] Ibid, p. 100.
[52] Alexander Kerensky, '*Russia on the Eve of World War One', The Russian Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn, 1945); Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt, *The Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Accounts,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 46.
[53] Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1964*, pp. 64-80.
[54] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 170.
[55] Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1964,* pp. 64-80.
[56] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 191.
[57] Thatcher, *Regime & Society in Twentieth Century Russia*, p. 50.
[58] Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1964*, pp. 64-80.

a subsequent increase in revolutionary activity. The number of people on strike, for example, rose from 47,000 in 1910 to 1.3 million, by 1913,[59] with 1914 also seeing the Petrograd general strike.[60] The 1912 Lena Goldfields massacre also led to as many as 300,000 workers being involved in strike action, with over 1,000 strikes in Petrograd.[61] One can, therefore, draw significant attention to Stolypin's contribution to the increase in Russia's stability, post-1905, further proving his quality as a statesman.

Overall, it was no fluke that Stolypin's time as Russian Prime Minister coincided with a brief, but relatively peaceful era in Late Imperial Russian standards. This was not just due to the optimism generated by his reforms, but as a consequence of his shrew tactics in repression. Radicals were limited to fighting one-another abroad, whilst revolutionary activity decreased remarkably. The extent to which this can be attributed to Stolypin is attested to by the rise in opposition after his assassination, in 1911, once again marking his quality as a statesman. Overall, therefore, the evidence proves Stolypin unquestionably strengthened the Romanov regime's grip on power, between 1906-11, thanks to the success of his crackdowns on opposition.

Stolypin's success in foreign policy further determined his effectiveness as Prime Minister. He adhered to the sustainable strategy of pursuing peaceful international relations, neglecting a traditionally aggressive foreign policy, to allow Russia to focus on strengthening herself internally, without disruption. Stolypin's success in this area has largely been accepted by historians, with Ian Thatcher leading his praise.

Stolypin correlated failures in foreign policy, common in late Imperial Russia, with threats to internal stability. Indeed, he sought to avoid the international shortcomings that preceded domestic unrest, such as the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war, which led to the 1905 Revolution. He listened to individuals, such as A.F. Rediger (Russia's Minister of War), who claimed the armed forces could not even repel an invasion, because of their deplorable state. Indeed, added to backward military strategies, Russia only trained 25% of her eligible males, whilst Germany trained 54%, and France 80%.[62] This proved Russia's dire military capacity, and the likelihood she would be globally embarrassed, something Stolypin kept in mind. In 1909, for example, he accepted Germany's demands of recognising Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to avoid war.[63]

[59] Ibid, pp. 64-80.
[60] Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 36.
[61] Sam Lowry, *The Lena massacre, 1912,* 2007, https://libcom.org/history/1912-lena-massacre [accessed on 10 June 2020].
[62] Thatcher, *Regime & Society in Twentieth Century Russia*, pp. 55-61.
[63] Ibid, p. 55.

Russia's poor military subsequently proves Stolypin right in working around the negative impacts of an expansive foreign policy, further marking his qualities.

Additionally, Stolypin realised the damaging effect war would have on civil strife, regardless of armed success. Recognising that over 50% of the population were not ethnically Russian, Stolypin worried of the civil unrest that would follow 'non-Russians' being conscripted, subsequently being further drawn to a peaceful foreign policy.[64] Indeed, Kazakhs responded to this, during World War One, by murdering 3,500 ethnic Russian settlers, and Imperial troops slaughtering roughly ten-times that number of Kazakhs, in retaliation, during the 1916 conscription riots.[65] This proves just how in touch with Russia's problems, Stolypin was. Therefore, his foreign dealings, subsequently paint him as incredibly competent, with Stolypin aware of the difficulties international war would bring, in fracturing society further.

While arguing Stolypin's pursuit of a peaceful foreign policy was necessary, may seem like stating the obvious, this did not seem so at the time. While we are blessed by hindsight, in justifying a peaceful foreign strategy, by drawing on Russia's performance in World War One, Stolypin was not, being among the few advocates for peaceful international relations. The words of an early 20th Century Minister of the Interior, arguing a "victorious war" was the best remedy for Russia's issues, speaks volumes of attitudes toward internal relations.[66] Indeed, while the Romanovs included military conflict in political calculations,[67] most politicians believed in an aggressive foreign policy, to the extent the liberal Kadets supported Slavic interests, despising Austrian-Hungarian Eastern European influence.[68] Additionally, most politicians not only overestimated Russia's global capacity, but also underestimated Germany, particularly since the 1890s, despite their superiority, demonstrating how unaware of war's harmful impacts Russia was.[69] Indeed, following Stolypin's death, Russian politicians quickly pursued a course that would lead to war,[70] with only the radical socialist parties denouncing Russia's entry into the war.[71] Therefore, the degree to which Russia's political sphere ignored problems with seeking an aggressive foreign policy, adds to Stolypin's competency, thereby positively displaying his tenure as Prime Minister.

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[64] Author unknown, 'The First General Census of the Russian Empire in 1897; Distribution of the Population by Mother Tongue, Provinces and Regions' (in Russian), *Demoscope Weekly*, 2012 http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php [accessed 7th March 2020].
[65] Alexander Morrison, *Central Asia: Interpreting and Remembering the 1916 Revolt,* (October 2016), https://eurasianet.org/central-asia-interpreting-and-remembering-1916-revolt [accessed 9th March 2020].
[66] Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 31.
[67] Geyer, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 22.
[68] Thatcher, *Regime & Society in Twentieth Century Russia*, p. 57.
[69] Ibid, pp. 55-56.
[70] Ibid, p. 55.
[71] Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1991*, pp. 75-88.

Overall, therefore, Stolypin's choice of foreign policy demonstrates his qualities as a statesman, as he recognised the difficulties, brought by conflict. These harms included further fragmenting society, and threatening domestic advancements, with Russia likely facing wartime humiliation. Russia gained remarkably from peace, with internal development not only uninterrupted, but imports and exports both doubling.[72] While his choice of foreign policy may seem obvious, with hindsight, contemporary popular opinion lay with international expansion, ignoring internal repercussions, further contributing to Stolypin's positive image.

Piotr Stolypin's handling of domestic politics, has consistently been placed under fire. However, an understanding of the turbulent political situation Stolypin faced, remains crucial in further assessing his time in office. Tsar Nicholas' own mother, Empress Dowager Marie, complained of Stolypin's treatment, suggesting he held office during a troublesome period. She protested, despite Stolypin proving "intelligent and energetic", he was "pushed into the abyss […] by those who claim to love […] Russia and in reality are destroying it".[73] Implying this was the Tsar's circle's doing, they, indeed, began worrying his reforms would diminish Nicholas' authority by 1909,[74] also being jealous of the heights Stolypin reached.[75] Therefore, they made consistent attempts to undermine him, most notably in the 3rd Duma of 1911. Figes criticises Stolypin for his handling of this Duma, as he failed to pass plans to introduce western zemstvo, despite the conservatives, 'inclined' to support him constituting 287 out of 443 seats.[76] However, his plans were selfishly derailed by members of the Tsar's circle. Alexander Trepov and Pyotr Durnovo, in a vote of no-confidence, on personal rather than political grounds, orchestrated the failure of the act's passage through the Duma.[77] The fallout ended with Stolypin losing the Octobrist Party's support, with former ally Guchkov resigning as leader.[78] In this case, Stolypin's shortcomings, during the duma, were not self-inflicted, rather the cause of external forces, bent on threatening his position. This revealed the extent to which Stolypin was jeopardised by those close to Tsar Nicholas, highlighting the troubling situation he faced.

Though directed at Nicholas' right-wing circle, Empress Dowager Marie's message can also be applied to Russia's centre-ground. Indeed, the failure of Russia's moderate parties, to support Stolypin, was less his fault, rather their own. This was due to their failure to unify, as Thatcher argues, with the 1905 Kadet and Octobrist split creating an absence of a political centre, further

[72] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution,* p. 191.
[73] Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokotsov, *Iz moego proshlogo*, I. 460-1, from; Pipes, *The Russian Revolution,* p. 187.
[74] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 177-183.
[75] Ascher, *P.A. Stolypin*, pp. 1-2.
[76] Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, pp. 225-229.
[77] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 184-186.
[78] Ibid, pp. 186-7.

deepening Stolypin's impracticable position.[79] Additionally, though the Octobrists supported him until 1911, the Kadets opposed him, refusing Stolypin's invitation to join the government, because, although they were moderates, they approved of terrorism, further highlighting the era's turbulence.[80] The fragmentation of moderate politics had widespread effects on Russia's political situation, certainly making it less favourable for Stolypin, who lost the support he needed.

Furthermore, historiography is split on assessing Stolypin's adherence to democracy. Indeed, drawing on his 1907 electoral law, while Von Mohrenschildt portrays him as anti-democratic,[81] Pipes argues Stolypin preserved democracy as much as he could.[82] Certainly, the first and second Dumas faced the difficulties of being highly dysfunctional, and having a short duration.[83] Consequently, Stolypin's electoral law ensured at least two-thirds of the Duma were supportive of the Tsar,[84] resulting in the next two sessions being more productive, as they lasted longer.[85] Thereby, Stolypin cannot be seen as anti-democratic, as he evidently succeeded in preserving democracy as best he could, with the unworkable situation he otherwise faced, adding to his effectiveness as a politician.

Stolypin, thereby, faced unbearable political circumstances, as neither the Tsar's circle, nor the moderates, offered consistent support. Pipes successfully argues his electoral law conserved democracy as best he could, whilst Empress Dowager Marie perfectly summarised the failure of the right and the moderates. This denounces Figes' suggestion Stolypin mishandled domestic politics, rather revealing the inevitable difficulties he experienced.

Orlando Figes, attempting to portray Stolypin in such a negative light, argued that no 'Stolypinites' existed, so his view for Russia died with him.[86] In this statement, Figes can actually be proved partially correct, as this paper demonstrates no other politician understood Russia's position as well as he did. It was World War One, which ultimately destroyed the Romanov regime, but Stolypin's death, in August 1911, which set it on its path. With the challenges late Imperial Russia faced, Stolypin stood out from others in directing the Empire away from revolution, with pragmatism woven into his political calculations. He did this via his vision of creating the conditions needed for Russia to develop, through reforms, without being interrupted; a peaceful foreign policy added to

[79] Thatcher, *Regime & Society in Twentieth Century Russia*, pp. 45-46.
[80] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution,* p. 179.
[81] Von Mohrenschildt, *The Russian Revolution of 1917*, pp. 48-49.
[82] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 181.
[83] Oxley, *Russia, 1855-1964*, pp. 64-80.
[84] Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 182.
[85] Author unknown, *Duma: Russian Assembly,* 2014, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Duma-Russian-assembly [accessed 9th March 2020].
[86] Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, p. 231.

brutal but cunning repression. Additionally, considering the delicate situation of domestic politics, Stolypin's handling of this cannot be seen as detrimental.

His vision for Russia was certainly competent, given the position it was in when Stolypin inherited it. His reforms focusing on the peasantry was logical, considering they comprised over three-quarters of the population, with their transformation able to subsequently allow Russia to fundamentally change.[87] Certainly, Russia was put on course for transformation, due to rapid agricultural development, between 1906-14. This was allowed to occur, however, because Stolypin created the conditions needed for Russia to develop without being interrupted; a peaceful foreign policy added to repression. His choice of foreign policy was due to Russia's poor military capacity, and the damaging effects of foreign failure, despite widespread political agreement Russia should be aggressive in her international relations, adding competency to Stolypin's portrayal. His repression, however, was more cunning than brutal, which many historians mistakenly viewed it as. With opposition quelled, Stolypin effectively put Russia on the path to fundamental transformation, which was not realised, because of factors out of his control. Additionally, he faced the problem of dealing with Russia's political theatre, which was in an incredibly troublesome state. Indeed, this proved difficult for Stolypin, who nevertheless saved some sort of form of democracy, whilst he was only undone by the far-right's personal dislike and jealousy.

Overall, therefore, Stolypin being depicted, by much of history, as symbolic of Imperial Russia's old order, or of the Romanov's downfall, can be proved wholly inaccurate. This owed much to his vision of Imperial Russia, which would have saved the Empire from revolution, and subsequent collapse. This was, however, jeopardised by factors outside of his control, with his lack of time and backing, combined with the difficult conditions he inherited.

[87] Moynahan, *The Russian Century*, p. 23.

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From Greengrocers to a French Oil Company: The Emergence of French Oil, 1918-1925

Harry Bull

Abstract

A shortage of oil in the harsh winter of 1917 brought France's attention to oil security. Its contribution to the Middle Eastern theatre of war had been symbolic at best, and initially there was no plans to suggest that oil would become the commodity that it is today, most believing an abundance of coal to be enough economic protection, while oil had always been something bought in tins at a greengrocers. Nevertheless, French diplomats soon found themselves saturated by the black gold in the post-war settlements of Turkey and the Middle East, until they themselves created a national oil champion in 1925, with the creation of one of the world's oil majors: Compagnie française des pétroles, transforming the way our modern economy functions. The French were the underdog in a world where the British Empire reached its climax, and America began to take off as the world economic power, but they nevertheless used their position of weakness to their advantage: their war dead and the sufferings of war aiding their negotiating position so that they too would benefit from oil and the modern inventions it helped to power.

Realising all was lost, the Ottoman government signed an Armistice on 30 October 1918, on board *HMS Agamemnon*, one of the first warships to be partially oil-powered. The venue symbolised the watershed moment in how the world would perceive oil and its significance in the aftermath of war about mechanisation. Invoking the Anglo-French plan to divide up the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which by now had already become a dead letter, the Allies lost no time in occupying their spheres of influence carved from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. The French arrived late, and assumed control of Syria and Cilicia. It was the end of an epoch of Ottoman rule, and would change the landscape forever, driven by a new desire for oil security.

By the time British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon convened the Lausanne Conference in November 1922, the French were the seemingly the most innocent party at the table. Their contributions to the Middle Eastern campaign were symbolic at best, and the other main parties of the Conference: Britain, America and Turkey all had varying degrees of cordiality for the French government. Whilst Britain had been her main ally of the war, the San Remo Oil Agreement (April 1920) had caused tension between the two parties and the United States. The French

surreptitiously signed the Ankara Accord in 1921 with modern-Turkey's founder Atatürk, against British policy, becoming the first government to recognise the new Turkish state; the French withdrawal from Turkey altogether in 1922 further strained Anglo-French relations. America was also now interested in exploiting the oil of the Middle East, who expressed an interest with the new Turkish state in reopening an old oil agreement, the Chester Concession, which further diversified the complicated question of oil which oozed out from the floorboards at Lausanne.[1]

The French had been slow to grasp the importance that oil would come to play in world affairs, and indeed their own economy; that said their negotiating positions at the diplomatic level were strong, and they were able to maintain Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent of the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which would later pass to the French oil company, *Compagnie française des pétroles* (CFP). The majority of French concerns about oil remained in Romania, where the guarantee of oil had been proven by decades of commercial extraction; French ties to the nation would equal favourable concessions. With the Great War only just concluded, it is fair to assume that France was prioritising its domestic security over international affairs, and the question of German backlash against the Treaty of Versailles was more pressing than the new fuel source that seemed to do the same job as coal. The Conference table was awash with oil, and while the French were one of the late comers to this multinational affair, they held their ground and played a very bad hand, very well.

By the end of the Great War the international oil market had become one of public intrigue and excitement; for its investors a lucrative opportunity. France, however, had very little in the way of oil reserves; a tiny pumping operation existed in the commune of Pechelbronn, Alsace, and a group of refineries of the so-called *Cartel des Dix* worked under the umbrella of Standard Oil of New Jersey (Standard Oil).[2] These domestic operations were all that the Third Republic and her territories and colonies possessed. In truth, this reflected the position of the French Premier. Georges Clemenceau allegedly responded to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in December 1918 that 'when I need oil, I ask my *épicier* [grocer]', perceiving oil as the tinned substance that France's oil industry produced, rather than appreciating the bigger picture and the real importance oil would come to play in international and economic affairs.[3]

French politicians underneath Premier Clemenceau, however, understood why other governments were moving fast to secure oil, aware that a free market would not solve France's

[1] **Jonathan Conlin, revised for clarity.**
[2] Jonathan Conlin, 'An Oily Entente: Britain, France, and the Mosul Question, 1916-1925', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 31 (2020), 1-27, p. 2.
[3] Daniel Yorgin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 173; Jonathan Conlin, *Mr Five Per Cent: The Many Lives of Calouste Gulbenkian* (London: Profile, 2019), p. 128.

absence of oil.[4] The solution was direct control imposed by government in the name of national security. Clemenceau perhaps had already tried to forget the dependency which Europe had on foreign oil shipments; during the winter of 1917, France faced dwindling food and heating supplies owing to German U-Boat operations. Following the British and Americans in creating non-ministerial departments to address the problem of oil supply, the French established the *Comité Générale du Pétrole.*[5] Members of the French Parliament Henry Bérenger and Étienne Clémentel worked to form a French oil consortium on 29 March 1918, the *Consortium Française d'Importation de Pétrole*, which set price controls and the distribution of oil into the French economy; effectively creating a legal monopoly on oil importation.[6] Without an independent oil policy, France was forced to protect its economy with *étatisme* (statism), with government assuming full authority in the French energy market, distributing oil within the domestic market from foreign oil imports.

As early as 1865 the British Admiralty under Captain J. S. Selwyn undertook tests in order to see how viable it was to transition the Royal Navy away from coal and towards oil-powered ships.[7] The French in contrast had a navy nearly two-and-a-half-times smaller than the Royal Navy, having just 348 warships to the British's 803.[8] France's behemoth commercial shipping industry on the other hand, including the lines *Compagnie Générale Maritime* and *Messageries Maritimes*, relied on coal for transportation, and while in the long-term there would be a growing demand to switch from coal to oil, coal remained the main energy resource for the French economy. Whilst French industry was constantly asked to explore the empire's resources, especially by the colonial elite present in the *Quai d'Orsay* (Foreign Ministry), they were too exhausted from the war and represented an absence of economic imperialism in France. For this reason, oil exploration in the nation's empire was in short supply, further accounting for the complexity in French oil policy.

Although the French government was more experienced, and able, to negotiate from a stronger position than its commercial leaders, the government's instability resulted in a weakened foreign policy when it came to the question of oil, Mosul and equity. From the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 to the Lausanne Conference's reconvening in April 1923, the Third Republic had nine Prime Ministers and three Presidents. In comparison to its allies, the French government had difficulty

[4] **Jonathan Conlin, revised for clarity.**
[5] Ibid., p. 109.
[6] Jean-Marie Bouguen, *Le Pétrole en France: Genèse et strategies d'influence (1917-1924)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), pp. 42-45.
[7] Geoffrey Jones, *The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry* (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 9.
[8] 'Histoire de la Marine nationale', in Marine nationale <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/patrimoine/histoire/histoire-de-la-marine-nationale/histoire-de-la-marine-nationale> [accessed 29 November 2019]; 'Royal Navy History', in Royal Navy <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/features/history-timeline> [accessed 29 November 2019].

retaining any sense of policy when the Ministers in charge of government departments constantly changed. Oil policy also constituted a whole new level of economic and political vernacular unknown to most of France's politicians. Oil magnate Calouste Gulbenkian, the brainchild of TPC (of which 25 per cent would be owned by CFP), proactively sought to capitalise on France's oil demand.[9] Under Royal Dutch-Shell (RDS), Gulbenkian aligned the company's interests with those of the "father' of France's oil policy', Senator Henry Bérenger.[10] The *Société pour l'Exploitation des Pétroles* was created, intended to take on the 25 per cent of TPC, under the agreements preceding San Remo in April 1920, though this never occurred due to Lloyd George's reservations with the initial Long-Bérenger Agreement in March 1919; concerned with how popular opinion would perceive private companies exploiting the oil gained through the death of British and Imperial troops to obtain the Mosul *Vilayet* (Ottoman province).[11] On top of this, rivalries between two French banking groups the *Banque de l'Union Parisienne* and the *Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas* (one supporting Standard Oil, the other RDS) reflected a rivalry between the French Finance Ministry and the *Quai d'Orsay* (only resolved in 1922, during which things seemed to finally be going RDS' way), which weakened any united front that the government in Paris could project internationally, especially in relation to oleaginous diplomacy.[12]

The Lausanne Conference was not the only reason France was in international headlines during April 1923. Since December 1920, the French and German governments remained in protracted talks on war reparations, and sought to secure reparations-in-kind for raw materials, namely coal, of which were abundant in Germany.[13] Plans for the invasion and occupation of the German Ruhr dated 22 April 1921, confirmed that French policy still remained fervently prepared to invade the German Ruhr to increase reparations in-kind in the form of coal and steel. The French Prime Minister, Raymond Poincaré, reached a deadlock in discussions with the Germans, made worse after British economist John Maynard Keynes criticised the French government's belligerent approach towards Germany, resulting in a joint French-Belgium occupation of the Ruhr.[14] The occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 signalled to the world that France was, domestically, focused on protecting itself in case Germany reared its head again, and its coal and steel industries would be aided by the confiscation of German coal and iron ore. Lausanne would thus be a time for the French delegation to perhaps create a proto-coal and steel community which Europe would later see

[9] David Styan, *France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2006), p.14.
[10] Conlin, *Mr Five Per Cent*, pp. 110, 127-128.
[11] **Jonathan Conlin, revised for clarity.**
[12] Styan, *France and Iraq*, p. 15; Conlin, *Mr Five Per Cent*, p. 131.
[13] J. F. V. Keiger, *Raymond Poincaré* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 276.
[14] Keiger, *Raymond Poincaré*, pp. 294, 284.

established in the 1950s, so long as they got the United States to agree that war debts for Germany could be written off. For the French, the pooling of raw materials was essential in war-time as it would be in peacetime, making them the basis not for emergency stockpiling but for a new world order. This model was not popular at the time, particularly with the US, though some including Henry Brailsford hoped that the League of Nations could assume an economic role in order to control the supply of natural resource, believing that the best cure for Imperialist rivalries was interdependence between governments via some higher umbrella body.[15]

French claims to Deutsche Bank's sequestered assets were not uncontested. Standard Oil and the British also had interests in obtaining the 25 per cent of TPC that France had been promised. After Clemenceau ceded Mosul to the British, some in Whitehall saw no reason to reciprocate this gift; after all, it had been done without any diplomatic bargaining whatsoever. One communique from the Custodian of Enemy Property to the Board of Trade in April 1919 wrote:

The existence of shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company […] will give the French an opportunity of putting in a claim to such a share, and we shall be in a far stronger position to resist it if in fact these enemy owned shares have been disposed of.[16]

This shows that France, who would one year later enter into the San Remo Agreement with the British, were on their own during this apparent race for oil that they were so slow to start. Their negotiating position was weak, and even following San Remo were discounted as ignorant about oil: British Ambassador to France, Edward Stanley, on 31 July 1920 communicating to Curzon that the French 'surrender [of] their claims in the Mosul region [… would provide Britain] a definite supply of oil'.[17] Lausanne gave the French the opportunity therefore to make sure the British stood by San Remo and support the French; as Curzon had said it was after all a 'guarantee to France […] because France has got no oil of her own', in order to placate the fears created in the so-called 'Oil War' that Britain was trying to block American entry to the region.[18]

With assistance from her allies, the French nation had fought off the Central Powers by November 1918 and was exhausted from her efforts. As noted, France had survived a harsh winter the year before and there had been a series of negotiations at the lower levels towards a mutual oil agreement between Whitehall and the *Quai d'Orsay*. As was evident during the Foreign Office Agreement in 1914, France's negotiating power lay with its diplomats and high politics, not in

[15] Henry Noel Brailsford, *After the Peace* (London: Leonard Parsons, 1920), pp. 160-161.
[16] André Nouschi, *La France et le Pétrole* (Cahors: Picard, 2001), p. 25; London, The National Archives (TNA), Trading with the Enemy 29 April 1919, BT 15/76.
[17] London, TNA, Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris), ADM 1/8632/169A.
[18] London, TNA, Statement published upon instruction of Sir A. Geddes, ADM 1/8632/169A.

backroom channels. The final San Remo Agreement went through two iterations before both Lloyd George and his new French-counterpart Premier Alexandre Millerand would confirm it, as discussed. However, the fact that the British continued to push towards Mosul after the Armistice was signed showed a determination in the British to exploit the region's natural resources; the question being whether this would be directly controlled by the state, a British-controlled company or by some other means. Discussions continued, revived by French diplomat Philippe Berthelot and the Secretary for Overseas Trade and Secretary to the Board of Trade Hamar Greenwood which resulted in the San Remo Agreement. Mesopotamia, and the 25 per cent share in TPC earmarked for the French, were codified as follows:

7. Mesopotamia.- The British Government undertake to grant to the French Government or its nominee 25 per cent of the net output of crude oil [...] or in the event of a private petroleam [*sic*] company being used to develop the Mesopotamian oilfields, the British Government will place at the disposal of the French Government a share of 25 per cent in such company.[19]

This ambiguity of how France should receive Deutsche Bank's share of TPC, or whether it would be actual oil, continued the uncertainty of France's oil policy, but nonetheless afforded France the opportunity to weaponise this insecurity in their favour. The French also saw no hurry to appoint the company or vehicle to carry the share of the company, or its oil output. San Remo therefore served France with two hands: firstly, it would confirm its share of TPC sequestered from Deutsche Bank, which had gained the shareholding from the 1914 Foreign Office Agreement, although the British had been anything but forthcoming in affirming. Secondly, which was significantly more promising for the French in the short term, was binational support for negotiations with the Romanian government for oil concessions.

For French oil policy, Romania presented a source of immediate, guaranteed, oil. Rather than waiting for oil to be discovered in Mosul, combined with the time lag for building pipelines and other infrastructure, Romania at the time pumped out 1,017,382 tons of petroleum; in comparison to the other oil-producing nations, this placed Romania fifth globally and well above that of any other European state.[20] The promise of a stake in TPC as part of war reparations was still a gamble in 1923: whether anything truly substantial would come of exploration in Mesopotamia was inconclusive. Far more desirable from San Remo was the commitment of the British to aid France in Romania. As part of the ongoing effort to redistribute the assets of Deutsche Bank as enemy

[19] London, TNA, San Remo Agreement, ADM 1/8632/169A.
[20] Marian Kent, *Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900-1920* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976), Appendix VIII: 'Table 3: World Production of Petroleum, 1913-1920', pp. 202-203.

property and from sequestered shell companies, concerted efforts were repeatedly made and agreed to at San Remo between both governments, for a joint Anglo-French co-ordination to gain concessions in Romania.[21] This in itself was in the short-term more important to the French than the ambiguous promises they received about oil under TPC's remit. The French also had cultural influence in Romania, owing to the Parisian education that many of Romania's politicians received in the pre-cursor to the nation's independence movement in the 1870s.[22] For France's financial institutions, Romania was a popular destination for foreign direct investment. In particular its oil industry was looked upon with favour, and from 1904 the French *Compagnie Internationale des Pétroles* began investing in oil-supply programs in order to boost the productive capacity of Romania's oil fields.[23]

By the time Lausanne's delegates were re-convened in April 1923, the situation for Kemal and the Turkish delegation remained one of hard-nosed determination to get a better deal from the Allies. However, the Conference was unofficially the opportunity for the Allied nations to settle their differences. Lausanne was a conference following several awkward diplomatic events. Relations between Britain, France and the United States were at a low point following San Remo, the Chanak Crisis and the Ankara Accord, and the all-but-forgotten Chester Concession. Britain and France were cordial at San Remo, but the Chanak Crisis and Ankara Accord were viewed by Whitehall as grave misgivings as to the lengths France would go to upholding international treaties and Britain's diplomatic position. The Chester Concession also inflated the ongoing 'Oil War' between the British and the Americans to the point that it felt that at any moment one of the delegations at Lausanne could be bypassed and shut out of negotiations.

The revelation of the San Remo Agreement to the Americans was seen as a British attempt to shut America out of the Middle East and to cut off its access to foreign oil outright; the treaty had been leaked by French newspaper *Le Temps*, much to European embarrassment. The diplomatic row which followed played to American fears that their own domestic supplies would run out, and they would be at the mercy of a British-controlled oil supply; an ironic turn of events from the Great War. This was in fact a great embellishment of the truth: as Fiona Venn notes 70 per cent of the world's oil supply originated from US exports, compared to the British Empire's two-and-a-half per cent.[24] Combined with the US's own panic against oil trusts forming into cartels and price-fixing, relations froze over between the two nations. The Americans contended that 'mandated areas should be held

[21] Bouguen, *Le Pétrole en France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), p. 47.
[22] Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 10.
[23] Ibid., p. 31.
[24] Fiona Venn, *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), p. 55.

and administered […] to assure equal treatment to the commerce and to the citizens of all nations', something which they believed the British would ignore in Iraq in order to capitalise on Mesopotamia's undeveloped oil fields.[25] Accordingly, this souring of Anglo-American relations opened up France to negotiate behind the backs of the British to secure more than the 25 per cent of TPC, and perhaps even obtain the extra 25 per cent which French Ambassador Philippe Berthelot had failed to get at San Remo – both a share of the company and of the crude oil pumped out of the Middle East.

The Chester Concession, first set in motion in 1904, was ahead of any claims TPC held – promissory or official. The *Lettre vizierelle* which promised TPC the oil concessions of Mosul and Baghdad in June 1914 was nothing compared to the infrastructure and oil agreement that the Turkish Parliament re-examined in April 1923.[26] Its reopening suggests that the Turkish government were keen to befriend the United States, which had the potential to question the validity of British mandated Iraq, had the Ottoman-American Development Company (spearheaded by the eponymous Colby Mitchell Chester) come into fruition. Fears of a British monopoly on international oil reserves, combined with this more concrete of agreements that the Turkish government were actually willing to entertain, could have cajoled the French into entertaining a French-American venture. To support Turkey's claim in retaining the *Vilayets* of Mosul, Basra and Baghdad, which the British were keen to form into a mandate, would have been a powerful opportunity to rewrite the San Remo Agreement and give France a stronger footing. With the Americans as new partners, combined with the good relations that France had been building with the Turks since the Ankara Accord there was potential for the British to be pushed out of Mesopotamia, extending Turkish sovereignty over the area, which France had ceded back against the wishes of the British, enabling France to gain a better concession than the arbitrary deal it currently had.

Lausanne was ostensibly not about oil whatsoever. On the surface, it comprised of three commissions to find solutions to Turkey's boundaries, war reparations and control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. For Lord Curzon it was paramount that Britain remained above any discussions on oil at the international level; it nevertheless remained a point of strong contention. For the French, their humiliation following the leaking of the San Remo Agreement presented Poincaré with the second greatest tool of French diplomacy, after their war dead. If the British would not relax their position, then the Mosul Question would be tabled as an official item of business. In doing so, Mosul would not only form the debate on the Turkish-Iraq border dispute, which was so

[25] Edward Mead Earle, 'The Turkish Petroleum Company - A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy', *Political Science Quarterly* 39.2 (1924), 265-279, p. 274.
[26] Conlin, *Mr Five Per Cent*, pp. 94-95.

troublesome that it would not be dealt with until the League arbitrated in 1925, but would return to the news headlines the San Remo Agreement. This would also bring the 1914 Foreign Office Agreement in to disrepute, putting His Majesties' Government in conflict with the Agreement's 'self-denying ordinance' to stop direct meddling in Mesopotamian oil by governments except through TPC.[27] In turn, the British would also be exposed as meddlers in oleaginous affairs, and further question the validity of British control of the region after their illegal occupation of Mosul which occurred *after* the Armistice was signed. Even though the French Army had a very minimal presence in Mesopotamia, their negotiating position remained strong, continually being able to deploy the war dead and the damage sustained on French soil as negotiating chips. This was used time and time again, and each time had no dilution of its effect: France's war dead was one of their most powerful tools used in international negotiations during the interwar years.

The Armistice at Mudros ended the Ottoman Empire's rule over much of the Middle East. The French, whose investors and financial institutions owned over half of Ottoman public debt had not even been consulted before the British had orchestrated its surrender. It is said that the subsequent row between Lloyd George and Clemenceau was 'the most violent ever in the stormy relations of the two'. One American diplomat present described Lloyd George's eruption in response that:

The British, Lloyd George burst out, had captured three of four Turkish armies, and had incurred hundreds of thousands of casualties in the war against Turkey. The other governments [France] had only put in a few nigger policemen to see that we did not steal the Holy Sepulchre.[28]

So enraged was Lloyd George that the French should start demanding a larger seat at the table, when in his eyes they had done comparatively little for the war effort, that this perception of the French by the Prime Minister and verily the rest of Whitehall remained for much of the Interwar Period. Nevertheless, the position of the French by April 1923 and indeed after the Lausanne Conference concluded showed that they were not perturbed by this and argued their case very well.

Despite the initial negligence adorning the oleaginous diplomacy of Clemenceau, the French state took steps to take control of the oil crisis facing the French war effort in 1917. The French policy of *étatisme* took the form of government departments which regulated oil within France. Nevertheless, compared to the 'free trading' UK, whose government owned 51 per cent of an oil company (Anglo-Persian), the French government did not following this direct route.[29] France

[27] Kent, *Oil and Empire*, pp. 170-171.
[28] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas*, p. 163.
[29] **Jonathan Conlin, revised for clarity.**

remained sluggish in the switch from using coal that its maritime and steel industries depended on for their survival. Oil exploration in French colonies was at best scarce, owing to the exhaustion that blanketed the French economy following the war; domestic politics were focused on rebuilding and protecting France from any German resurgence.

The Lausanne Conference gave the French a platform to protect its carefully structured oil policy, which was centred on the San Remo Agreement. The threat certainly loomed over the delegation that at any moment the British, the Americans or the Turks could pull something out from underneath the Conference table which would push French interests aside and destroy their ambitions for self-reliant oil. San Remo assured France some form of control over TPC and/or its oil at an undetermined point in the future. British desires to keep France out of oil arrangements disappeared once it was realised that the Mosul Question could be thrown open to greater scrutiny than Curzon and the British delegation desired. The French could have played the British off the Americans in their 'Oil War', even though the Chester Concession was in 1923 vastly overdeveloped (making it look like the deal of the century) and ready to be agreed to than TPC's *Lettre* was. More importantly for the French, San Remo secured opportunities to negotiate favourable concessions from the Romanian government. Romania as a source of instant and guaranteed oil cannot be understated and was quite safe from the reach of delegates at Lausanne, so long as the conference stuck to the aims it was convened to address. Nevertheless, domestic rebuilding following the war remained France's greatest priority, and while coal remained the staple French fuel source, it was demonstrated that an independent French oil policy was now well established in time for the creation of CFP the following year.

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Political, Economic and Social Stagnation in Brezhnev's Russia

Tom Ford

Abstract

Leonid Brezhnev's rule of the Soviet Union from 1964 to his death in 1982 is typically remembered in Russia with fondness, as the quality of life was the highest it had ever been in the region. However, this period of Soviet history has often been labelled as an 'Era of Stagnation'. This paper addresses this interpretation, arguing that stagnation characterised Brezhnev's rule politically, economically and socially. With a timid and conservative leadership built on consensus, the flaw at the heart of the Soviet economic system led to an economic stagnation whilst corruption characterised Soviet politics. Historians often overlook new cultural and social shifts in Soviet society at this time. Yet, even here, decay persisted in the everyday life of the Soviet Union, as it seems impossible for the Brezhnev leadership to shake of the label 'stagnant society'.

Leonid Brezhnev came to power following Nikita Khrushchev's removal from office by his colleagues in 1964. Khrushchev's erraticism in policymaking, evidenced through his failed Virgin Lands campaign, his Stalinist reorganisation of the Communist Party and government, and the cult of personality that grew around him all unsettled other Soviet leaders. Brezhnev, on the other hand, opted for a more conservative approach to leadership. Rhetoric changed so that the Soviet Union was no longer being described as in the early stages of communism but instead as a 'developed socialist society'. It grew in affluency, as citizens now enjoyed the highest standard of living in Soviet history. Most Russians in fact look back on Brezhnev's rule (1964 to his death in 1982) with positivity.[1] It too, as in the West, was a time of family vacations, with the wages of workers and farmers growing faster than those of managers and specialists. Even the hippie movement graced the streets of Moscow.[2]

[1] The All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), January 2000, in Edwin Bacon, 'Brezhnev as Leader, in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. by Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 22.

[2] For holidays see: Christian Noack, 'Brezhnev's "Little Freedoms": Tourism, Individuality, and Mobility in the Late Soviet Period', in *Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange*, ed. by Dina Fainberg and Artemy M. Kalinovsky (London: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 59-77.
For workers' wages see: Ronald G. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 438.

However, to justify his agenda of radical reform, Brezhnev's successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, declared that Brezhnev's rule had been characterised by nothing other than stagnation and decay.[3] Ever since, this has been immortalised as a metaphor for Brezhnev's Russia. Brezhnev himself also became a metaphor for the times, with his lavish lifestyle, obsession with military awards and failing health often being picked apart as an introduction to the 'Era of Stagnation' interpretation.[4] This interpretation is accurate when analysing Brezhnev's rule, with various contributing factors. Through his attempts to deliver a period of peace for the Soviet Union, his policy of the 'stability of the cadres' birthed a privileged political elite that froze the higher echelons of society. The Soviet Union also lagged behind the West in technology 'from smart weapons to smart washing machines',[5] whilst Brezhnev's emphasis on collective leadership meant that the reason behind the economic decay was never properly confronted: the Stalinist command economy. Lastly, whilst there were cases of social explosions, the 'Little Deal' (summed up among Soviet citizens with the phrase 'they pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work'), characterised Soviet society much more than hippies, holidays or housing.

Of course, eighteen years of rule is a long period of time to consider, and there is justification in viewing Brezhnev's early years as a period of stability rather than stagnation. After the USSRs experience of three revolutions, two world wars, one civil war, Stalin's Terror, collectivisation, industrialisation, and no less than four famines, Brezhnev reportedly remarked that 'Soviet people should receive a peaceful life, so they can work normally'.[6] One way this was pursued was through orderly and stable governance. Greater security of tenure for senior officials, a stable working environment, collective leadership, and consensus in policy was therefore prioritised. This probably had more of an impact on the 'modestly improved economic performance' of the late 1960s than the economic reforms pursued in 1965.[7]

But as Bacon points out, 'stability is the flip-side of stagnation'.[8] What began as a breakaway from the instability of the Khrushchev era undeniably developed into stagnation. 'The Politburo grew old together, the younger generation of leaders was held back' and corruption,

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For a summary of various subcultures in the Soviet Union, see: Julianne Fürst, 'Where Did All the Normal People Go?: Another Look at the Soviet 1970s', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* , 14.3, (2013), pp. 621-640.

[3] Ian D. Thatcher, 'Brezhnev as Leader, in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. by Bacon and Sandle, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 22.

[4] Two such examples include: Edwin Bacon, 'Reconsidering Brezhnev', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. Edwin and Sandle, pp. 2-3 and Mary McAuley, *Soviet Politics 1917-1991* (Oxford: University of Oxford, 1992), p. 86.

[5] Bacon, 'Reconsidering Brezhnev', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. by Bacon and Sandle, p. 2.

[6] William Tompson, *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev* (London: Pearson education ltd, 2003), p. 26.

[7] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[8] Bacon, 'Reconsidering Brezhnev', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. by Bacon and Sandle p. 11.

encouraged by job security, was prevalent.[9] The corruption began with the lives that these elites were privileged to on the state budget, which 'assumed luxurious proportions in the given Soviet conditions'. The privileges were used as a carrot by employers in the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, and various ministries in exchange for good job performance. In 1986 (the system was the same as in Brezhnev's lifetime), Anatoly Dobrynin found himself in 'a world apart' when he became secretary of the Central Committee. He was entitled to a Dacha near Moscow with two cooks, two gardeners, and four waitresses. The dacha itself was comprised of two floors, a large dining room, a living room, multiple bedrooms, and a projection room. There was also a tennis court, a sauna and an orangery, complete with a Zil limousine and several bodyguards. The material privilege would only have been greater for a Politburo member, 'let alone general-secretary'.[10]

The privilege did not stop at material benefits alone, however. The hereditary nature of the Soviet system meant that those on top could pull strings to aid their children get the best education and career possible. Corruption grew further still, as it 'began to eat into the legitimacy, efficiency and budget of the state'. One such instance includes the scandal in which the entire republican Party leadership of Uzbekistan was found to have been involved in a massive fraud between 1976 and 1983. In that time, the equivalent of $2 billion was embezzled from the central government for millions of tons of non-existent cotton. The plan was masterminded by the Uzbek Party leader and even involved the First Deputy Interior Minister, Brezhnev's son-in-law. These multiple layers of corruption are a clear case of the decay of political life under Brezhnev's rule.[11]

Yet, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) did not have to be involved in such largescale scandals for it to be identifiable as stagnant. For decades, admission into the party had been the first step into a flourishing career or promotion. Membership was only offered by officials, who were tasked with the recruitment of as many potential members as possible. This resulted in the CPSU containing a range of members from 'staunch Stalinists, Khrushchev-type reformers, political weathercocks, Social Democrats, Russian nationalists, Baltic patriots', to those who only joined for career advancement.[12] There was no political message that could unite such a range of opinion, and so the CPSU repeated 'the old ideology, with its old phrases', until it became less meaningful, and 'hollower and hollower'.[13]

[9] Ibid.
[10] Moshe Lewin, *The Soviet Century*, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2016), pp. 230-232.
[11] Mark Galeotti, *Gorbachev and his Revolution* (London: Macmillan Press ltd, 1997), p.13.
[12] McAuley, p. 86.

[13] Ibid.

This gave the main chamber of mainstream political discussion the impression of decay, but this theme, leaders repeating the old ideology of Marx and the Bolsheviks, was picked up by a Soviet dissident, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his letter to Soviet leaders, dispatched shortly before his exile in 1974. He evaluates the Soviet Union's 'inability to change even a single letter, a single syllable of what Marx said […] about industrial development'.[14] Solzhenitsyn conversely advocated a '*zero growth economy*, a stable economy', arguing that any further industrial growth would be 'ruinous', for the environment and humankind.[15] It was unlikely that any Soviet leader would share such a position, as plans for industrial growth was the business of the day. Regardless, economic growth stagnated during Brezhnev's rule, and attempts to reverse the trend were doomed to failure. According to Solzhenitsyn, this was because the Brezhnev leadership had dawdled and repeated 'what others had done' by keeping the Soviet command economy as it had been for decades.[16]

The priority of this policy, which had been closely identifiable with Stalin, was rapid growth in output through centralised planning, to facilitate the USSR's rapid industrialisation process and to compete with the economies of developed capitalist countries. The quantity of manufactured goods was thus prioritised over their quality. Planners gave enterprises high output targets to be reached, with bonuses used as incentives to exceed the expectations of these plans. The value of enterprises was thus based not on profits, but how many goods, regardless of their own value or quality, could be made.

This system may have aided in the industrialisation and impressive growth of the Soviet economy under Stalin, but output rates declined during the Brezhnev era. Estimates from the CIA and G. I. Khanin, a crucial figure in Soviet debates on economic reform after Brezhnev's death, placed the growth rate at 5.2% and 7.2% respectively for 1950-60. In 1975-80, their respective estimates are placed at 1.9% and 1.0%. Whilst the official Soviet figures are inflated, they too show a downward trend.[17] The Stalinist economic plan had hitherto been successful in growing the economy, because it had the simple goal of military industrialisation and relied on coercion. Brezhnev was now using the same system without the use of Stalinist violence, and to achieve much more complex ends. Without effective change, the result was a stagnating economy.[18]

The Kosygin reforms of 1965 did seek to reverse this trend, however. In the package, managerial powers were enhanced, and the amount of plan indicators was reduced. It introduced

[14] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to Soviet Leaders*, trans. by Hilary Sternberg (London: Index on Censorship, 1974), p. 24.
[15] Ibid., p. 22.
[16] Ibid., p. 24.
[17] Mark Harrison, 'Economic Growth and Slowdown', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. Edwin and Sandle, p. 40.
[18] Galeotti, p. 16.

payment for capital, bonus funds for enterprises, sales targets and decentralised some investment decisions. However, the reform was also 'fraught with contradictions and many of the changes were never implemented'.[19] This was to be expected, as Brezhnev's leadership was based on collective responsibility and consensus. This style of collective leadership, in which Brezhnev acted as a deal broker, had some advantages. The erratic leadership of Khrushchev, who tended to act in the moment, almost brought the Soviet Union to war with the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and led to a disastrous agriculture campaign.[20] Brezhnev also took advice from experts in fields that he did not fully understand, unlike his predecessor.[21] However, it also meant that most decisions had to be made through compromise, and so there was a 'built-in bias' against radical measures.[22] The economic reformers therefore could only reach political compromises 'with more conservative elements in the leadership', whilst Brezhnev himself opposed the reforms.[23] McAuley emphasises this leadership style as the main factor for economic decay. Economic departments were not expected to act independently, but instead looked up the chain of command for cues. If the leadership was not dynamic, as the Brezhnev leadership was not, then departments would act under the status quo. At this point, the status quo was leading to economic stagnation, and so under McAuley's argument, Brezhnev's leadership contributed directly to the decay.[24]

To return to the Kosygin reforms, a recalculation of producer prices was also included, intended to free sectors from losses imposed by prices that discriminated against them. However, change to the actual mechanism of price formation was not pursued. Prices instead continued to be set centrally and failed to reflect relative scarcities. In the absence of such economically meaningful prices, cost and profit were 'statistical artefacts, devoid of real economic significance'.[25] Thus, managers being encouraged by the reforms to act with their new freedoms based on price and profit signals 'was as likely to reduce allocative efficiency as to increase it'.[26] Harrison places emphasis on the failure of government prices committees to fix the prices of tens of thousands of goods, which would allocate scarce resources to efficiently satisfy plans 'even for one year at a time'.[27] Regardless, without radical reform to the mechanism of price calculation, the economy was likely to keep on its course of stagnation, regardless of who the departments looked towards for cues.

[19] Tompson, pp. 64-66.
[20] Galeotti, p. 17.
[21] Ian D. Thatcher, 'Brezhnev as Leader, in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. by Bacon and Sandle, p. 27.
[22] Galeotti, p. 17.
[23] Tompson, pp.64-66.
[24] McAuley, pp. 79-82.
[25] Tompson, p. 68.
[26] Ibid.

[27] Mark Harrison, 'Economic Growth and Slowdown', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. Edwin and Sandle, p. 59.

Another problem was the fear of the leadership concerning the social and political consequences of applying economic penalties for poor performance. In the case of enterprises, this meant closure, and in the case of workers, unemployment. Neither was acceptable to the regime, but it helped damage economic output. Excessive labour, for example, which was hoarded by managers like any other commodity, reduced levels of productivity. Measures to rectify this, such as the 1967 Shchekino Chemical Plant experiment, which gave managers full control of their wage fund, failed, due to failure to fulfil excessive targets given after the needed labour had been let go.[28]

With the failure and abandonment of the reform a few years later, the leadership turned to other short-term solutions. Emphasis was made here because it was also feared that further economic reforms would lead to demands for political reforms as well, just as had happened during the Prague Spring of 1968.[29] So, the reprieve gained by the oil embargo of 1973-74, which increased the price of gold and oil of which the Soviet Union was rich in both, was a welcome one. Any prospect of further reform was thus deemed unnecessary and swept out of sight.[30] Trade was also pursued, as hope for economic growth was placed on technology imported from the West.[31]

These solutions, however, ignored that the Soviet system itself was flawed. Another Soviet dissident, Andrei Sakharov, conceded the system had been beneficial in the past, but pointed out the USSR had caught up with the US only in 'some of the old, traditional industries', such as coal and steel. In the newer fields, such as 'automation, computers, [and] petrochemicals', growth was minimal.[32] The command economy simply could not adapt to the economic needs of modern life. Technology was imported by the Soviet Union, but crucially, 'the institutions and values that had made such achievements possible' were not.[33] Not only was the economy stagnating, but the Brezhnev leadership was unwilling to radically adapt to their situation to solve their problem effectively. All the while, 'the capitalists of the US', Sakharov writes, were 'actually using the social principles of socialism', improving the position of working people there. He goes on to suggest that the Brezhnev leadership should have borrowed the 'positive elements' of the capitalist model, by overhauling the failing Soviet command economy and introducing aspects of a market economy.[34]

[28] Ibid., pp. 61-62.
[29] McAuley, p. 77.
[30] Suny, p. 436.
[31] Mike Bower, 'Brezhnev and Superpower Relations', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. by Bacon and Sandle, pp. 98-99.
[32] Andrei D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, ed. by Harrison E. Salisbury, trans. by The New York Times (New York: Norton & Company, 1968), p. 72.
[33] Tompson, p. 73.
[34] Sakharov, p.74.

With this we can see that the leaders and managers of the Soviet economy, most of whom had stayed in their cushioned jobs for around 30 years, were unwilling to adapt, to the cost of the economy. The emphasis on caution and collective leadership led to complications and contradictions within the Kosygin reforms. No radical change was sought in the system, characterised by the inefficiency of the price calculation mechanism. All the while, the Brezhnev leadership was afraid of the political and social consequences of such reforms. The Prague Spring destroyed anymore prospects of reform for good. Only short-term solutions, such as trade, technology and oil were prioritised, delaying the problems for another day.

Juliane Fürst argues that although people had to contend with the problems and mundanities that the USSRs economic stagnation brought, such as shortages and poor quality of goods, we must not forget that *subjectively,* the period offered an exciting life for some. Moscow 'blossomed', and society was shaken by new forms of underground art and expression. Many were 'entrenched in the second economy' tolerated by the authorities. Although the Central Committee of the Komsomol (the Soviet youth organisation) allowed the development of disco clubs, the 'bustling energy' of Moscow 'manifested itself in the grey area between organized youth and unsanctioned entertainment'. The introduction of music by the Beatles to Soviet audiences, as well as translations of other western musicians helped to develop a new, exciting culture. At the crux of her argument is that society was no longer reliant on the Soviet authorities for guidance, but that to be normal in a western sense, was to go against the stagnation of the regime. The lives of some individuals then during Brezhnev's rule, such as Arnold Gurevich, 'the master black marketeer of Dnepropetrovsk' were far from stagnant. His 1970s 'were not stuck in queues for deficit items'. Rather, they were probably the most 'exciting period of his life'.[35]

While Fürst is writing about a rather specific segment of Soviet society, it is true that some aspects were also changing in general for the better during Brezhnev's rule. As Suny writes, the face of the Soviet Union was changing, as millions flocked for the cities to enjoy the higher standard of living promised there. More people owned their own homes, as 40% of Soviet families shared an apartment or bathrooms with others in the early Brezhnev years, but by 1975, over 70% of working-class families lived in unshared apartments. Television ownership rose from 24% in 1965 to 85% in 1980. One out of every three citizens were enrolled in a form of educational institution from 1964 to 1982. Illiteracy had been effectively eliminated and educators aimed to achieve secondary education for the entire population. From the sixty universities and eight hundred higher

[35] Fürst, pp. 621-640.

technical schools of the Soviet Union emerged 'the largest scientific-technological intelligentsia in the world'.[36]

However, it is true that even more aspects of Soviet society were in decline and decay. For instance, Suny also shows that the Soviet Union per-capita consumption of food was one-half to three-quarters of the level in advanced Western countries, with a much heavier priority placed on bread and potatoes for calories. Shortages of goods and food was common, as queues, time wasted searching for scarce products, and hoarding became common practice.[37] Housing was unsatisfactory, as by the end of 1970, only Latvia and Estonia had achieved the Soviet minimum requirement of living space.[38] Meanwhile, whilst it is true that family holidays appeared at this time, the conditions of facilities were poor. Many people abandoned 'organised' trips and instead held their own getaways.[39] Further, whilst society was frozen for many workers in dead end jobs, this was especially true for women. They were not seen as 'freaks' for wanting a career, as in the West, but were very much 'considered inferior' at work.[40] All the while, issues debated in the West, such as feminism, had no place 'even on the private agenda of Soviet intellectuals' interested in discussing what they saw as the decay of society.[41] Lastly, crime increased, along with child abuse, divorce and mortality rates. The Soviet Union led the world in alcohol consumption per capita.[42] For most people, society itself was also in a state of stagnation.

The stagnation of Brezhnev's rule is difficult to dispute, and one Soviet anecdote captured the reputation that the period received. In it, the Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev are stuck on a train when the tracks run out, and each comes up with their own unique solution for the problem. Lenin exhorts to a crowd of peasants and farmers to lay more track, to no avail. Stalin decides to shoot the train crew, but still the train does not move. Khrushchev rehabilitates the dead crew, ordering that the tracks from behind be placed in front, but again, no progress is made. All the while, Brezhnev rocks back and forth with the curtains drawn, pretending that the train is moving.[43]

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[36] Suny, pp. 436-442.
[37] Ibid., p. 339.
[38] Henry W. Morton, 'What have the Soviet Leaders Done about the Housing Crisis?', in *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's*, ed. by Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tőkés (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp.169-170.
[39] Noack pp. 59-77.
[40] Barbara W. Jancar, 'Women and Soviet Politics', in *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's*, ed. by Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tőkés, pp. 118-126.
[41] McAuley, p. 84.
[42] Suny, p. 438.
[43] CIA document detailing Soviet jokes, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89G00720R000800040003-6.pdü

The Soviet Union was going nowhere, caught in stagnation, and the leadership under Brezhnev was unwilling and unable to solve the problems that existed. The elites, under the pretence of stability, became the essence of this stagnation, as their privileges and corruption defeated any notions of an egalitarian society, whilst the CPSU itself had become a hollow shell. The Kosygin reforms failed out of fears of the possible social and political repercussions; conservatism on price formulation, and preferences for other short-term fixes, such as technology and trade, were pursued instead. As Galeotti writes, 'this was a time which called for a decisive and hard-headed leader to force change on the system', or an elite willing to sacrifice their power to 'ensure their rule had a tomorrow'.[44] Instead, we see Brezhnev pretending that the train is moving. Lastly, for a lucky minority, the Brezhnev era may well have been a time of unprecedented cultural explosion, but for the majority, inadequate food and goods, poor housing, and a lack of social mobility was the order of the day in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev's rule.

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[44] Galeotti, pp. 17-18.

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Breaking down the Base: Reconsidering Al Qaeda's Methods, Aims, and the Challenges they pose to Counterterrorism.

Sam Pearson

Abstract

The techniques employed by Al Qaeda in carrying out their attacks have created significant problems for counterterrorists trying to defeat them. In fact, it would be tempting for a superficial analysis to conclude that Al Qaeda have been phenomenally successful as a terror group. Their mass casualty attacks on symbols of US power and influence have the capacity to shock and outrage the American public, leading to demands that the US government strike back with overwhelming force. This, for Al Qaeda, makes their aims of a war between Islam and the West more achievable, while many of their other aims and grievances are likely to prove long-term recruiting assets. However, US reaction is required for their success, and many of Al Qaeda's successes have been due to unforced errors by American political leadership and media.

When Michael Scheuer wrote that "it is fair to conclude that the United States of America remains Bin Laden's only indispensable ally", he was of course inaccurate.[1] However, his statement touched on what a portion of this essay will argue - that the successes of Al Qaeda (AQ) are as much due to US reaction as to the capability of the group. An explanation of why this is the case can be found in discussing the challenges that the goals and techniques of AQ present to counterterrorists. These challenges arise from the fact that these aspects of AQ challenge core areas of the US' worldview and lead Americans to perceive the group through a lens of emotion and absolute principle. This drives demand for further violence against AQ, as per the group's goals of inciting global conflict. These circumstances are exacerbated by the role of the media, that have frequently provided considerable publicity for AQ. Given the limited scope of this article, however, aspects of the subject matter such as the Iraq war will be discussed relatively briefly, in favour of less highlighted areas.

The techniques employed by AQ in carrying out their attacks have created problems for counterterrorists trying to defeat them. Mass casualty attacks on symbols of US power and influence have the capacity to shock and outrage the American public, pushing counterterrorism to the top of

[1] Michael Scheuer, *Imperial hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*, (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2004), p. 165.

the political agenda.[2] Furthermore, the symbolic nature of these attacks makes them easy to perceive as assaults upon the very fabric of the nation, as it was by the rhetoric of the Bush administration.[3] The problem this creates for counterterrorists is that often this leads to a popular perception of terrorism that is removed from reality, leading to demands that the US government strike back with overwhelming force. This in turn can create further grievances against the United States. Indeed, through encouraging violent reaction, it plays into one of AQ's key charges against the US, namely that it considers itself to be the ruler over the rest of the world.[4]

The techniques employed by AQ in carrying out their activities can cause violent and overwhelming response. However, US reaction is required to effect this. Mass casualty attacks are the principle method by which AQ has conducted its campaign against the US; the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) caused 6 deaths, the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya killed a combined total of 224 people.[5] The attack on the USS Cole killed 17 US sailors.[6] In turn, the Clinton administration ordered cruise missile strikes against suspected AQ facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. A total of 79 missiles were fired against a group whose funding had reduced significantly with the disownment of Osama bin Laden (OBL) by his family.[7] However, there was no retaliation for the bombing of the USS Cole, due to Clinton's reluctance.[8] This contravenes the view of Richard Clarke, who was no doubt seeking to defend his own record of failing to deal with OBL, as had Clinton really wanted action against OBL he would have ordered it unambiguously. [9] The attacks of 9/11, on the other hand, provoked a full invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion of Iraq was spun as part of the response to these attacks, evidenced by the Bush administration including it under the umbrella of the 'War on Terror'.[10] What is evident is that while AQ have certainly been effective at

[2] 'American Psyche Reeling from Terror Attacks', 19th September 2001, in 'people-press.org', < https://www.people-press.org/2001/09/19/american-psyche-reeling-from-terror-attacks/ > [Accessed 01-12-19]

[3] Peter Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda*, (London: Free Press, 2011), p. 58.

[4] Osama bin Laden, interviewed by Peter Arnett, CNN, March 1997, in 'From Somalia to Afghanistan', in Bruce Lawrence, 'Messages to The World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden', (London: Verso, 2005), p. 44-57.

[5] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: AQ's Road to 9/11*, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 177, 270-2.

[6] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: AQ's Road to 9/11*, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 319-320.

[7] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: AQ's Road to 9/11*, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 319-320.

[8] Thomas H. Kean et al, 'The 9/11 Commission Report', National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (Washington: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States). Found at 'govinfo.library.unt.edu' < http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm > [Accessed 02-12-19] pp. 190-7.

[9] Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies; Inside America's War on Terror*, (London: Free Press, 2004). p 204.

[10] Peter Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda*, (London: Free Press, 2011). p 57-58.

carrying out attacks, the success of these attacks in sparking a response is contingent on whether or not it is deemed by US leadership that there is political desire or need to respond.

That AQ desire a US response to their attacks, as part of a wider war between America and Islam, is indisputable. Indeed, the leadership of AQ have made every attempt to tell the world this, however limited their success has been. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, in his statement confirming the death of, and eulogising, OBL, claimed that his one goal was to incite a full-scale war between Muslims worldwide and 'the West'.[11] Zawahiri also wrote in 'Knights under the Prophet's Banner' that it was necessary to attack the US in order to provoke this war.[12] OBL himself stated that he wanted all Muslims worldwide to fight the US, either in their own countries or by emigrating to do so.[13] This provides evidence in two ways. First, that AQ want a war. Second, they require the US to act in order for this to become a reality. Zawahiri's first statement implied that at some level the US has acted in a way that requires the incitement of such a war, while the second states that a reaction by the US is required to meet AQ's aims. OBL's statement was in response to US soldiers being deployed in Saudi Arabia and is also useful in that it clarifies the scale of this conflict – it is to be worldwide, with every Muslim fighting the US. When viewed in context, however, reality has not quite lived up to their intentions. While the US popularity among Muslim majority countries is down, particularly in Pakistan and Turkey, it is not an insurmountable hostility.[14] In Indonesia, US approval ratings have rebounded since their lowest recorded point in 2005, while Kuwait maintained a steady majority of approval between 2003 and 2007.[15] These dates include the Iraq war, a significant detracting factor for perceptions of the US internationally. Furthermore, low poll numbers do not equate to declarations of war. But these poll numbers do suggest that dramatic responses have caused further grievances against the US, driven by their response to AQ's attacks.

It is AQ's ideological aims that make the media problematic for counterterrorists, as its use is key for the group. Boaz Ganor outlined a theory of mutual benefit between terrorists and the media

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[11] Ayman Al-Zawahiri, 'The Noble Knight Dismounted', in Donald Holbrook, *AQ 2.0: A Critical Reader*, (Online: Oxford University Press, 2018), Oxford Scholarship Online <https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190856441.001.0001/oso-9780190856441 > [Accessed 27-11-19].

[12] Ayman al Zawahiri, 'Knights Under the Prophet's Banner', in *In His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr Ayman al Zawahiri*, Laura Mansfield (trans), (New Jersey: TLG Publications, 2006), p. 219.

[13] Osama Bin Laden, 'The Invasion of Arabia', December 29th, 1994. In *Messages to The World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, Bruce Laurence (eds). (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 18-19

[14]'Question Search' in 'pewresearch.org' < https://www.pewresearch.org/global/question-search/?qid=824&cntIDs=&stdIDs= > [Accessed 27-11-19].

[15]'Question Search' in 'pewresearch.org' < https://www.pewresearch.org/global/question-search/?qid=824&cntIDs=&stdIDs= > [Accessed 27-11-19].

– one gains coverage of their actions and cause, the other ratings and viewership.[16] AQ have acted within this interpretation, having engaged with international press and disseminated propaganda in a variety of ways. The problem is that it is in the media that we can observe the collision of two different paradigms. Ganor points to polling that indicates that the American public both support media coverage of terror attacks, as part of their right to know, but are also aware that that this coverage encourages terrorists.[17] These different points of view express both the paradigm of absolute principle and that of a realist approach. A sensible compromise could no doubt be reached between them, yet in AQ's case this does not seem to have happened. The 1997 interview of OBL by CNN's Peter Arnett provides evidence for this; questions were submitted to AQ beforehand, and they were permitted to excise those pertaining to OBL's finances or personal life.[18] Furthermore, the broad questions offered OBL every chance to expound AQ propaganda.[19] While CNN's typical American constituency were unlikely to be swayed by these messages, they were also broadcasted to AQ's constituency – populations in Muslim majority countries. Thus, CNN's interview with OBL can be seen as gifting AQ the chance to propagandise. At other times, the media can play into AQ's aim to foment division and spark conflict. Fox News' online coverage of the eighteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks was marked by an opinion piece claiming the attacks were sufficient justification in of themselves to still be at war with AQ and related groups eighteen years later.[20] They also posted an AQ propaganda piece promising to strike the US again.[21] This contributes directly to AQ's goals of causing a global war between Islam and the west, through both highlighting the threats AQ have made, and advocating for the continuation of war in Muslim majority countries.

One of AQ's key goals is to defeat the state of Israel by attacking the US. In this they have remained unsuccessful – in 2019, Israel has received the largest amount of cumulative US aid.[22] Walter Hixson sought to explain these circumstances through examining the rise of the Israel lobby;

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[16] Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: a Guide for Decision-Makers*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 232.
[17] Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: a Guide for Decision-Makers*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 232.
[18] Osama bin Laden, interviewed by Peter Arnett, CNN, March 1997, in 'From Somalia to Afghanistan', in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to The World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, (London: Verso, 2005). p 44.
[19] Osama bin Laden, interviewed by Peter Arnett, CNN, March 1997, in 'From Somalia to Afghanistan', in Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to The World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, (London: Verso, 2005). p 44-57
[20] Daniel P. Gabriel, 'Ex-CIA Counterterrorism Officer Gabriel: 18 years after 9/11 we cannot forget our 'never again' promise'. In 'foxnews.com' <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/ex-cia-counterterrorism-officer-gabriel-18-years-after-9-11-we-cannot-forget-our-vow-never-again-promise > [Accessed 28-11-19]
[21] 'Al Qaeda' in 'foxnews.com' < https://www.foxnews.com/category/world/terrorism/al-qaeda > [Accessed 28-11-19]
[22] Walter L. Hixson, *Israel's Armour: the Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestine Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, March 2019). in 'Cambridge.org' < https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/israels-armor/400B00B71F10319719FD3D15C7178AA7 >. p. 1.

a movement that combines centralised structures and informal support to be the most powerful diasporic lobby in the US.[23] The reason behind its support lies, Hixson argues, in American desires for atonement over their inaction against the holocaust, in their worldview of Israelis and Americans as both chosen settler peoples, and American religiosity.[24] Hixson's argument contrasts in some ways to that of Jonathan Rynold, who argued that explaining US support via religiosity and atonement was simplistic and ignorant of the popularity of the Zionist movement before World War Two.[25] However, their arguments converge on the idea that US support for Israel is deeply rooted in American political culture. From this consensus, it is clear that the US will not give up Israel now or in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, it is clear that this is due to the US perceiving the issue through a lense of emotive cultural myths, in a similar vein to the perceptions of AQ mentioned earlier. The problem this poses for counterterrorists is that the issue of Palestine will therefore continue to radicalise. AQ will continue to gain recruits, being a group dedicated to the overthrow of Israel.

In the area in which AQ has been most successful, that of US withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, success has been equally due to unforced errors made in US foreign policy as their own capability. These primarily came from the Bush administration's desire to go to war in Iraq, spurred by the ideas of the PNAC. Invading Iraq had several impacts. It took pressure of the Taliban and AQ in Afghanistan, and it presented AQ with the opportunity to hit US soldiers in a vulnerable position.[26] Furthermore, it destabilised the region and contributed to the Arab Spring, that granted AQ new lease of life.[27] For that last point we have as evidence leaked US diplomatic cables and captured terrorist documents detailing extremist links to Syria, Libya and Egypt from Iraq.[28] The PNAC (which counted Bush's defence secretary, deputy defence secretary, and chair of the defence advisory board as members), had lobbied President Clinton to invade Iraq in 1998, meaning there was an

[23] Walter L. Hixson, 'Israel's Armour: the Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestine Conflict' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, March 2019), p.1.
[24] Walter L. Hixson, 'Israel's Armour: the Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestine Conflict' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, March 2019), p4.
[25] Jonathan Rynold, 'The Arab Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, March 2015). 'Cambridge.org' <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/arabisraeli-conflict-in-american-political-culture/07999F5BDE38FD22551B98A07EF9D2A6 > [Accessed 27-11-19], p.2.
[26] Peter Bergen, 'The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda', (London: Free Press, 2011), pp.155-163.
[27] Donald Holbrook, 'Al Qaeda's response to the Arab spring', *Perspectives on terrorism,* Vol. 6, Issue 6. (Dec 2012), p.17.
[28] When Chickens Come Home to Roost: Syria's Proxy War in Iraq at Heart of 2008-2009 Seidnaya Prison Riots', US Department of State, (Damascus: 24th Feb 2010). Found at 'Wikileaks.org' < https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10DAMASCUS158_a.html > [27-11-19]; Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, 'Al Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at The Sinjar Records", Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point, (New York: West Point Military Academy, 2007).

established desire to do so.[29] But it would not have been politically viable without the impact of 9/11. As covered earlier, the attack profoundly shocked the American public. Without this challenge to American feelings of security, it is likely that the *casus belli* of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' and the alleged alliance between AQ and Saddam Hussein would have been insufficient.[30] The prospect of a devastating attack on the US, and the threat that AQ posed, were more abstract before 9/11. The ensuing destruction and casualties made the mistake of the Iraq war possible, as the Bush administration were able to portray it as part of countering the threat of AQ. The strength of this feeling is shown in part by the fact that, eighteen years later, the right wing of the US media is running articles arguing that the possibility of another attack was reason enough to continue the present wars. Therefore, AQ gave the Bush administration cover to make the strategic mistake of invading Iraq, and thereby withdrawing from Saudi Arabia, but did not force it to do so.

It would be tempting for a superficial analysis to conclude that AQ have been a phenomenally successful as a terror group. It would appear retrospectively that they have managed to force the US into a series of costly wars without a clear exit strategy. But while we should not overlook AQ's competency in carrying out terror attacks, the evidence suggests that they are dependent on a US response to achieve their aims. Furthermore, AQ's exploitation of near-sighted media attitudes to terrorism and the divide between reality and perception regarding terrorism (and associated foreign policy issues) in the US public imagination have presented significant problems for counterterrorists trying to end them as a terror threat. Unless these issues are addressed, AQ may endure for some time to come. To prevent this, a serious discussion needs to be had about the role of the media and behaviour of the US abroad.

[29] 'Letter to President Clinton from the Project for the New American Century', 26th January 1998, at 'web.archive.org' <https://web.archive.org/web/20130621044422/http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm> [Accessed 28-11-19]

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