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Hi all,

It's been a pleasure this year to oversee the production of the second issue of the Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History. The high quality of last year's journal meant we had a tough act to follow, but I think we've created another fantastic issue. Filled with articles on a huge range of topics- from same-sex relations in biblical pronouncements, the Iranian Revolution, to the late 1980s insurrection in South Africa- there's hopefully something for everyone within these pages.

My thanks go to my Editor, Daniel Williams, who has been an immense help to me and always on hand to help with any query or decision. Equally, my team of markers have really done the heavy-lifting in terms of selecting the absolute best essays from our submissions. We received so many high-quality pieces this year, so I am so grateful for the marker's work in narrowing down the selection. My markers this year have been: Lena Harding, Olivia Rashid, Georgina Russell, Rebecca Williams, Rikardas Cirunas, Ulfat Islam, Nico Blackstock, Zubair Khalil, and Lukas Zaleckis. Equally, thanks to Samuel Dedman for providing the design of the journal (for all three issues), and to Dr George Gilbert for being our helping hand within the history department.

Enjoy!

Victoria Lawman

Editor-in-Chief

The controversy of biblical pronouncements on same-sex sexual relations

By Robert Tucker

Abstract

The treatment of homosexuality in the world today is, for many people, based upon the Bible's apparent rejection of it, which has led to a great deal of prejudice and discrimination against gay people. A close study of the biblical texts relating to same-sex sexual relations, however, reveals that they are highly ambiguous, and forces us to reconsider whether the Bible is 'anti-homosexual' at all. This essay does not seek to provide a conclusion on whether the Bible 'permits' homosexuality; rather, it examines various passages from the Old and New Testaments (taken from the English Standard Version, unless otherwise stated) containing pronouncements relating to same-sex relations and demonstrates how controversy may arise from interpretation, translation and, indeed, real-world application of them.

Throughout history, the Bible has acted as a moral compass for generations of people around the world, teaching right from wrong; good from bad. Yet some of the Bible's pronouncements on certain subjects or actions has led great controversy in society, both over the exact meaning of the text and its real-world application. One prominent topic is that of homosexuality, to which the "majority of conservative Christians are united in opposition".[1] It is not uncommon to see the Bible invoked as justification for discrimination against homosexuals; colloquialisms such as 'the Bible says homosexuality is wrong' can often be heard by those seeking to validate their own biases against this group of people. Indeed, a 2013 study conducted by Pew Research Center (on global attitudes towards homosexuality) gathered data from over 37,000 respondents in 39 countries, and found that acceptance of homosexuality in society correlated negatively with countries which had higher levels of 'religiosity'.[2] The results

[1] Stephen Hunt, 'The Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement in Britain Mobilization and Opposition', in *Journal of Religion and Society*, *Vol. 4* (2002), pp. 3 – 4

[2] Pew Research Center, *The Global Divide on Homosexuality* (4 June 2013),

were particularly conclusive in African countries: at least 90% of respondents in Kenya, Ghana and Uganda, for instance, answered that society should not accept homosexuality, and in these countries (using data from the 2010 round of UN censuses) over 70% of the populations are reportedly Christian.[3] Whilst it is important not to confuse correlation with causation, the results would indicate that there is a relationship between those with a greater belief in biblical teachings and those opposed to homosexuality in society. Yet the notion that the Bible condemns homosexuality is highly controversial, because it is not necessarily an accurate one, and warrants further investigation. For instance, historians have recognised that the few passages referring to homosexuality in both the Old and New Testaments can have a variety of interpretations, to the extent that, based on the intricacies of the phrasing and exact translation of words, some may not necessarily be read as 'anti-homosexual' pronouncements at all. As shall be demonstrated, there is an ambiguity surrounding each of these passages, which creates problems for both scholars attempting to understand them in a historical context, and Christians attempting to use them for moral guidance in our world today.

There are few references to same-sex sexual relations in the Old Testament, which, in itself, can be seen as significant: the entry for 'homosexuality' in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* states that "the infrequency of references" to the matter suggests "this was not a subject of great concern to OT writers".[4] Yet one of the most oft-quoted and, to many, clearest examples of biblical opposition to homosexuality, is Leviticus 18:22, which states that "You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination". This is repeated in Leviticus 20:13, with the added instruction that "they shall surely be put to death." The Book of Leviticus sets out a series of laws and regulations for the Hebrews – being, essentially, a list of 'do's and don'ts' – and it is, therefore, difficult to read these pronouncements as anything other than an explicit condemnation of same-sex sexual relations. Yet the lines remain convoluted ones, and it is easy to see how controversy may arise over various interpretations of them. In his study of Leviticus, Jacob Milgron concludes that its

http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/ [accessed 19 December 2018]

[3] UN Data, *Population by religion, sex and urban/rural residence*, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3a28#POP [accessed 19 December 2018]

[4] F. L. Cross & E. A. Livingstone (eds), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Third Edition Revised)*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 786

"prohibition" of homosexuality "is severely limited", given that it makes no mention of female same-sex relations – suggesting that lesbianism may well have been acceptable to the biblical authors – and that, given the placement of both lines amongst a larger list of forbidden heterosexual unions, they only prohibit homosexual unions between family members.[5] Yet his analysis of his own question – "Does the Bible prohibit homosexuality?"– lacks a depth of textual analysis, and his argument that the line only applies to Israelites (thus should not be taken to prohibit homosexuals in the rest of the world), is a weak one; the same could be said of the rest of Leviticus, which would render the entirety of its moral laws and codes essentially meaningless. Other historians, therefore, have paid more attention to the specific language of Leviticus, to question exactly which part of the sexual act is forbidden by it, and what its intended purpose is. Saul Olyan has concluded, from the linguistics of the Hebrew text, that "lie with a male" refers specifically to penetrative anal intercourse between two men, which was "analogous to vaginal penetration", but that the prohibition of Leviticus 18:22 only applies to the active sexual partner, or "penetrator", with the shift in focus to both partners in 20:13 representing an "editorial recasting" due to its awkward phrasing.[6]

Walsh, however, arrives at a different conclusion, believing instead that the Levitical laws address the receptive partner in male intercourse; given that "honor and shame" were "foundational social values" in Israelite society, a free adult male playing the role of the passive, receptive partner would have been emasculating, and thus shameful.[7] Furthermore, the receptive partner in male intercourse is acting in the role of a woman, which transgresses the male-female boundary, in the same way that bestiality, for instance, is forbidden because it transgresses the human-animal boundary. Daniel Boyarin agrees; with gender being "conceived around penetration and being penetrated", complicity in male anal intercourse represented "a kind of cross-dressing", which was tabooed in Israelite culture.[8] Whilst these historians may debate the specifics of the original text, therefore, they deduce that – as we will see in other

[5] Jacob Milgron, *Leviticus: A Continental Commentary* (Minneapolis, MN: Aubsburg Fortress Press, 2004), pp. 196 – 197
[6] Saul M. Olyan, '"And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying down of a Woman": On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13', in *Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 5, No. 2*. (Oct., 1994), pp. 185 - 187
[7] Jerome T. Walsh, 'Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13: Who is doing what to whom?', in *Journal of Biblical Literature, Volume 120, No. 2* (Summer 2001), p. 208
[8] Daniel Boyarin, 'Are There Any Jews in "The History of Sexuality"?', in *Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 5, No. 3* (January 1995), p. 344

biblical passages – the pronouncements are more concerned with the social implications of two free males having sex, as it represented effeminacy and a weakening of social standing, rather than calling the act itself sinful. It is here, perhaps, that we can draw a distinction between homosexuality and same-sex sexual relations: the concept of two men being in a stable, loving relationship would not have been understood in Israelite society, and thus the pronouncements of Leviticus must be read as products of their time. Indeed, the term 'homosexuality' was first used in the nineteenth century (in a translation of physician Richard von Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis*), so it is arguably unfair to use Leviticus as a condemnation of what we now understand homosexuality to be. This has not stopped Leviticus being cited as justification for laws restricting gay rights – in the 1986 case of Bowers v Hardwick, for instance, Chief Justice Burger cites "millennia of moral teaching" as evidence that sodomy should not be protected as a fundamental right in U.S. law, likely in reference to the ancient biblical laws of Leviticus and, as we shall see, Genesis.[9] Yet, as has been shown, the pronouncements relating to same-sex relations in Leviticus cannot be casually dismissed as 'prohibiting homosexuality' – our modern translation and interpretation of the Book, then, as well as our understanding of the context in which it was written, causes controversies to arise over its exact meaning.

Further controversy over the Old Testament's handling of same-sex sexual relations surrounds Genesis 19, which tells the story of God's destruction of Sodom, after sending two angels to Lot's house whom the men of the city attempt to attack and rape. This story is popularly interpreted as "a demonstration of God's wrath toward homosexuality" – such a reading makes the story particularly memorable, because it is the only instance in the Bible where we clearly see a divine punishment for those who are complicit in same-sex sexual acts.[10] In a 1986 letter regarding 'Homosexual Persons', The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) asserts that "there can be no doubt of the moral judgement" that the story makes "against homosexual relations,"[11] a notion further supported by the recent discovery that an area near the

[9] Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, *Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186* (1986), in Louis Crompton, *Homosexuality and Civilisation* (Cambridge, MA & London, England: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 34
[10] David F. Greenberg, *The Construction of Homosexuality* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 136
[11] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons* (1986), n. 6

Dead Sea, thought to be the ancient site of Sodom, was destroyed by an exploding meteor thousands of years ago.[12] Such similarities between this event and the biblical description of Sodom's destruction – "the Lord rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire" (Genesis 19:24) – would seem to provide scientific evidence of God's divine wrath against the Sodomites. The fear generated by the destruction of Sodom, therefore, may well fuel people's homophobia today; Martti Nissinen believes that such a reading of Genesis 19 "has naturally had a massive impact on how homosexuals have been treated" in Western society throughout time.[13] Indeed, we can witness the destruction of Sodom being invoked in contemporary issues of gay rights: in his discussion of homophobia relating to the story of Sodom, Michael Carden describes the political opposition to the Australian Labour Party's twentieth century reforms of discrimination laws, saying that "the spectre of Sodom…has lurked in the background" of the debates, with the government being "warned that it faced divine condemnation" for passing legislation protecting same-sex couples.[14] This seems to be a clear allusion to the divine wrath called down upon the Sodomites for their sins, showing how real-world controversy can arise over the use of a biblical story for a political agenda.

However, the chapter remains particularly controversial because of its interpretation by scholars; building on a theory first put forward by D.S. Bailey, scholarship has generally come to reject the notion that the destruction of Sodom is a warning against homosexuality.[15] Nissinen, for instance, argues that "homosexual rape is not the main theme of the story" in Genesis 19, believing instead that it is the Sodomites' "excessive arrogance, xenophobia and contempt of hospitality" which are punished; they attempt to disgrace and humiliate the foreign visitors, and incur God's wrath as a result.[16] The threatened sexual violence is only one aspect of the Sodomite's aggression against the visitors; Nissinen makes the point that, even in today's world, rape is not about sexual desire or pleasure, but, rather, is "the ultimate means of

[12] Evan Gough, *A Meteor may have Exploded in the Air 3,700 Years Ago, Obliterating Communities Near the Dead Sea* (4 December, 2018), https://www.universetoday.com/140752/a-meteor-may-have-exploded-in-the-air-3700-years-ago-obliterating-communities-near-the-dead-sea/ [accessed 3 January 2019]
[13] Martti Nissinen, *Homoeroticism in the Biblical World: A Historical Perspective* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1998), p. 45
[14] M. Carden, "Remembering Pelotit: A Queer Midrash on Calling Down Fire", in Ken Stone (ed.), *Queer Commentary and the Hebrew Bible* (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001), pp. 167 – 8
[15] John Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 93
[16] Nissinen, *Homoeroticism*, p. 48

subjugation and domination", suggesting that the story is more about an exercise of power over the foreigners, with homosexual violence simply being a product of this.[17] David Greenberg agrees; threatening to rape a guest was an "outrageous violation of hospitality norms", with "all ancient moral codes" upholding that hospitality to travellers be shown.[18] Even some leaders within the Christian faith have taken this view – for instance, United Methodist pastor Jimmy Creech, speaking of passages in the Bible which refer to homosexuality, believes that they condemn the "violence, idolatry and exploitation" relating to same-sex relations, "not the same-gender nature of the behaviour", which seems applicable in the case of Genesis 19.[19] As in Leviticus, therefore, Genesis appears to condemn the breaching of social 'norms'– that is, aggression towards a foreign guest, to whom it was customary to show the utmost respect – of which homosexual acts are merely a by-product.

The angels of the story, furthermore, do not explicitly state their reasons for destroying the city, simply telling Lot that "the outcry against its people has become great before the Lord, and the Lord has sent us to destroy it." (19:13). Indeed, in the chapter preceding the story, God proclaims that "the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah is great and their sin is very grave" (18:20), whilst Genesis 13:13 states that "the men of Sodom were wicked, great sinners against the Lord", yet the verses make no mention of what, in fact, these sins are. Nowhere within the book of Genesis is sodomy named as the cause for the city's destruction. Indeed, *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* states that the story "does not emphasize this particular sin", nor do any of the subsequent references to Sodom throughout the Old Testament, suggesting that this is not the real moral of the story.[20] Based on the lack of textual evidence within Genesis, therefore, it cannot be concluded that the chapter is a parable about God's punishment of men for their homosexual practices; there is a historical consensus that the story criticises the Sodomite's inhospitality, not their sexuality. Nevertheless, it is clear to see how scholarly debate over the exact interpretation of Genesis 19, which

[17] *Ibid*
[18] Greenberg, *Construction of Homosexuality*, p. 136
[19] Jimmy Creech, *What Does the Bible Say About Homosexuality?* (n.d.), https://www.hrc.org/resources/what-does-the-bible-say-about-homosexuality [accessed 3 January 2019]
[20] Cross & Livingstone (eds), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (*1997), p. 786

often contradicts the use of the passage by Christians, continue to make the chapter so controversial in the world today.

If the few references to homosexuality in the Old Testament are, at least, ambiguous in their exact meaning, we can similarly examine how the topic is dealt with in several New Testament passages – the "precise interpretation" of which, determines Greenberg, also "remains controversial."[21] On one hand, the CDF finds that there is "a clear consistency within the Scriptures themselves on the moral issue of homosexual behaviour" – in other words, the fact that the condemnation of homosexuality is consistent between the Old and New Testaments, despite them being written in different times, is proof that the Church's opposition to the issue is based on a "foundation of…constant Biblical testimony." It is important, it concludes, that today's Catholics maintain a continuity with the ancient communities within which the Scriptures were written, and that they continue to receive the same word of God.[22] Yet, again, historians have taken issue with the meaning conveyed by New Testament pronouncements on homosexuality, and question whether it can undeniably be concluded that same-sex sexual relations are condemned. Robin Scroggs, for example, has argued that the New Testament is mostly unconcerned about homosexuality as an issue, given that there are only three passages, from Paul, which refer to it, and that each of them is found within a longer list of traditional vices in Greco-Roman and Jewish cultures.[23] There is, concludes Scroggs, no original statement from Paul provided on the issue.

Boswell goes further, claiming that Paul's writings contain "no clear condemnation of homosexual acts" – he takes issue with the term 'arsenokoitai', appearing in both 1 Corinthians 6:9 and 1 Timothy 1:10, which is generally translated into English as 'homosexuals'.[24] (The Good News translation of 1 Corinthians 6:9, in fact, adds the word "perverts", implying a strong level of judgment by the translator.) By studying the linguistics of 'arsenokoitai', Boswell deduces that it likely meant 'male prostitute', until, after several centuries, its meaning was confused with other words relating to sexual activity and it came to be associated with 'homosexuality'. Its lack of

[21] Greenberg, *Construction of Homosexuality*, p. 210
[22] CDF, *Letter to the Bishops* (1986), n. 5
[23] Robin Scroggs, *The New Testament and Homosexuality* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 99 – 101
[24] Boswell, *Christianity*, pp. 107 – 110

prior usage in other Greek writings about homoerotic sexuality, he concludes, serves as proof of this.[25] Yet Scroggs arrives at a different conclusion: its lack of prior use in Greek suggests instead that 'arsenokoitai' is a made-up word, or a literal translation of a foreign phrase – namely, the Hebrew term 'mishnav zakur', or 'lying with a male'.[26] Since 'mishnav zakur' refers to the active sexual partner, when considered in conjunction with the terms 'malokoi' (in Corinthians) and 'pornoi' (in Timothy), Scroggs claims that both passages "attack very specific forms of pederasty" in the Greco-Roman world – that is, the adult male who occasionally uses another young man for sexual purposes.[27] Indeed, this was already condemned by contemporary writers, as, for Romans, the only issue with homosexual acts was "the social status of a partner", due to "concerns about effeminacy" among men of upper classes leading to fears that the empire would be weakened militarily.[28] Whilst it is unlikely that Paul looked upon homosexuality favourably, therefore, these New Testament pronouncements do not necessarily represent a general condemnation of homosexuality; they may only relate to a specific type of male prostitution, which was attacked due to its social or military implications for the Roman Empire.

Although their modern application may be limited, however, we can still witness these New Testament passages being used by critics to justify an anti-gay agenda. One notable example is reality TV star Phil Robertson, who was suspended by American network A&E in 2013 after an interview with GQ magazine, in which he linked homosexuality to sin, citing 1 Corinthians 6:9.[29] This has been commented on by Franklin Graham, a controversial U.S. preacher who condemned the backlash against Robertson's "orthodox, biblical view on the sin of homosexuality" by the "intolerant gay community."[30] The opinions of Graham himself, as president of the hugely influential Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, led to great opposition towards his visit to the UK in 2018; he believes that the growing acceptance of gay rights in society represents "a full-scale assault against Christianity", the architect behind which "is none other than

[25] *Ibid*, p. 345
[26] Scroggs, *The New Testament*, pp. 107 – 108
[27] *Ibid*, p. 121
[28] Greenberg, *Construction of Homosexuality*, pp. 157 – 159
[29] BBC News, *US TV star Phil Robertson suspended for anti-gay remarks* (19 December 2013), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-25444631 [accessed 21 December 2018]
[30] Franklin Graham, *Ducking the Issue: The Church and Today's Permissive Culture* (17 February, 2014), https://billygraham.org/decision-magazine/february-2014/ducking-the-issue/ [accessed 21 December 2018]

Satan himself."[31] Such fear-inducing rhetoric, which seeks to create an association between gay people and Satan, encourages intolerance and ostracization of homosexuals, for the sake of Christian's own souls. As a wider point, however, this example demonstrates how, regardless of the precise meaning of such biblical pronouncements, proponents of homosexual intolerance will continue to use them in a way to serve their own personal or political agendas, thus continuing to make them controversial.

The other passage referring to homosexuality in the New Testament is found in Paul's Letter to the Romans, which suggests that same-sex relations are features of the Gentile (non-Israelite) world; as a consequence of rejecting God, he "gave them up to dishonourable passions", with women exchanging "natural relations for those that are contrary to nature" and men being "consumed with passion for one another" (Romans 1:26-27). This passage is highly notable as being the only instance within the Bible which references female same-sex relations; the lack of attention given to lesbianism in the Bible suggests that this was of far less concern to biblical writers. This could, of course, simply be a result of the Bible's intended audience being men – as the more educated and dominant members of Greco-Roman society – with women being expected to follow the male reading of it. Yet, again, Romans 1 cannot be read as a simple condemnation of women having sexual relations; in Bernadette Brooten's study of female homoeroticism, she concludes that Paul only condemns female homosexuality as 'unnatural' because of "the widely held cultural view that women are passive by nature", and thus should remain so in sexual relations.[32] Greenberg, meanwhile, suggests that the women's actions being "contrary to nature" could merely be describing those that took a "superior position in heterosexual intercourse"; this would be a subversion of their "natural relations" with men, to whom they were expected to be sexually submissive.[33] It is not necessarily, therefore, the act of women having sex that is condemned by Romans, but, perhaps, the social implications of it – if indeed the passage refers to female homosexuality at all. Regarding the men, however, Greenberg is more certain that Paul viewed the deviation from their "natural relations with

[31] *Ibid*
[32] Bernadette J. Brooten, *Love Between Women: Early Christian Responses to Female Homoeroticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 216
[33] Greenberg, *Construction of Homosexuality*, pp. 214 – 215

women" (Romans 1:27) negatively, as the overarching theme of the passage is to describe the wickedness of a people who have turned away from God.[34] Yet this demonstrates, in Boswell's view, that homosexuality was being used as a "mundane analogy" to make a wider point about the Gentile's sin of rejecting God, and is "not the crux of this argument" – tellingly, the subject of homosexuality is quickly dropped by Paul.[35] Such a reading of Romans 1:26-27 is strikingly similar to that of Genesis 19: in both, it can be argued, homosexuality is used as an analogical point about a group of people's wider sinfulness; a by-product of their offences to God, without homosexual acts themselves being the offence. Whatever our interpretation of the passage, therefore, this argument demonstrates that its literary form, as well as the context within which the lines are contained, must be taken into consideration when trying to interpret its exact meaning.

Whilst interpretation of these biblical pronouncements has attracted scholarly controversy, however, the social controversies within Western Christianity are perhaps more immediate. The Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement (LGCM) in the UK, examined by Stephen Hunt, has "seen itself as engaged in a battle against religious homophobia" since its founding in 1976, yet the movement pays little attention to a precise analysis of the biblical texts.[36] Meanwhile, organisations such as the American-based Metropolitan Community Churches (MCC) are also supporters and advocates of gay rights, who encourage a progressive reading of the Bible to teach that homosexuals are welcome within Christianity. Writing in an MCC pamphlet, Rev. Don Eastman identifies "new scientific information, social changes, and personal experience" as key factors in the way Christian beliefs and interpretation of the Bible change over time.[37] Indeed, he invites us to consider nineteenth-century America, where "whites were thought to be superior to blacks", with some clergymen claiming biblical authority for such a notion; now, such a reading of the Bible is no longer accepted, because our interpretation of it has changed.[38] Eastman's reasoning – that societal change often leads to a redefining of Scripture – is in direct opposition to a number of statements from the Catholic Church,

[34] *Ibid*
[35] Boswell, *Christianity*, pp. 108 – 109
[36] Hunt, *Journal of Religion & Society*, p. 4
[37] Rev. Elder Don Eastman, *Homosexuality; Not A Sin, Not A Sickness* [pamphlet] (Los Angeles: Universal Fellowship Press, 1990), p. 1
[38] *Ibid*

which places a great deal more importance on the necessity of Church tradition being upheld. For example, the CDF declares that the Bible cannot be understood when it is "interpreted in a way which contradicts the Church's living tradition,"[39] whilst the 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church further states that "Tradition has always declared that 'homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered'", and thus "under no circumstances" can be approved by the Church.[40] This 'tradition' is in reference to the *Persona Humana,* an earlier CDF document, which provides a firm ruling on questions regarding human sexuality – it concludes that, whilst homosexuals must be "treated with understanding", they must not be given "moral justification", as Scripture condemns them as "a serious depravity".[41] With, as Brooten states, modern "politicians and private citizens alike" continuing to grant a "considerable authority to Church teachings on sexuality", such proclamations from the Catholic Church undoubtedly give validation to the political and social treatment of homosexuals in the world today.[42] It is clear to see, therefore, how a great deal of controversy has arisen over Christianity's relationship with homosexuality, as the Church's heavily conservative stance has placed it into conflict with more liberal organisations which seek to adapt biblical teachings for our modern world.

It has hopefully become clear that the notion of the Bible 'condemning' homosexuality is a short-sighted one. There are only a handful of references to same-sex sexual relations throughout the Old and New Testaments, and each of them can be considered as open to interpretation, due to the ambiguity of the authors' intended meanings. Translation of the original texts remains a key issue; having no exact term for (or, indeed, concept of) loving homosexuality in Israelite and Greco-Roman societies, biblical authors were forced to use terminology which historians continue to disagree about the precise meaning of, especially words like 'yada' and 'arsenokoitai'. In addition, we must take into consideration the form of the writings, as references to homosexuality are often used to demonstrate a wider point, like in Genesis 19. The contexts in which each of these passages were written, furthermore, can impact upon their exact meaning; it is unclear, for instance, whether Levitical laws condemned all homosexuality without exception, or simply a specific form of same-sex relations which

[39] CDF, *Letter to the Bishops* (1986), n. 5
[40] *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1994), n. 2357
[41] CDF, *Persona Humana* (1975)
[42] Brooten, *Love Between Women*, pp. 195 – 196

no longer exists in civilised societies. Reception history of the Bible, however, moves beyond an analysis of Scripture and forces us to consider whether, in fact, the specifics of the text matter; all organisations, as large as the Catholic Church or as small as pro-gay rights Christian movements, are entitled to their own interpretations of the texts, thus the intended or exact meaning of the Scripture is arguably unimportant. Indeed, Timothy Koch's impassioned essay compares the historical discussion of the Bible's relationship with homosexuality to "an auction" – there is, he laments, a constant "back-and-forth" debate between liberals and conservatives, both aiming to prove what the Bible's true stance on homosexuality is, with the "prize" being "the right to decide what behaviours" gay people may or may not partake in.[43] It is unimportant whether others are convinced by his own, homoerotic reading of the Bible – all that matters is that he, personally, can use the texts for moral guidance. Perhaps, therefore, the 1993 Methodist Conference on Human Sexuality highlights the issue best, stating that "disagreements about sexual matters" are a result of "divergent views about the ways in which the Bible should be understood and interpreted."[44] All readings of the Bible will, invariably, be affected by agenda and context, but no reading is necessarily 'wrong', which is why citing the text as the supreme authority on the morality of same-sex relations is so controversial in the world today.

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[43] Timothy Koch, Cruising as Methodology: Homoeroticism and the Scriptures', in Ken Stone (ed.), *Queer Commentary and the Hebrew Bible* (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001), p. 171
[44] Methodist Conference, *Human Sexuality*, *Agenda 1993* (1993), n. 1

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How did King's interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' change, c.924-1035?

By Matthew Bowen

Abstract

One of the most interesting aspects of the legal system in medieval England was the existence of the king's mercy. While much of medieval law was, on the surface at least, barbarous and complex, the system of 'fearsome mercy' shows the compassionate side of the legislation. The term has been used by the historian William Chester Jordan to describe the mercy shown by medieval kings, as it stresses the idea that clemency was intended to punish offenders temporally, while allowing them the chance to acquire salvation for their souls before God. This article intends to examine certain laws promulgated by Æthelstan, Æthelred and Cnut through the lens of 'fearsome mercy' in order to understand if kings' interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' changed over time. After a close examination of the sources, it appears that the interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' changed little between the years of 924-1035. All three kings interpreted mercy to be an expression of their role as a Christian king. What did change, however, were the reasons why these kings decreed merciful laws. These reasons include the influence of leading churchmen who wrote the law, the personal piety of kings and the use of law for propaganda purposes.

The punishment of criminals in the medieval era is a subject that has sparked much discussion in the following centuries. Many scholars have spilled ink attempting to work out exactly what was being legislated against and many more have tried to uncover what light these laws can shed on society at the time. However, an area that has received significantly less focus is the existence of the king's mercy. Throughout the pre-conquest medieval period in England, kings enacted their mercy in severe, but different ways. This aspect of medieval law has been termed 'fearsome mercy' by the historian William Chester Jordan.[45]. The idea of 'fearsome mercy' helps to explain why

[45] William C. Jordan, *From England to France: Felony and Exile in the High Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), p. 30.

punishments that seem draconian to the modern mind made perfect sense to the monarchs of medieval England, who saw the promotion of mercy and justice as some of their most important roles. When these sentences are examined in the context of the contemporary Christianised kingship and the religious beliefs of the time, they are easier to understand. Mercy was intrinsically linked to Christianity and the idea that one of the main roles of kings in the middle ages was to rule in a just and lawful manner. In this article, I will argue that the term 'fearsome mercy' can be applied to many laws promulgated by different kings of England. This article focuses on three, namely Æthelstan, Æthelred and Cnut. By analysing their laws through the lens of 'fearsome mercy', one can make more sense of the intentions behind the pieces of legislation and can better understand why laws were promulgated. Furthermore, I will argue that king's interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' changed little over the period I am focusing on. At all points, laws created out of 'fearsome mercy' were promulgated ostensibly for religious reasons. What did change, however, were the true motives that lay behind the promulgation of these merciful laws. The mercy shown by kings depended heavily on the political situation that the kings found themselves in and on the beliefs of the individual monarch and their advisors. The inherent flexibility in what was deemed merciful allowed some kings to manipulate it for propaganda, while allowing others to use it to reflect their earnest views on how best to punish criminals. Nevertheless, there was one key ideology underpinning the whole idea of mercy - Christianity. I hope to show that it was the influence of the Church and leading churchmen, as well as king's responsibility for the spiritual welfare of their people that largely drove the idea of 'fearsome mercy'.

At this point, it is worth explaining a few more key ideas. One of these is the notion of what kingship meant to medieval rulers. Key to the understanding of medieval kingship is the awareness that it was both a secular and an ecclesiastical role. Kings were supposed to act in a just and merciful manner to their subjects, protecting them from crime and allowing them to live a peaceful and prosperous life.[46] In addition to their role as temporal guardians, kings also had many religious duties. A close co-operation between the Church and state was one of the defining features of European kingship, with the English crown being no exception. The two institutions can be said to have

[46] H.R. Loyn, *The Governance of Anglo-Saxon England 500-1087*, (London: E. Arnold, 1984), p. 86.

formed a symbiotic relationship, with the monarch being the dominant party. Kings provided the Church with protection and land, while churchmen anointed kings as God's chosen rulers on earth, giving them the so-called 'divine right' to rule. Churchmen were also instrumental in writing and guiding a king's legal codes. Ultimately, a king's goal was to purify his people before God, help them to avoid sin, and lead as many of them to salvation as possible.[47] It is, therefore, clear that medieval kings had considerable religious responsibilities as well as their obvious secular ones.

Another crucial concept that requires a few words of explanation is the idea of an English kingdom. By the eleventh century, there was an English kingdom well-defined enough to have been conquered twice and ruled as a single entity. To find out where this kingdom came from and why it had been created, it is necessary to travel a bit further back in time. During the early medieval period, it was believed that the people living in the kingdoms of Wessex, Mercia, East Anglia and Northumbria were all a single people. This belief can be seen in Bede's *Ecclesiastical History of the English People,* which used one word to describe those living in these areas– the *Angli* (English). The English people had several things in common, such as a shared language and belief that their ancestors had migrated from the continent. Importantly, the English people also had a shared ecclesiastical history, as their forefathers had been converted to Christianity by Gregory the Great and Augustine of Canterbury. Bede had gone as far as to call Augustine the 'Archbishop of Britain'.[48] When Æthelstan conquered York in 927, he united a group of people with a shared identity and language. In doing so, he created a kingdom of England that was a coherent nation, not just a kingdom of English people. The kings of England became the guardians of their subjects on earth and swore to protect them.

As the first king of a united England, Æthelstan provides a perfect entry point to considering how king's interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' changed over time. The second of his surviving law-codes, known as II Æthelstan, prescribed very harsh penalties for thieves. It stated that 'no thief shall be spared, who is seized in the act, if he is over twelve years and (if the value of the stolen goods is) more than eight pence'.[49]

[47] Loyn, *Governance,* p. 86.
[48] George Molyneaux, *The Formation of the English Kingdom in the Tenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 202-9.
[49] II Æthelstan I, trans. by F. L. Attenborough, *The Laws of the Earliest English Kings,* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 127.

This promulgation appears to have not been effective as the law-code V Æthelstan opens with the statement that 'the public peace has not been kept to the extent, either of my wishes, or of the provisions laid down at Grately'.[50] The King then briefly offered amnesty to thieves, allowing them to settle their cases by compensating the aggrieved families. This proved to be only temporary, and VI Æthelstan saw the King reverting back to the death penalty for thieves caught in the act.[51] VI Æthelstan, however, contained a key difference in the punishments handed out when compared to previous law-codes. The death penalty now only applied to thieves over the age of fifteen, because the King thought it was 'cruel to put to death such young people and for such slight offences, as he has learnt is the practice everywhere'.[52] The nature of this source gives a very telling insight into the workings of administration in the tenth century. VI Æthelstan survives as an ordinance drawn up by a 'peace guild' in London, made up of bishops and reeves, who swore on oath to uphold the laws of the king. The ordinance was created to organise arrangements for a response to the laws promulgated by the King, showing that there was considerable dialogue between the monarch and his leading bishops and thegns when issuing laws. It also indicates there was a measure of dialogue between the King and the men on the ground implementing the law, as the ordinances were a direct response from the men of London to the laws that Æthelstan had enacted.[53] That the exact nature of the death penalty was being constantly tweaked suggests these punishments were not being handed out arbitrarily. It appears likely that they were discussed and deliberated upon to ensure that the appropriate measures were being taken to punish criminals.[54] This code has been cited as one of the first pieces of evidence that English kings modified laws as a direct response to the failures of previous ones, showing the maturity of the legal systems of even the earliest English kings.[55] It is significant that II Æthelstan prescribed death for thieves at the age of twelve, as this was the age that males joined tithings, showing that twelve-year olds

[50] V Æthelstan trans. by F.L. Attenborough, *The Laws of the Earliest English Kings,* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 153.
[51] Sarah Foot, *Æthelstan: The First King of England,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 141.
[52] VI Æthelstan 12, trans. by F. L. Attenborough, *The Laws of the Earliest English Kings,* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 169.
[53] Charles Insley, 'Assemblies and Charters in Late Anglo-Saxon England' in *Political Assemblies in the Earlier Middle Ages*, ed. by P.S. Barnwell and Marco Mostert, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), p. 51.
[54] Jay Paul Gates, Nicole Marafioti, 'Introduction: Capital and Corporal Punishment in Anglo-Saxon England' in *Capital and Corporal Punishment in Anglo-Saxon England,* ed. by Jay Paul Gates and Nicole Marafioti, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014), p. 3.
[55] Patrick Wormald, *The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century. Vol. 1., Legislation and its Limits,* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 305.

were deemed to be legally culpable and could be tried for their actions. That Æthelstan decided to increase the minimum age of the death penalty to fifteen was thus a more merciful act than one may initially assume. It is clear, then, that a king's advisors certainly had a role in shaping his interpretation of 'fearsome mercy'.

Despite law-codes being one of the most revealing pieces of evidence that a historian has at their disposal when trying to examine the personal beliefs of the Anglo-Saxon kings, many of them cannot be taken at face value. While it is highly likely that Æthelstan was personally worried about social disorder amongst his subjects, the wording of clause twelve suggests that the reasons given for the change in policy were rather disingenuous. It would be surprising if the king was shocked to 'learn' that death penalty was 'the practice everywhere' when one considers the fact that he had been responsible for the legislation that imposed it in the first place. [56] There is some evidence that this act of 'fearsome mercy' was motivated partly by religious pressure. The clause survives only as an appendix to the initial promulgation, leading to speculation that it was declared after the initial set of laws were.[57] Presented as a request from Æthelstan to Bishop Theodred of London, it asks that he informs Archbishop Wulfhelm of Canterbury of the King's merciful change of policy, claiming that he came to this decision after 'both he himself and those with whom he has discussed the matter with' decided to raise the minimum age of the death penalty.[58] The fact that he felt the need to personally inform the Archbishop of Canterbury of this new change indicates that this was a topic that the Archbishop was concerned with, and possibly had a vested interest in. It is possible that this act of mercy rose out of a conflict between the Church and state over whether kings should have the jurisdiction to kill petty criminals. Churchmen were worried that the souls of the executed men would be sent to hell, with no chance for salvation. Wulfhelm appears to have been an ardent defender of ecclesiastical privileges and has been attributed to several clauses in Æthelstan's law-codes that attempted to protect the Church's interests at the expense of royal power. These include a section of II Æthelstan which places the ordeal under the

[56] VI Æthelstan 12
[57] Andrew Rabin, 'Capital Punishment and the Anglo-Saxon Judicial Apparatus: A Maximum View?' in *Capital and Corporal Punishment in Anglo-Saxon England,* ed. by Jay Paul Gates and Nicole Marafioti, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014), p. 190.
[58] VI Æthelstan 12

joint jurisdiction of the King and Archbishop of Canterbury.[59] That it is Wulfhelm that is being informed could indicate that the King and his Archbishop had previously discussed or quarrelled over the issue of execution. It appears that Æthelstan was attempting to portray himself as a merciful and just ruler, while also appeasing the Church on an issue that they were very anxious about. In a shrewd political manoeuvre, Æthelstan successfully characterised his change in policy as a noble compromise to the appeals of his council and Church, instead of an attempt to distance himself from an unsuccessful decree.[60] By framing his change in policy this way, he was able to allay the fears of his leading churchmen while also appearing like a merciful Christian ruler. This is an indication of the fact that 'fearsome mercy' could be used as a political tool by kings to create an image of them as a just sovereign. This was of particular importance to Æthelstan as he was a conquering King who was attempting to rule new territory and subjects for the first time. That the Northumbrians pledged themselves to Anlaf Cuaran following Æthelstan's death showed the fragility of his position and indicates he was wise to adopt mercy as a political device.[61] Thus, this source highlights the influence that powerful churchmen and their religious beliefs could have on kings and their interpretation of 'fearsome mercy', whilst also revealing the idea that mercy could be utilised as royal propaganda.

Nevertheless, it would be going too far to suggest that Æthelstan's personal piety played no role in his policy of 'fearsome mercy'. There is ample evidence to suggest that Æthelstan took both his religious and secular duties very seriously. In his *Ordinance on Charities,* Æthelstan stated that 'for the forgiveness of my sins', his reeves should 'always feed one poor Englishman' and that they should also 'set at liberty someone that has for his crimes been condemned to slavery, for the mercies of Christ'.[62] From the available evidence, Æthelstan appears to have been a pious ruler. Æthelwold, one of leaders of the Benedictine reform movement, spent time in his court as a young man and the king was known to have been an enthusiastic collector of relics.[63] His piety meant that he was personally worried about theft as it was an attack on his authority and it jeopardised the spiritual and temporal health of his people. The idea that he was a

[59] Rabin 'Capital Punishment' in *Capital Punishment*, ed. by Gates and Marafioti, p. 191.
[60] Rabin 'Capital Punishment' in *Capital Punishment*, ed. by Gates and Marafioti, p. 192.
[61] Alex Woolf, *From Pictland to Alba,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 174.
[62] Foot, *Æthelstan,* p.139.
[63] Barbara Yorke, *Bishop Æthelwold: His Career and Influence*, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997), p. 2.

conscientious ruler can be seen in his introduction to V Æthelstan, in which he claimed that 'oaths and pledges and sureties… have been disregarded and broken and we know of no course which we can follow with confidence, unless it be this'.[64] The sense of frustration that the King is feeling is palpable. Anglo-Saxon kings believed that they were God's chosen rulers on earth and as such, had a direct responsibility to God to maintain peace and order in society. Failing to do so could, it was believed, cause a king to lose God's favour. This could have a multitude of negative consequences, such as divine retribution. Therefore, he was bound by his duty as God's ruler on earth to curb crime and guide the souls of the English. Æthelstan's personal religious beliefs, as well as his view on his own responsibilities as a Christian king, certainly encouraged him to follow policies of 'fearsome mercy'. He clearly believed he had an obligation to lead the English people towards salvation and VI Æthelstan can be interpreted in this way. It is, however, likely that his beliefs were moulded and cultivated by the Church.

By the early eleventh century, the kingdom of England was in turmoil. The Vikings were invading England more frequently and in greater numbers. It appeared to many that the English king, Æthelred, was powerless to stop them.[65] Many contemporaries, such as Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, wondered whether these heathens were ushering in the apocalypse. It was not so much the Vikings themselves that Wulfstan feared, but what they represented to him. He believed they were the manifestation of the wrath of God.[66] Concerned that God had sent the Vikings as punishment for the sins of the English, he drafted several law-codes that attempted to impose a system of national penance in a desperate attempt to try to regain God's favour and defeat the invaders.[67] His influence on late Anglo-Saxon law cannot be denied, and as such it is worth spending some time explaining his approach to law-making. Wulfstan was influenced by the Benedictine reform movement, which emphasised the importance of members of the clergy being celibate and learned. He saw law as a method of achieving his ultimate goal, reforming society based on the law of God.[68] The overwhelming message that one can glean from

[64] Foot, *Æthelstan*, p. 141.
[65] Simon Keynes, *The Diplomas of King Æthelred the Unready, 978-1016: A Study in their uses as Historical Evidence,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 217.
[66] Ryan Lavelle, *Æthelred II: King of the English, 978-1016,* (Stroud: Tempus, 2002), p. 93.
[67] Ian Howard, *The Reign of Æthelred II, King of the English, Emperor of all the peoples of Britain, 978-1016,* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2010), p. 74.
[68] T.A. Heslop, 'Art and the Man: Archbishop Wulfstan and the York Gospelbook' in *Wulfstan, Archbishop of York: The Proceedings of the Second Alcuin Conference,* ed. by Matthew Townend (Brepols, 2004), p. 303.

his writing is his unwavering belief in the rule of a sole king, who should always be obeyed. He believed that the hierarchical social order of medieval England was ordained by God and argued that everyone in society was bound to their role. To question this was to go against God and risk both earthly fortune and heavenly salvation.[69] Wulfstan's style of writing mixed law and Christian teachings to the point that it is hard to differentiate between his legal and religious work. He saw no clear distinction between a king's secular and religious responsibilities, and hoped that the new ecclesiastical laws that he had drafted for Æthelred would accomplish what previous secular laws had not managed- deliverance from the Viking invaders.[70] Wulfstan's outlook is perhaps best summarised by Alice Cowen, who claimed that for the Archbishop, 'the religious was political and the political religious'.[71] When examining Æthelred's later codes, it is important to keep their author and the political context in mind. Only then is it possible to explain why Æthelred's interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' is rooted so deeply in Christian ethics.

The code known as VI Æthelred focused on the spiritual wellbeing of the English, as Wulfstan was determined to purge their sins. It attempted to stamp out sinful practices that had taken root in various sections of English society, such as the sale of Christian slaves to heathens. Clause nine states that 'it is the decree of the councillors that Christian men who are innocent of crime shall not be sold out of this land, least of all to the heathen'.[72] This shows a clear concern for the spiritual wellbeing of the English people. Being sold out of the country to heathen owners would likely cause a slave to cease being a practicing Christian and would thus be detrimental for slave's chances of salvation. That even a slave's deliverance was meaningful perfectly illustrates his belief that every member of a functioning society must fulfil their role for the society to flourish. A concern for the Christian soul is shown more explicitly in the very next clause, which states that 'Christian men shall not be condemned to death for too trivial offences, but on the contrary, merciful punishments shall be determined upon… that the

[69] Pauline Stafford, *Unification and Conquest: A Political and Social History of England in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,* (London: E. Arnold, 1989), p. 13.
[70] Ann Williams, *Æthelred the Unready: The Ill-Counselled King,* (London: Hambledon and London, 2003), p. 92.
[71] Alice Cowen, 'Brystas and bysmeras: The Wounds of Sin' in *Wulfstan, Archbishop of York: The Proceedings of the Second Alcuin Conference,* ed. by Matthew Townend (Brepols, 2004), p. 411.
[72] VI Æthelred 9, trans. by A.J. Robertson, *The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I* (Cambridge, 1925), p. 95

handiwork of God and what he purchased for himself at a great price be not destroyed for trivial offences'.[73] This is perhaps the closest clause in all of Anglo-Saxon law to Jordan's idea of 'fearsome mercy'. It contains a clear reference to Christ's sacrifice on the cross and once again shows Wulfstan framing Æthelred's law-codes within Christian ethics. Exactly how much input the King had in this code is questionable, as it is hard to assess how pious he was. The clause mentions that this was a 'decree of the councillors', which suggests that this section was possibly drafted by his religious advisors, rather than directly by the King himself. Patrick Wormald, however, has raised the idea that it would not be impossible for Æthelred to have shared in his Archishop's anxieties, especially with the increasing threat of Viking invasion. Wormald cites the fact that kings promised that 'at God's will' they were to 'lead forth the flock' of which they were 'made the shepherd of in this life' as evidence that Æthelred would have been conscious of his religious responsibilities when drafting laws.[74] That he supported Wulfstan in the creation of the law-codes suggests that he was at the very least interested in his Archbishop's ideas, and quite possibly believed many of them would help curry favour with God. While it is difficult to assess the impact of Æthelred's own beliefs on this act of 'fearsome mercy', it is clear that the beliefs of his churchman, particularly Wulfstan, were of the utmost importance. Wulfstan not only wrote down the laws, he also incorporated his own views into them, integrating them squarely within his philosophy of Christian morality. Therefore, VI Æthelred undoubtedly continues a theme highlighted in Æthelstan's law-codes- the impact that the Church and leading churchmen had on policies of 'fearsome mercy'. In contrast to VI Æthelstan, it appears that Æthelred's own beliefs did not play as large a role. This is likely due to the influence of Wulfstan on the law-codes and the fact that there were drafted in response to the increasing threat of a Viking invasion.

Wulfstan was also heavily involved in the making of the law-code known as II Cnut. As I have demonstrated above, Wulfstan spent much of his life writing laws and sermons intended to bolster the English defences against Scandinavian invasions. Following Cnut's successful invasion of England in 1015-16, he was faced with the prospect of serving a Scandinavian king. Despite the seemingly odd circumstances, the Archbishop

[73] VI Æthelred 10

[74] Patrick Wormald, 'Æthelred the Lawmaker' in *Æthelred the Unready: Papers from Millenary Conference*, ed. by David Hall (London: British Archaeological Reports, 1978), p. 74.

saw Cnut's new regime as a second chance for the English people to renounce their former sins and for society to be recreated with an emphasis on the laws of God. In his foreword, Wulfstan went as far as to say that 'foremost', the English people were to 'love Cnut with due loyalty'.[75] However, the purpose of II Cnut is markedly different to VI Æthelred. Rather than proposing religious penances, Wulfstan attempted to use Cnut's law-codes to provide a more practical response to England's ills, whilst also promoting reconciliation between the Danes and the English.[76] His plan was to use these laws to reform English society and as such, the clauses show an idealised version of Cnut's reign. Rather than revealing how Cnut ruled, many clauses reveal how Wulfstan thought he should be ruling. For example, clause II Cnut 54 states that 'if anyone has a lawful wife and also a concubine, no priest shall perform for him any of the offices which must be performed for a Christian man'.[77] It is widely known that Cnut kept Ælfgifu as a concubine after his marriage to Æthelred's widow, Emma.[78] Wulfstan was attempting to legitimise Cnut as a pious Christian leader that the English could rally around and who could restructure English society.[79]

In typical Wulfstan fashion, many clauses from Æthelred's law-codes also turn up in II Cnut. One such example is clause three, which repeats the ban on 'selling Christian people out of the country, and especially of conveying them into heathen lands'.[80] To Wulfstan, the inclusion of this code was a method of ensuring that sinful practices which had sprung up during Æthelred's reign did not return. To Cnut, however, this law-code represented something slightly different. As a king who had won his throne via conquest, he was aware that his control on the throne was tenuous. Accordingly, he was glad to be shown in a virtuous light by the new laws being drawn up by his Archbishop. That the law-codes also recycled many older pieces of legislation added further legitimacy to Cnut's rule, as it identified him as part of a long-standing line of devout

[75] Timothy Bolton, *The Empire of Cnut the Great: Conquest and Consolidation of Power in Northern Europe in the Early Eleventh Century,* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 83.
[76] Patrick Wormald, 'Archbishop Wulfstan: Eleventh-Century State-Builder' in *Wulfstan, Archbishop of York: The Proceedings of the Second Alcuin Conference,* ed. by Matthew Townend (Brepols, 2004), p. 20.
[77] II Cnut 54, trans. by A.J. Robertson, *The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I* (Cambridge, 1925), p. 203.
[78] M.K. Lawson, 'Archbishop Wulfstan and the Homiletic Element in the Laws of Æthelred II and Cnut', *The English Historical Review,* vol.107, no.424, (Jul. 1992), 565-586, (p. 579.).
[79] M.K. Lawson *The Danes in England in the Early Eleventh Century*, (London: Longman, 1993), p. 63.
[80] II Cnut 3, trans. by A.J. Robertson, *The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I* (Cambridge, 1925), p. 95.

kings who strove to fight injustice wherever it sprang up in their kingdom. The Laws of Edgar were particularly key to this political tactic, as his laws were considered by contemporaries to be the 'laws of England'.[81] They had been drawn up in what Wulfstan believed had been a golden age of peace and prosperity for the Kingdom of England.[82]

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there is evidence that Cnut was either personally religious, or that he understood the importance of cultivating the image of being a pious king. In 1027, he went on a pilgrimage to Rome in order to 'pray for the redemption of my sins and for the security of the… people who are subject to my rule'.[83] He also founded an abbey in Bury which he dedicated to St. Edmund, an East Anglian king who had been killed by Cnut's ancestors only around one hundred and fifty years prior.[84] The evidence for 'fearsome mercy' in Cnut's reign once again highlights the importance of religious beliefs and churchmen in the enacting of clemency. Were it not for Wulfstan's influence, and possibly also Cnut's own piety, there would have been no issues with selling slaves to heathens. It was because of their fear for what would happen to the Christian soul of the slave that they were against the practice. Cnut's law-codes also show the political effect that a policy of 'fearsome mercy' could have. By allowing Wulfstan to cultivate an image of Cnut as a religious monarch who was committed to continuing the practices of previous English kings, Cnut added both legitimacy and stability to his reign. Thus, the political situation that Cnut inherited in England greatly affected how he interpreted 'fearsome mercy'. Much like VI Æthelstan, II Cnut reveals the ways that a politically savvy king could manipulate the idea of mercy to strengthen their reign, whilst also fulfilling their role as a spiritual protector of the people.

In conclusion, kings' interpretations of fearsome mercy changed little over the period I have studied. Every king, to a greater or lesser extent, interpreted 'fearsome mercy' as part of their religious duty and aimed to improve the spiritual wellbeing of their subjects with merciful policies. What did change, however, were the reasons why kings showed 'fearsome mercy'. Chief amongst these were their own personal piety, the influence of leading churchmen and political propaganda. However, it would be

[81] Pauline Stafford, 'The Laws of Cnut and the History of Anglo-Saxon Royal Promises' in *Anglo-Saxon England*, vol. 10, 173-190, (1981), p. 180.
[82] Bolton, *Cnut*, p.83
[83] Cnut's Proclamation of 1027, trans. by A.J. Robertson, *The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I* (Cambridge, 1925), p. 147.
[84] Bolton, *Cnut*, p.93.

inaccurate to say that the interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' remained exactly the same over the era I have studied. Rather, the interpretations of 'fearsome mercy' fluctuated with each ruler, depending on the constantly shifting political situation they inherited, the beliefs of each monarch and the advisors they surrounded themselves with. For example, the personal religious beliefs of Æthelstan and Cnut were more important in forming their merciful policies than the beliefs of Æthelred had been. Similarly, Æthelstan and Cnut showed a greater ability to politicise 'fearsome mercy' than Æthelred, who's interpretation of mercy relied heavily on the views of his leading churchman, Wulfstan. During Æthelred's reign, it was Wulfstan and not the king who successfully created laws to fit his political agenda. 'Fearsome mercy' existed as part of a larger dispute between the Church, king and regional nobility over the boundaries of the king's jurisdiction. In times when the kingship was weak, such as during Æthelred's reign, the influence of the Church can be seen more strongly. The Church's involvement in law-making was ever-present throughout the period and it was constantly trying to extend its jurisdiction over matters that affected the souls of Christians. Execution and the sale of slaves to heathens were particularly problematic for the Church as they prevented people from having a chance at salvation. Therefore, compromises between the Church and state were necessary to ensure that the two pillars of medieval English society continued to function. Such a negotiation can be seen in VI Æthelstan, where the King agrees to raise the minimum age for executions while still retaining his right to carry them out and punish wrongdoers in society. A king's interpretation of 'fearsome mercy' can be understood best when examined as a wider system of law-making that was strongly influenced by Christian morality and a compromise between secular and religious leaders over where ecclesiastical jurisdiction ended and temporal jurisdiction began.

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An Examination of Henry VIII's Love Letters: An Insight into his Blossoming Relationship with Anne Boleyn.

By Bronwyn Peatman

Abstract

The love letters written by Henry VIII to Anne Boleyn clearly express the passion of the King of England for a lady of his court. They give us an insight into Henry's true feelings for Anne. But how useful are they as a source when it comes to assessing the progression of their relationship? In this article the validity of the letters are assessed in comparison to the other sources. Also, the content of the letters are examined against the most influential interpretations, showing that some are over-zealous in their claims and read too much into lovers promises. Instead it is more likely that Henry and Anne had a courtship of mutual love and passion and that they understood that certain precautions were important to the success of their relationship. By looking for consistencies across the letters and other contemporary sources (such as Hall, Chapuys and Pole) it is possible to determine what may be based in fact and what may be based on rumour and gossip. Emotion is an important part of events in the 1520's and a consideration for the relationship dynamics is crucial to understanding the motives behind Henry and Anne's actions in the early stage of their relationship.

Quite arguably the catalyst of the King's Great Matter and the Break with Rome, the nature of the relationship between Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn is still incredibly divisive. This is because the sources are limited; there is very little about their initial courtship because it was kept secret. The beginning of their liaison is also extremely hard to uncover, because the sources are so often undated. Many are also influenced by political, religious or national bias. Even secondary materials, and the authors perception of primary sources, are affected by their view of the period.

Seventeen love letters, handwritten to Anne Boleyn by Henry, have survived. These letters are a key source for the growing passion between them. They show the full extent of Henry's feelings for Anne and how much he wanted her; first as a mistress and then later, as a wife. These letters aren't dated, and they do not explicitly mention key

events which could provide a time frame. Also, Anne's replies are missing and thus her responses can only be guessed at.

Other sources largely detail Anne's emerging presence at court from 1527 onwards. These include reports from ambassadors and chroniclers. These accounts, while useful in some cases, are often biased, or rely upon the memory of an individual to call to account conversations that happened many years before. However, these sources will often share similarities in the events they describe. They also come from individuals who are in the best place to witness what was happening between 1520-1530, so some of what they report has to be considered as a realistic possibility.

Eric Ives suggests that the letters show Henry VIII trying to 'turn the conventions of courtly love into something more serious.'[85] On the contrary, David Starkey argues that the letters show that Henry 'could neither command this woman [Anne Boleyn] nor her love.'[86] A key issue with the letters is the lack of obvious order to them. There are a number of different sequences; the first published by Thomas Hearne in 1720, a second in the Harleian Miscellany from 1745 and the third from a later edition in Paris by M. Meon.[87] J. O. Phillips bases his sequence on the Paris edition and argues the letters are best understood in this order. However, Ives uses a different sequence of letters to Phillips. This in itself makes it difficult to assess the letters, because changing the sequence can change the implication of the contents.

Attempts to date the letters result in different interpretations of the development of the relationship. A wide range of dates have been considered, from as early as 1526, to as late as 1528.[88] Starkey's own interpretation is that the first letter was sent in the summer of 1526, with Henry's infatuation beginning in 1525.[89] J. J. Scarisbrick agrees that Henry's interest was serious around this time. Scarisbrick bases this on Cavendish's biography of Thomas Wolsey.[90] Ives disagrees, arguing that these dates are too early, and this time frame changes Anne's role in the divorce. It would also make her 'the catalyst for the rejection of Catherine of Aragon', whom Ives points out had likely been rejected

[85] Eric Ives, *The Life and Death of Anne Boleyn,* (Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 84.
[86] David Starkey, *Six Wives: The Queens of Henry VIII,* (Vintage: London, 2004), p. 278.
[87] J. O. Phillips, *Love Letters of Henry VIII to Anne Boleyn,* (Merchant Books, 1922). p. 2.
[88] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 279.
[89] Starkey, *Six Wives,* pp. 278-80. and Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* pp. 88-9.
[90] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 88.

long before Henry's involvement with Anne.[91] Ives' chronology has the relationship emerging along-side divorce proceedings in 1527. Only in the summer of that year did Henry realise he could marry Anne and solve 'both his sexual and matrimonial frustrations.'[92] What is clear, is that the last batch of letters are from 1528, when the sweating sickness was rife at court. Anne Boleyn was among those affected and she returns to Hever Castle alone. G. W. Bernard also argues that the latest the couple could have committed to each other is in August 1527 since Henry applied for a dispensation to marry a woman 'to whom he was linked by reason of a relationship with her sister'. Presumably this refers to Henry's affair with Mary Boleyn.[93] As one can see it is clear that by 1527 the relationship between Henry and Anne has become both very real and incredibly serious.

Anne is near enough invisible until mid-1527; Starkey points out that no English source mentions her.[94] The letters show that Henry and Anne understood the importance of discretion. Anne's frequent absences from court were dictated by propriety and the relationship was trusted to an inner circle.[95] This is made obvious when Henry writes 'I trusted shortly to see you, which is better known at London than with any … about me, … I not a little marvel, but lack of discreet handling must … be the cause'.[96] Henry seems unhappy that his mistress is known by the public since this damages his role as a distraught husband with a troubled conscience. Cavendish also claims that 'the … secret love between the King and Mistress Anne Boleyn began to break out into everyman's ears', which supports Henry's concerns.[97] However, Cavendish reports the relationship becoming public before the divorce is in progress; since Wolsey begs Henry not to pursue with it. The secretive nature of the relationship makes it extremely difficult to detail its progression. But the love letters do allow us to see Henry's feelings for Anne and the motives behind some of his actions in 1527.

[91] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 89-90
[92] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 90.
[93] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 25.
[94] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 286.
[95] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 87.
[96] Phillips, *Love Letter,* Letter 13, pp. 37-8.
[97] George Cavendish, *The Life of Cardinal Wolsey,* e.d. S. W. Singer, introduction by Henry Morley, (Routledge: London, 1890), p. 108.

The interpretations of the letters contents can shape the way in which one would view the relationship between Henry and Anne. What is clear is that Anne is initially reluctant to submit herself to Henry. In the earlier letters, Henry begs Anne 'let me know … your whole mind as to the love between us' and to 'give an entire answer' as to how she feels about him.[98] Perhaps Anne is not sure how to respond to the King's advances, or Henry's wish to move their flirtations beyond the realm of courtly love, as Ives suggests. Bernard's argument that Anne feared the fate of royal mistresses is extremely plausible since she would have witnessed her sister's ordeal.[99] What seems unlikely, is Starkey's interpretation that Anne had an ongoing ambition, and ignored Henry's protestations and threats believing that 'it was beyond Henry's power to give her up.'[100] These are only the first few letters and although Henry's passion is evident, it is unlikely to suggest that had Anne given Henry no sign of favour whatsoever that he would have continued to pursue her. To say it is 'beyond his power' seems a bit extreme at this early stage of their courtship.

What Henry appears to be offering Anne is the position of an official royal mistress or *maîtress en titre.*[101] Henry asks Anne 'to give up yourself body and heart to me' and in doing so he promised to 'take you for my only mistress, casting of all others … out of my thoughts and affections'.[102] Initially it appears that Henry has every intention of having a sexual relationship with Anne, and that he does sincerely wish to take her as a mistress. Nothing in the early letters indicates marriage. Bernard suggests that Anne was happy to be the king's mistress, but she sought some guarantee of commitment and Henry realised that Anne wanted this reassurance before she submitted to him.[103] There is no reference to marriage, or to Anne wanting to be Queen. Ives suggests that it is after Anne had sent him the jewel of a storm-tossed maiden that Henry starts to think about marriage. Ives refers to Henry's dedication of his heart to Anne, and then wishing he could dedicate his body also, claiming that if it pleased God, He would allow it. From this point, Ives believes the couple are engaged.[104]

[98] Phillips, *Love Letters,* Letter 1, pp. 1-3.
[99] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 29.
[100] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 280.
[101] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 85.
[102] Phillips, *Love Letters,* Letter 1, pp. 1-3.
[103] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 29.
[104] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 87.

Starkey, seems to take a completely different direction here, arguing that Anne's goal was to seek a commitment of marriage. The letter and gift Anne sent are a conditional surrender; Henry can have her love but not her body; 'only when – if – they were married would she give him that.'[105] However, the reference to God and His will, is a plea for a prompt resolution to the divorce and it is important to note that it is made by Henry, not Anne. It is far more likely that Henry proposed marriage, rather than Anne asking for or hinting at it – there is certainly no evidence to suggest this in the letters. Starkey is possibly making much of George Wyatt's chronicle which has Anne claiming, 'to have already given my maidenhead into my husband's hands.'[106] Wyatt was writing in the reign of Elizabeth I and wanted to present the monarchs mother in a positive light. Wyatt was not alive at this time and this is not a conversation he would have witnessed. His informant would have been extremely old or reporting here say. It's a romantic image, but it seems improbable that this reflects any real belief by Anne that she could use her virginity to coerce Henry into leaving his wife and marrying her.

The letters prove that some kind of physical relationship existed between the couple, even if it was not full intercourse. Henry often ends his letters with loving wishes such as; 'I would we were together an evening' or 'wishing myself (especially an evening) in my sweetheart's arms, whose pretty dukkys I trust shortly to kiss'.[107] This implies that they have spent evenings together privately and have enjoyed some physical contact; the king even laments 'I think it long since I kissed you'.[108] It is often believed that Anne held back from intercourse with Henry. Starkey certainly believes this, but there is nothing in the letters that imply that Anne was withholding sexual relations from Henry, they are clearly already intimate. And yet, Henry seems just as willing to wait. Bernard argues that it is Anne who wished to engage in intercourse and that it was Henry holding her off.[109] This seems counterproductive. If Anne was worried about the past experiences of royal mistresses, she might not have been in a rush to engage in coitus and get pregnant since, historically, Henry's mistresses were replaced once they had been through childbirth.

[105] Starkey, *Six Wives,* pp. 282-3.
[106] George Wyatt, 'The Life of Queen Anne Boleigne' in *The Life of Cardinal Wolsey* by George Cavendish, e.d. S. W. Singer (1827) p. 85.
[107] Phillips, *Love Letters,* Letters 11 and 15, pp. 23-4. and pp. 41-2.
[108] Phillips, *Love Letters,* Letter 17, pp. 45-7.
[109] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 32-3.

Also, if marriage was on the table at this time, she would have understood the consequences of full sexual relations to hers and Henry's cause.

Henry often reassures Anne that they shall have their 'desired end' which implies that Anne was impatient for a resolution; either for sexual gratification or perhaps their impending marriage.[110] However, Henry also seems impatient for a solution and writes (after sending Anne some meat from his hunt) 'some flesh representing my name … God willing, you may enjoy some of mine.'[111] Although, the placement of this letter in Phillips is different to the sequence used by Ives and Bernard, it still shows that Henry wants to sleep with Anne just as much as she wants to sleep with him. It could be reasonably concluded that both Henry and Anne understood the importance of waiting for a resolution before having sex. If Anne had fallen pregnant before Henry's first marriage had been dissolved, then the entire moral case would have been destroyed. Any child of Anne's that had been conceived or born before any settlement would have been considered illegitimate. Therefore, it is entirely possible that Henry and Anne agreed to wait, or hold off on having intercourse, and made do with the intimate, partially physical relationship that the letters imply they had.

George Cavendish was a Gentleman Usher, who wrote a biography of his master, Cardinal Wolsey, who was Lord Chancellor and Henry's closest advisor. Many historians have used Cavendish's biography to help date Henry VIII's love letters, since the beginning of Henry's infatuation with Anne is mentioned at length. However, Cavendish's account is undated and written with hindsight; around 35 years after the events it is describing.[112]

It begins with the secret love affair between Henry Percy and Anne Boleyn 'which came to the king's knowledge, who was then much offended.'[113] Wolsey is asked to prevent the relationship between the pair from going any further because, as Cavendish claims, Henry had secret intentions for Anne. Cavendish is often considered the only source for this relationship, but a pre-contract is mentioned by Chapuys in 1534 and Wriothesley in 1536, which suggests that this was widely known at court.[114] Also, both

[110] Phillips, *Love Letters,* Letter 7, pp. 16-7.
[111] Phillips, *Love Letters,* Letter 10, pp. 28-9.
[112] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 65.
[113] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* p. 48.
[114] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 66.

Percy and Anne are involved in marriage contracts which falter around 1523 and Percy's father makes an unscheduled visit to London that year, which if it was due to this secret pre-contract, dates Cavendish's tale to sometime between 1522-1523.[115] Starkey suggests that Cavendish is writing about events between 1524-25, since Mary Boleyn is still the king's mistress until 1525.[116]

Cavendish uses this story to set the pretext for Anne Boleyn's supposed hatred of Wolsey, with Anne claiming, 'if it lay ever in her power, she would work the cardinal much displeasure'.[117] The fact that Cavendish adds 'as she did indeed after' shows the key issue with his account.[118] Cavendish's account is extremely hostile to Anne Boleyn. He blames Wolsey's fall on the Boleyn faction at court. He also assumes that Anne has enormous influence over the king claiming, 'Mistress Anne was much offended … that he [Henry] so gently entertained my lord [Wolsey]' and that she organised a picnic when Henry was supposed to meet with Wolsey.[119] It is not impossible to claim that maybe Anne simply did not like Wolsey, and Cavendish does write that she was 'not yet privy to the King's secret mind', meaning that she may have begrudged Wolsey breaking up her relationship with Percy because she did not know the instruction, supposedly, came from the King.[120]

What is clear is that Anne becomes entirely committed to her relationship with Henry and she would have known that Wolsey was the best agent to be working on the King's matter. It is unlikely that Anne had any real reason to hate Wolsey and their working relationship was cordial; Anne was full of flattery and praise for the cardinal.[121] It would have been detrimental to her cause to oppose Wolsey or undermine him, particularly if the King still had faith in his minister. Cavendish does say that Anne was offended 'as far as she durst' which implies that Anne had limits to how much she could complain to the king.[122] When she does complain, Henry doesn't like it. Chapuys reports that Anne uses 'words and authority towards the king, of which he has several times

[115] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* pp. 65-7.
[116] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 274.
[117] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* p. 55.
[118] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* p. 55.
[119] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* p. 135.
[120] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* p. 56.
[121] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 65.
[122] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* pp. 135-6.

complained to the Duke of Norfolk.'[123] The contemporary sources show that it is Henry who is in command, and not Anne.[124] Even the letters suggest that Anne is informed of progress in the divorce by messengers at the King's will. The fact that she mixes up Gardiner and Foxe implies she is not involved in private discussions. Foxe also presents letters to the King after Anne has left the room, and when it is good news, Henry calls Anne back so she can hear it.[125] This is directly contradictory to Cavendish's belief that Anne acted 'more like a queen than a simple maid' and that she had influence over the King and his decisions.[126]

The lack of dates in Cavendish's work is frustrating because it doesn't help us to date the beginning of Henry and Anne's relationship. It also places Anne in a role that is only supported by the gossip of those, like Chapuys, who had a religious and political bias against her. Again, since Cavendish was recalling events that had happened 30 years ago, it is unlikely that he remembers the conversations that he is observing. But Cavendish is one of the few sources that explicitly describes how the love affair began, and that it was Henry who was keen to pursue it.[127]

Eustace Chapuys was the Spanish Ambassador to the English court between 1529 – 1545. Chapuys is therefore not present for the beginnings of the relationship between Henry and Anne, but he does see the relationship develop from a private liaison into a public affair. He also does report earlier gossip which was circulating about Anne. In fact, Chapuys often reports gossip, whether it be about the court or public opinion. It is important to consider that gossip might have basis in fact, particularly if multiple individuals report it. Even if gossip is not true, it does allow one to assess what individuals where thinking about each other – or what peers were considered to be capable of. For example, Chapuys writes to Margaret of Savoy that it was 'the wishes of the whole country for the preservation of the marriage and the downfall of the Lady.'[128] While Chapuys is most likely exaggerating that 'the whole country' is opposed to Anne Boleyn, it is plausible

[123] J. S. Brewer, J. Gairdner, and R. H. Brodie, eds., *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII,* (21 Vols: 1862-1923) Vol 5, 216.
[124] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 38.
[125] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 39.
[126] Cavendish, *Wolsey,* p. 134.
[127] Starkey, *Six Wives,* pp. 275-7.
[128] Garrett Mattingly, eds, *Calender of State Papers, Spain: Further Supplement to Volumes 1 and 2, Documents from Archives in Vienna,* (London, 1947), pp. 449-50.

that Chapuys is basing this on some unpopularity of the divorce and the King's new marriage. It also shows that by 1530 the relationship has fully entered the public sphere. Chapuys also reports that he had 'just heard from a well-informed man that this marriage will undoubtedly be accomplished in this Parliament' which suggests that Henry was hopeful of a favourable resolution in 1530.[129] However, the relationship may be public, but Anne was still being sent away from court. Chapuys reports, 'I believe he [Henry] was intending, seeing that he would ultimately be compelled to it, to separate the Lady from him.'[130] This is evidence to suggest that they were still trying to cultivate favourable public opinion and avoid an international scandal; although by now it is clear to Chapuys, and the other ambassadors that Henry intends to marry Anne.

Chapuys does also get to witness what Henry and Anne were like as a couple. He reports to Mary of Hungary as late as 1533 that Henry 'would beg alms from door to door' before 'abandoning the Lady'.[131] This shows that the couple were still very much in love, and Henry was still committed to his new marriage and, by extension, his break with Rome. Micer Mai, the Imperial Agent in Rome reported that 'the King of England has quarrelled with … Mistress Anne … but that they afterwards reconciled themselves … According to what happens generally in such cases, their love will be greater than before.'[132] Clearly, Henry and Anne have a volatile and passionate relationship, and at this stage are still able to forgive and make up. As we know, towards the end of the relationship Henry grows tired of Anne's quarrelsome personality.

Chapuys is a useful source of the development of the relationship from its gradual exposure from private to public, right until its bitter end. His fortnightly reports are lengthy and detailed. However, it is crucial to note that Chapuys is an Imperialist and a Catholic. He is a staunch supporter of both Catherine and Mary, and he is also highly opposed to Henry's religious changes. Any negative gossip about Anne, he reports, including any time Anne speaks against the Queen. Examples include Anne's declaration that 'she did not care anything for the Queen'.[133] Gossip such as this which is not found in other source material should be read with a more sceptical mind. It is unlikely that Anne

[129] *LP,* Vol. 5, 24.
[130] *LP,* Vol. 5, 70
[131] Mattingly, *State Papers Spain,* pp. 451-2.
[132] *LP,* Vol. 5, 61.
[133] *LP,* Vol. 5, 24.

would have so publicly spoken out against Catherine before the legality of her marriage with Henry was secured. It would have been childish for Anne to have railed against a foreign princess like this, in the same way it would have been to hold a grudge against Wolsey.[134]

Reginald Pole, a cousin of Henry VIII and a scholar, had been involved in gaining favourable verdicts from the universities in favour of Henry's cause. However, once the Church was under attack he went to Padua to study, 'rather than become implicated in the king's divorce.'[135] In 1536 he wrote a treatise entitled *Pro ecclesiasticae unitatis defensione (In defence of Church unity)* which took the form of an open letter. This letter has been viewed by David Starkey and G. W. Bernard, with completely opposing interpretations. Starkey takes the letter at face value, with Pole turning 'his spotlight on the murkiest corner of the King's case: his relationship with Anne Boleyn.'[136] He believes that Pole, supposedly, highlighted the crucial role that Anne held in the divorce. It was Henry's passion for her, not his conscience that led him to seek annulment from Catherine.[137] Pole may have based his evidence on Anne's copies of the love letters which had likely been stolen from her and were in Rome. Starkey points out that Pole goes further and claims that the divorce had been entirely Anne's idea because 'she herself sent her chaplains … to declare to you [Henry] that it was lawful to put her [Catherine] away.'[138] Starkey uses Pole's treatise as conformation that his interpretation of Anne's role, and her relationship with Henry, is correct – suggesting that Pole might have even used the same evidence that Starkey uses to make his claims.[139] It is highly unlikely that it was wholly Anne's idea to have Henry divorce his wife to marry her. This would have been unheard of, extremely risky and the chances of succeeding in this aim would have been ridiculously minimal. Anne was no foreign princess, nor even a great noble lady, and what she was, supposedly, asking for could have led to war. Henry himself is very cautious in proceeding with his divorce for this very reason. It is not sensible to assume that Henry would have allowed Anne to lead him down that path. Although it could, of course, be a

[134] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 65.
[135] Bernard, *Fatal Attractions,* p. 27.
[136] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 287.
[137] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 287.
[138] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 287.
[139] Starkey, *Six Wives,* p. 287.

theoretical possibility, there is no real evidence that Anne made the demands that Pole, and then Starkey, are accusing her of.[140]

Bernard's interpretation of Pole's treatise is diametrically opposed to Starkey's. Pole berates Henry for 'having done so many terrible things just for the love of a woman.'[141] Pole highlight's Anne's role as the mastermind of the divorce as a 'polemical tactic'. Pole wants Henry to recant all that he has done and return to papal authority and Christendom.[142] Bernard argues that Pole is painting Anne as a *'femme fatale'* who Henry could blame for planting the idea of the divorce, forcing him to execute it and break with Rome.[143] Henry VIII is an egoist and never wants to appear to be wrong - it isn't often that he expresses regret. By giving Henry someone else to blame, it would have been more likely that he would have repented. We can see this during the Amicable Grant, where Henry publicly allows Wolsey to take the blame for an unpopular policy that most likely came from himself. This shows that Pole probably had a good understanding of Henry's personality.

Therefore, Bernard's interpretation of Pole's letter is more convincing than Starkey's. If Anne had had a more influential role in orchestrating the divorce it is more likely she would have been reported by the sources earlier than 1527. Also, Henry's love letters mention only that she is informed of progress by Henry and his agents, and that it is Henry's efforts that are forwarding their cause. For this reason, Bernard points out that one should be cautious of later sources which detail the role of Anne in the divorce. They are likely to biased or influenced by hindsight.

Edward Hall's *Chronicle* is a complete account of the reign of Henry VIII. However, Hall's *Chronicle* is not entirely useful to our analysis of the beginnings of Henry and Anne's relationship. Anne is barely mentioned but he does write that 'the Lady Anne Bulleyne was so much in the King's favour, that the common people … thought that the absence of the Queen was only for her [Anne's] sake, which was not true: for the King had been openly rebuked … for keeping company with his brother's wife, which was the occasion that he eshued her company til the truth was tried.'[144] Hall is extremely Henry-centric

[140] Bernard, *Fatal Attraction,* p. 27.
[141] Bernard, *Fatal Attraction,* p. 27.
[142] Bernard, *Fatal Attraction,* pp. 27-8.
[143] Bernard, *Fatal Attraction,* p. 28.
[144] Edward Hall, *Chronicle,* (1809 edn.), p. 789.

and aims to make Henry look like a righteous king at every opportunity. He has clearly distorted the facts in order to uphold Henry's moral case. Anne was not permanently at court during the early stages of their courtship. The love letters prove that she regularly retired to Hever, and as Ives points out, both Henry and Anne knew this was essential to their cause.[145] The relationship was not known by the public in the beginning stages of the divorce. Hall makes more comments on Anne in the years immediately before she becomes Henry's wife, but as a source for the development of their relationship Hall's account is rather vague and extremely limited.

In conclusion, Henry VIII's love letters to Anne Boleyn, are an incredibly useful source when it comes to evaluating the development of their relationship. Although there are difficulties with the lack of dates and the sequencing of the letters, they show how Henry's passion intensifies, and how Anne went from an unsure recipient to a willing lover – though the letters don't tell us why she changed her mind. While the contents of the letters can be intensely debated and are at times ambiguous, at face value they simply show how much Henry VIII loved Anne Boleyn. In context with the other contemporary sources the letters further flesh out the image of their relationship. Generally, sources are affected by bias, such as Chapuys and Cavendish being hostile to Anne, because they are loyal to people who were ultimately displaced by her ascendance at court. This can compromise their usefulness in analysing the development of the relationship. However, if more than one source shares the basic facts of a story (e.g. Henry Percy and Anne Boleyn) then it is reasonable to suggest that there is some legitimacy in them. All the sources together provide evidence that can help analyse Henry and Anne's courtship, but what the letters do best is allow us to see inside the mind of Henry, to understand how passionately in love with Anne he was, and this provides important context to why he took such drastic measures to be with her. Therefore, the love letters are one of the best sources for the development of the relationship between Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn.

[145] Ives, *Anne Boleyn,* p. 87.

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The Radicalism of American Revolutions, 1775-1877: The Disparity Between Perception and the Realities of Political and Economic change

By Joseph Moore

Abstract

There have been many Politically unstable times in American history that have appeared radical, often termed Revolutions, but have had limited ramifications. More importantly however it aims to show that many current Socio-economic problems more specifically inequality and the abuses of business are not modern problems by any measure and have precedents stretching back to the early American Republic. I have identified four major Political/ Social Revolutions that occurred in America between 1775 and 1877 and through these lenses I will examine their significance.

I have been inspired to write this essay by the Political culture of recent years. With talk of cataclysmic changes and regressions in government, shock elections and political turmoil have dominated US politics. Many people have had the tendency to blow the situation out of proportion, partly because it has created an uncertainty about the future and when times are as tumultuous as ours it is easy to see how things could escalate quickly. In light of this, this essay has a dual purpose, to show that there have been many Politically unstable times in American history that have appeared radical, often termed Revolutions, but have had limited ramifications. In some cases what appears radical about them is actually a by-product of the event appearing later stemming from a separate cause. Thus, we should not be as worried as we are, for worry can induce its own problems. Most importantly however it aims to show that many current Socio-economic problems more specifically inequality and the abuses of business are not modern problems by any measure and have precedents stretching back to the early American Republic. Additionally, that there are solutions to the inherent flaws of the system and the way in which it is abused, through the organisation of the people as hopefully my analysis of the role of working class in the Political Revolution will illuminate. It also in another capacity shows how much work there still is to do in US politics to secure the rights of its citizens and free them from discrimination as well as to regulate its economy and the businesses that operate within

it. From this it is hoped that perhaps people will take steps to progress in these areas. To achieve this end, I have identified four major Political/ Social Revolutions that occurred in America between 1775 and 1877 and through these lenses I will examine their significance. That is how radical the change they created was, how far they are related to modern problems in the US as well as picking up on any lessons we may learn from them.

Despite the fact it presented a monumental break from European systems of Monarchy the American Revolution wasn't as significant as assumed. It failed to really change much, in the way of affecting American society, it didn't restructure the economic hierarchy like the Market Revolution would and politics became equally if not more restricted. The Market Revolution and the Political Revolution were the two single most important Revolutions in US History. Almost inextricably linked they will be discussed separately. The Market Revolution was the genesis of modern class systems by which the Political spectrum would be defined. Importantly more so than ever before, it tied the Government and Economy more closely than ever and allowed Businesses to influence policy, a radical threat to Democracy which is still ongoing. The Political Revolution which widened enfranchisement (even with its inherent limitations) and saw the emergence of a Public Sphere set the stage for Women's rights and allowed Abolitionism a significant voice. Furthermore, as it was a victory from middle and working-class pressure groups it showed that rights could be won if struggled for. The Civil War was as regressive as it was progressive, that is in no way to neglect the issue of freeing blacks from chattel bondage but whilst the Civil war physically freed them, they were held in economic and legal bondage by American States thereafter.

True the American Revolution was an attempt at creating a new system of democracy seen nowhere else in Europe, but other than the removal of the hereditary Monarch it failed to create any meaningful change. The Constitution imposed strict limitations on the liberty it proclaimed to represent. Nash has argued that Post revolution the conditions to abolish Slavery were ripe, and that the Southern States were in too weak a position to resist, the flaw being the movement lacked a strong leader.[146] The actual weakness here was the fragility of the Union. It was a challenge to get States to ratify

[146] Gary Nash, *The Forgotten Fifth, African Americans in the age of Revolution* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2006) 69-122

without introducing the complicated question of Slavery. Many Southern States only ratified due to the concessions and voting power they gained from Slavery. The slightest discontent could create threats of disunion.[147] Therefore, Delegates took the same line as Governor Morris, opposing Slavery publicly but supporting it for the sake of the Union.[148] The delicate state of the Union was part of a larger problem for the new Nation and that was it lacked a coherent National feeling, even by the time of the Constitution.[149] One which would not be established until after the war of 1812.[150] Two indicators of this are apparent, One Paine's common sense was not as influential or widely disseminated as has been suggested.[151] Two, states hardly had a harmonious relationship and consistently fought with one another.[152] States fought to maintain their independence, unsurprisingly when we consider that the goal of the Union was to reduce the "excess of Democracy".[153] This was especially true with regard to the Militias who states didn't want to lose jurisdiction over.[154] Eventually It was the ineffectuality of the articles of Confederation and a resulting Political necessity for Economic aid, protection and stabilisation by a National Government as a consequence of Political problems created by the Revolution that States ratified. A resulting lack of National feeling, a desire for independence from the States, and the failure to abolish Slavery would plague the Union. These failures demonstrate the Revolutions limited impact on American society.

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[147] Peter Onuf, "A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians," *Diplomatic History* 22, no. 1 (1998) 80

[148] *Debates from the constitutional convention of 1787*, Edited by Gaillard Hunt and Scott Brown (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920) 242-249

[149] John Murrin, "A Roof Without Walls, the Dilemma of American National Identity" in, *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, edited by Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward Carter, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill,1987) 333-348

[150] David Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire; the American Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009); 12-25, 33-34, 64-65; Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty, A History of the Early Republic 1789-1815* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 695-700

[151] Trish Loughran; "Disseminating Common Sense: Thomas Paine and the Problem of the Early National Bestseller" *American Literature* 78, No.1 (1 March 2006) 1–28.

[152] James Nagel Review of, *Robert Morris: Financier of the American Revolution* by Charles Rappleye (Simon & Schuster, London, 2010) *Public Contract Law Journal* 40, no. 3 (Spring 2011) 891-892; John Murrin, "A Roof Without Walls, the Dilemma of American National Identity" in, *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, edited by Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward Carter, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill,1987) 343

[153] *Debates from the constitutional convention of 1787*, Edited by Gaillard Hunt and Scott Brown (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920) 32

[154] Max Elding *A Revolution in Favour of Government : Origins of the U. S. Constitution and the Making of the American State*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003) 73-88

The Market Revolution was one of the most influential revolutions in American history because it transformed the Economic system. It was the foundation of Capitalism in America and the system in which World Economy operates which made America the global power it would become in the Twentieth-Century. It also created class systems by which living conditions were set and resistance became more organised.[155] There was a restructuring of the social hierarchy. Whereas predating the rise of the market Economy, elite status was defined through access to Capital.[156] During the Market Revolution, access to Capital became increasingly easy as merchants bought on credit and loans became commonplace. Indeed, the Market Revolution directly created the middle class through the process of specialisation.[157] Society witnessed a transition from sustenance to consumption.[158] In other words consumerism, the hallmark of a modern Economy. Most importantly though it created a dangerous corporate monopoly over Government, especially after the Supreme Court granted Federal Government the right to regulate commerce against the wishes of the States.[159] The Southern slaveholders held immense power over National Politics by concentrating wealth.[160] They used nepotism and friendship to gain seats of election and by 1860 two-thirds of all the Southern legislature were Slaveholders.[161] The Southern hold over Congress was exemplified with Calhoun's attempt to pass a concurrent majority bill.[162] Its intention

[155] Sven Beckert, "Merchants and Manufacturers in the Antebellum North" in *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy* edited by Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 93

[156] Andrew M. Shocket, "Thinking about Elites in the Early Republic" *Journal of the Early Republic* 25 No.4 winter (2005) 547-555

[157] David Grusky's review of *The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City, 1760-1900* by Stuart M. Blumin *American Journal of Sociology* 96, No. 1 (1990): 201-03.

[158] Gordon Wood - *Empire of Liberty, A History of the Early Republic 1789-1815* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 322-323; Cindy Sondik Aron, *Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Service: Middle-Class Workers in Victorian America* (Oxford University Press, Cary, 1987) 15

[159] John Marshall, *Gibbons Vs Ogden*, Court Case, Published by digital history Online accessed 11th December 2108 at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4034

[160] Adam Rothman, "The Slave Power in the United States, 1783-1865", in *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy* edited by Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005), 64-91

[161] Edward E. Baptist, "The Migration of Planters to Antebellum Florida: Kinship and Power," *Journal of Southern History* 57, No. 3 (August 1996): 527– 554; Donald Wooster, *Politicians, Planters, and Plain Folk* (University Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1975), 41; Donald Wooster, *The People in Power* (University Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1979), 125-153

[162] John C Calhoun *A disquisition on government*, edited by Richard K. Cralle (John Caldwell), 1782-1850 (Appleton and Co, New York, 1854) 24

was to allow Slaveholders to protect their interest in congress by blocking popular bills harmful to their monopoly. Even increasing enfranchisement, despite it being a victory for the common man was expected to encourage Militias to protect Slaveholding interests in the South.[163] This policy was so accurate that many Militia later evolved into Klansmen.[164] It was not just Southern influence that was being exerted on Congress. Despite their failure to create a collective policy to establish a monopoly over Government, individual interest groups still wielded huge power and possessed resources to influence Government policies.[165] It was Lowell that persuaded congress to impose tariffs on Foreign goods. This created the Nullification crisis and showed that Business could have a powerful and also detrimental effect on Government through pursuit of business-friendly policies. Even historians such as Shoultz have underestimated the North's power in the Legislature, framing imperial expansion to multiply slave plantations exclusively as a Southern initiative, whilst he does argue that the North's fears of their own abolitionists and consequently of former slaves spilling into their territory caused them to support the Southern expansion, the North's support is treated as reactionary as opposed to aiding the conjuring of its inception.[166] However, it must be remembered that the North held just as great a Financial stake in the Salve markets through exportation and transport of goods and this would lead them to support slavery's expansion equally. Originally the Hamiltonian system had found little encouragement in promoting Industry because faced with English markets American's with Capital capable of Investments could find greater opportunities for return abroad.[167] The rise of Cotton Kingdom meant these areas for investment appeared through the opening of Markets in Securities and Transport and the Occupations themselves. Both were essential to and a product of the stimulating revival of the Slave trade. The Market Revolution which allowed businesses to generate vast amounts of wealth linked Government and Economy and showed Businesses that they could

[163] Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote, The Contested History of Democracy in the United States,* revised edition (Basic Books, New York, 2009) 22-42
[164] Steven Hahn*, A Nation Under Our Feet, Black Political Struggled in the Rural South from Slavery to Migration,* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 269
[165] Sven Beckert, "Merchants and Manufacturers in the Antebellum North" in *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy* edited by Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 92-94
[166] Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States, a History of US policy towards Latin America* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998), 14-38
[167] Louise Hacker*, The Triumph of American Capitalism, The development of forces in American History to the End of the Nineteenth Century* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1947) 192

subvert Democracy by concentrating both power and Wealth. Indeed, Jackson's Bank war attempted to mitigate their efforts.

The Political Revolution of the first half of the Nineteenth Century was one of the most important Revolutions in American history. Primarily, because it involved the right of enfranchisement struggled for by common people.[168] The Constitution hadn't totally solved the problem of no taxation without representation and the tax bill to help finance the war of 1812 contributed to that pressure to win the vote. Violent insurrections like the Dorr rebellion were a clear case in point of the work done by working men to win the vote. It was an initiative that deviated radically from the views of the founding fathers who had been strictly for the inclusion of property requirement. Firm in the belief that Men of Property and logically following, men of knowledge should control the Political sphere.[169] Efforts to make the people more representative had been made in the 1790's and Jacksons initial electoral victory had been an important stepping stone in the inclusion of the expressed will of the people.[170] However, by 1829 the political system had been turned on its head in such a short space of time after its establishment. It was a clear victory for Democracy embodying Madison's, The Federalist.[171]
Whilst Women and Black people were Politically excluded the enfranchisement of White males gave a Political foothold to would-be reformers that showed them if they could justify and gain support for their cause the Vote could be extended to them too. When considered within the context of the emerging, what Habermas termed public sphere, it is clear that the enfranchisement allowed abolitionism a Political voice.[172] Despite their inability to vote Women could influence those who could by championing Abolition movements.[173] The role imposed upon them by Men as the moral centre of the home allowed them to transcend that boundary and redefine themselves as the moral conscience of the nation through tracts and writings. The power to influence public

[168] Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff. "The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World." *Journal of Economic History* 65, No. 4 (2005) 907
[169] *Debates from the constitutional convention of 1787*, Edited by Gaillard Hunt and Scott Brown (Oxford University Press, New York, 1920) 621
[170] James Roger *Sharp a New Nation in Crisis* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993) 68; Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty, A History of the Early Republic 1789-1815* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 276-314
[171] James Madison "The Federalist No. 10" continued in *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Shapiro Ian, John Dunn, Donald Horowitz and Eileen Botting, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009) 47-53
[172] Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992)
[173] Eric Foner, *Reconstruction, Americas unfinished revolution 1863-1877* (Harper and Row, New York, 2015) 255

opinion such as Gail Hamilton's work which encouraged support for the Republican party through penetration of the public sphere, cannot be underestimated primarily because it remained outside Political control and was so rich in literature.[174] Uncle Tom's cabin disproved notions of Slaves as inhuman and barbaric, only to be further enhanced by appeals from Black Writers.[175] Enfranchisement, and the influence of the Civil Society helped Lincoln sweep the North in the election of 1860. [176] Had enfranchisement remained restricted, the Economic interest of Northern power blocks concerning Slavery would have denied the election of Lincoln. Support for Abolition among the Working Classes was limited somewhat by fear of competition with free blacks for jobs.[177] Democrats attempted to play upon this and it is also reflected in the New York draft riots.[178] However, it is difficult to see without the support for the Working Classes just how the Republicans could've been elected.

As far as American revolutions go the Civil war would've been the most important in US History had its effects and aims materialised in the long term. The lack of coherent Republican policy and Johnsons racial and political objections to black prerogatives were a significant barrier to reconstruction.[179] However the key to enforcing political change in the South was military force. Without it, the rights guaranteed to free blacks could not be enforced, their Freedom to operate equally in Society couldn't be protected and they were effectively at the mercy of the States and the KKK.[180] Without Military protection, States could use literacy tests to manoeuvre around the fifteenth

[174] Gail Hamilton *A call to my Countrywomen*, originally published by the Atlantic monthly March 1863 Accessed online on 12th December 2018 at http://sceti.library.upenn.edu/sceti/civilwar/details.cfm?textID=67725_D&type=fulltitle

[175] Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, edited by Jean Fagan Yellin (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998); Frederick Douglass, "what to the slave is the 4th July", *Great Speeches by Frederick Douglass* (New York: Dover Publications, 2013) 25-40;
From Slavery to Freedom, The African American Pamphlet Collection accessed on 11th December 2018 at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/aapchtml/aapccap.html

[176] Walter Dean Burnham, *Presidential ballots, 1836–1892* (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1955) 247-257

[177] William DuBois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* (Routledege, Abingdon, 2017) 602

[178] Democratic party's *Address of the Workingmen's United Political Association of the City and County of New York to the workingmen of the United States* accessed on 8th December 2018 online at 16174_O_9.pdf

[179] Eric Foner, *Reconstruction, America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (Harper and Row, New York, 1988)* 228-251

[180] William Alan Blair. "The Use of Military Force to Protect the Gains of Reconstruction." *Civil War History* 51, no. 4 (2005): 388-402; Steven Hahn, *A Nation Under Our Feet, Black Political Struggle in the Rural South from Slavery to Migration,* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 265-313

amendment, fire Black Republicans without justification to reduce black representation and importantly as DuBois highlighted reduce the black man's wage to an almost bare minimum in defiance of the Law.[181] Without direct enforcement on the ground Federal regulation was meaningless. The power of the Federal Government could be used to weaken the Klan, as trials show the Supreme Court wouldn't excuse a group of youths under Duress, for participation in Klan activities.[182] But with no army to prevent this they could be compelled to, or out of free will, join the Klan and attitudes would continue to be cemented rather than changed.

Overall the most Important Revolutions in American History between 1775 and 1877 were the Market Revolution and the Political Revolution. The Market Revolution because it was the genesis of our modern Economy, introducing, Consumerism and the Class systems which operate within it. It also linked Government and the Economy more closely and showed Businesses that by concentrating wealth they could influence policy favourable to them, a dangerous precedent that has continued in modern society. The Political Revolution because it showed Americans that if they struggled for their rights they could win huge concessions, even overturning the policies of the Founding Fathers. It also created the potential for Blacks and Women's rights. When examined with the Public Sphere of the Nineteenth-Century it is easy to see how the works of Women and Black writers advanced the abolitionist cause helping Lincoln win the North in 1860. The American Revolution was much less important, although it created a new system of Government and threw off the British, its inherent Constitutional limitations, its lack of National unity and desire for its States to maintain independence from National government highlight its limited outcomes. The Civil War had the potential to be the most important US Revolutions after freeing its Slaves but it was unable to effect meaningful long-term change. Blacks were still held in Economic and Political entrapment and without military police they were prone to attacks by the KKK. It became impossible to enforce their rights. It was an unfinished revolution, one which would make huge ground in the 1960's but with corrupt Police and Racism still

[181] *Affidavits of discharge from employment in Alabama for voting, 26th March 1868*, Accessed online on 2nd December 2018 at 75644_O_part01.pdf 75644_O_part02.pdf 75644_O_part03.pdf 75644_O_part04.pdf; William DuBois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* (Routledge, Abingdon, 2017) 599

[182] Judge Bond, *Trial records for the Supreme Court* Accessed online on 11th December 2018 at http://sceti.library.upenn.edu/sceti/civilwar/pdf/19955_O_12_part13.pdf

entrenched in America, one that is still incomplete to this day.

Thus, it is easy to see how Revolutions like the American Revolution and the Civil War both appeared ground breaking and in many sense they were, especially the Civil War that freed slaves from physical bondage but the change was not as radical as anticipated, as America failed to make provision or protection for its freed slaves. In some cases, the change that was anticipated was not caused by the revolution itself but was a later product of another instrument such as what I will loosely term, American nationalism, which was not created by the American revolution but by the ensuing war of 1812. Both of these Revolutions, despite having significant consequences for the fate of the Nation indicate that change is not always as rapid or as vast as one might anticipate despite the momentous affect they appear to have or the changes they bring. The Civil war however as highlighted does show that much work still needs to be done to further the cause of racial inequality in America even to this day. The Market Revolution is a clear example of how closely Businesses and Government have been since the Early republic, through the concentration of wealth. Even charges of neoliberalism have their ghosts in the practice of privatisation of government assets, of which John Larson's book on public works is a leading resource.[183] However it should be remembered that all is not lost, the work done by the Working Class to attain the Vote which then subsequently created grounds to advocate for the vote for both Women and Black people shows that if people organise and struggle for their rights, meaningful change is possible.

[183] John Lauritz Larson, *Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001).

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The Significance of the Great Exhibition of 1851 on the Victorian Public's Perception of Prince Albert

By Rebecca Wood

Abstract

Prince Albert's popularity within the public opinion is currently at a high point as television series such as ITV's Victoria are presenting him as a romantic hero and a passionate scholar. Within the Victorian period, however, the public's perception of Albert was generally less positive. After his marriage to Queen Victoria in 1840, Albert received numerous criticisms in the press referring to his German origins, his attempts to redesign military uniform and particularly for his work towards what turned out to be his finest achievement, the Great Exhibition of 1851.

To assess the public's perception of Albert some of the most useful primary sources are the cartoons and poems featured in the popular satirical magazine Punch. By examining the portrayal of Albert through these and various other sources, it is possible to identify the significance of the Great Exhibition as a turning point in the Victorian public's perception of Albert.

The Great Exhibition of 1851 has been regarded by both contemporaries and historians as an immense achievement for Britain in the nineteenth century with Hoffenberg describing it as '*a defining moment in national identity and history*'.[184] Much of the praise for the success of the Exhibition has been attributed to Prince Albert, portraying him as the genius behind the idea, and that his name would, in Victoria's words, be '*for ever immortalised*' with the Exhibition.[185] However, the perception of Albert from the public and the press was not always positive, with criticisms of him exemplified in the public opinion and in the resentment of the aristocracy. The popular perception of Albert has

[184] Hoffenberg, Peter H., *An Empire on Display*, (Berkley, CA and London: University of California Press, 2001), p. 205.

[185] Queen Victoria, 'Thursday 1st May 1851', Vol. 31, Princess Beatrice's Copies, via *Queen Victoria's Journals*, (2012), <available at http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org/search/displayItemFromId.do?FormatType=fulltextimgsrc&QueryType=articles&ItemID=18510501> [Date accessed 02/12/18].

undergone both changes and maintained continuities and these require an examination to determine to what extent the Great Exhibition was a catalyst for the changing opinions. Albert's popularity from his first arrival in England and his marriage, to the close of the Great Exhibition and his enduring legacy saw a significant shift from the initial resentment towards his Coburg family to an outbreak of national mourning upon his death in 1861.

The primary sources used to chart the public opinion will predominantly be cartoons, such as the satirical *Punch Magazine,* and newspaper reports including *The London Times*. Additionally, Victoria and Albert's private correspondence and diary entries will provide a unique insight into their own feelings towards how the public perceived them throughout this period. The Great Exhibition was a key event in Albert's lifetime and did significantly help to improve his reputation, but this was marred by the negative press he received during the years prior to the Exhibition, often during the planning and constructing of the scheme, and thus his achievements were not fully recognised until after the Exhibition was confirmed to be a success.

The turbulent early years of Victoria's reign were chequered with crises that reflected badly on the monarchy, including her poor judgement during the Bedchamber Crisis and the Lady Flora Hastings affair early in 1839.[186] Albert brought with him a calm and level-headed influence, perfect for Victoria, who was in need of guidance.[187] Throughout the early years of the marriage, Albert's reputation was predominantly negatively presented through the press. Born the second son of a Duke of a small European principality, Albert had few options for his future, including the military or a good marriage.[188] One cause of unpopularity towards Albert can be seen from his family. The Coburgs, particularly Victoria's own mother, the Duchess of Kent, was disliked by William IV, leading to his disapproval of the visits of Albert and his brother, Ernest.[189] Anti-Coburg feeling also stemmed from Parliament, who remained resentful that Albert's uncle, Leopold, was still claiming his annual income of £50,000 granted to him when he married the Princess Charlotte, even though she had died in 1817.[190] Generally there was

[186] *Queen Victoria's Journals*, (2012), 'Queen Victoria's life and times', <available at http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org/search/browseByCalendar.do> [Date accessed 02/12/18].
[187] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[188] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[189] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[190] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].

the feeling that once again the Coburgs '*had been lucky once too often*' and England again had to pay an income for *'another penniless German princeling'* at a time when England was facing its own socio-economic problems, such as the Hungry Forties.[191]

The precarious nature of Albert's position as a Prince Consort was not taken for granted by either himself or Victoria. Albert knew the importance of making the country like him as he wrote in a letter to Baron Stockmar, he was aware he needed to gain '*the respect, the love, and the confidence (…) of the nation*'.[192] Meanwhile Victoria was conscious of the '*great sacrifice*' Albert would be making when he married her.[193] Even after their marriage in February 1840 Albert's position did not much alter despite Victoria's attempts to give Albert a position. The initial response to Albert from the upper classes, was not very positive, particularly from the lower members of the royal family. Victoria's wish to place Albert after herself in precedence angered her uncle, the Duke of Cumberland and new King of Hanover, and Parliament also opposed this. Victoria also faced rumours of Albert being a Catholic, which had to be '*firmly squashed*'.[194] These came from the stories of his Coburg relates marrying Catholics in the pursuit of power and advancement.[195] A satire of the period implied that Albert had been chosen due to the influence of Baroness Lehzen.[196] Lehzen, Victoria's governess and close friend, was also German and, as argued by Plowden, was informed by Leopold of the great likelihood of an engagement between Albert and Victoria before they turned 18, and she was subsequently '*obedient to instructions*' when she discussed the Coburg Princes with Victoria.[197] The satire also suggested that Albert sought '*England's fat Queen and England's fatter purse!'.*[198] The above examples present the common criticism that the

[191] Plowden, Alison, *The Young Victoria*, (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1981), p. 202.
[192] Prince Albert, 'Letter to Baron Stockmar', (November 1839), quoted in Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[193] Queen Victoria, 'Tuesday 15th October 1839', Vol. 12, Lord Esher's Typescripts, via *Queen Victoria's Journals'*, (2012), <available at http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org/search/displayItemFromId.do?FormatType=fulltextimgsrc&QueryType=articles&ItemID=18391015> [Date accessed 03/12/18].
[194] Plowden, Alison, *The Young Victoria*, (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1981), pp. 203-204.
[195] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[196] *The German Bridegroom; A Satire*, (1840), quoted in Fulford, Roger, *The Prince Consort*, reprint, (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 46.
[197] Plowden, Alison, *The Young Victoria*, (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1981), p. 129.
[198] *The German Bridegroom; A Satire*, (1840), quoted in Fulford, Roger, *The Prince Consort*, reprint, (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 46.

Coburgs were ambitious and scheming for their own advancement and this was the scepticism Albert was met with. According to Plowden the '*ordinary Londoners'*, meanwhile, were quite charmed with Victoria's romance with a '*good-looking Prince'*.[199] This initial support is indicative of to the revival of romance in the Victorian era, as indicated by the popularity of novels by authors such as Sir Walter Scott.[200]

Victoria's diary entries present Albert as having an '*amiable, mild disposition'* and thus he would hopefully provide a guiding influence unto the young queen.[201] Albert began to work alongside Victoria, for example being seated next to her during audiences, and acting as an intermediary between the queen and the Prime Minister, Robert Peel. Albert had succeeded in forging himself this '*informal authority*' despite lacking an '*English title or rank'*.[202] During Victoria's first pregnancy, a Regency Bill was passed and gave Albert new importance as it enabled him to act without a council should Victoria be unable or if their heir was a minor.[203] He soon found a place helping culture by directing the Ancient Concerts, speaking at Anti-slavery convention and being placed by Peel on the Royal Commission redesigning the Houses of Parliament. Weintraub marks this as Albert's '*real initiation into public life*' and the beginning of his close relationship with Peel, whom he came to view as an '*informal mentor'*.[204] Albert's childhood education had taught him well in science, philosophy, mathematics, history, encompassed a Grand Tour and attendance to the University of Bonn in 1837-38. He and his brother, Ernest, funded their own music lessons as their father deemed it a superficial waste of money.[205] Albert's interest in art was shown through his participation in the Society of Arts from 1843 onwards and his immediate push for art and science to have a useful or industrial purpose. Albert's years as President of the Society saw increasing member numbers with valuable new additions, including Stephenson and Paxton, showing his influence in this

[199] Plowden, Alison, *The Young Victoria*, (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1981), p. 207.
[200] BBC2 (2018), 'Writing Scotland: Walter Scott', *BBC*, <available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/profiles/6ybQ7x2H4s0LF0ZlL8jKj0/walter-scott> [Date accessed 06/12/18].
[201] Queen Victoria, 'Thursday 17th October 1839', Vol. 12, Lord Esher's Typescripts, via *Queen Victoria's Journals*, (2012), <available at http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org/search/displayItemFromId.do?FormatType=fulltextimgsrc&QueryType=articles&ItemID=18391017> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[202] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[203] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[204] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[205] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].

field.[206] Unfortunately, this studious and dedicated student was not the portrayal in the press at the time.

It is important to consider the public perception and media portrayal of Albert upon his first arrival in England and in the early years of his marriage, before any plans for the Great Exhibition were underway in order to identify changes. One portrayal of Albert in *Punch* was as a tailor, following his work to redesign the British soldiers' hats. A cartoon shows Albert in a studio full of models and plans for hat, looking pleased with himself, whilst Victoria attends looking bemused (Fig. 1). A *Punch* extract quoted in *Mr Punch's History of Modern England* describes Albert as having *'devoted the energies of his mind (…) to the manufacture of infantry caps'* and other pieces of military uniform. The tone throughout the piece is mocking, suggesting that Albert has a great and well-educated mind, but is wasting it on frivolous sartorial designs which are later '*withdrawn by an order from the War Office'*.[207] Albert is further mocked with the '*The Tailor's Goose'*, showing him as a goose, riding into battle armed with '*nothing but the* bill', his new patterns and a pair of scissors (Fig. 2). This is mocking his lack of military experience and showing him so naïve to believe that merely the uniform you wear to battle is enough to deter the enemy. This joke heightened in 1845 when Albert met with the Merchant Tailors and was named by Punch as the '*Prince of Tailors*'.[208] These satirical cartoons reveal is that there is some ambiguity and uncertainty towards the matter of Albert's position. Albert himself was frustrated with his '*peripheral place'* at Victoria's side.[209] Politically he had little power as the government had denied Victoria's request to make him a peer, and she could only grant him the Order of the Garter.[210] This ambiguity was further represented in a 1847 cartoon that showed Albert in a room surrounded by his many costumes including a scholar, a soldier and a judge (Fig. 3). This suggested to the public that he was attempting to fill numerous different roles, rather than fixing on one certain course.

[206] Hobhouse, Hermione, *Prince Albert: his life and work*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983), pp. 90-91.
[207] Graves, Charles L., *Mr Punch's History of Modern England*, Vol. 1 – 1841-1857, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1921), <available at https://archive.org/details/mrpunchshistoryo01gravuoft> [Date accessed 24/11/18], pp. 171-172.
[208] Ibid., p. 172.
[209] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[210] Ibid., [Date accessed 04/12/18].

In his early years as Prince Consort, therefore, it is evident that Albert's reputation was not perfect. The public were receiving mixed reports of him, varying from his humanitarianism with the speech at the Anti-slavery Convention, to his frivolous redesigning of military uniforms, for which he had no actual military experience. Much of the criticism from these early years stemmed from the uncertainty of Albert's position. Some of the press, such as Punch, would mock him and '*dismiss him as ponderous and dull*', whilst those who moved in the right upper-class cultural groups were likely to have seen a very sensible and well-educated individual in the Prince Consort.[211] Once the concerns over the marriage, his position, his influence and his allowance subsided, the cartoons indicate that Albert began to be portrayed as less of a concern to the British and more of a joke (Figs. 1, 2, 3).

Although the Great Exhibition did not take place until May 1851, over 11 years after Victoria and Albert's wedding, the project began some years earlier. Albert's work towards achieving this goal was not without its problems and nor did it completely improve the public perception of him. The notion of a Great Exhibition first came over to England after Cole's visit to the Exposition Nationale des produits de l'industrie in 1849. Albert was reported to have responded that any exhibition had to be international.[212] One of the contentious issues raised with hosting an international exhibition was the matter of funding. This was seemingly solved in August 1849 with the contribution of some £75,000 from James and George Munday, who finally agreed after demanding Albert must be supportive of the endeavour.[213] This is indicative of the influence attributed to Albert, not necessarily as an intellectual, but a popular and powerful figure thanks to his royal status. This contract with Mundays, however, later came undone in January 1850 as there was widespread anger that a private company would be able gain profit from such a national event.[214] As a result of this negative press, Albert was forced to mitigate the situation, presenting his vision for the Exhibition to the Royal Society in March 1850 with his Mansion House speech. This speech rallied on the advantages of the Exhibition, including taking a survey of the level of development and progressing onward

[211] Fulford, Roger, *The Prince Consort*, reprint, (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 203.
[212] Greenhalgh, Paul, *Ephemeral Vistas; The expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and Worlds Fairs, 1851 - 1939*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 11-12.
[213] Hobhouse, Hermione, *The Crystal Palace and the Great Exhibition*, (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 11-12.
[214] Ibid., pp. 14-16.

together.[215] The significance of the Mansion Speech cannot be overestimated. *Punch's* report on the event praised the Exhibition with its promises to give the public '*domestic comforts made more comfortable*'.[216] It also suggested that the event had the support of the working class, as a working-class man was present to give his sincere thanks to the commission and Prince Albert for this chance to showcase their skills. This account suggests Albert is, to some extent, in touch with the working-classes, giving them an opportunity for self-betterment. He is also shown to have respect for them, reportedly shaking the man's hand afterwards.[217] Furthermore, *Punch* is presenting Albert in a favourable light, commending him on a speech that was '*strong with good Saxon sense*'.[218]

Whilst it appeared at the time that Punch had seen the positives in Albert's ideas and improved their opinion of him, this was not a permanent change. Punch continued their tirade of embarrassment towards Albert just three months later with the *Industrious Boy* (Fig. 4). The cartoon depicted him as a young boy begging, cap in hand, with a mischievous grin, in an attempt to raise money for the Exhibition. Whilst this is not only a demeaning portrayal, as the Queen's husband is seemingly having to beg for money, it may also relate to the troubles Albert faced at the beginning of his marriage. The accompanying poem (Fig. 4) again continues the theme that Albert was a '*poor young Prince*', suggesting he has little power and money of his own, was a common concern throughout Albert's early years and the portrayals of him in the press. He was granted a significantly smaller allowance than previous Prince Consorts.[219] Therefore, whilst those present at the Mansion House speech appeared to have been moved by Albert's words, receiving them with '*such enthusiasm'* and '*deafening cheers*', the effect was short-lived as once another hurdle arose, he was ridiculed again.[220]

Another of the main points of contention throughout this process was the use of Hyde Park and the placement of the Exhibition. As early as July 1849 Albert and Henry

[215] Prince Albert, 'Mansion House Speech', (March 1850), in Hobhouse, Hermione, *Prince Albert: his life and work*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983), p 98.
[216] 'Knife-and-Fork Exhibition at the Mansion-House', *Punch*, (Punch Publications Limited, 1850), Vol. 18-19, <available at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IwYDAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y> [Date accessed 24/11/18], p. 123.
[217] Ibid., p. 123.
[218] Ibid., p. 123.
[219] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[220] *Punch*, (Punch Publications Limited, 1850), Vol. 18-19, <available at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IwYDAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y> [Date accessed 24/11/18], p. 123.

Cole had determined the best place for the Exhibition would be in Hyde Park thanks to its central location. The press, however, was very critical about the disruption this would cause to the popular social area of Rotten Row. This area of Hyde Park was frequented by the '*respectable society'* as a favourable place to ride in one's carriage every morning and hear the most pressing gossip.[221] There were fears that the Exhibition would cause an influx of '*undesirables'* to this part of the city.[222] Auerbach argues that at this point, much of the strongest opposition came from '*the upper echelons of society'* as they would be the group who could afford leisurely pursuits such as this.[223] This opposition is not directly against the idea of the Exhibition or against Albert himself, but rather the impact it will have upon one particular group.

Hyde Park is further referenced in the cartoon '*A Certain Good Queen Intercedes…'* (Fig. 5), where Victoria is shown pleading with her husband, who is shown with a stubborn facial expression and posture, suggestive of a childish tantrum. The figure next to Albert is holding '*plans for spoiling Hyde Park'*, making it clear to the audience that the cause of this conference and dispute is the proposal to build in Hyde Park. Albert is depicted wearing a version of the tall, flat-topped Shako hat he designed in for the English military in the first half of the 1840s.[224] The Shako hat has been a key theme Punch repeated in many of their cartoons of Albert. The only positive review of said hat was that '*Caricaturists loved it',* thus suggesting that this became a popular joke within the publication and with the public and shows that these jokes could be maintained over numerous years.[225]

A further concern that turned the opinion against Albert was the fear that a number of the trees in Hyde Park would have to be cut down to allow for a large exhibition space.[226] This is exemplified in the *Punch* cartoon where Albert is being pleaded with before he cuts down one of the elm trees (Fig. 6). Here Albert has been shown in the outfit

[221] Auerbach, Jeffrey A., *The Great Exhibition of 1851*, (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 44.
[222] Ibid., p. 42.
[223] Ibid., p. 44.
[224] Weintraub, Stanley, *Uncrowned King: The Life of Prince Albert*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), pp. 152-3.
[225] Weintraub, Stanley, *Uncrowned King: The Life of Prince Albert*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 153.
[226] Auerbach, Jeffrey A., *The Great Exhibition of 1851*, (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 45.

of a scholar with the mortar board hat, indicative of the educational purpose of the Exhibition. This is in keeping with another ongoing theme, that Albert was often portrayed as having something of a single-mindedness in many of the cartoons of him. Here he is willing to cut down the elms in Hyde Park for the sake of his Exhibition despite the accompanying poem declaring that he would be '*spoiling Rotten Row*'.[227]

During this period of working towards the Great Exhibition, Albert faced numerous obstacles that could have destroyed the project entirely. Whilst there were many advantages to having Prince Albert appear at the forefront of the Great Exhibition, such as greater influence and power, there were also disadvantages for him, such as his name and reputation being slandered. This misconduct got such that Fuller spoke to Albert's secretary, Grey, expressing his concern at the bad reputation currently surrounding Albert's name.[228] Grey, however, was not concerned as this was only stemming from the upper classes and was thus not widespread.[229] The extent of the problems faced by Albert during these planning stages was such that combined with the untimely death of his close friend, Robert Peel, Albert nearly gave up the scheme entirely.[230] A distraught letter from Albert to his older brother showed his despair from this '*terrible loss*', and his concerns that the patrons would be scared from the endeavour and they '*shall probably be defeated*'.[231] This letter presents Albert's genuine concern about the severity of the opposition he and the Commission faced over the matter of Hyde Park. It was during this period that Albert respectfully declined the offer from the Duke of Wellington to become the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Weintraub suggest that this was also because Albert was occupied with the Exhibition, but also '*wary of overt intrusion into governmental affairs*' and his decision to decline was most wise.[232] Therefore, by not accepting the position offered from Wellington, Albert was shielded from a pursuit likely to have caused further discontentment among the populace.

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[227] *Punch*, (Punch Publications Limited, 1850), Vol. 19, <available at https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=qYXnFa4UfisC> [Date accessed 29/11/18], p10.
[228] Auerbach, Jeffrey A., *The Great Exhibition of 1851*, (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 45.
[229] Ibid., p. 45.
[230] Ibid., pp. 45-46.
[231] Prince Albert, 'Letter to Ernest', (July 1850), quoted in Auerbach, Jeffrey A., *The Great Exhibition of 1851*, (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 46.
[232] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].

One of the most significant cartoons that was published during the build up to the Great Exhibition was *Punch*'s '*Specimen from Mr Punch's Industrial Exhibition of 1850*' (Fig. 7). This depicted Mr Punch and Albert thoughtfully observing four common Victorian industrial workers, displayed inside bell jars. This source, like the military hats before it, suggests to the viewer that Albert was out of touch with his endeavours, and that this Exhibition would celebrate British industry, whilst the workers are faced with such conditions and working well into old age, as depicted by the '*Labourer Aged 74'* in the background. Suggesting that Albert's Exhibition will '*be improved in 1851'* indicates concern that the Great Exhibition will be presenting a romanticised depiction of industry, ignoring the hardships faced. From the above examples, it is evident that Albert's work in the lead up to the Great Exhibition received mixed responses.

When the Great Exhibition opened on the 1st of May 1851, Victoria and Albert were at the centre of the celebrations in the Crystal Palace. *The London Times* reports the arrival of Victoria through the cheering and '*genuine good feeling'* from the crowds along the royal procession.[233] They also reported that Albert was visibly emotional and proud of the Exhibition, suggesting that it will now be '*inseparably associated*' with him.[234] This suggests his work in creating the Great Exhibition could overshadow the previous misjudgements the press and public have previously associated with him, namely the Shako hats. The ceremony of the opening day pushed Albert as the leader of the scheme, as reported in Victoria's journal, Albert moved from standing by her side, to being '*at the head of the Commissioners*' before reading a report to which she then responded.[235] The contemporary accounts of the opening suggest that this event was so glorious, that Albert's reputation is now centred around the Great Exhibition. This was, however, not strictly true as noted by Weintraub, the British press only truly liked Albert '*during his highly visible but temporary successes'.*[236] Nowhere is this more evident than within just five years, when Albert was again the subject of negative press through his intervention in the National Gallery and his support for the scheme to move the precious artwork

[233] 'The Opening of the Great Exhibition', *The London Times*, (2 May 1851).
[234] Ibid., *The London Times*, (2 May 1851).
[235] Queen Victoria, 'Thursday 1st May 1851', Vol. 31, Princess Beatrice's Copies, via *Queen Victoria's Journals*, (2012), <available via http://www.queenvictoriasjournals.org/search/displayItemFromId.do?FormatType=fulltextimgsrc&QueryType=articles&ItemID=18510501> [Date accessed 04/12/18].
[236] Weintraub, Stanley, (2012), 'Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha], *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/274> [Date accessed 04/12/18].

further out of the polluted city centre.[237] Therefore, despite his great feat in the Exhibition, his passion for art remained a subject of criticism.

One significant change in Albert's perception was how he was reflected in later years by *Punch* in 1921. In *Mr Punch's History of Modern England*, they acknowledge that whilst they initially criticised the idea of the Exhibition, '*after a little wavering'* gave it '*enthusiastic support*'.[238] In 1853 they published an apologetic poem that reflected on Albert's display of his *'propriety, judgement and soundness of taste*'. He also remained dignified in the face of '*John Bull's little oddities'* of which '*his own blunders he mourns'*.[239] This poem shows remorse towards their previous prejudgements and treatment of Albert, but the poem was some two years after the Great Exhibition, sparked by the suggestion of a statue of Albert for Hyde Park. Therefore, this is not an immediate concession, but one of caution after waiting to see how the public opinion would settle. The complete publication, which dates from 1921, acknowledges that it was not until Albert's death that there was a real change in his perception. The most poignant quote is comparing Albert to Peel, saying he '*had to die before his services to the country were recognized*'.[240] This is evidence that the Great Exhibition was not a catalyst as it took Albert's death for his work to be acknowledged without criticism. It was not so much the Great Exhibition itself nor Albert's work towards it that significantly changed his perception, but the fact it was ultimately a success. His work towards the Exhibition would have amounted to nothing, and very likely have been used against him later, had the Exhibition not been a such a success. The ultimate popularity of the event was shown in the receiving of 6,039,195 visitors, and a profit of £186,437 which was later invested into an arts and science centre in South Kensington.[241]

In conclusion, the Great Exhibition in 1851 was a significant event that did change the public's perception of Prince Albert. His work towards creating the Exhibition, however, seemed to hinder rather than help his reputation. Albert received negative depictions in

[237] Hobhouse, Hermione, *Prince Albert: his life and work*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983), pp. 76-77.
[238] Graves, Charles L., *Mr Punch's History of Modern England*, Vol. 1 – 1841-1857, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1921), <available at https://archive.org/details/mrpunchshistoryo01gravuoft> [Date accessed 24/11/18], pp. 181-183.
[239] Ibid., pp. 182-183.
[240] Graves, Charles L., *Mr Punch's History of Modern England*, Vol. 1 – 1841-1857, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1921), <available at https://archive.org/details/mrpunchshistoryo01gravuoft> [Date accessed 24/11/18]., p. 184.
[241] Allwood, John, *The Great Exhibitions*, (London: Studio Vista, 1977), pp. 22-23.

the press for the use of Hyde Park, the cost, and the possible removal of trees. These new criticisms were then coupled with the previous attacks on Albert, such as his seemingly frivolous designing of military hats. He was portrayed as uncaring whilst his wife pleaded with him (Fig. 5), stubborn in seeking what he wanted, willing to disrupt those frequenting Rotten Row (Fig. 5), and seeming to beg for huge amounts of money (Fig. 4). Much of Albert's work towards the Great Exhibition did not change his perception. It rather solidified the assumptions within the press and the public that he was interfering and grasping more power for himself.

The Great Exhibition was not, however, a single catalytic event that permanently changed the public perception. Albert's work towards the Exhibition did, on some occasions, improve the public opinion of him. For example, his Mansion House speech recognised the role of the workers and was well received. Nevertheless, when considering the positives alongside the negatives of Albert's reputation prior to the Exhibition, there were considerably more negative than positive responses to the plans as shown by the *Punch* cartoons (Fig. 4, 5, and 6). Within the early years of his marriage, the public opinion was set that Albert was a poor German prince trying to determine his position, whilst wasting his time redesigning military hats unnecessarily. The Great Exhibition's ultimate success once it was completed, however, conveyed an Albert that was not only intellectual, but also philanthropic and cultured. The Exhibition gave Albert a purpose and a chance to show off his passions on an international stage and defined his place as a Prince Consort and a great patron of art, industry and philanthropy. In many ways, the Great Exhibition helped to define Albert. This was much needed after a decade of ambiguity over Albert's position in government and in the Royal precedence. Therefore, the Great Exhibition did change the public's perception of Prince Albert significantly, but this was not immediate and nor was it absolute. The real and significant change is primarily after the Exhibition was clearly a success and, in some cases, after the passing of such a well-educated patron and Prince.

Appendix:




Fig. 1 'Prince Albert's Studio'

Leech, John, (1843), 'Prince Albert's Studio', via *British Museum*, (2018), <available at https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=3550425&partId=1&people=104183&peoA=104183-1-7&page=1> [Date accessed 02/12/18].





Fig. 2 'The Tailor's Goose- The Terror of the Army

'The Tailor's Goose – The Terror of the Army' (1845), in Graves, Charles L., *Mr Punch's History of Modern England*, Vol. 1 – 1841-1857, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1921), <available at https://archive.org/details/mrpunchshistoryo01gravuoft> [Date accessed 24/11/18], p. 172.



Fig. 3 'Prince Albert "At Home"'

Punch Magazine, 'Prince Albert "At Home"', (March 1847), via *Punch*, (2018), <available at https://punch.photoshelter.com/image/I0000Awfd8j67cKU> [Date accessed 04/12/18].



THE INDUSTRIOUS BOY.

"Please to Remember the Exposition."

Pity the troubles of a poor young Prince,
Whose costly scheme has borne him to your door,
Who's in a fix—the matter not to mince—
Oh, help him out, and Commerce swell your store!

This empty hat my awkward case bespeaks,
These blank subscription-lists explain my fear;
Days follow days, and weeks succeed to weeks,
But very few contributors appear.

Station brings duties: why should we replace?
Station has brought me to the state you see;
And your condition might have been like mine,
The child of Baxter and of Raikery.

Fig. 4 'The Industrious Boy'

Punch Magazine, 'The Industrious Boy', (June 1840), via *Punch*, (2018), <available at https://punch.photoshelter.com/image/I0000UlN2gOw4HEA> [Date accessed 04/12/18].



A CERTAIN GOOD QUEEN INTERCEDING WITH A CERTAIN PRINCE FOR THE UNHAPPY BELGRAVIANS AND OTHER CITIZENS.

Fig. 5 'A Certain Good Queen Interceding with a Certain Prince for the Unhappy Belgravians and Other Citizens'

Punch Magazine, 'A Certain Good Queen Interceding with a Certain Prince for the Unhappy Belgravians and Other Citizens', (July 1850), via *Punch*, (2018), <available at https://punch.photoshelter.com/image/I00004TJ6zAKm9n8>




Fig. 6 'Albert! Spare Those Trees'

'Albert! Spare Those Trees', *Punch Magazine*, (Punch Publications Limited, 1850), Vol. 19, <available at https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=qYXnFa4UfisC> [Date accessed 29/11/18], p. 10.




Fig. 7 'Specimens from Mr Punch's Industrial Exhibition of 1850'.

'Specimens from Mr Punch's Industrial Exhibition of 1850', Punch Magazine, Vol. 17, (1850), in Kriegel, Lara, *Grand Designs: Labour, Empire, and the Museum in Victorian Culture*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), <available at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=LuJWiajLKvIC&dq=Grand+Designs:+Labor,+Empire,+and+the+Museum+in+Victorian+Culture> [Date accessed 02/12/18], p. 94.

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spx?objectId=3550425&partId=1&people=104183&peoA=104183-1-7&page=1> [Date accessed 02/12/18].

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Understanding Khrushchev's Motives: A Historiographical Review of the Cuban Missile Crisis

By Tom Golebiowski

Abstract

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 has been widely debated by historians. Did Khrushchev intend to use the missiles to reduce the United States' strategic superiority? Or perhaps to force concessions in Europe? Or simply to defend his ally in the Caribbean? This article will analyse the scholarly debate surrounding Khrushchev's motives and reveal how the emergence of new sources can rewrite history.

For 13 days in October 1962, the entire world held its breath as events in Cuba escalated Cold War tension to near-breaking point. The United States had discovered what it believed to be Soviet-made nuclear missiles on the Caribbean island and thus, after much deliberation, the administration of John F. Kennedy blockaded Cuba to prevent this seemingly offensive Soviet incursion into the Western Hemisphere. In the aftermath of the crisis, considerable literature has emerged concerning Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's intentions for installing missiles in Cuba. The earliest interpretations ranged from condemning Kennedy's weakness to blaming Khrushchev's insecurities. As time has advanced, considerable revisions have developed thanks to the availability of new sources; especially during *glasnost*. This essay will attempt to track the historiographical debate surrounding this key issue of the Cuban missile crisis and will assess whether or not, over half-a-century later, historians have finally established Khrushchev's true intentions for placing missiles in Cuba.

Some of the earliest and most widespread interpretations of the crisis suggest that Khrushchev's primary motive for placing missiles in Cuba was to gain leverage in the Cold War. The key advocates of this 'traditional' perspective are ex-Kennedy officials. Presidential advisors Theodore Sorenson and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., epitomise this interpretation, writing in 1965 that Khrushchev wanted to test Kennedy and improve

the Soviet Union's capability to launch an attack on the US.[242] Khrushchev also wanted, they claim, to apply pressure on Kennedy to force through a settlement on the contentious issue of divided Berlin.[243] In 1967, Roger Hilsman, a State Department official involved in analysing the Sino-Soviet split, corroborated this and added, based on his experience, that Khrushchev sought to challenge Kennedy in order to bolster Soviet prestige in the face of a growing opposition with communist China.[244] The 1969 posthumously published memoir of the crisis by the president's brother and closest advisor, Robert Kennedy, offers similar analysis.[245] In his 1972 book *Diffusions of Power*, Walt Rostow, a national security advisor to Kennedy, summarised the participant perspective succinctly, writing that "Khrushchev was looking for a quick success which would enhance his political prestige and power in Soviet politics; enhance his authority in the international communist movement… redress the military balance cheaply in terms of resources… and provide leverage for the resolution of the Berlin problem."[246]

Critically, historians such as John Lewis Gaddis have charged participants with assuming Khrushchev's motives.[247] Though the views held by participants are cohesive and rational, their accounts offer near-complete reliance on personal recollections without any attempt to use Soviet sources.[248] In the 1960/70s, Soviet sources were exceptionally limited and the main indicators of Soviet rational were the government newspaper *Pravda,* Soviet actions and Soviet correspondence. Historians have argued that the propagandistic nature of official channels, such as *Pravda*, removed objective value for understanding the crisis. Khrushchev's public speeches and previous actions were therefore the best indicators of future Soviet action. Following the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik in 1957, Khrushchev had made considerable boasts that he now had the technology to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles, all-the-while building up conventional forces in Cuba.[249] In the context of the Cold War, it is logical that American officials saw missiles in Cuba as a continuation of provocative behaviour.

[242] Theodore C Sorenson. *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965) p. 796; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr*., Thousand Days*. *(Boston: Houghton Publishers, 1965) p.729; See* Lester H. Brune, *Missiles of October 1962: A Review of Issues and References*. (Guide to Historical Issues Series: No.2) (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1985) p.18

[243] Sorenson, pp. 277-79; Schlesinger pp. 729-30; See William Medland. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolving Historical Perspectives" *The History Teacher*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Aug. 1990) p. 2

[244] Roger, Hilsman. *To Move A Nation*. (Garden City, New York: Double Day, 1967.) pp. 161-64; See Medland p. 2

[245] Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days: Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969) p. 273

[246] Walter Rostow. *The Diffusion of Power*. (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1972). p. 253

[247] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War*. (New York: Penguin Press, 2005) p.75

[248] Réachbha FitzGerald. "Review Article." *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. 18, 2007 p. 193

[249] Brune. p. 29; Graham Allison. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971) p. 80

As Kennedy officials lionised the president in their accounts, the objectivity of their interpretations also comes into question. Sorenson writes for instance that "[Kennedy] had earned his place in history by this one act alone."[250] In presenting Khrushchev as the antagonist, participants were further bolstering Kennedy's reputation by suggesting that he had successfully deterred subversive communist provocation.

Traditional accounts also existed from outside the administration but fall to similar criticism.

The earliest explanation of the crisis was written in December 1962 by Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop for the *Saturday Evening Post*. Their widely-read 'In Time of Crisis' referred to the missiles as "strategic" and suggested that the Soviets had "tried to lay a trap", thereby advocating Khrushchev's confrontational intentions.[251] Much like participant accounts, Bartlett and Alsop's article was restricted by the availability of sources. The journalists, through Bartlett's close friendship with Kennedy, relied upon interviews with members of the administration including Kennedy himself, meaning that this early article can be treated as an addition to the participant perspective. In 1966, Elie Abel, a former *New York Times* foreign correspondent, wrote a popular hour-by-hour account of the crisis which claimed again claimed that Khrushchev wanted to provoke Kennedy; but added that Kennedy's age was a contributing factor.[252] Again, this account was based on correspondence with the administration. Therefore, from the perspective of the administration and the press in the 1960s, Khrushchev had installed missiles with the intention of improving the position of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, even as the traditional view was still being established, scholars of the 1960s/70s began to test elements of the Kennedy administration's 'official' history, instigating historical debate.[253] Unlike the subjectively positive view of Kennedy in traditional accounts, a number of conservative scholars in the 1960s suggested that Kennedy's weakness was the primary reason for Khrushchev's decision to place missiles in Cuba. In 1963, political scientist David Lowenthal, stated

[250] Sorenson, p. 717
[251] Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett. "In Time of Crisis." *Saturday Evening Post 235* December 8. 1962
[252] Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis*. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1968) p. 37; See Lebow, Richard. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly" *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 98, No. 3 Fall, 1983 p. 440
[253] Michael Dobbs. *One Minute to Midnight* (Random House, 2008) p. 343

that a number of factors, including Kennedy's failure at the Bay of Pigs, had invited Khrushchev's challenge.[254] Also citing Kennedy's non-invasion pledge as "an explicit retraction of the Monroe Doctrine", Lowenthal began a trend of criticising Kennedy directly for Khrushchev's provocation. [255] More moderate criticism followed with James Daniel and John Hubbell's 1963 *Strike in the West*, the first full-length book on the crisis, which accused the Kennedy administration of deliberately ignoring Soviet armament build-up in Cuba that inevitably led to nuclear weapons.[256] Cuban exiles also felt strongly that Kennedy was to blame for the crisis and, writing in 1968, former lawyer Mario Lazo held Kennedy's inexperience responsible, claiming that this convinced Khrushchev his endeavour would be successful.[257] However Lazo, as with other Cuban exiles, held existing frustration for Kennedy following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, which suggests that his account lacks the objectivity of other conservative scholars.

The left also believed that Soviet motivations were misinterpreted by the administration. Rather than accusing Kennedy of weakness, the consensus from left-wing revisionists was that Kennedy's stance on Cuba was threatening to Khrushchev. Appearing in 1963, the first left-wing response '*Cuba: Triumph or Tragedy?*' was written by Roger Hagan. Kennedy had "rejected diplomacy" and opted for aggression, claimed Hagan.[258] Khrushchev didn't have provocation in mind, as placing missiles in Cuba did not compromise the first-strike and retaliatory second-strike capabilities of the US.[259] The Soviet Union was forced to respond to protect their ally and did not have ulterior motives.[260] In 1974, historian Thomas Paterson expanded upon Hagan's argument and showed that Kennedy was "fixated" with Cuba.[261] Factors from Kennedy's public anti-Cuba rhetoric to the CIA's assassination attempts (Operation Mongoose) greatly concerned Khrushchev that the US might again attempt to invade Cuba.[262] In 1976,

[254] David Lowenthal. "U.S. Cuban Policy: Illusion and Reality", *National Review*. January 29, 1963 p. 62
[255] Ibid, 63.
[256] James Daniel and John G. Hubbell. *Strike in the West*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963). P. 57
[257] Mario Lazo. *Dagger in the Heart: American Foreign Policy Failures in Cuba.* (New York: Funk & Wagnells, 1968) p.
[258] Roger Hagan. "Cuba: Triumph of Tragedy?" *Dissent*. Winter, 1963 p.13
[259] Hagan, p. 19
[260] Ibid.
[261] Paterson, Thomas G., "Fixation with Cuba: The Bav of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert W'ar Against Castro" in Paterson, Thomas G., ed. *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy 1961-1963*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 136-141
[262] Ibid.

historian Herbert Dinerstein went so far to suggest that US actions in Guatemala in 1954 had left a permanent impression of US aggression in Latin America.[263]

Building on this indictment of Kennedy's hostility towards Cuba, some scholars have shown that Khrushchev had no need to use Cuba to challenge the US. Writing in 1966, historians Arnold Horelick and Michael Rush state that Khrushchev had already tested Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna summit over the Berlin issue.[264] Suggesting Cuba was a test, they claim, undermined Soviet planning and decision-making. If the Soviet Union was 'testing' the US, it would have been somewhere more favourable such as Berlin or Turkey.[265] Political scientist Graham Allison corroborated this argument in 1971 and pointed to admissions by Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, who claimed numerous times that US resolve over Berlin was enough evidence for Khrushchev of firm American intentions.[266]

Many on the left have also substantiated the traditionalist argument that Khrushchev wanted to use the situation to gain political leverage. In 1969, using Moscow-Berlin communications, Soviet specialist Michel Tatu, showed that friction between Khrushchev and East German Premier Walter Ulbricht was causing tension in the Kremlin. As a consequence, Tatu concludes that Khrushchev put missiles in Cuba to force a settlement on his most urgent issue, Berlin.[267] Writing in 1965, philosopher Leslie Dewart also suggested that Khrushchev wanted to use a settlement in Cuba to push through a conclusion favourable to the Soviet Union in Berlin.[268] In her very far-left interpretation, Dewart even suggested that Kennedy's hostile stance had invited Khrushchev to act in Cuba, so that Kennedy could later expose Khrushchev to manipulate events in Berlin in American favour. However, citing Dewart's lack of evidence on this point, scholars reviewing this debate have termed Dewart's account a "conspiracy theory".[269]

Though one would assume it ought to be a significant source, revisionists pay little attention to Khrushchev's memoirs, which were published in the US in 1970. Based on

[263] Herbert S Dinerstein. *The Making of Missile Crisis: October 1962*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) p. 233-235
[264] Arnold L Horelick and Myron Rush. *Strategy Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) p. 126
[265] Ibid.
[266] Graham T Allison. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971) p. 52
[267] Michael Tatu. *Power in the Kremlin* (New York: The Viking Press, 1969) p. 232-233; See Brune p. 23
[268] Leslie Dewart. "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited" *Studies on the Left* Spring 1965 pp. 19-24
[269] Divine, Robert A. 'Alive and well: the continuing Cuban missile crisis controversy', *Diplomatic History* 18 (4) Fall 1994 p. 166

recordings of Khrushchev that had to be smuggled out of the Soviet Union, *Khrushchev Remembers* was edited and translated by journalist Strobe Talbott. In his account, Khrushchev claimed that the purpose of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba was "to maintain the independence of the Cuban people" after Kennedy had orchestrated an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.[270] Khrushchev's words provided support to the left-wing argument that Kennedy's hostility towards Cuba caused the Soviet Premier to act. However, as Lebow has shown, while Khrushchev's argument was understandable, it was unreliable as evidence of his truest intentions. Khrushchev's memoirs were seen as attempts to save face in the aftermath of a crushing foreign-policy defeat.[271] A US non-invasion pledge on Cuba was obtained following the crisis, but scholars couldn't believe that this was Khrushchev's real aim. Summarising this distrust of Khrushchev, Horelick stated: "to regard the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis as coinciding with Soviet intentions is to mistake salvage of a shipwreck for brilliant navigation".[272]

Developed in response to the traditionalist explanation that was being promoted by the press and the administration, revisionists offered new perspectives on Khrushchev's motives and reinforced existing ones. But due to the contextual constraints of the 1960s/70s, revisionists were fundamentally limited to the same methodological approaches as traditionalists. Offering interpretations based on existing facts, revisionists were able to bring few relevant new sources into the discussion. Dinerstein for instance presented the Guatemalan coup to offer more evidence of hostility; but this wasn't new, just a re-reading of existing evidence. A key source that revisionists working in the 1970s had access to, Khrushchev's memoirs, was seen as unconvincing. Not only were revisionists limited in methodology, the Cold War context also limited their scope of thinking. As post revisionist Gaddis claims, scholars writing during the Cold War were accustomed to giving "one side disproportionate attention".[273] As products of their time, revisionists were unable to truly understand the Soviet Union perspective. The clearest example of this is shown by Horelick, who wrote that "if deterrence of a U.S. attack on Cuba was the sole Soviet objective, the plan backfired: The

[270] Khrushchev, Nikita. Edited and translated by Strobe Talbott *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970) p. 511

[271] Lebow, p. 436
[272] Arnold L. Horelick. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics 16* (1964) p. 365
[273] John Lewis Gaddis. *We now know: rethinking Cold War history*. (Oxford, 1997) p. 282

Soviet weapons provoked rather than deterred".[274] Revisionists, restricted to American thinking, were induced to conflate consequence with causation and come to speculative conclusions without access to Soviet materials.[275]

Following the wave of initial responses to the traditional perspective, historians of the late 1970s and early 1980s switched their focus from understanding Khrushchev's motives to debating the decisions of the Kennedy administration, as the JFK Presidential Library began to release the correspondence of Kennedy officials.[276] However, with the introduction of *glasnost* (openness) in the Soviet Union in 1986, new sources including declassified Soviet documents and oral testimonies began to emerge, reigniting debate over Soviet intentions. In 1989, the book *On the Brink* was published by historians James Blight and David Welch, which presented new uncensored Soviet accounts of the crisis, sparking intense debate. Focusing on a conference organised in 1987 at Harvard University with three Soviet representatives, Blight and Welch summarise the revelations of Sergo Mikoyan, Georgi Shaknazarov and Fyodor Burlatsky. When asked on Khrushchev's intentions, the Russians confirmed that the Soviet Union had feared that the US would repeat the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and so placed the missiles on Cuba primarily to defend the island, with strategic parity as a secondary concern.[277] This new evidence gave substance to left-wing interpretations that Kennedy's hostility was a factor and opposed traditional/conservative opinions that Khrushchev was provoking Kennedy. However, the new revelations suggested that strategic imbalance was still an important factor, despite its dismissal by many revisionists. The Russians did not suggest that wider political concerns, such as Berlin, mattered much to Khrushchev.

In response to Blight and Welch, historian Raymond Garthoff has called into question the reliability of the Soviet representatives. The Soviets at the Harvard Conference, Garthoff claimed, were not senior enough to have access to Khrushchev's inner circle.[278] Burlatsky was a speech-writer to Khrushchev, not a policy maker; Sergo Mikoyan could

[274] Horelick, *World Politics 16*, p. 369
[275] Lawrence Chang. Chapter 4: 'The View from Washington' in Nathan, James. A. (ed.), *The Cuban missile crisis revisited* (New York, 1992) p. 139
[276] Ibid. 134
[277] James Blight and David Welch, *On the brink: Americans and Soviets re-examine the Cuban missile crisis* (New York, 1989) p. 229, 239, 257-258; See Medland p. 439

[278] Garthoff, Raymond. *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* rev. edn. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989) p. 553

only report what his father, first deputy Ansastas Mikoyan had told him; and Shaknazarov, an aide to Mikhail Gorbachev, reported secondary evidence from conversations with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the US. Garthoff argues that reliance on these accounts, thirty years after the crisis, is not enough to understand Khrushchev's motivations. Only Soviet dispatches, such as between Khrushchev and Dobrynin, will allow scholars to fill in the gaps on the Soviet side of the crisis, Garthoff states.[279]

It is important to note that Garthoff, while an esteemed scholar, was also a member of the State Department in 1962. Garthoff's mistrust of Soviet recollections shaped a neo-traditionalist view that was substantiated by Ray Cline, the CIA officer responsible for informing Kennedy of missiles in Cuba.[280] Cline wrote later in 1989 that the new revelations had "too much topspin of glasnost to be convincing".[281] As mistrustful of the Soviets as though it were the 1960s, Cline relied on the work of fellow participants in arguing that Khrushchev wanted to gain concessions in Berlin.[282] Importantly however, some later traditional accounts did take notice of new ideas. In 1989's *Danger and Survival*, former National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy conceded that Kennedy's hostility provoked Khrushchev to put missiles for the defence of Cuba, showing some flexibility within the participants' interpretation.[283]

In 1993, Blight and Welch, alongside historian David Allyn, provided backing to the conclusions from the Harvard conference with a second book, *Cuba On the Brink*. Using the 1992 Havana conference as its primary source, a number of quotes from Fidel Castro supported the proposition that Khrushchev's highest priority was the defence of Cuba. Castro stated that "Nikita loved Cuba very much… he had a weakness for Cuba, you might say– emotionally, and so on– because he was a man of political conviction".[284] A committed revolutionary and socialist, the new evidence showed that Khrushchev's

[279] Gartnoff, 554
[280] Tim Weiner (March 16, 1996). "Ray S. Cline, Chief C.I.A. Analyst, Is Dead at 77". The New York Times. Retrieved June 4, 2017.

[281] Ray S. Cline, "Commentary: The Cuban Missile Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 4 Fall 1989 p.196
[282] Ibid.
[283] Bundy, McGeorge *Danger and Survival (*Random House Publishing Group, 1988)

[284] James Blight, Bruce Allyn and David Welch, Cuba *on the brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon 1993) p. 203

main focus was to protect his socialist ally above all else, just as the Soviets had claimed in 1987 and Khrushchev himself had argued in his memoirs.[285]

Answering Garthoff's calls for more concrete evidence of Khrushchev's intentions, the 1997 historical study *One Hell of a Gamble* by Russian Aleksandr Fursenko and Canadian-American Timothy Naftali broke new ground within the debate and has been described as "a treasure-trove of a book".[286] Fursenko and Naftali united their backgrounds and offered a new, balanced look at the crisis, detailing happenings in the East and the West hour by hour, decision by decision. Critically, Fursenko was granted considerable access to classified material in former Soviet archives. Through study of Soviet correspondence, Fursenko discovered that Khrushchev wanted to "scare the Americans and give them a taste of their own medicine".[287] Khrushchev was concerned that the US was too provocative towards Cuba and with its missiles in Turkey.[288] Fursenko and Naftali's account gave merit to both the traditional opinion that Khrushchev was provocative and to the leftist interpretation that Kennedy's hostility concerned the Soviet leader. Perhaps most dramatically, Fursenko uncovered a new argument entirely. A growing rift between Castro and the Soviet Union was concerning Khrushchev. Castro had recently dismissed pro-Moscow individuals from his government and with China's challenge on the horizon, Khrushchev feared losing Cuba.[289] Defensive missiles on Cuba provided commitment to Soviet-Cuban cooperation but also "reminded Washington of Soviet power".[290]

The general trend in the historiography of this debate shows a clear pattern of refinement through the provision of new evidence. Early traditional accounts viewed Khrushchev with Cold War suspicion and saw his motives as provocative because this was how the missiles were perceived by Americans. Revisionist scholars meanwhile attempted to provide different explanations but, as victims of the Cold War context, they had limited access to Soviet sources and were suspicious of those that they did have, reducing the strength of their arguments. Not until more objective evidence from the

[285] Khrushchev, p. 511
[286] Thomas Blanton, "Annals of Brinkmanship" *THE WILSON QUARTERLY,* Summer 1997

[287] Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *'One hell of a gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis, 1958–1964* (London, 1997) p.182
[288] Ibid, p. 180
[289] Ibid, p.183
[290] Ibid.

Soviet side emerged in the late 1980s, could post-revisionist historians assess the interpretations of traditionalists and revisionists and come to solid conclusions based on more credible evidence. Debate over Khrushchev's intentions has more or less settled with historians accepting Khrushchev's desire to protect Cuba as his primary motive, out of a need to reaffirm commitment to Castro. Strategic parity was another factor, but Berlin was less important. As Sheldon Stern claimed in 2012, Khrushchev's original explanation from his memoirs was essentially true.[291]

Despite the disclosures provided by Fursenko and Naftali, this debate over Khrushchev's intentions cannot be closed. As Gaddis has shown, Khrushchev himself may not even have clear intentions: "it was characteristic of him to not think things through".[292] Historian Thomas Blanton has also criticised the exclusivity of Fursenko and Naftali's account. The sources available to them are not available to other scholars, so how can their evidence be properly verified? Likewise, how do we know that they could even view all sources available? Are some still withheld?[293] Fundamentally it seems the question of Khrushchev's motives for placing missiles on Cuba does not yet have a concrete answer. Scholars have presented what is likely to be the best answer to the question but until all sources on the crisis are available to everyone, we cannot be completely sure of Khrushchev's true motives.

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[291] Sheldon M. Stern, *The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012) p.2

[292] Gaddis, The Cold War, p.77

[293] Thomas Blanton, "Annals of Brinkmanship" *THE WILSON QUARTERLY,* Summer 1997

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Origins of the Iranian Clerical Regime

By George Pinnell

Abstract

The role of clerics from the Tobacco Concession (TC) propelled the confidence of successive clerics who presented the clerical regime's appeal. From the Tobacco Movement (TM), clerics focussed on acquiring not only religious but also political power for themselves.[294] To address potential contentions that it was not only Shiite clerics who sought power, this paper applies Realism to demonstrate how those aspiring for political power focus on increasing power personally. Despite the claim made by clerics such as Nuri and Khomeini that their aim was to align political power with Islamic, this article, by referring to Maw Weber's theory of legitimacy contends that in fact both the anti-constitutionalist clerics like Nuri and Khomeini as well as the constitutionalist clerics (such as Na'ini and Khorasani) used their interpretations of sharia to achieve power rather than to apply the Islamic tenets.

This article accounts for how a *process* unfolded whereby clerics targeted existing authorities for personal power, rather than installing Islam due to differences in applications.[295] Firstly, Islam's *ideology* was employed by clerics since the TC for this end goal. Ridgeon is incorrect suggesting conflict was provoked by ideological differences, since the pursuit of supremacy dominated clerical actions.[296] This is because power motives come more naturally to individuals than asserting collective ideologies. From the TC, clerics operated in a mixture of authorities, with dominant powers being foreign influences and Shahs. Although these powers possessed different ideologies, from the TC, there is consistency with how each asserted itself, namely in a manipulative manner. Secondly, Burns' claim that revolutions are characterised by *power struggles*, proves although breaking existing power was difficult, twentieth-century events propelled the

[294] N. Keddie and Y. Richard, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New York: Yale University Press, 2006) p.21.
[295] T. Skocpol, 'Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution' (*Theory and Society*: Volume 11, Issue 3, 1982) pp. 265-283.
[296] L. Ridgeon, *A Religion and Politics in Modern Iran* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005) p.38.

struggle for the 1980s regime.[297] Since the nineteenth-century, there was more emphasis on legitimacy deriving from charismatic leaders, despite much historiography purporting that it was only during Khomeini's intervention clerics utilised charisma to claim rule.[298] Since CR clerics were the only organised opposition to existing power, clerics were influential in arousing resentment and skilful at manipulating leadership.[299] This can be proven from Nuri, to Tabataba'I and finally Khomeini who combined ideologies like Islam and nationalism creating antipathy towards existing powers. Therefore, I disagree with Arjomand that the clerical campaign's aim was protecting the Islamic citadel against deviations, since this consolidated clerics' personal power since the TC.[300]

Historians have observed clerics' *individual involvement* politically, that underwent a long process of establishing power. However, there has been little attempt other than from Afary to correlate clerical power from the Qajar period to the IR.[301] To prove that clerics acting from the TC largely provoked the 1980s regime, this paper uses *Plato's* views to account for how superiors gradually convince ignorant 'appetitive' populations they offer the best governance.[302] Significantly, the constitutionalist clerics stance mirrors Plato's ideas on power insofar as they call into question the legitimacy of the existing powers in order to replace them with their own power. Plato emphasises how rulers prescribe 'strong drugs' through falsehood.[303] Furthermore, Crossman maintains that Plato's medicinal lies used by clerics control behaviour.[304] Likewise, as Floor argues, the clerics were not the only ones who sought power through their actions. The secular elites' involvement in politics also aimed at taking power.[305] Conceptually, the 'medicinal lie' links with Plato's 'double man' characterisation, an individual with 2 characters, can be applied to clerics' contradictory characters. From Morteza Ansari (thereafter, Ansari),

[297] G. Burns, 'Ideology, Culture, and Ambiguity: The Revolutionary Process in Iran' (*Theory and Society:* Volume 25, Issue 3, 1996) p. 350.
[298] Weber, *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*; S. Whimster, *The Essential Weber: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2004).
[299] M. Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution Of 1905-1909* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p.22.
[300] S. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) p.51.
[301] J. Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional revolution 1906-11* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
[302] Plato, *The Republic* (ed. By I. Richards, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p.33.
[303] T. Brickhouse, 'Justice and dishonesty in Plato's republic' (*The Southern Journal for Philosophy*: Volume XXI, Issue 1, 2010) p.80.
[304] K. Popper, *The Open Society and its enemies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p.139.
[305] W. Floor, 'Revolutionary character of ulama: wishful thinking or reality?' (*International Journal of Middle East Studies*: Volume 12, Issue 4, 1980) pp. 501-524.

to Sayyed Abu'l-Qāsem Kashani (thereafter, Kashani) until Khomeini, clerics were inconsistent in ideological aspirations for Iran, emphasising their Islam yet focussing on propelling political power.

The best theory explaining clerics' actions in the process causing the clerical establishment is *Realism*.[306] Realists argue that clerics were motivated by relative power evidenced from the TC.[307] Realism applies to the enduring process clerics underwent based on personal motives in 2 ways. Firstly, clerics temporarily empowered those less powerful, hiding away their manipulative instruments.[308] Revolutions provided opportunities for Iranians to express themselves, yet it was clerical figureheads who consolidated power. This raises Habermas' statement that everyone is required to take another's perspective.[309] Secondly, Realism explores how dominant individuals use hostilities like the TM to propel themselves. The purpose of political activities is desiring domination (*animus dominandi*) with little compromise.[310] Cleverly, clerics exhibited power hiding under guises of morality to be effective. Therefore, Realism suggests that power motives use moral justifications like fighting oppressive powers, to not accentuate its true desires.

This paper investigates 4 periods explaining how clerical involvements gradually deteriorated existing powers, paving the way for 1980s successes. Firstly, the *Qajar regime* arose in instability ravaging Iran beforehand. As one observes clerics like Ansari's political involvement, there were stronger incentives to spread influence. Secondly, the CR's dress rehearsal -the *TC*- purports the upscaled clerical involvement from Shirazi, struggling against Shahs and foreigners. Although clerics historically supported Shahs, the TC depicts changes in clerics' political alliances. Thirdly, the CR indicated that clerical involvement from Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'I (thereafter, Tabataba'I) and Nuri was

[306] T. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651); H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948) p.34.
[307] F. Vahdat, 'Post-Revolutionary Islamic Discourses on Modernity in Iran: Expansion and Contraction of Human Subjectivity' (*International Journal Middle East Studies:* Volume 35, Issue 4, 2003) p. 610; Hobbes, *Leviathan*; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* p.21.
[308] R. Cox and T. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.505; A. Jackson, *From Constantinople to Home of Omar Khayyam* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1911) p.96.
[309] D. Mutz, *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (London: Polity Press, 1992).
[310] S. Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism. A Genealogy of Power Politics* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.90.

motivated by gaining power through diverse regimes. Finally, this article concludes with assessments of Kashani and Khomeini, who used previous clerics to their advantage.

Ideologically, the *importance of Islam* from the Qajar period helped clerics acquire power. Islam, being a salvation religion with a distinct notion of prophethood, appealed to its Zoroastrian past showcasing the dominance of 'imam'.[311] Despite the last Twelver Imam's disappearance which partially scuppered Islam's reputation because it did not have an existing figurehead, clerics rebuilt trust to guide Muslims. Underneath prevailing social contracts, Iranians were absent from political spaces, with Islam the only thing uniting them.[312] Although not practically implemented until the TC, Shi'I clerics used Islamic principles like *'ijma* portraying the necessity to unite against Qajars. From the late eighteenth-century, ulama power increased by the outcome between 2 Shi'i schools: Akhbaris and Usulis.[313] From their victory, the *Usulis* became increasingly independent from the Safavid state.[314] Once Usulis established power, they were actively involved politically. Clerics used a Usuli-style thought to reinforce their legitimacy in dual ways. Firstly, Usuli thinkers believed that one individual could be considered more knowledgeable than others through *ijtihad*, meaning a handful of clerics dominated.[315] Through *ijtihad,* motjaheds increased power which was at the clerical regime's foundation interpreting shari'a to their understanding. Secondly, the *faqih* provided clerics with the ability to assert domination over the 'blind majority'. The Shi'I notion of deputyship re-emerged helping legitimise *faqih*. The Usuli school taught that Shi'is are divided into laymen and experts in religious law, necessitating the need to emulate experts.[316] This means that the Usili victory had important political consequences for reviving clerical leadership, like re-establishing control of taxes demonstrating clerical business acumen.[317] It was not until the TM that the Usuli school was practically utilised, however.[318] Later, the Akhabaris failed to create a Babi movement to fight mojtaheds,

[311] Keddie, *Modern Iran,* p.4.
[312] J. Cole, 'Imami jurisprudence and role of Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating Supreme exemplar' in N. Keddie, *Religion and Politics in Iran* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1983) p.36; J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (New York: Barnes & Noble publishing, 2008).
[313] ibid. p.39.
[314] Katouzian, p.18.
[315] M. Ansari, *Zendegani va shakhsiyyat-e Shaikh Ansari* (Tehran: Ahwaz, 1860).
[316] Cole, 'Imami jurisprudence and role of Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating Supreme exemplar' in Keddie, *Religion and Politics in Iran* p.33.
[317] H. Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The role of ulama in Qajar period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) pp.33-36.
[318] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p. 12.

reinforcing Shiite clerics' political legitimacy.[319] Therefore, Islam promoted political phenomena within mosques, which became local propaganda centres with mass mobilisations attracting resentment towards existing powers. From this period, historians have recollected 'Islamism', where clerics politically sought power.

One of the first clerics to intervene politically was *Ansari*.[320] Considered as the first supreme source of emulation (*marja-I taqlid kull*), Ansari's influence became widespread amongst Usulis.[321] Shi'a annals portrayed Ansari as the most learned and least corruptible mojtahed.[322] Although clerics like Ansari committed themselves to theoretically supporting Islam, he portrayed himself subtly as leader in writings like *Sirat an-Najat*.[323] At this time, there existed unchallenged leadership over Islamic communities. Only until Ansari proposed revolutionary views does one see power contestations *amongst* clerics rather than between Shi'I schools. These clerics were prepared to undermine fellow clerics, like Nuri undermining Ansari's proposed constitutional changes. The first American representative in Iran, Samuel Benjamin, claimed that senior mojtaheds like Ansari were so powerful they could bring down the Shah instantly.[324] For example, Ansari emphasised that he would avoid wealth accumulations for his involvements. However, at the time opposition powers were contradicting Ansari's propositions.[325] When Ansari was writing, Naser al-Din Shah used loans acquired from Britain and Russia for personal needs. One contentious topic Ansari created resentment about was Naser al-Din Shah's visits to Europe. Not only did Ansari showcase the Shah wasting money, but conciliation with the oppressive West was frowned upon.[326] Linking with Islamic justice, Ansari expressed how the Shah's tyranny was corrupt. Increasingly, there were calls to prevent corruption inside the government that was well-known for suspicious activities, due to increased mass political involvement. As Realism contends, corrupted powers created fear and thus the

[319] Weber, *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*.
[320] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.13.
[321] Cole, 'Imami jurisprudence and role of Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating Supreme exemplar' in Keddie, *Religion and Politics in Iran* p.34.
[322] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.13.
[323] M. Ansari, *Sirat an-Najat* (Tehran: JHajj' Ali Akhbar, 1883) pp.1-5.
[324] E. Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.16.
[325] A. Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shiism* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009) p.164.
[326] H. Katouzian, *The Persians* p.176.

population became subservient to clerics. By attaching the widely practiced Islam juxtaposing political corruption, Ansari consolidated clerical power that increased.[327]

Tobacco Concession

Amidst the TC, clerics worked towards establishing power giving them assurance in progressing towards the CR. Keddie, Lambton and Adamiyat assert that from the TC, the ulama's influence increased.[328] As Katouzian argues it was the first time an organised popular movement succeeded in breaking down the Iranian arbitrary state.[329] Seen as the first political campaign by Iranians, the TC mirrored European demonstrations. Without creating a revolution, such revolts of existing power frames, albeit temporary, provided clerics with the ability to simultaneously undermine foreign influence and Naser al-Din Shah. At this time, Britain and Russia monopolised Iran. Additionally, the Shah was selfishly content on deceiving and pleasing his interests rather than Iranians, that clerics utilised this exploitation of the concession to purport that the existing regime did not care.[330] As Realism argues, when a powerful force looks to oppose another power, it can use the masses as a support basis to wield influence. Thereby through playing on Iranians' natural instincts, clerics propelled their intervening image. Therefore, there was a dominant clerical sect opposing the concession, seeing more personal power emanate from this.

Shirazi's intervention demonstrates the practical action by clerics that saw the TC as threatening the clerical regime. Historians like Bayat point out before the TC, neither Shirazi nor Hasan Ashtiani laid claim to political authority.[331] Persian sources portray Shirazi as a pious quietist man of Islam before the TC.[332] Shirazi, however, acted as a socio-political force as he developed influence to take advantage of the weak Naser al-Din Shah.[333] By the mid-nineteenth century, a solid alliance between the bazaars and ulama expanded meaning both temporarily supported each other. Since the TC could bear huge profit for the British Talbot company but undermined Iran, naturally Shirazi became

[327] Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shiism* p.155.
[328] N. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892* (London: Frank Cass, 1966); A. Lambton, 'The Persian ulama and the constitutional revolution' in L. Bellefonds, *Le Shi'isme lmamite* (Paris: Colloque de Strasbourg, 1970) pp. 183–99; Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*.
[329] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.3.
[330] ibid. p.171.
[331] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* pp. 21-23.
[332] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.24.
[333] Ridgeon, *Religion and Politics* p.2.

resentful. This mojtahed from Samarra developed this from the *bast* tradition that placed pressure on central authority to respect Islam, which al-Din Shah's TC handling failed to. For example, Shirazi successfully used the Usuli tradition and wrote 2 *fatwa* lines: "from today, consumption of tobacco is forbidden and tantamount to waging war".[334]

Practically, Shirazi created a nationwide movement where Iranians stopped smoking, illustrating the previously unused yet effective clerical control.[335] Seemingly, the concession left tobacco-growers helpless against larger powers, not realising until the *Akhtar* journal that the TC undermined their survival.[336] As soon as it was realised, the concession was violently resented with clerics acting as opportunists, linking with Plato's views on superiors provoking bitterness. For example, Mirza Talibov Tabrizi reported on risings in southern Iran like Yazd.[337] In Tabriz, tobacco corporation placards were torn down, replaced with revolutionary proclamations protesting to Naser al-Din Shah to cancel the TC. Shirazi's support derived from his popularity as a teacher, who after Ansari, dominated the clerical class. Coming from a clerical-merchant family, Shirazi invested time in regarding merchants' fate. This is shown in Shirazi's letters to Naser al-Din Shah that were published after Shirazi's death, purporting that merchants were a 'tactical ally'.[338] As Gilbar concludes, the ulama led the protest to repeal, and merchants gave its content character.[339] Existing powers underestimated the newly-founded clerical power, who mobilised the population condemning the TC so it failed after implementation.

Constitutional Revolution

The CR demonstrates how clerics legitimised a clerical regime under their *leadership*.[340] This went alongside establishing power even though clerics did not claim or were realised to be power-seeking. Historians tend to evaluate clerical actions and ideas demonstrating how they processed such information to establish their regime. Using numerous means to grasp power, clerics manipulated followers through making

[334] Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians.*
[335] Ridgeon, *Religion and Politics* p.5.
[336] Journal of the 'news of the Tobacco Concession' (Istanbul: Akhtar, 1892).
[337] S. al-Din "Afghani", *Namih-ha-yi Tarikhi va Siyasi*. (Ed. By A. Asadabadi. and foreword by M. Tabataba'i. (Tehran: Presto (Amir Kabir), 1981) p.20.
[338] N. Kirmani, *Tarikh-I bidari-yi Iranian* (ed. Sirjani, Sa'idi, Tehran: 2nd edition, Volume 1, 1967) pp. 34-5.
[339] G. Gilbar, 'The Muslim Big Merchant-Entrepreneurs of the Middle East, 1860-1914' (*Die Welt des Islams*: Volume 43, Issue 1, 2003) p.290.
[340] M. Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.19.

Islam political, with historians calling this 'Islamism' dating back to the Usuli victory.[341] Although the Islamic constitution failed in 1911, this gave more legitimacy to existing clerical frames.[342] This movement towards a constitutional government neither stopped clerical habits nor eradicated traditional methods, with the ulama progressively consolidating their position.[343]

Clerics took advantage of chaos in the CR's run-up, provoking events that further undermined existing powers.[344] The onset of the CR implied the case that characterised Iran beforehand, allowing clerics to stamp clearer authority by using Shi'ism. One idea clerical constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists argued for was governance through *shari'a law*, since this enabled them to have the best power foundation if they overturned the regime. Before the CR, Iran was ruled by 2 laws: *shari'a* and *'urf*.[345] The *'urf* customary law threatened clerics since it was dominated by consensus linking with the Akhbaris' promotion of Islam, rather than relying on clerical guidance. According to Kasravi, the constitutional movement initially had religious applications, based on laws written in accordance with Sacred Law of Mohammad.[346] However, using *fatwa*, like that during the TC, this made the masses adhere to non-religious pastimes like smoking and gambling. Plato indicated that actors like clerics were thus able to manipulate, by adapting shari'a due to the population's ignorance. For example, in 1905, *Sayyid Abdullah Behbahani's* students attacked Mozaffar ad-Din Shah's police (*farrash*) that committed injustices against Iranians.[347] Paradoxically, however, hesitant clerics like Behbahani advocated the need for the constitution to be in accordance with the brutal shari'a law. Therefore, the tide turned in clerics' favour before the CR, providing clerics confidence to fight for power, to survive in an anarchic environment.[348]

During the CR, Afary argues that numerous clerics were influenced by constitutionalism.[349] For example, *Tabataba'I* was a determined opponent of the

[341] A. Bayat, 'Islamism and social Movement Theory' (*The Third World Quarterly:* Volume 26, Issue 6, 2005) pp. 891-908.
[342] Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown* p.59.
[343] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.5.
[344] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.190.
[345] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* p.13.
[346] S. Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896* (London, 1978) pp.28-38.
[347] ibid. p.171.
[348] Hobbes, *Leviathan*.
[349] Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional revolution 1906-11*.

government preferring constitutional monarchy, unlike Nuri who supported Mohammad-Ali Shah. Nazem al-Islam Kirmani (thereafter, Kirmani) depicted Tabataba'I as the foe of despotism in his later writings.[350] This is interesting because Kirmani attached himself to Tabataba'I and encouraged him to join his circle, due to consensus on Islamic democracy. Kirmani, speaking to his society in 1907, said that Tabataba'I ensured the Qur'an's application to the constitution through his interpretation.[351] Kirmani agreed with Tabataba'I that Iran was uncivilised which they sought change seeing opportunities for leadership. Focussing on modern education to instil Islamic democracy, Tabataba'I who was born into a family of respected mojtaheds, attached himself to Shirazi's inner circle resenting Western interference. Here, Tabataba'I emphasised a modern education system.[352] In the Qajar period, clerics had entire control over teaching Iranian students in Islamic schools. There was a fear of *takfir* which meant that despite modernist ideas, Tabataba'I referred to holy texts proving his views valid which he used to influence the constitution.[353] As Realism states, what is significant when observing actors during a chaotic period like a revolution, is actors like Tabataba'I persuaded supporters not through their principles yet likelihoods of potentially amplified power for Iranians. Arguing to his followers like Malek al-Motakellemin that such changes in the constitution would modernise Iran, this went away from Islamic traditionalism into redesigning shari'a.[354] Whilst doing this, Tabataba'i fended off opposition to his cause. For example, he denounced Al Ra'is as a Babi, meaning Tabataba'I halted other opportunistic actors from instilling their regime. In the end, Tabataba'I changed his attire from cleric to modern dressing, wearing a modern hat that characterised statesmen. Simply, Tabataba'I *adapted* his views according to where he perceived the most power, acting under the clerical regime.

Anti-constitutionalist clerics that resented secularism did so because they were also eager to create a clerical regime controlled by themselves. One anti-constitutionalist that actively expressed discontent for developments was *Nuri*.[355] Believing that

[350] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.30.
[351] Kirmani, *Tarikh-e bidari-ye Iraniyan* p.12.
[352] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.72.
[353] Amanat, *Iran: A modern history* p.328; Mozaffar al-Din Shah, *The Supplementary Fundamental Law of October 7, 1907* (Tehran, October 1907) p.372.
[354] Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* p.70.
[355] V. Martin, *Islam and Modernity, the Iranian Revolution of 1906* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1989); Ridgeon, *Religion and Politics*.

absolutism was the best means of protecting Islam, his constitutional defiance was a way he could actively enforce his regime. For example, Nuri protested freedom of press which he argued was backbiting Muslims.[356] Located in Tehran, where many were disillusioned with constitutionalism, Nuri encompassed the constitution's image as promoting corrupt and ineffective power changes, contrasting Ansari's claims. The most important consequence of Nuri's propaganda was mobilisation of piously apolitical ulama against parliamentarianism. Nuri had an electrifying effect in religious colleges (*madrasas*) with Nuri's students calling themselves the 'Army of God'.[357] Alongside this, since Tehrani people were predominately uneducated, they relied on charismatic personal guidance, blindly following powerful figures. Nuri wrote 'A reminder for negligent: Guide for ignorant' characterising the Majles as a 'house of infidelity'.[358] Here, Martin contends that Tehrani locals and students would have accepted absolutism for power justifications if Nuri succeeded.[359] This illustrates the massive impact that one clerical leader had on the national and international climate that Iran was seen amidst the CR. Therefore, Nuri believed that the existing regime helped propel his clerical power.

Like Khomeini, Nuri used Islam to fight against the constitution enabling him to gain identity as a *charismatic* leader.[360] For example, Afary argues how Nuri set-up large tents around Friday Mosque, holding religious gatherings (*rawzah'khvani)* which constitutionalist anjumans led by Behbahani despised.[361] During 1909 when Mohammad-Ali Shah was constantly pressured, Nuri provoked resentment towards foreign powers who seemingly favoured constitutionalism to the extent that they could strengthen their influence. Nuri placed emphasis on the Council of Guardians' role in protecting shari'a, arguing that the *mashrutiyyat* was destroyed by self-interested persons who were looking to exploit Iran. This is like Khomeini's reference in his *Little Green Book*, denoting how he prioritised the Muslim community's interests rather than his own.[362] Ironically, as Realism argues, all humans act in self-interested manners and therefore Nuri and Khomeini adopt a contradictory character to intensify support. The

[356] Ridgeon, *Religion and Politics*.
[357] Arjomand, *The Turban in the Crown* p.54.
[358] Ridgeon, *Religion and Politics* pp.39-41.
[359] Martin, *Islam and Modernity* p.165.
[360] Keddie, *Modern Iran* p.2; M. Williams, *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 209.
[361] Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional revolution* p.51.
[362] R. Khomeini, *The Little Green Book* (trans. By H. Salemson, New York: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 1979).

most important of Nuri's treatise was reproduced in Malik-Zadah's books, that expressed how the constitution violates Shi'ism.[363] This can be seen in Nuri's paper *Labayah-I Shaikh Fazullah Nuri,* where Nuri claimed the Majles interfered with 4 Islamic principles -*tawhid, nubuvat, imamat* and *ma'ad*- which could destroy Islam.[364] Therefore, Nuri seemingly believed that supporting constitutionalism advocated secularism, over which he rallied support. Nuri ended up calling the constitution an 'erroneous book', with it being fictionalised by the oppressive West contradicting Islam, whilst constitutionalist clerics criticised the Shah.[365] Although divided, clerical actors managed to dominate the constitutional debate and thus were prominent.

Clerics' involvements were accordingly heightened in the CR paving way for Kashani and Khomeini to further erode existing powers.

Post-Constitutional Revolution

It is worth mentioning the clerical consolidation of power under Mossadeq, and how although clerics waited until 1979 to successfully enforce Islam, CR's legacy gave continuing confidence. The clerical activism of *Kashani* saw this prominent Najaf cleric uphold Islam's legitimacy, contrasting oppressive foreign influence that was again pervading Iran. Historians like Katouzian have seen this as history repeating itself in Iran's 'short-lived' society.[366] Although British officials viewed Britain with a civilizing mission to eradicate Islam, clerics like Kashani contradicted this. This can be seen through Kashani's political involvement in supporting Mossaadeq against the Anglo-Iranian Oil company, calling for oil nationalisation.[367] Popular with poor merchants who saw the detrimental effects of Western capitalism, Kashani mirrored Khomeini in arguing that politics must come after settling Islamic rules. Many have argued that Kashani balanced between nationalism and Islam to gain optimum support. This proves how ideology failed to matter as an ultimate achievement for clerics, yet rather power aspirations created a clerical regime. In some circumstances, Kashani and Khomeini combined both affiliations together in their actions, seen in their fight against the newly-

[363] H. Malik-Zadah, *Inqilab* (Tehran: Salam Daily, reproduced in 2001) pp. 209-20.
[364] J. Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional revolution* p.72; R. Brunschvig, 'Les Usul al-fiqh imamites a leur stade ancien' in Bellefonds, *Le shi'isme imamate* pp. 201-13.
[365] Ridgeon, *Religion and Politics* p.18.
[366] D. Bayandor, *Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mossadeq* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010) pp.20-5; Katouzian, *The Persians.*
[367] S. MacKay, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam And the Soul of a Nation* (Oxford: Penguin Classics, 1998) p.198.

formed Israel in 1948.[368] This further instilled resentment amongst Iranians who followed Kashani rather than listening to specific ideologies. From the CR, the Shiite clerical hierarchy directed from Qom remained highly influential wielding power through mosques. Kashani used the *noh'e esfand* crisis to alert quietists in Qom to a scenario they dreaded: a drift towards secular republicanism replicating Shirazi's political mobilisation.[369] When the White Revolution arose, instead of pre-empting a Red Revolution, Mohammad Reza Shah paved the way for IR which clerics like Kashani before added legitimacy to.[370] Throughout the 1970s, Khomeini's sense of alarm at destruction of Shi'i culture saw Khomeini building on Kashani's rhetoric, arguing that the White Revolution spread colonial culture.[371] Thus, although Mohammad Reza Shah combined traditional arbitrary ruling and modern revolutionization, clerics targeted neglected areas from the Shah's rule like the countryside.[372] This explains why clerics under different historical processes came to power.

Khomeini's actions finalised the clerical establishment's success.[373] Before 1979, never had Iran been so rich with the oil revenues, yet rather than remaining content, Iranians were persuaded by clerical leadership again.[374] Arjomand argues the contemporary Islamic revival should *not* be viewed as surprising, since one can see different stages of a clerical establishment.[375] Khomeini, often lauded as the architect of this establishment, insisted implementing his program was essential.[376] Khomeini entered politics in 1963 after Kashani's death denouncing Mohammad Reza Shah for granting capitations to America, where social tensions intensified political radicalism. This program was based on *velyat-e faqeh* centring around Khomeini's 'Islamism'. The continuance of maintaining relations with foreign powers became a central issue in

[368] Speech delivered at Fayziya Madrasa by Khomeini, 'Afternoon of Ashura June 1963' in H. Algar, *Islam and Revolution* (New York: Mizan Press, 1981) pp.177-184.
[369] Bayandor, *Iran and the CIA* p.163.
[370] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.276.
[371] Arjomand, *The Turban in the Crown* p.99; Katouzian, *The Persians* p.265; A. Milani, *Eminent Persians*: *The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008).
[372] Katouzian, p.263
[373] Arjomand, *The Turban in the Crown*; Algar, *Islam and Revolution*; V. Martin, *Creating an Islamic state: Khomeini and the making of a new Iran* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
[374] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.280; Aristotle, *The Politics* (London: Penguin Classics, 2010); Khomeini, *The Little Green Book* chapter 5.
[375] Arjomand, *The Turban in the Crown* p.91.
[376] H. Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers,2005) pp. 409-484; E. Hooglund and W. Royce, 'The Shi'i clergy of Iran and the conception of an Islamic state' (*State, Culture and Society*: Volume 1, Issue 3, 1985) pp. 102-117.

Khomeini's revolution.[377] Instead, Khomeini played on modernised sentiments like Islamic democracy to entice domestic support, like Tabataba'I. For example, in 1978, Khomeini argued that his revolutionary government would be democratic and Islamic.[378] However, what his followers did not understand was that he never agreed to the liberal criteria for democracy.[379] Interestingly, Fallaci's interview with Khomeini explored the tensions between democracy and clerical authority, with Khomeini answering that Iranians adored the clergy and therefore affiliated obedience with it.[380] Relating to the Usuli phenomenon of source of emulation, this means that there was a misunderstanding of Khomeini's intentions.[381] Since Iranians were desperate to continuously improve their lives, Khomeini seized on this opportunity to instil resentment towards the Shah. For instance, Khomeini's references to Mohammad Reza Shah's 'satanic' regime and 'death to the Shah' found receptive audiences.[382] Like CR's clerics, Khomeini's single-minded character about Islam's application derived strongly from the normative foundation in Shi'I culture. Therefore, the strategic victor who gained the most from the clerical establishment and simultaneously overturning Mohammad Reza Shah was Khomeini, who became crucial to orchestrating popular resistance with morally uncompromising leadership. Khomeini earned Supreme leader (*Rahbar-e Enqelab*) status that was only assigned to Twelve Sacred imams.[383] Paralleling constitutionalist clerics, Khomeini broke with the existing regime by arguing how an action was incompatible with Islam, when it was rather unsuited to his ideal regime.

As we have seen, clerics' political claims to power from the TC massively helped the regime develop in the 1980s, in terms of advocating Islam. The build-up to the clerical regime was a long process, that began with the recognition the Qajar dynasty possessed political frailty in addition to disillusionment with utopian constitutions. Katouzian

[377] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.277.
[378] D. Hiro, *Iran under the Ayatollahs* (London: Routledge Publishers, 2013) p. 99; M. Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1989) pp. 257-58.
[379] R. Khomeini, *Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist* (trans. by H. Algar, London: Manor Books, 1970).
[380] Interview was reproduced in the *International Herald Tribune* (15 October 1979) p. 5.
[381] E. Ahmad, 'Theory and Society' (*Kluwer Academic*: Volume 11, Issue 3, 1982) p. 296; M. Amjad, *Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy* (California: Praeger Publishing, 1989) pp. 122-123; S. Arjomand, 'The causes and significance of the Iranian revolution' (*State, Culture and Society:* Volume 1, Issue 3, 1985) p. 52; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown* pp.103-5; M. Moaddel, 'Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of the Iranian Revolution' in S. Lyman, *Social Movements: Main Trends of the Modern World* (London: Palgrave MacMillian, 1995) pp.366-67.
[382] Burns, 'Ideology, Culture, and Ambiguity'p.361.
[383] Abrahamian, *A history of Modern Iran.*

argues that the popular movement is a long-term trend in history which began in the late nineteenth-century, developing into a clerical regime.[384] From this point, historians emphasise the clerics' increased involvement, from Ansari to Khomeini and currently with Hassan Rouhani.[385] Clearly, a power struggle also existed between the clerics throughout the twentieth-century. However, what it proved was from the TC, the increasing power of clerics appealed using Islamic ideals, enabling them to access higher powers that were traditionally confined under various Shahs. It is bewildering that in one century, there was a complete transformation in the Iranian state's meanings. In the past, Iran was dominated by a legitimised monarchy, yet became to reject tyrannical secular leaders, mirroring changes to Shi'ism that was previously conservative transforming into a highly politicised doctrine. However, what one should note when assessing relations is that individuals guiding changes wanted *power* personally, using dominant ideologies to assert this. The clerics were ready to be provoked by political situations from the TC, to the CR right until the clerical regime's creation under Khomeini.[386]

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[384] Katouzian, *The Persians* p.ix.
[385] Jackson, *From Constantinople to Home of Omar Khayyam* p.96.
[386] Abrahaminian, *A History of Modern Iran* p.107.

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The First 'New War'? : The 1984-94 Insurrection in South Africa re-evaluated

By Nico Blackstock

Abstract

Between 1984 and the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa experienced political violence, unlike that ever previously seen in the Apartheid state. Modern historiography has tended to classify this violence as an 'insurrection'. However, a reconsideration of the period through the use of Mary Kaldor's conceptual paradigm of 'new' wars may allow for this period to instead be considered a 'civil war'. This article aims to undertake this re-evaluation and see how significant such a shift would be for the historian's understanding of the causes of the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa.

In 2019, the African National Congress (ANC) faces its 'biggest challenge' since the creation of the so-called 'Rainbow Nation' in 1994, in the form of a general election in a dramatically socio-economically divided state and following the unceremonious exit of former President Jacob Zuma in the face of corruption charges.[387] Yet, the ANC and, more generally, South Africa faced a much larger crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s, with waves of political violence permeating the country, before and during the negotiated settlement to end apartheid, the system of official racial segregation in place since 1948. Dubow estimates that between 1984 and 1990, 20,000 people died in politically-motivated attacks, with three quarters of those fatalities occurring in the last four years of the conflict.[388] Township revolts, fanned by the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), spread across South Africa from 1984 onwards, though Ross correctly notes that much of the violence occurred in the KwaZulu Natal region between supporters of the Zulu cultural-political organisation, Inkatha (IFP), and the UDF and ANC.[389]

[387] Jason Burke, 'Toxic legacy taints ANC as it nears 25-year rule in South Africa', *The Guardian,* 1 January 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/01/toxic-legacy-taints-anc-nears-25-year-rule-south-africa [accessed 4 February 2019].
[388] Saul Dubow, *Apartheid, 1948-1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.268.
[389] Robert Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 191.

In 1989, the country's future President, Nelson Mandela, described the country as being in a state of 'civil war'.[390] In their account of a 'hidden war', the photojournalists Marinovich and Silva also depict the conflict between the ANC/UDF and Inkatha as a 'civil war', indicating that even observers, without the political biases of politicians like Mandela, viewed the conflict through the lens of civil disorder.[391] This is especially telling, considering that Marinovich and Silva both photographed the brutal civil conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda. Yet, modern scholarship has dismissed the idea that a civil war occurred in South Africa between 1984 and 1994; in his influential study on political transformation in the apartheid state Robert Price prefers the term 'insurrection'.[392] Dubow argues that South African violence of this time period was 'urban revolt' rather than an intrastate conflict.[393] William Beinhart indicates that South Africa was on the brink of a 'vortex of violence', but did not actually collapse into it, therefore empathically rejecting any notion of 'civil war'.[394] In the first extensive study of regional violence in the Pretoria–Witwatersrand–Vereeniging (PWV) region, Gary Kynoch notes that although South African violence resembles a civil war, the fact no group actively tried to 'capture the state through military action' means that he does not believe in the defining 1984-1994 as a period of civil conflict.[395] It is evident, therefore, that historiographical consensus has usurped the opinions of contemporaries and indicates that 'civil war' is not the correct term to describe South Africa in this period. The lexis to describe this period may not appear significant but reconsidering whether a civil war was fought in South Africa would dramatically influence the historian's understanding of the apartheid state and significantly, the reasons for its collapse. Instead of attributing the fall of apartheid to international sanctions, which damaged the economy, or the grand ANC narrative of the liberation movement, a re-evaluation will

[390] Nelson Mandela, 'A Document to Create a Climate of Understanding' 13 December 1989 https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01600/05lv01640/06lv01644.htm [accessed 22 February 2019].
[391] Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva, *The Bang-Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War* (London: Arrow Books, 2001), p. 15.
[392] Robert Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 191.
[393] Dubow, *Apartheid*, p. 211.
[394] William Beinhart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 192.
[395] Gary Kynoch, *Townhsip Violence and the End of Apartheid: War on the Reef* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018), p. 24.

allow for it to be argued that apartheid imploded, not due to one particular group, but because racial segregation led South Africa to near self-destruction.

'New' Wars.

There is no single criteria applied to classify violence as a war. However, a recent trend in war studies, which has failed to be applied to the South African context, may allow for the historian to do so. Mary Kaldor argues that a new type of organised violence swept through parts of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe in the late twentieth-century, coining these conflicts 'new wars'.[396] In his analysis of the New War Thesis (NWT), Heywood argues that new wars are: civil wars; wars of identity; asymmetrical (fought between parties of unequal size or military capabilities); and barbaric because the distinction between civilians and military is broken down.[397] This is a dramatically simplified, albeit accurate, representation of what Kaldor believes 'new wars' are; intrastate conflicts fought over claims to power, based around traditional ethnic identities (Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaner, not a generalised national identity) rather than theoretically-based ideologies (Marxism-Leninism, totalitarianism) and often fought using insurgency, counter-insurgency and terrorism.[398] These wars are therefore different to two centuries old Clausewitzian models of warfare, as wars are not fought between states through set-piece battles but instead through Mao Zedong's 'protracted warfare', which called for sporadic fighting through guerrilla engagements.[399]

The second part of Kaldor's theory focuses on the 'globalised war economy', an attempt to show how the socio-political macroeconomy of conflicts has changed in comparison to the 'total' and centralised economies of previous conflicts, like the Second World War.[400] Within the 'globalised war economy' paradigm, there is minimal participation in the conflict, unlike mass mobilisation of the population through conscription in interstate conflicts of the earlier twentieth century.[401] The absence of a total economy, which would traditionally require full employment to manufacture armaments, is due to the decreasing costs of war, with heavy weapons like AK-47 rifles easily accessible and

[396] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 1.
[397] Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 254.
[398] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 89.
[399] Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Oxford: Polity, 2005), p.12.
[400] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 10.
[401] Ibid, p. 10.

useable.[402] Armies in 'new' wars are often regionally sourced volunteers, organised as autonomous paramilitary groups either by the state or by the opposing parties who wish to gain power, according to Kaldor.[403] 'New' wars are also increasingly privatised, frequently through the use of foreign mercenaries and private security companies, such as Executive Outcomes, a South African private military company heavily involved in the Angolan Civil War.[404] Conflicts are then financed through a network of crime, such as weapons and drugs smuggling. Essentially, 'new' wars are civil wars, fought about identity, often using insurgency tactics and financed through unconventional and often illegal means.

Kaldor uses the conflicts in eastern Europe after the collapse of Yugoslavia as a key case study to reinforce her argument, specifically the Bosnian War (1992-1995). Post-2003 and the Iraq War, the NWT has come under scrutiny, as wars begin to move away from Kaldor's description, with intrastate wars, in which identity is not a motivation and without 'globalised war economies', being fought. Kaldor neglected South Africa in her monograph, only mentioning it a handful of times. The South African insurrection of 1984 to 1994 is actually the most representative example of the thesis. A civil war was fought in South Africa, with traditional ethnic identities at the conflict's centre. Insurgency and guerrilla tactics were deployed by the ANC, UDF, IFP and the South African Government and a 'globalised war economy', in which criminality funded the war, was prevalent. Most significantly, Münkler argues that 'new' wars occur in failing states, although they dramatically aid the reconstruction of the nation; the South African insurrection occurred within a disintegrating apartheid state but was a conflict with state-building qualities, as evidenced by an end to the violence after the 1994 election.[405] This article therefore aims not only to re-evaluate South African violence during the denouement of apartheid, but also to vindicate Kaldor's New War Thesis as model for warfare outside the developed world.

[402] Münkler, *The New Wars*, p. 3.
[403] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 98.
[404] Ibid, p. 100.
[405] Münkler, *The New Wars*, p. 8.

Insurrection as a civil war.

For the South African insurrection to be considered a 'new' war, it must have been a civil conflict, motivated by the claims to power of traditional identities. It is clear that this is an accurate description of violence in South Africa between 1984 and 1994. Heywood notes that 95% of armed conflicts since 1985 have occurred within states, not between them.[406] This does not mean that conflicts are confined to a country's international borders, as Münkler indicates that insurgency and guerrilla tactics mean that 'new' wars are sometimes transnational in nature.[407] South Africa is a key example of this paradox. Although violence enveloped parts of South Africa itself from 1984 onwards, Ellis argues that the 'war for South Africa' had previously occurred outside the nation's borders.[408] This is an allusion to the 'border wars' which the South African army (SADF) participated in during the 1970s and 1980s, trying to prevent unsympathetic governments coming to power in southern Africa's newly independent states of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.[409] Guerrilla groups, such as the ANC's *de facto* armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), used 'friendly' bordering nations as bases for raids into South Africa starting as early as the mid-1960s.

Despite this, the violence within the internationally recognised borders of South Africa (hence including the Bantustans, which were not internationally recognised by anyone apart from South Africa) can be considered a 'civil' war. Fearon defines a 'civil war' as 'a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the centre or in a region, or to change government policies'.[410] While Kynoch is correct in noting that no group actively tried to seize state power, it is clear that all of the belligerents involved in the violence desired a vicissitude in government policy, whether that be the dismantling of apartheid or anger over negotiations between the Government and the ANC.[411] The Government were trying to defend the state, with Dubow noting that covert death squads (assisting Inkatha fighters) were created to play on fears of 'black-on-black' violence and therefore present themselves as the only

[406] Heywood, *Global Politics*, p. 254.
[407] Münkler, *The New Wars*, p. 15.
[408] Stephen Ellis, 'The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (1998), pp. 261-298, p. 263.
[409] Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa*, p. 176.
[410] James Fearon, 'Iraq's Civil War', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2007.
[411] Kynoch, *Township Violence and the End of Apartheid*, p. 24.

option which would maintain law and order.[412] For the ANC and UDF, the aim of dismantling apartheid policy was enshrined in documentation 30 years before violence flared. The Freedom Charter, created by the Congress of the People in 1955 and adopted by the UDF soon after its creation in 1983, explicitly notes that 'all apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside' and that 'all bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government' when the abolition of apartheid takes place.[413]. It is likely that these aims were in mind when the ANC's leader-in-exile, Oliver Tambo, called for South Africans to 'make apartheid unworkable and make our country ungovernable' via Radio Freedom in July 1985.[414] Like the ANC, the Pan African Congress (PAC) and its armed wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) also wanted to destroy apartheid, but wished to replace it with an exclusively African state, as opposed to non-racial utopia desired by the ANC/UDF.[415] For Inkatha, the aim was regional control of KwaZulu Natal. Ross argues that at the core of conflict between the IFP and ANC/UDF was a struggle of political territory, with the latter groups threatening Inkatha's handle on the Bantustan and the system of patronage, which was the foundation of Zulu society.[416] Decreasing urban support from Inkatha amongst isiZulu speakers precipitated IFP violence.[417] For the various white-supremacist groups fighting in South Africa, their motivations are clear: to prevent racial integration an to try and sustain apartheid. It is evident, therefore, that the motivations of groups fighting in the South African insurrection of 1984-1994 align with those given by Fearon in his definition of civil wars, meaning that, consequently, the insurrection can be considered a civil war.

The Role of Identity.

Identity also needed to be the driving factor in the conflict for the 1984-1994 insurrection to be considered a 'new' war. Kaldor argues that identity politics often develops because of the erosion of state structures, a description which is easily

[412] Dubow, *Apartheid*, p. 258.
[413] Congress of the People, 'The Freedom Charter', 26 June 1955 https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01600/05lv01611/06lv01612.htm [accessed on 26 February 2019].
[414] Dubow, *Apartheid*, p. 212.
[415] Kwandiwe Kondlo, *In the Twilight of the Revolution: The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) 1959-1994* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2010), p. 49.
[416] Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa*, p. 192.
[417] Ibid, p. 192.

applicable to South Africa.[418] Identity politics often manifested itself in the form of ethnically-exclusive ideologies. It is hence ethnic identity which underpins the political motivations of these groups, not the political theory of alternative ideologies. Berger suggests that only one political grouping in South Africa directly involved in the violence was based around ethnic identity- Inkatha.[419] She is correct in noting the importance of identity for Inkatha, which was based around Zulu nationalism. Although Worden indicates that Inkatha's leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was once sympathetic to the ANC, by the late 1980s Buthelezi had become the 'defender of Zulu nationalism', the ideology of Zulu ethnic identity.[420] Buthelezi used Zulu nationalism to gain control of the KwaZulu Natal region and galvanise the isiZulu speaking population against the ANC, who Buthelezi believed would limit his regional power if they formed a constitution and government. He played on Zulu history, an important part of identity politics, using historical-based rhetoric in his oratory, exemplified by 'the blood of the founding fathers of our [Zulu] Nation flows through our veins', an obvious example that the key underpinning to Inkatha's politics was not ideology but identity.[421]

Inkatha vigilantes or *impis* (a reference to Zulu warriors of the nineteenth-century) would also target groups based on their identity, as highlighted by the destruction of the mainly Indian Phoenix Township in 1985, where 500 Indian families were displaced.[422] Attacks against ANC supporters would often result in violence against isiXhosa speakers, fuelled by the rivalry between Zulus and Xhosas, indicating that even violence with an ideological basis became about ethnic identity. Kynoch notes that identity was not always the predominant impetus for the violence and that regional disputes, often between ANC-supporting Xhosa township dwellers and Inkatha-supporting Zulu migrant workers or between Xhosa and Zulu taxi drivers, was also commonplace.[423] This nuance does not limit the fact that for Inkatha, violence during South Africa's civil

[418] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 81.
[419] Iris Berger, *South Africa in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 119-120. Berger also notes that identity politics was vital for the National Party, but their direct involvement in the conflict is still debated.
[420] Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 143.
[421] Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Speech on King Shaka Day, 24 September 1989 cited in James Simpson, 'Boipatong: the Politics of a Massacre and the South African Transition', *Journal of Southern African* Studies, vol. 38, no. 3 (2012), pp. 623-647, p. 630.
[422] Dubow, *Apartheid*, pp. 218-219.
[423] Kynoch, *Township Violence and the End of Apartheid*, p. 34

war was motivated by traditional identities and ethnic rivalries, as even general disputes were transformed into ethnic discord.

However, Berger is wrong to argue that only Inkatha played on identity politics during the South African insurrection. Other groups, both white and black, used identity as a motivation to destabilise South Africa, disrupt negotiations and essentially fight a civil war in the Cape of Africa. The APLA were motivated by a more generic form of 'African' identity, arguing that South Africa was a land for Africans, not Europeans. This led to insurgency attacks against white South Africans, especially in the Eastern Cape.[424] In 1993, APLA's self-proclaimed 'Year of the Great Storm', 150 terrorist operation were mounted, including attacks on a white English-speaking Church, a golf club and the murder of American Fulbright scholar Amy Biehl, with all attacks occurring to create a climate of fear amongst the white population.[425] Slogans such as 'Kill the Boer, Kill the Farmer' and 'one settler, one bullet' were often shouted by APLA supporters, while the visual media of 1990s South Africa depicts the prevalence of these slogans, as indicated by Beinhart.[426]

White supremist movements, who wished to keep racial separation and wanted to create a *Volkstaat* akin to the Transvaal and Orange Free State of pre-1910 (the creation of the Union of South Africa) were also motivated by Afrikaner identity. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) became infamous due to the group's militant nationalism and the racist charisma of its leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche. The AWB stormed negotiations to end apartheid in 1993, smashing an armoured car through the façade of the World Trade Centre, where talks were taking place.[427] This was the climax to the violence campaign which they began in March 1990, which killed 2 and injured 48 across South Africa in July 1990 alone.[428] An AWB supporter, Jensuz Walus, shot and killed the Commander of the MK, Chris Hani, in April 1993.[429] It is clear that some of the most extreme belligerents in the South African insurrection used identity as a

[424] Beinhart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, p. 197.
[425] Rodeny Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000) p. 566.
[426] Beinhart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, p. 200.
[427] Dubow, *Apartheid,* p. 271.
[428] Nancy Clark and William Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Oxford: Pearson Education Ltd, 2011), pp. 112-113.
[429] Berger, *South Africa in World History*, p. 125.

motivation for the conflict, while also utilising traditional rivalries between different ethnic groups as a cause of violence. Although the ANC/UDF were non-racial and did not play on ethnic identities, it is clear that identity played a paramount role for many groups fighting in South Africa between 1984 and 1994, with many belligerents the proponents of ideologies with a clear foundation in ethnic identity meaning that the South African insurrection can be considered the first 'new' war.

Insurgency and terrorism in South Africa, 1984-1994.

'New' wars are also characterised by insurgency , guerrilla or terrorism tactics, to gain political control of the population as opposed to territorial control.[430] This is due to the fact that 'new' wars are asymmetrical, as one side may have a technological or military advantage, meaning the other belligerents must adapt their tactics.[431] In the South African context, even the Government, who had the biggest military in Africa, a 50,000 strong police force and nuclear capabilities, resorted to insurgency tactics, making South Africa a critical, albeit neglected, example of the New War Thesis.[432] The National Party gained notoriety in the 1992 for its funding of Inkatha insurgency and its own death squads after the Boipatong massacre, in which 45 people were killed by government-backed Inkatha militants. This insurgency was characterised as the 'Third Force'. The day after the massacre, Joe Slovo argued that 'people have been murdered in their beds, not by people in uniform but… those who sent them wore police uniforms'.[433] Although Slovo was ideologically opposed to apartheid and worked actively against it, his assumption was proved correct by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Boipatong was committed by Inkatha-supporting hostel dwellers, with the expertise of government-backed death squads. In his influential article on the Third Force, Ellis notes that by 1988 the SADF had trained 200 paramilitary personnel for Inkatha, using the model of the Selous Scouts in the Rhodesian Bush War (intelligence gathering units with an offensive capacity, made up of captured guerrillas).[434]

These groups worked jointly with white death squads, like Eugene 'Prime Evil' de Kock's C10 group. C10 were involved in the murder of anti-establishment activists, while

[430] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 8.
[431] Heywood, *Global Politics*, p. 255.
[432] Clark and Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, p. 96.
[433] Reuters, 'ANC Chargers Government Complicity in Massacre', 18 June 1992.
[434] Ellis, 'The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force', p. 274.

making their deaths seem the work of other groups. In his autobiography, de Kock recounts a raid in Botswana in 1990 which 'should have the trademarks of PAC operation' and in which 'all the occupants had been eliminated', including children.[435] More significant is the fact that the upper echelons of the apartheid state were aware of these actions. Adriaan Vlok, Minister for Law and Order, secretly endorsed these attacks in 1990: 'I support you [C10 Death squad] in these things [illegal activities] but you must know I would be committing political suicide if they ever came to light'.[436] Dubow highlights that even President P.W. Botha (and, most possibly, F.W. de Klerk) had knowledge of de Kock's death squads, indicating that insurgency was often directed from the top.[437]

Insurgency tactics were also deployed by the ANC through the MK and through unofficial 'Self-Defence Units'. In 1985, the MK began its 'armed propaganda' campaign, in which buildings of mass grievance (council buildings, courts) were attacked to increase the visibility of the armed struggle.[438] This often required MK agents to secretly return to South Africa from MK training camps across Africa, similar to Vietnamese guerrilla warfare. By 1988, the MK were carrying out 300 attacks a year under the codename Operation Vula.[439] They also used insurgency to prevent the deposition of pro-ANC Bantustan leader Bantu Holomisa by the Transkei Defence Force (baked by the SADF), which led Douek to conclude that the MK took on a defensive role during the insurrectionary period.[440] While this may be an accurate representation of the MK in Transkei, across South Africa, the MK were an offensive insurgency group, although they were not always effective, according to Dubow.[441]

ANC 'Self-Defence Units' are also characterised as having defensive duties, but actually operated on an autonomous level.[442] The increased militarisation of the townships from

[435] Eugene de Kock, *A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid State* (Saxonwold: Contra Press, 1998), p. 193.
[436]Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, 'The Dying Days of Apartheid', *South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives,* ed. By Aletta Norval and David Howarth (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 13-30 , p. 15.
[437] Dubow, *Apartheid*, p. 255.
[438] Daniel Douek, '"They Became Afraid When They Saw Us": MK insurgency and counter-insurgency in the Bantustan of Transkei, 1988-1994', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 39, no. 1 (2013), pp. 207-225, p. 213.
[439] Dubow, *Apartheid*, p. 256.
[440] Douek, 'MK insurgency and counter-insurgency in the Bantustan of Transkei', p. 209.
[441] Dubow, *Apartheid*, p. 254.
[442] Ibid, p. 269.

1984 onwards meant many young, often unemployed men would band together into 'Self Defence Units' and often use great violence against suspected apartheid collaborators, with the Mandela United Football Club set up by Winnie Mandela a key example of this.[443] This type of vigilante violence, another product of 'new' wars, was expressed through the necklace, a car tyre put around someone's neck, filled with petrol and set alight, which Mrs Madikizela-Mandela believed would 'liberate this country'.[444] Davenport and Saunders describe necklacing as 'a brand of terrorism' indicating how acts of violence in 'new' wars are not always enacted by professional soldiers, but instead normal civilians.[445] War lords, another 'new' war phenomenon, controlled their own private armies, like Simon Skosana, who destroyed the Crossroads township in 1986, displacing 60,000.[446] It is evident that the South African insurrection was fought through insurgency, counter-insurgency and terrorism on all sides, including the aforementioned activities of the AWB and APLA. This is different to other insurrections and rebellions, especially the tenuous examples of the 1905 Russian Revolution and 1956 Hungarian Uprising provided by Price.[447] Consequently, it is easier to consider that the South African conflict of 1984 to 1994 was a 'new' war rather than an insurrection.

'Globalised War Economy'.

The final consideration to make surrounds whether a 'globalised war economy' existed in South Africa between 1984 and 1994. Kaldor indicates that a 'globalised war economy' is the financing of fighting forces through plunder, illegal trading or support from neighbouring countries.[448] Due to international sanctions against the apartheid state, these forms of funding were heavily used, both by the government and by other groups. Ellis notes that the illegal ivory and rhino horn trade was a vital way to finance covert South African operations; Magnus Malan, head of SADF, wanted Johannesburg to become the international capital of illegal wild animal trading as early as 1978.[449] He

[443] Berger, *South Africa in World History*, p. 121.
[444] David Beresford, 'Row over 'Mother of the Nation' Winnie Mandela', *The Guardian*, 27 January 1989 https://www.theguardian.com/century/1980-1989/Story/0,,110268,00.html [accessed on 27 February 2019].
[445] Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, p. 510.
[446] Beinhart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, p. 189.
[447] Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis*, p. 191.
[448] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 10.
[449] Ellis, 'The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force', p. 298.

also notes that the National Party created its own 'commercial-military complex' through the formation of fake companies to launder money to fund clandestine acts of violence, undertaken by government forces (SADF, C10) and Inkatha.[450]

Regional conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also created a bounty of weapons accessible to anti-apartheid groups, allowing for the creation of a 'Kalashnikov culture', as the AK-47 was the cheapest and most accessible weapon for MK and APLA guerrilla fighters and ANC 'Self-Defence Units'.[451] Ex-combatants in these conflicts would sell these arms and they would often be smuggled in through Transkei, the only 'friendly' area of South Africa for the ANC, according to Douek.[452] In the townships, ANC 'Self Defence Units' would fund weapons through the financial backing of the rest of the township.[453] Although such crowd funding is not illegal, the fact they had such easy access to such weaponry at all indicates the existence of a 'globalised war economy'. Kaldor also indicates that there are high rates of unemployment during 'new' wars.[454] Unemployment in South Africa rose from 13.7% in 1984 to 22.9% in 1994 and this is without considering the mass strikes led by COSATU in the late 1980s.[455] A 'globalised war economy' did exist in South Africa between 1984 and 1994, which allows the South African insurrection to be considered a 'new' war.

Conclusion

Whether due to insurrection or civil war, South Africa was a place of tremendous violence between 1984 and 1994. Clark and Worger estimate that by 1990, there were 100 deaths from politically-motivated violence per month. In 1993, that figure rose to almost 200 a month.[456] The Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted that many of these deaths occurred in KwaZulu Natal, in violence between the ANC/UDF-supporters and Inkatha advocates.[457] This would fuel Ross' argument that a low intensity civil war occurred only in Natal.[458] However, the nature of 'new' wars means that it is difficult to

[450] Ibid, p. 280.
[451] Beinhart, *Twentieth- Century South Africa*, p. 197.
[452] Douek, 'MK insurgency and counter-insurgency in Transkei', p. 211.
[453] Kynoch, *Township Violence and the End of Apartheid*, p. 50.
[454] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 10.
[455] 'South Africa- Unemployment Rate' (2017) https://knoema.com/atlas/South-Africa/Unemployment-rate [accessed on 27 February 2019].
[456] Clark and Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, p. 113.
[457] Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2 (1998), p. 584.
[458] Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa*, p. 202.

define where warzones actually are because of the limited fighting force.[459] Consequently, it would be easier for the historian to characterise all of South Africa as being a state of civil war between 1984 and 1994; Christopher's cartographical study indicates that political killings occurred across South Africa in this time period.[460] Far from being a conventional civil war, the South African conflict has many of the hallmarks of a 'new' war. Both internally and externally, South Africa was recognised as being in a state of civil war by contemporaries. Identity was the prime motivator for many of the combatant groups, especially Inkatha. Insurgency tactics were used, not only by the ANC and Inkatha but also by the Apartheid Government through covert security forces. A 'globalised war economy', created through criminal activities, was prevalent in South Africa. The South African insurrection is the least explored, yet most valuable contribution to Kaldor' 'New War Thesis'. The use of South Africa, alongside Bosnia and perhaps contemporary evaluations of the civil wars in Libya or Syria would vindicate the NWT and show that 'new' wars are truly the conflicts of the post-modern world.

For the historian's understanding of the fall of apartheid, the re-evaluation of the South African insurrection as a civil war is a substantial shift. An insurrection, according to Price, involves the active reduction of state power and its replacement with alternative forms of government (street councils, township courts).[461] This implies that protests by the liberation movement destroyed apartheid in certain places, which forced the National Party into negotiations with the ANC and which consequently caused the collapse of the apartheid state. This is the grand narrative of the liberation struggle. International sanctions are also considered to have caused the collapse of apartheid because they crippled South Africa, who defaulted on her debts in 1986. As the economic decline hit the white electorate the National Party relied on most, political change was necessary and hence apartheid collapsed. Without wishing to strip agency from the liberation movement or diminish the importance of international sanctions, seeing the South African insurrection as a civil war allows for the historian to argue that apartheid collapsed because South Africa, as a failed and war-torn state, went to the brink of self-annihilation. The only way back was a total reconstruction of state, through

[459] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 177.
[460] A.J. Christopher, *The Atlas of Apartheid* (London: Routledge, 1994). P. 170.
[461] Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis*, p. 191.

the enfranchisement and the creation of equal opportunities for South Africa's Black, Coloured and Indian populations. Yet, unlike most civil wars, there was no protracted peace-treaty or war trials. Instead, almost 20 million South Africans signed their armistice with a cross on a ballot paper in late April 1994. South Africa went down the road of reconciliation, not recrimination, through the public catharsis of the apartheid era, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Unlike most former war zones, South Africa, despite its difficulties, became the 'rainbow nation at peace with itself and with the world'.[462] This should remain the legacy of the violence in South Africa between 1984 and 1994, whether it be considered a civil war or an insurrection.

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