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Hi all,

It's been a pleasure this year to oversee the production of the second issue of the Southampton Journal of Undergraduate History. The high quality of last year's journal meant we had a tough act to follow, but I think we've created another fantastic issue. Filled with articles on a huge range of topics – from the First Muslim Civil War, to the British Royal Navy, the Medieval Church to America in the interwar years – there's hopefully something for everyone within these pages.

My thanks go to my Editors, **Louis Jeffries and Daniel Taylor**, who have been an immense help to me and always on hand to help with any query or decision. Equally, my team of markers have really done the heavy-lifting in terms of selecting the absolute best essays from all our submissions. We received so many high-quality pieces this year, so I am so grateful for the markers' work in narrowing down the selection. My markers this year have been: **Eleanor Joyce, Charlie Merry, Charlotte Samways, Fern Francis, Samantha Cassar, Niamh Day, Rebecca Walsh, Laura Else, Ivan Morris-Poxton, James Pride, Victoria Lawman, Philip Bettles, Dan Fowler, and Josh Burns.** Equally, thanks to **Samuel Dedman** for providing the design of the journal, and to **Eve Colpus** for being our helping hand within the history department.

Happy reading!

Molly Evans
(Editor-in-Chief)

The First Muslim Civil War and Modern Historiography

By Mohammed Ahmed

Abstract

After the emergence of Islam and the subsequent death of the Prophet Muhammad, his successors disagreed as to who would succeed the caliphate. This dispute resulted in the First Muslim Civil War, the repercussions of which have left Muslims divided until today. Abu Ja'far Al-Tabari is one of the few historians of the Abbasid era who details the factors that led to this confrontation between the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. This article will analyse his portrayal of these factors, using the lens of modern Islamic historiography.

The First Fitna, was a period of severe civil strife during the Rashidun Caliphate which ultimately resulted in the overthrowing of the Rashidun caliphs and the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty. It began when the caliph Uthman ibn Affan was assassinated by Egyptian rebels in 656 CE, and continued through the four-year reign of the Rashidun caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib. It ended in 661 CE when Ali's heir Hasan ibn Ali concluded a treaty acknowledging the rule of Muawiya, the first Umayyad caliph, known as the Hasan-Muawiya pact. Within this larger phenomenon of the First Fitna, one of the most decisive moments was the Battle of Siffin between Ali and Muawiya, which took place in 657 CE. Thus, my analysis will begin from the death of Uthman, include the succession of Ali, and peak at the Battle of Siffin, when Muawiya's defiance against Ali resulted in war. Thus, the first factor leading to civil war was the murder of Uthman. With it, the caliphal power balance was severely disrupted, resulting in the creation of a toxic power vacuum. The very circumstances of his death were controversial, and vengeance of the blood of Uthman became a rallying cry for those fighting in defiance against Ali. Due to this, the First Fitna is commonly referred to as '*fitnat maqtal Uthman*' due to the effect of Uthman's death on the stability of the caliphate.[1] The second factor is that of Ali's personal right to the caliphate.[2] Strongly challenged since the inception of his leadership, Ali's right to the caliphate was constantly questioned by the melee of different political groups that were emerging in the caliphate. These included the Kharijites, Medinans, Basrans, Egyptians under the leadership of Amr ibn al-As, and most notably

[1] *Fitnat maqtal Uthman* – lit., the strife of the killing of Uthman; see: Martin Hinds, "Muʿāwiya I", *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), Brill, retrieved 12/03/2018

[2] Though his personal right was constantly questioned, historians such as Madelung view it as an inherent prejudice against the *ahlul bayt* – lit., the people of the house (of Muhammad); see Wilferd Madelung, 'Ali: The Counter-Caliphate of Hashim', *The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997 pp. 141-9. Madelung's over-reliance on sources such as Waq'at Siffin (which have their origins in a retrospective partisan quarrel) render him a tendentious source regarding Ali. See: Albrecht Noth, *The Early Arabic Historical Tradition: A Source Critical Study*, 2nd ed., Trans. Michael Bonner, The Darwin Press Inc. Princeton: 1994)

and most significantly, the Umayyad forces of Muawiya located in *Sham*.[3] The third factor leading to civil war is this defiance against Ali by Muawiya and his military and political allies (specifically Amr ibn al-As). Thus, the combination of these factors resulted in an unavoidable conflict between Ali and his opponents, the effect of which remains tremendously controversial between Sunnis and Shi'ites to this very day.[4]

Al-Tabari's Tarikh al-Rusul wal-Muluk is an early 10th Century work. It is a universal creation narrative, beginning with the Quranic story of creation and ending in 915 CE. Al-Tabari is usually analysed as a history, and as such, is traditionally critiqued to shed the inconceivable and the unlikely, leaving a layer of more accurate events that likely occurred in early Islamic history. Such is the 'positivist' approach of historians such as Watt, Madelung, Blankship and Kennedy.[5] The approach of these 'descriptivist' historians is not uncritical however, and primary texts are vigorously analysed and cross-examined for technical and narrative inconsistencies. The result of this approach is a largely coherent historical narrative based on primary sources such as Al-Tabari. Concerning the early Islamic tradition, its written form did not ensure the transmission's authenticity, but rather helped to substantiate its oral narrative.[6] Positivist historians assert that fabricated oral traditions would have simply been rejected by the populace at large, who by the time of Al-Tabari's writing, would have been aware of the general narrative of early Islam.[7] Thus, the chronological gap (of over a century) between the beginnings of Islam and the development of historical narrative is not as central an issue to positivist historians. This gap however, has caused sceptics to question the validity of the entirety of early Islamic sources. Goldziher, Wansbrough, Crone, Cook, and more recently historians such as Bashear, Berkey and Robinson have challenged this assumption of factuality – and maintain that with such a gap, we must question the very basis of the narrative.[8] Retrospective Islamisation could have completely fabricated this narrative, and the life of Muhammad and his companions could simply be myth and legend. Therefore Al-Tabari

[3] i.e. Greater Syria, including Cyprus, Palestine and Southern Asia Minor. Umayyad forces however, were concentrated in mainland cities such as Damascus and Raqqa.

[4] Historians such as Robinson cite that this First Fitna was the trigger for the religious sectarian development in the Sunni and Shi'ite movements of Islam. See: Francis Robinson, *Atlas of the Islamic World Since 1500*, London, Phaidon Publishing, 1982, p. 23; see also: Mohammed Jafri, *The Origin and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 6-8

[5] For an analysis of the positivist and revisionist approaches concerning Al-Tabari see: Boaz Shoshan, *Poetics of Islamic Historiography : Deconstructing Tabari's History,* BRILL, 2004, xxvi-xxvii; For loci classici of positivism see: William Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961; Madelung, *The Succession to Muhammad*, 1997; Khalid Yahya Blankship, *The End of the Jihad State: The Reign of Hisham Ibn Abd Al-Malik and the Colla: Reign of Hisham Ibn 'Abd Al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1994; Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, New York, Routledge, 2004

[6] Erling Ladewig Petersen, *'Ali and Mu'awiya in early Arabic tradition: studies on the genesis and growth of Islamic historical writing until the end of the ninth century*, ACLS Publishing, 1964, p. 23

[7] William Montgomery Watt, Translator's Foreword, *The History of Al-Tabari*, vol. V, New York, State University of New York Press, 1988, xx-xxi

[8] See introductions to: Ignaz Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, 2 vols., ed. M Stern, London, Aldine Publishing, 1971; John Wansbrough, *The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978; Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, *Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977; Suliman Bashear, *Muqaddima fi l-tarikh al-akhar: nahwa qira'a jadida li l-riwaya al-islamiya*, Jerusalem, private printing, 1984; Jonathan Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Chase Robinson, *Islamic Historiography*, Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 2003

(according to the revisionists) holds little historical value, and perhaps reflects contemporary 10th Century Abbasid concerns more than the history it claims to explore. This analysis does not attempt to reconcile this debate with regards to Al-Tabari, but rather focuses on Al-Tabari's portrayal of the first civil war. It will analyse the factors that he presents, and why Al-Tabari portrays them as so. As such, my approach is in line with that of Shoshan's *Deconstructing Al-Tabari's History* – one that assesses the depiction of events, rather than one that explores the historical veracity of Al-Tabari's *History*. To this end, Al-Tabari's personal views and preferences are vitally important to grasp, as this affects his portrayal of the events. In any discussion on early Islamic history, particularly pertaining to Ali and the *sahaba*,[9] it remains necessary to outline the loyalty of the author. In this case, Al-Tabari is firmly Sunni.[10] His loyalty therefore belongs to all the companions of Muhammad, including those of the *ahlul bayt*.[11] Al-Tabari is therefore preoccupied with preserving a narrative that showcases *islah* between the companions as the norm, and opposition as a simple error of a companion in his *ijtihad*.[12] Nonetheless, he does not avoid historical detail, nor does he preserve a completely flattering narrative. Al-Tabari presents the three aforementioned factors as causing an unavoidable first civil war. In fact, as soon as Uthman is murdered, Al-Tabari makes civil war inevitable.

Death of Uthman

After Uthman spoke in the Prophet's Mosque addressing the rebels as to his misdeeds and need for reform, Uthman was ashamed and for three days refused to leave his house. During this time, Marwan ibn al-Hakam spoke harshly to the people on behalf of Uthman: 'What is the matter with you that you assemble as if you came for plunder? You have come coveting to wrest our property (*mulk*) from our hands. Be off from us. By God, if that is what you want, something of us will fall upon you which will not please you, and you will not praise the outcome of your fancy. Go back to your houses, for, by God, we shall not be overwhelmed and deprived of what we have in our hands'.[13] This extract shows Uthman's nepotism in choosing Marwan (his close relative from Banu

[9] Sahaba – lit., companions (of Muhammad)

[10] Al-Tabari is well-known for considering the Hanbalites as short-sighted literalists, the Shi'ites as an extreme group, but revered the Shafi'ites, Hanafites, Malikites, Dhahirites, and in turn was revered by them after his death. Thus, his loyalties are with the traditional schools of Sunni jurisprudence. See also: 'Biography of Al-Tabari' by Franz Rosenthal, The History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, trans. Franz Rosenthal, New York, State University of New York Press, 1988 pp. 20-33

[11] Whose status was revived under the Abbasids, partly due to Al-Saffah's (and all subsequent Abbasids) relation through Al-Abbas to Muhammad, but also as a political tool of the Abbasids to gain Shi'ite support. See: El-Hibri, Tayeb, "The empire in Iraq: 763–861". In Chase Robinson, *The New Cambridge History of Islam. 1: The Formation of the Islamic World: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 269–304

[12] *Islah* – lit., reconciliation in the relationship, especially in a time of crisis between two friendly parties. The Quran says: 'And do not cause mischief in the Earth after its *islah*'. Thus, as a Qur'anic principle it remains important for Al-Tabari, the expert exegete, to view the lives of the companions through this lens. Ijtihad – lit., judgement. This term features heavily in Islamic jurisprudence as an honour that only the most knowledgeable scholars may practise. The companions were considered to be able to practise *ijtihad*. Therefore, Sunni sources (and Al-Tabari is no exception in this regard), do not explicitly condemn any companion of Muhammad, and rather refer to their errors as errors in *ijtihad* and not in their character. For more on *ijtihad* see: John L. Esposito, ed."Ijtihad". *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; Marion Katz, "The Age of Development and Continuity, 12th–15th Centuries CE". *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law*. Oxford University Press, 2015

[13] Al-Tabari, *History* x, 2985, 2977, 2975

Umayya) to represent him. Al-Tabari portrays Marwan's cavalier attitude towards the situation as careless to Uthman's own welfare. This is important as the other main adviser to Uthman at this point during the crisis was Ali. As two high ranking companions with early precedence, their upsetting the rebels further (instigating the death of Uthman) would be seen as either treasonous, or more importantly, as religiously immoral. The use of the word *mulk* by Marwan establishes that the Umayyad family considered the caliphate their familial inheritance. This term is used to refer to the Umayyad caliphate in derogatory terms, especially after the caliphate of Muawiya, indicating that the caliphate had morphed into a *mamlaka*.[14] The subsequent abandonment of Uthman by Marwan himself, but also other significant Umayyads such as Muawiya and Al-Walid ibn Uqba, the latter of whom was Uthman's own brother.[15] Thus, Al-Tabari portrays Uthman's nepotistic approach as one that does not avail him, and that the death of Uthman has shifted political power away from the Umayyad family. According to Al-Tabari, it also created a toxic power vacuum that companions did not wish to be associated with. Ali, Talha and Al-Zubayr repeatedly denounce the rebels and their 'plan'.[16] Al-Tabari uses the word '*makr*', linking the rebels with the hypocrites mentioned in the Quran.[17] This shows how the death of Uthman severely shook the ruling establishment to its very core – and why historians such as Madelung and Kennedy assert that only an event this politically seismic could have installed the 'counter-caliphate of Hashim'.[18]

Al-Tabari records the burial of Uthman in great detail. 'Hakim ibn Hizam al-Qurashi spoke to Ali about his [Uthman's] burial, seeking his permission for his [Uthman's] family to see to that. Ali granted them his permission, but when news of this spread, people lay in wait for [Uthman's] body by the road, armed with stones. A few members of his family set out with [his body], intending to take him to an enclosure in Medina, named Hashsh Kawkab, where the Jews used to bury their dead. Now when [Uthman's body] was brought out before the people, they stoned his bier and were bent on throwing him to the ground. When Ali heard that he sent and demanded that they leave him alone.'[19] Al-Tabari portrays Ali as in control of the rebels following the death of Uthman, indicating that those who disliked Uthman could have been deterred by him, as they can now be deterred from further violating Uthman's dead body simply by Ali's command.[20] It also shows that

[14] *Mamlaka* – lit., kingdom. *Mulk* (property), *malik* (owner/king), and *mamlaka* (kingdom) all come from the m-l-k verb in Arabic, and thus share the same etymological root. The negative accusation of the Umayyad Caliphate being a tyrannical kingship is found in virtually all sources compiled in the Abbasid era, including Al-Tabari. See: Heather Keaney, "Confronting the Caliph: 'Uthmân b. 'Affân in Three 'Abbasid Chronicles". *Studia Islamica*. 2011, 106 (1)

[15] Al-Walid had vacated the city of Medina, and wept upon his receiving the news of Uthman's death. Muawiya and other members of the Umayyad family sought refuge with Umm Habiba bint Abi Sufyan, widow of Muhammad. See: Al-Baladhuri, Ansab, V 80, 102-103; Al-Tabari, History, xv 3002, 3022

[16] See full report of Al-Tabari, 3074: 'The Egyptians approached Ali, but he hid from them and disowned their plans, the Kufans searched for Al-Zubayr, but he disowned their plan, The Basrans searched for Talha, he withdrew from them and disowned their plan'. Ibn Umar further relates (regarding assuming the caliphate): 'it involves vengeance, so I am not going to interfere with it'. (Also Al-Tabari, 3074)

[17] '*Wa Makaru wa makarallah, wallahu khayrul makireen*' – lit., They plan, and Allah plans, and Allah is the best of planners, Quran 8:30.

[18] See: Madelung, *Succession to Muhammad*, p. 227; Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, p. 79

[19] Al-Tabari, *History*, xv 3046

[20] Madelung, *Succession to Muhammad*, p. 139

though the rebels may have killed Uthman, he continued to be a decisive figure, and this hatred could be projected onto his legacy also. The fact that Uthman was buried in Hashsh Kawkab, the Jewish cemetery, shows the extent that the rebels had power over Medina – as the Medinans were not opposed to Uthman's burial.[21]

Most importantly however, the legacy of the death of Uthman was exploited by Ali's opponents as a key principle in rejecting Ali's claims to the caliphate. How could Ali be a legitimate caliph, let alone God's chosen caliph, if he does not punish the perpetrators who are amongst his own loyalists?

Right of Ali

Al-Tabari portrays Uthman as willing to seek the council of Ali, but only when the threats posed by the rebels are at their most severe.[22] Madelung asserts that Uthman had virtually no choice in the matter, and that his safety necessitated his co-operation with Ali.[23] However this does also show Ali as a *mushawar*,[24] and a confidant of Uthman. Al-Tabari is presenting a narrative in which Uthman and Ali are working together, before the former's death. This coincides with the Sunni view of *islah* between the companions. Even if they had been at ideological loggerheads before, they can come together and unite in the face of a prospective enemy. Ali is portrayed as having some authority over the rebels.[25] Ali is ordered by Uthman to ride out to the rebels, and persuade them to turn back. This shows that Uthman's trusted Ali to dispose of his affairs. Madelung claims that Uthman gave Ali a free hand to negotiate on his behalf.[26] Al-Tabari records that Ali reminded Uthman that he had previously advised him, but that Uthman had favoured Marwan ibn al-Hakam's advice (likely due to his close kinship with Uthman).[27] This again links to Uthman's nepotism, which is portrayed as having angered Ali in the past. However, Uthman subsequently vowed to follow Ali's advice and ordered Ali to take the *Muhajirun* and *Ansar* with him to meet the rebels.[28] Here, Al-Tabari raises two very significant points. The first is that the caliph Uthman has now submitted to Ali, and declared that he will follow him. This places Ali's position of power above the caliph, even before the latter's death. This is then heightened by Al-Tabari's mention of Uthman commanding Ali to lead both the *Muhajirun* and *Ansar*. It shows Ali had sufficient political clout to be popular amongst these two groups, the two most significant groups in the development

[21] Ibid, p. 139
[22] Tabari, *History*, xv 2968-9
[23] Madelung, *Succession to Muhammad*, p. 119
[24] i.e. one from whom the caliph seeks *shura* – lit., counsel
[25] Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, (2nd ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 47
[26] Madelung, *Succession to Muhammad*, p. 119
[27] Tabari, *History*, xv 2968-9
[28] Muhajirun – lit., those who migrated (to Medina before the Conquest of Mecca); Ansar – lit., helpers (of Medina) *Ibid*, 2968-9

of early Islam. In this way, Al-Tabari has linked Ali's popularity to that of Muhammad himself, who was the only universally recognised leader by both the *Ansar* and the *Muhajirun*.[29]
Indicating Ali's right to lead the Muslims, Al-Tabari records 'Abu Ayyub al-Ansari led the salah for a few days [after Uthman's death], after which Ali led the prayers.'[30] The leading of the prayers is highly indicative in who has the right to lead the believers politically.[31] This links back to claims that Abu Bakr was commanded by Muhammad to lead the people in prayer.[32] This helped to establish Abu Bakr as the legitimate successor of Muhammad.[33] Therefore, Al-Tabari presents Ali as having taken up this privilege, indicating that his leadership, like Abu Bakr's, was ordained by Allah. However, in this case, we have the intermittent *imamate*[34] of Abu Ayyub Al-Ansari. This shows that Ali's leadership had not been categorical or immediate amongst the companions (as other narrations in Al-Tabari recall).[35] Undoubtedly, Al-Tabari achieves a balance in this narrative of not wholly endorsing Ali in regards to the leadership of the prayers, but not denying him of this right either.
The term 'imam' continues to be one of significance in Al-Tabari's narrative. Al-Tabari constantly uses the term 'imam' when referring to the position that Ali assumes.[36] All of these *asanid*[37] use Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, the son of Ali. This differs from the earlier narratives of Abu Bakr and Umar, when the people need an '*amir*'.[38] Whilst both can mean leader, there is a clear association with using the word imam solely for the leadership of Ali. By Al-Tabari's time, the Shi'ites would be using the term imam to mean the rightful spiritual successor to Muhammad.[39]
The Sunnis however, would more commonly use either Caliph or *Amir al-Mu'minin*[40] to refer to the religio-political inheritors of Muhammad.[41] Whilst we may accept the word imam in its most literal form (and perhaps how Al-Tabari intends), it carries with it the connotations of Shi'ite thought in regards to Ali's leadership.
However, Al-Tabari also portrays Ali's weakness in leadership, and the reluctance of some companions to pledge allegiance to him shows this. He faces immediate opposition from Talha and

[29] The event at Saqifa Bani Sa'ida proved that Abu Bakr was not ordinarily popular with the ansar, and they had to be convinced of his political leadership by other companions. The early caliphs needed the support of both the ansar and muhajirun to maintain political balance. See: *Sahih al-Bukhari*, 8:82:817; Francesco Gabrieli, *The Arabs – A Compact History*, Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 15-20; on Al-Bukhari as a source, see: Jonathan Brown, *The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunnī Ḥadīth Canon*, BRILL, 2007
[30] Al-Tabari, *History*, xv 3060
[31] Especially according to the Sunni tradition. See reports of: Ibn Ishaq, *Sirah*, 1011; Robert Hoyland, *Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam*, London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 230-240
[32] Al-Tabari, *History*, xv 2810
[33] Hoyland, *Arabia and the Arabs*, pp. 230-240
[34] *Imamate* strictly in the sense of leading prayers. Not the Shi'ite definition of *imamate* (the community's spiritual leader).
[35] i.e. challenges were posed by other companions
[36] Al-Tabari, History xv 3067, 3069, 3080
[37] Pl., *isnad* – lit., chain of transmission (of an oral statement)
[38] Ibn Ishaq, *Sirah*, 1010; Al-Tabari, History, xi 1100
[39] Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, New York, Routledge, 2004 p. 130
[40] *Amir al-Mu'minin* – lit., Commander of the Faithful, sometimes shortened to simply *amir*.
[41] By Al-Tabari's time, only the first four caliphs were considered both religious and political inheritors of Muhammad. Subsequent caliphs were only considered political leaders and religious authority remained amongst the knowledgeable people of the general population – according to 'Sunni' Islam. See: William Montgomery Watt, Translator's Foreword, The History of Al-Tabari, vol. V, New York, State University of New York Press, 1988, xx-xxx

Al-Zubayr. Both (with Ali) are fellow rivals of the Council of Six, as Al-Tabari narrates earlier.[42] The rivalry may thus be caused by their desire to assume the caliphate, but this is presented as unlikely, due to the climate of fear that arose after the death of Uthman, as discussed. Companions did not wish to be associated with the murder, which is perhaps why Ali himself protests before assuming the caliphate under duress.[43] However, the forced allegiance narrative is extremely convenient in the subsequent military challenges that Ali faces from Talha and Al-Zubayr (Battle of the Camel).[44] Shoshan argues that their allegiance is given so much attention in Al-Tabari's narrative solely due to the military exchanges that follow, and that otherwise these two companions would have remained relatively discreet during the election of Uthman's successor.[45] Al-Tabari must thus portray Ali's leadership as both strong and questioned. This is due to the fact that Ali is the fourth rightly-guided caliph according to Al-Tabari's own Sunni view, but the *sahaba* are not to be condemned on a matter of *ijtihad* in which they erred. Therefore, in essence, Al-Tabari is arguing that Ali was within his rights to demand loyalty, even by force. Conversely, the other companions were also within their right to oppose Ali's leadership, as it was the best course of action according to their understanding.

Defiance of Muawiya

The death of Uthman is a major theme in justifying the defiance against Ali. Indeed without it, Muawiya's actions (and those of his allies, including Amr ibn al-As), would simply be seen as defiance against the legitimate leadership. When Muawiya hears of Ali's plan to advance towards *Sham*, he summons Amr ibn al-As.[46] Amr then informs Muawiya: 'Ali has set out with a band [...] amongst whom are those who killed your caliph. Fear God, lest you forfeit your right to claim vengeance, and allow the [your] blood of Uthman to go unavenged.'[47] The use of Amr ibn al-As by Muawiya showcases important elements of the First Fitna. Muawiya is presented as diplomatically successful, and one who does not lack allies. This speech is a clear example of the heightened use of rhetoric that Ali's opponents used to justify their stand. Also the use of 'your caliph' and 'your blood' serves to remind Muawiya that he shared emotional and familial connection with Uthman – and his wrongful death should be taken up by him.[48] Ali responds by derogatorily calling Amr ibn

[42] The council of six was chosen by Umar on his deathbed. Revisionist historians debate its authenticity. It consisted of Ali, Uthman, Sa'd ibn abi Waqqqas, Al-Zubayr, Talha, and Abdul Rahman ibn Awf. See: Al-Tabari, History, xiv 1010

[43] According to the majority of narratives presented by Al-Tabari (and other primary historians), Ali is not presented as desirous to assume the caliphate. See: Al-Tabari, History, xvi 3069-3070

[44] Again, it presents both sets of companions in the best possible light. Ali is the rightful caliph and may demand allegiance. Talha and Al-Zubayr did not truly wish to give allegiance, so their involvement in the Battle of the Camel against Ali is seen as less of a betrayal. Al-Tabari remains tactfully loyal to the companions, whilst hinting that the displacement of loyalties in Ali was a major factor for the first civil war.

[45] Boaz Shoshan, *Poetics of Islamic Historiography : Deconstructing Tabari's History*, BRILL, 2004, pp. 40-45

[46] In Al-Tabari's narrative, Amr is presented as Muawiya's right-hand man. For more on Amr's role, see: Andrew Marsham, "The Pact (Amāna) Between Muʿāwiya Ibn Abī Sufyān And ʿamr Ibn Al-ʿāṣ (656 Or 658 CE): 'Documents' And The Islamic Historical Tradition", *Journal of Semitic Studies*, 57 (1): 69–96

[47] Al-Tabari, *History* xvi 3257

[48] '*Damuka*' – lit., your blood; '*khalifatuka*' – lit., your caliph; Arabian patrilineal custom would transfer responsibilities to the nearest male kinsman in the event of a death. In the case of Uthman, this is clear from Muawiya taking responsibility for avenging Uthman's death, and his incessant plea to Naila (Uthman's widow who was attacked by rebels whilst

al-As 'Asi bin Asi', clearly indicating that Amr has a natural defiance to true leadership, and that Ali will continue to march to war.[49] This heightened use of rhetoric by Al-Tabari indicates that the situation would be unresolvable.[50]

Muawiya's forces and their attitude at Siffin is presented as inhumane. There is a strong narrative of Muawiya's forces depriving Ali and his troops of water (from the Euphrates).[51] Al-Tabari presents this as Muawiya's own personal command.[52] Ali must therefore camp on dry, unforgiving land. This is remarkably similar to the water deprival by the later Umayyad army against Al-Husayn. The Euphrates is cut-off from Husayn and his army, and they are forced to camp on dry, rocky land.[53] Indeed the battle itself at Siffin shares many details with the Battle of Karbala. This includes the desperate attempts to get water, the brutal crushing of any attempt to do so, and the showering of arrows on Alid/Husaynid forces. By doing so, Al-Tabari makes a link between the struggle of Al-Husayn with the struggle of Ali.[54] The *ahlul bayt* are therefore presented as fighting Umayyad tyranny together. However there are two key differences. Muawiya is treated differently due to his status as a companion (Yazid was not). Furthermore, Muawiya was a governor who made an error in *ijtihad*, and is treated as so, whereas Yazid is presented as an oppressive king who inherited dominion from his father (thus fulfilling the prophecy about tyrannical kingship).[55] For these reasons, Al-Tabari presents Muawiya and the early Umayyads as erroneous in their actions, but with seemingly sincere intentions.

In conclusion, Al-Tabari has merged the three factors of the death of Uthman, the right of Ali, and the defiance of Muawiya as key elements leading to war. Chronologically speaking, one could trace the factors leading to civil war to an earlier period. For example, Muawiya's appointment as Governor of Syria (succeeding his brother Yazid), followed simple logic of appointing a member of the Umayyad family to a land where they had money, land and influence.[56] Abu Sufyan and Hind's earlier involvement in Yarmouk showcased the family's loyalty to the land of *Sham*.[57] The expectation that Muawiya would simply give this up upon the simple command of a rival to Uthman is unthinkable.[58] The defiance of Muawiya and his allies against Ali is therefore understandable, and Al-Tabari presents it as so, covering any errors with the veil of *ijtihad.* The

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defending Uthman), that he should marry and take care of her. See: Shirley Guthrie, *Arab Women in the Middle Ages: Private Lives and Public Roles*, Saqi Publishing, 2013, p. 90.

[49] '*Asi*' comes from the Arabic word *Ma'siya* (transgression), thus Ali is calling Amr a transgressor, son of a transgressor. This also sets up a familial comparison between Ali and Amr, in which Ali is more 'Islamically' noble, and closer to Muhammad.

[50] Further examples of heightened rhetoric include Al-Walid's statement in a letter to Muawiya: 'Your family in Medina have been wiped out, cast down like a chaff' Al-Tabari, *History*, xvi 3259

[51] Al-Tabari, *History,* xvi 3266

[52] *Ibid*, 3266

[53] Al-Tabari, History, xviii 1920

[54] 'A Local Historian's Debt to al-Ṭabarī: The Case of al-Azdī's *Ta'rīkh al-Mawṣil*', Chase Robinson, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 126, No. 4 (October – December 2006), pp. 521–535

[55] A well-known tradition by Al-Tabari's time: 'The Prophetic khilaafah will last for thirty years, followed by tyrannical kingship'. *Sunan Abu Dawud*, 3257, as cited in Petersen, *Ali and Muawiya*, pp. 43-44

[56] Clifford Edmund Bosworth (ed.), "Muʿāwiyah I", *Encyclopædia of Islam*. VII, Brill, 1989, pp. 263–268.

[57] Al-Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, 292

[58] Habib Rahman, *A Chronology Of Islamic History 570-1000 CE*, Ta-Ha Publishers, 1999, p. 72

right of Ali is also questioned since his assumption of the caliphate. Al-Tabari is firmly on Ali's side, and acknowledges his right to the caliphate as ordained by God.[59] Likewise, Al-Tabari presents the de facto relationship between the companions as one of *islah*, and any disagreements, however militarised or heightened by rhetoric or force, are simply misunderstandings. The seeds of the civil war however, are most definitely sown during the narrative of the death of Uthman. Constant foreshadowing by Al-Tabari within the narrative of the death of Uthman supports the claim that the first civil strife was not a random occurrence – rather it was built upon by frequent unfortunate events.[60] Therefore, Al-Tabari provides a shield by which we view the events of the First Fitna. We cannot view the events as completely immoral actions. Rather, we can only conclude that unavoidable events led to a misunderstanding that resulted in war, and no prominent companion is categorically to blame.

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[59] Madelung, *Succession to Muhammad*, pp. 20-23
[60] Petersen, *Ali and Muawiya*, p. 220

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An Examination of the Significance of the Greco-Persian Wars in the 5th Century

By Jack Slade

Abstract

The Greco-Persian wars of the 5th century BC not only have historical importance, but also have captured the public's imagination for many years. The aim of this article is to uncover which of these battles was in fact the most decisive for the course and result of the Persian Wars. For the purposes of this article I shall be taking the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea and Mycale into account, as these were the major military confrontations between the Greeks and the Persians during the climax of the Persian Wars in the years 490-479 BCE. This article shall argue that the battles of Marathon, Salamis and Plataea were each hugely significant for the course of the Greco-Persian wars, as a Greek loss in each of these battles could have led to the subjugation of Greece by Persia. However, ultimately the most decisive battle of the Persian Wars during this time period was the battle of Salamis, due to the high stakes of the battle and the achievements of the Greek victory there.[61]

It has been said that the battle of Marathon has iconic status more than any other battle of ancient history.[62] Historians attribute huge importance to the battle of Marathon, when a predominantly Athenian army routed a much larger Persian force led by King Darius.[63] A Greek loss in this battle would have led to the conquering of Athens by Persia, and the rest of Greece may have faced the same fate. The view that Western Civilisation as it exists now would not have developed had it not been for the Greek Victory at Marathon has been held by many prominent figures, such as John Stuart Mill.[64] The battle of Marathon effectively marked the start of the golden age of Athens, and demolished the idea that the Persian Empire was invincible.[65][66] However, the importance of Marathon should not be overstated. The Battle of Marathon settled nothing with the Persians; immediately afterwards King Darius began preparing a new army with which to subjugate Greece, and his son Xerxes returned to Greece with a much larger invasion force 10 years later. By contrast, after his defeat at Salamis, King Xerxes never returned to Greece.

[61] Revisions made to this essay have been to turn the introduction into an abstract, and to change the word 'essay' into 'article' wherever it appears. Other than these changes, no other revisions were made.
[62] Krentz, Peter, *The Battle of Marathon,* (Yale University Press, 2010) pxii [online] available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/soton-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3421189 (accessed 10 April 2017)
[63] Herodotus, *Histories* VI
[64] Krentz, Peter, *The Battle of Marathon,* (Yale University Press, 2010) p9 [online] available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/soton-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3421189 (accessed 10 April 2017)
[65] Holland, Tom, *Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West*. (Abacus 2006) p201
[66] Krentz, Peter, *The Battle of Marathon,* (Yale University Press, 2010) pxiv [online] available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/soton-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3421189 (accessed 10 April 2017)

When one compares the numbers amassed by King Darius in the 1st Persian invasion of Greece and the numbers amassed by King Xerxes in the 2nd Persian invasion of Greece, it seems that the 2nd invasion posed a much bigger threat than the first. Various ancient sources claim that Darius' force consisted of 600 ships and between 200-300,000 men.[67][68][69] Yet modern estimates give different figures; a rough consensus exists that Darius' force consisted of around 25,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.[70] Xerxes' invasion force, according to both ancient and modern sources, was much larger. Herodotus claims it was made up of 2.5 million military personnel.[71] According to modern estimates, it numbered around 200,000 men and 600-1200 warships.[72] The fact that Xerxes' force was larger than Darius' lends credence to the view that the Battle of Salamis was more decisive than the battle of Marathon; as the Greek allies at the time of Salamis were faced with a much larger Persian invasion force than the Greeks at the time of Marathon. The Persians' defeat at Marathon did not reduce their resources to any significant degree. Moreover, Marathon did not even make Athens safe at the time; straight after the battle the Athenian army had to quickly march back to Athens to prevent the remaining Persians from landing nearby and taking the city in their absence.[73] It could be argued that if the battle of Marathon had not been won, then Greece would have been conquered and the other battles which will be considered in the article could not have taken place. Marathon made the battles of Salamis and Plataea possible. However, the same is true of Salamis; victory at Salamis made Plataea possible, and if the Greeks had lost either of these battles, then Greece would likely have been conquered. The consequences of a Persian victory at any of these 3 battles would have likely been catastrophic for Greece; each of these 3 significant battles of the Persian wars shares this characteristic. Moreover, it is far from clear that Darius did actually intend to conquer and subjugate all of Greece, and it is also unclear whether his force would have been able to do so even if that was his intention.[74] Xerxes clearly was intending to take control of the whole of Greece, and had amassed an invasion force with this goal in mind.[75] This means that the Greek victory at Salamis was more significant for the fate of Greece than the Greek Victory at Marathon. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the battle of Marathon was any more decisive than Salamis.

The Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium were not as decisive as the battles of Salamis, Marathon and Plataea. This is because Thermopylae and Artemisium did not significantly affect the outcome of the Persian wars. Thermopylae was a defeat for the Greeks, despite their brave fighting, and the Greek fleet at Artemisium retreated from the battle upon hearing of the defeat at

[67] Plutarch, *Moralia*, 305 B
[68] Pausanias, *Description of Greece* IV, 22
[69] Herodotus, *Histories* VI 95
[70] Holland, Tom, *Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West*. (Abacus 2006) p390
[71] Herodotus, *Histories,* VII 186
[72] de Souza, Philip. *The Greek and Persian Wars*, 499–386 BC. (Osprey Publishing, 2003) p41
[73] Herodotus, *Histories* VI 116
[74] Hanson, Victor Davis, ''No Glory that was Greece:' The Persians win at Salamis 480 BC,' in *What If? Military historians imagine what might have been* ed. by Robert Cowley (London: Macmillan Publishers ltd 2000) p24
[75] Herodotus, *Histories* VII 138

Thermopylae. Forcing the pass of Thermopylae was a strategic victory for the Persians; it was probably not the intention of the Greeks to give up all of Boeotia and Attica to Xerxes, and the Persians conquered the majority of Greece in the aftermath of Thermopylae.[76] One could argue that delaying the Persians at Thermopylae was crucial in buying time for the Greek Navy time to prepare for the battle of Salamis. Yet this argument fails to convince when one considers the fact that the Greek Navy was suffering significant losses at Artemisium at the same time as the Battle of Thermopylae; which would have likely cancelled out any preparations made for Salamis during this time.[77] The battle of Mycale was also not a significant battle of the Persian Wars in comparison to Salamis, Marathon and Plataea. The Greeks sought battle in this case, which was not true of Salamis and Marathon. The stakes of a Greek loss at Mycale were lower than at Salamis, Marathon and Plataea, as the Greeks were on the offensive, they were far less outnumbered than was the case at Salamis and Marathon, and the Persian invasion force under Mardonius was being defeated at the same time as Mycale. [78][79] With these facts in mind, it is clear that the battles of Thermopylae, Mycale and Artemisium cannot be attributed the same significance as the battles of Marathon, Salamis and Plataea.

It is essential to consider Plataea when assessing which battle was the most decisive of the Persian wars. It could be argued that the Battle of Plataea was the most decisive battle of the Persian wars because the Greek victory at Plataea finally ended the threat of Persian conquest over Greece. The Athenians could not have returned to their city until the Persian commander Mardonius and his Persians were finally defeated. After this battle, Persia never again attempted to invade and conquer Greece. However, ultimately the battle of Salamis was more decisive than the battle of Plataea, mainly because the force at Plataea posed less of a threat to Greece than the force at Salamis. There are 3 main reasons for thinking this. Firstly, the Greek infantry at Plataea was more skilled and better equipped than that of the Persians.[80] Secondly, due to its defeat at Salamis, the Persian Navy was not nearby Plataea to support and reinforce Mardonius' Army. Thirdly, there are indications that Persian morale was not high at Plataea. The Persian commander Mardonius was concerned by the fact that much of his force consisted of Greeks who may betray him.[81][82] Herodotus repeats an eyewitness account that the Persian noblemen with Mardonius were upset at the thought that same of them may die during the battle.[83] The Persian force at Plataea also employed a stockade, which may have been constructed to improve morale and reassure

[76] Lazenby, JF. *The Defence of Greece 490–479 BC.* (Aris & Phillips Ltd. 2003) p248-253
[77] Herodotus, *Histories* VIII 1-19
[78] Diodorus of Sicily reports that there were 250 ships in the Greek fleet (Diodorus, Biblioteca Historica XI 34.) Herodotus reports the Persian fleet as being 300 ships strong (Histories, VIII 130.) Thus the two fleets were roughly equal in size, whereas at Marathon and Salamis the Persian force was twice as large as that of the Greeks'.
[79] Herodotus reports that the battles of Mycale and Platea were taking place on the same afternoon: *Histories* IX, 96
[80] Herodotus, *Histories* VIIII 62-63
[81] Herodotus, *Histories*, IX, 32
[82] Barron, J.P. 'The liberation of Greece' in *the Cambridge Ancient History Volume 4,* 2nd edition, ed. by J. Boardman (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) p598
[83] Herodotus, *Histories,* IX 15.4-16

frightened soldiers.[84] The recent Greek victory at Salamis had probably demoralized the Persians at Plataea, whilst unifying and emboldening the Greeks. Thus, arguably the force at Plataea presented less of a threat to Greece than the Persian fleet at Salamis, which had had Xerxes accompanying it, whose presence would have improved morale and coerced the Persians to fight more bravely. To sum up, the battle of Plataea was fought from a position of greater Greek strength and at lesser odds than Salamis and Marathon, and thus was less decisive than those battles.

The battle of Salamis is often seen as the turning point of the 2nd Persian invasion of Greece. Like the battle of Marathon, it has been attributed the status of one of the most significant battles of human history.[85] The stakes were very high at Salamis; if Xerxes destroyed the allied Navy, he would be in a strong position to force a Greek surrender, and by contrast if the Greeks destroyed the Persian fleet, then they would be in a much stronger position to stop the conquest of Greece from being completed.[86] Both sides thought that a naval battle would be decisive.[87] When assessing the decisiveness of this battle it is important to keep in mind how serious a defeat it was for the Persians. The naval superiority of the Persians had been removed. Xerxes left Greece with most of the Persian Army as a result of the losses incurred there; he was fearful of being trapped in Europe by the Greeks. [88] Persian losses were suffered by the best troops and the best ships; the Persian, Median and Sacan infantrymen were not able to swim.[8990] Xerxes had to abandon his plan of building a pontoon bridge across the straits in order to use his army to attack the Athenians, such a move would be impossible to carry out with the Greek Navy now in control of the straits.[91] On the journey back to Asia most of the Persian Army travelling with him died of starvation and disease.[92] After their defeat at Salamis, the Persians abandoned Attica and the Peloponnese was safe from conquest by them. The Greek victory at Salamis put the Greek allies in a position where they would be able to go on the offensive against the Persians at Plataea. Thus, it is clear that the battle of Salamis represented a huge defeat for Persia and very significant achievements on the part of the Greeks.

The Greeks were highly outnumbered at Salamis. From Herodotus' account we learn that the Greek fleet numbered 371 ships, whilst he, along with other ancient sources, records the Persian

[84] Barron, J.P. 'The liberation of Greece' in *the Cambridge Ancient History Volume 4,* 2nd edition, ed. by J. Boardman (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) p598
[85] Hanson, Victor Davis, ''No Glory that was Greece:' The Persians win at Salamis 480 BC,' in *What If? Military historians imagine what might have been* ed. by Robert Cowley (London: Macmillan Publishers ltd 2000)
[86] Holland, Tom, *Persian Fire*. (London: Abacus, 2005) p300-309
[87] Holland, Tom, *Persian Fire*. (London: Abacus, 2005) p303
[88] Herodotus, *Histories*, VIII, 97
[89] Herodotus, *Histories* VIII, 89
[90] Hammond, N.G.L., 'The expedition of Xerxes,' in *The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 4*, 2nd edition, edited by J. Boardman (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp580
[91] Holland, Tom, *Persian Fire*. (London: Abacus, 2005) p327-329
[92] Herodotus, Histories, VIII, 15

fleet as being made up of over 1000 ships.[9394959697] This number has been disputed by modern historians; many of the numbers reported by Herodotus are met with scepticism.[98] Nonetheless, according to modern estimates, the Persian fleet was made up of between 600-800 ships.[99] This means that whether one accepts the ancient or the modern view, the Persian Navy was roughly twice as large as the Greek fleet (if not more.) Yet the narrow straits at Salamis crucially enabled the Greeks to offset the Persian's superior numbers.[100] This means that the location of the battle is a vital factor which makes Salamis decisive; had the Greeks attempted to confront the Persian fleet in any other location, the Greek fleet would likely have been destroyed and Greece would have been conquered.

To sum up, the Battle of Salamis was on balance the most decisive battle of the Persian wars throughout the period 490-479. The battles of Thermopylae, Artemisium and Mycale were far less significant to the outcome of the Persian wars than Salamis, Plataea and Marathon. Although Plataea was an important battle in the Greco-Persian wars, ultimately it was made possible by the Greek victory at Salamis. The same could arguably be said of the relationship between Marathon and Salamis; however this underplays the successes achieved at Salamis. The Greek victory at Marathon did remove the immediate threat of Persian invasion. However after the Marathon this threat still remained; their defeat made the Persians even more determined to subjugate Greece, and they returned a decade later under Xerxes with an army and fleet much larger than that of the previous invasion force. The Greek victory at Salamis destroyed half of the Persian fleet, including most of its best ships and soldiers, and caused Xerxes to leave Greece with much of the Persian Army, never to return. Most of the Persians accompanying Xerxes back to Asia died of starvation and disease on the journey. Victory at Salamis made the Peloponnese safe from Persian invasion, enabled the Greeks to take the offensive and ultimately paved the way for the final destruction of the Persian invasion force at the battle of Plataea.

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[94] Aeschylus, *The Persians*
[95] Diodorus of Sicily, *Biblioteca Historica*, XI, 3
[96] Ephorus, *Universal History*
[97] Plato, *Laws III,* 699
[98] de Souza, Philip. *The Greek and Persian Wars*, 499–386 BC. (Osprey Publishing, 2003) p41
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Establishing Sexual Norms: An Examination into how effectively the later medieval Church regulated sexual behaviour.

By Caroline Taylor

Abstract

From the second century onwards, the Catholic Church had been establishing its theology and teaching on what constituted sexual norms, through an extensive body of canon law. However, by the later middle ages the nature of canon law, its sheer size and complexity, had created a gap between theory and practice. The laity, and to some extent even the clergy, were unaware of the Church's teachings on sex, or in some cases misunderstood or rejected them. Thus, the late medieval Church sought to regulate sexual behaviour through a number of avenues explored here. These include new laws, new styles of teaching and a greater uniformity within the Church on teachings regarding sexual behaviour. Yet, the effectiveness of these developments to regulate sexual behaviour remains questionable and this text will argue that despite the efforts of the Church, by the end of the middle ages there remained a difference between the theory of the Church and the practice of the laity in regard to sexual behaviour.

The Church's teachings on sex are drawn from the Bible, in particular, the teachings of St Paul in the letters he wrote to early church. A key example of this is in his first letter to the Corinthian church in around 53-55 A.D. He writes that marriage is acceptable when "passions are strong" so that "Satan may not tempt you because of your lack of self-control", but that virginity and those who "refrain from marriage will do even better".[101] This created the idea in the Church that virginity was the ideal state, and sexual union within marriage was a way to combat lust. The later medieval Church sought to create a unified view on the role of sex, as well as concerning itself with the moral implications of sexual desires and behaviours.[102] Canon law began to create sexual norms at around the start of the second century. This is seen in an early document *Didache* or *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*.[103] Indeed, the medieval church was extremely intrusive and extensive in its teachings on sex and what was considered acceptable or sinful. While virginity and/or celibacy (even within marriage) became the ideal for the Church, restrictions were also put on sexual behaviour within marriage. Overall, as Karras summarises, within the Church "sexual desire was almost universally condemned within orthodox teaching as a force destructive of social

[101] Bible quotations are taken from the Anglicized English Standard Version, 1 Corinthians 7:36,5,38. These teachings can be found throughout chapters 5-7, and in other letters to the church in Rome and Ephesus.
[102] Vern L Bullough and James A Brundage, *Handbook Of Medieval Sexuality* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013) p. 34.
[103] Ibid, p. 33.

order and threatening individual salvation".[104] How then did the Church attempt to translate this theory into practice? The Church's attempts to do so evolved throughout the later medieval period with varying degrees of success. While the Church and canon law may have been thorough in their conclusions of what sexual behaviour should look like for the ideal Christian, there remained large areas of ambiguity. Moreover, how effective were their efforts in regulating the sexual behaviours of the laity who had no knowledge of canon law? As Donahue highlights "simply explaining these rules to a population, the vast majority of whom could not read, would have been a formidable task... we might imagine that enforcement of the rules about impediments would be difficult and disputes about the common".[105]

To combat the ignorance of the laity the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 decreed that; every believer must attend confession annually; priests had to preach annually on the creed, the commandments, works of mercy, the sacraments, and, perhaps most importantly for this study, the seven vices and virtues.[106] While this does not mean that priests were not already doing so, the specific nature of this decision shows that the Magisterium felt that the laity were not as well informed as they should be. This is part of what Karras describes as "a concerted effort" by the Church "to transmit its doctrine to the whole community of the faithful" during the thirteenth century.[107] The Church did this in several ways. One of which was the use of the Dominican and Franciscan friars who were adopted into the body of the Church to preach to the laity in towns and villages. In addition, they wrote sermon aids and model sermons for the laity and the clergy alike to read. [108] Indeed, these sermons often had a focus on the theology and practice of marriage and thus sexual relations. This is explored extensively by David d'Avray. The Dominicans were especially effective in relation to the Church's use of confession to regulate sexual behaviours through the handbooks and penitentials they created. Brosyna argues that Penitentials focussed heavily on sexual sins in a way not seen in any other type of legislation, ecclesiastical or secular. This made them invaluable in the Church's efforts to regulate sexual behaviour by clearly laying out what was sinful and what the repercussions of such a sin should be.[109]

By the seventh century penitentials had begun to narrow down what sexual behaviours were acceptable and listed them extensively.[110] Indeed, penitentials were edited and amended to accommodate the sinful trends in society. For example, as towns grew between the eleventh and twelfth centuries penitentials reflect that prostitution became a social phenomenon which needed

[104] Karras, Ruth Mazo, *Common Women: Prostitution and Sexuality in Medieval England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 103.
[105] Donahue, *Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 40.
[106] Karras, Ruth Mazo, *Common Women: Prostitution and Sexuality in Medieval England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 104.
[107] Ibid, p. 104.
[108] Ibid, p. 104.
[109] Brozyna, Martha A, *Gender And Sexuality In The Middle Ages* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005) p. 123.
[110] They stated that, for example, sex was forbidden during: Lent; Pentecost; and Advent; on certain days (Wednesday, Friday and Saturday); and if the woman was menstruating, pregnant or breastfeeding. Moreover, it was sinful to have intercourse during the day, naked or in any position other than missionary. Vern L Bullough and James A Brundage, *Handbook Of Medieval Sexuality* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013). pp. 35-36.

to be regulated. This was incorporated into canon law.[111] The collection of this written material created, what Karras describes as, "a common pool of moral teaching" unseen before in the Church.[112] This not only formed a sense of unity in the Church but allowed a more effective form of enforcement of its teachings than seen previously.[113] Evidence suggests that handbooks produced in the thirteenth century, aimed to guide priests, could also be read by the laity while preparing for confession.[114] However, as the majority of these were viewed as 'private' sins they would have been dealt privately within the secrecy of confession. Indeed, confessors had to be instructed on how to discover if a sin had been committed without providing any new ideas. As seen in a marriage dispute case in York regarding an Elizabeth Lovell whose 'husband' was informed of a fault in their vows during his annual confession.[115] This suggests that confession was an effective means for the Church to regulate sin and counsel people to avoid future sin.[116] Perhaps this was so because the laity were willing to confess sins to gain the forgiveness and begin their penance, rather than attempt to disguise their sins and suffer the spiritual consequences. Thus, providing the Church with unprecedented opportunities to learn about, and condemn if necessary, people's sexual behaviours.

Gratian's *Decretum* marked a turning point in the effectiveness of the Church's attempts to regulate sexual behaviours. While penitentials had been extensive in their judgements in this field they often varied. *Decretum* instead combined this into one universally accepted and used approach of canon law.[117] Moreover, it was easily understood by both canon lawyers, clerics and the laity.[118] While Gratian's theory of marriage being about consent and consummation was rejected by theologians in Paris in favour of Lombard's idea of present and future consent, *Decretum* nonetheless influenced canon lawyers in matters of sexual practice and, more importantly, its regulation.[119] Thus, aided by Gratian's *Decretum*, from the thirteenth century onwards, the Church provided a comprehensive system of enforcement via a system of justice.[120] The establishment of

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[111] Richards, Jeffrey, *Sex, Dissidence and Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages (*London: Routledge, 2017)p. 118.
[112] Karras, Ruth Mazo, *Common Women: Prostitution and Sexuality in Medieval England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 106.
[113] It is important to note here that penitentials did vary according to their author and region. We do not see one universally used penitential and indeed nothing resembling a clear and comprehensive guide to canon law's teaching on sexual behaviours until the twelfth century and the creation of *Decretum Gratiani*. Therefore, while the church was more unified in what it saw as sinful sexual behaviours, the way it regulated them via penances was not universally applied but differed with each penitential.
[114] Karras, Ruth Mazo, *Common Women: Prostitution and Sexuality in Medieval England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 105.
[115] Pedersen, Frederik, *Marriage Disputes In Medieval England* (London: Hambledon and London, 2000) p. 111.
[116] Vern L Bullough and James A Brundage, *Handbook Of Medieval Sexuality* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013). pp. 41-5.
[117] While Pederson criticises Decretum for laying an "imperfect foundation for the practice of law" and contemporary critic Frederic Maitland described it as having "no deep religious feeling" but rather the work of men "amusing themselves by inventing a game of skill". Nevertheless, Decretum remains a vital turning point in the Church's regulation of sexual behaviour. Pedersen, Frederik, *Marriage Disputes In Medieval England* (London: Hambledon and London, 2000) pp.1-2.
[118] Pedersen, Frederik, *Marriage Disputes In Medieval England* (London: Hambledon and London, 2000) p. 5.
[119] Gratian argued that marriage was formed through consent (vows) and consummation. In contrast Lombard argued that marriage was formed through consent alone. Present consent created a marriage instantly or Future consent (betrothal) and subsequent sexual relations also created a marriage. Lombard thus affords a lesser role of sex than Gratian in the formation of marriage. Revised:20/02/18.
[120] Ibid, p. 5.

Church courts in every diocese allowed the Church to regulate sexual behaviours, specifically those involving public sins, on a wider and more effective scale. Michael Sheeran in the 1970's in a study of the Church court at Ely (1374-82), concluded that a fairly large cross section of fourteenth century Cambridgeshire was aware of and used the Church courts apart from the nobility.[121] Indeed, Pederson argues that "the laity recognised the courts expertise, and litigants willingly – or indeed enthusiastically – embraced the opportunity the Church courts offered them to pursue their grievances and settle their disputes".[122] Thus the Church was able to enforce and exercise its jurisdiction over sexual behaviour especially in regards to marriage. Indeed, matrimonial cases made up 38% of all cases in York between 1300-1499.[123] This was primarily because the Church's idea of marriage did not correlate with the laity's concept of marriage. The marriage promoted by the Church was indissolvable so long as both parties lived in comparison to a culture of easy divorce and no sense of formal marriage.[124] Even when both shared the same idea of what a marriage should be, when commenting on the Church court records, Pederson notes that there is a certain air of ambiguity in what created a marriage. The laity give the impression of being aware that marriage could be contradicted without a priest and that words were what made a marriage, whilst subsequent sexual union made it binding. Indeed, as seen in one case in York (Dawson c. Brothewell) the neighbours of the woman appear to understand that after marriage negotiations have taken place sexual union would create a marriage. Knowing that the woman does not want to marry they offer the man a place to stay so that the two do not sleep under the same roof. This prevents any future claims of sexual union having taken place. [125] The main issue, therefore, appears to be, as was the case for Maud Schipyn, that the *correct words* were not always said even if the *intention* had been correct. The laity therefore were unable to understand the intricacies of canon law concerning valid vows and it is also unlikely they fully understood the difference between present and future consent.[126] Thus, as Pederson continues, while "the laity had excellent opportunities to familiarise themselves with the law in the course of their lives and had the opportunity of receiving good legal advice should they decide to litigate" the more technical side of canon law remained absent from their understanding.[127] Moreover, tribunals at the court were open to manipulation especially from family members. In the case of Huntington c. Munliten the family of the couple threaten the officers of the court to deny the existence of a marriage which they had previously acknowledged, and indeed they do so.[128]The Tribunals also show that, while the laity by the fourteenth century accepted that arrange fell under the jurisdiction of the Church,

[121] Ibid, p. 61.
[122] Ibid, p. 11.
[123] Donahue, *Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 65.
[124] Ibid, p. 45.
[125] Pedersen, Frederik, *Marriage Disputes In Medieval England* (London: Hambledon and London, 2000) p. 77.
[126] Ibid, pp. 69-73.
[127] Ibid, p. 59.
[128] Ibid, pp. 108-9.

they would still attempt to settle disputes among themselves.[129] Therefore, the Church courts were not entirely effective. They were open to manipulation from outside influences somewhat damaging their reputation. Furthermore, while the Church had now established jurisdiction over sexual behaviours, the complex nature of canon law made it impossible for sin to be avoided even when the laity intended to do so.

Finally, limits were placed on the Church's effectiveness in regulating sexual behaviours by their reliance on secular authorities to promote the Church's teachings and comply with them themselves. The Church could only punish spiritually and needed secular support to regulate sexual behaviours more successfully. While monarchs did aid the Church in this way, their level of obedience fluctuated over time as different regulations effected their rule or no longer benefitted them. For example, despite the Church's condemnation of prostitution Charles VII of France recognised the need for brothels and authorised them.[130] This demonstrates a lack of secular support for the teachings of the Church, particularly those that went against the ideals of the nobility. Without secular support enforcement was compromised.[131] However, later monarchs would be more inclined to supress prostitution somewhat due to the rise in crime around the newly created 'red light' districts. Henry II of England was one of the first to order all prostitutes to leave the city or face imprisonment in 1185. However, as this order was repeated in 1307, 1383 and 1483 suggests that in practice little changed. Moreover, this secular suppression of prostitution was not due to canon law but rather the wide held view that prostitution was a threat to public order as well as morals. It was now in the monarch's best interest to control it.[132]Here we can see that while the Church was arguable reliant on secular authorities for complete regulation of sexual behaviours, public authorities did so only when and if it benefitted them. This weakened the overall effort of the Church to control sexual behaviour. It was not enough for the laity to be taught what was sinful, but all opportunities of sin, and in some cases, frequent offenders, needed to be purged from society. This was only possible through secular support, and the relationship between the papacy and secular authorities which was never formed or maintained.

Overall, as argued by Richard Helmholtz, the establishment of the Church as the main authority over sexual behaviours, was a long process and the main issue was establishing the idea among the laity that sexual behaviours were not private matters but open to the interference of the Church.[133] While confessors were deployed to inform and consult the laity on these offenses it was hard to do

[129] Ibid, p. 118.
[130] Notably some Christian theologians such as Augustine and Aquinas understood prostitution to be a 'necessary evil' but overall, based on Biblical texts, theologians such as Jerome and traditions inherited from Roman Law the Church condemned the practice.
[131] Richards, Jeffrey, *Sex, Dissidence and Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages (*London: Routledge, 2017) p. 117.
[132] Ibid, pp. 118-20.
[133] It is impossible to exactly date when the Church took full control over marital and sexual matters. A case has been made for the ninth to tenth century although we see little evidence of it in practice until the twelfth century. As the Church was not forced to create a direct definition of marriage until the twelfth century heavily implies that this idea was not successfully engrained in the laity until then. Brooke, Christopher, *The Medieval Idea of Marriage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

so effectively given popular conceptions in these areas.[134]Pre-marital and extra-marital sex, for example, were viewed as necessary to assert masculinity and relieve the needs of men without compromising respectable women.[135] This is perhaps why penitentials, preaching and the Church courts focussed so heavily on sexual behaviours. The laity failed to understand why things were sinful and therefore did not obey the Church's regulations. This suggests that while the Church was effective in establishing jurisdiction over sexual behaviours, this was only part of a bigger struggle to translate this into reality. The laity simply chose not to agree in most cases and a lack of consistent secular support only enforced this apathy in the laity, as well as weakening the Church's ability to enforce its teachings. However, even when the laity tried to comply, the complex nature of canon law and the extreme amount of teaching on this matter made it impossible to do live in a sinless manner on a practical level. Therefore, despite the Church's effectiveness in regulating sexual behaviour through confession for private sins and Church courts for public, it was its own extreme teachings which made regulating sexual behaviours impossible. Thus, the Church was effective in establishing its authority over sexual behaviours in the late medieval period, but was only partly successful in actually regulating the behaviours of the laity.

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[134] Vern L Bullough and James A Brundage, *Handbook Of Medieval Sexuality* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013) p. 41.
[135] Richards, Jeffrey, *Sex, Dissidence and Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages (*London: Routledge, 2017) p. 117.

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Late Antique Martyrs And Current-Day Suicide Bombers – Are They Comparable?

By Shannon Woolford

Abstract

This article looks at comparing martyrs from the Late Antique and modern-day suicide bombers. Modern day suicide bombers are something we are all far more familiar with as a result of being connected to media platforms all over the world. Late Antique martyrs, however, are not familiar yet it is interesting to explore whether there indeed lies any similarities in the carrying out of martyring oneself for religion. Are the motivations behind sacrificing yourself for religion the same now as they were then? Can we define these? I explore the basis of the ideology behind martyrdom and how martyrdom has evolved over time whilst examining the differences and similarities in the two 'types' of martyrs. It begs the question – are they comparable?

The acts of late antique martyrdom and current-day suicide bombing can be extremely difficult in defining and distinguishing between. It is obvious to conclude that these are actions which bring about great self-infliction of violence or hardship upon the body and mind, and can ultimately end in death. The motivations behind the decision to self-inflict suffering can vary, but often there are strong religious or political reasons behind why someone is willing to sacrifice their life for a belief or cause. It takes a certain type of character to be prepared to endure agonising suffering of the mind and body, or death, in the name of religion. Martyrs from the late antique, and those who exist today, possess a willingness to suffer torture and death, and an ability to adhere to strict ways of life, so to imitate or glorify God. Suicide bombers, a far more recent concept, tend to volunteer or be selected for training camps where they learn how to initiate a suicide bombing mission, with the intent to kill themselves. Fundamentally, there may be similarities in these two ideologies, but they are executed in very different ways.

The terms 'martyrdom' and 'suicide bombing' may be used universally, but this doesn't mean that they hold a universal definition. Different cultures or religions may define these two acts as entirely opposite things. Some may even argue that an association between martyrdom and suicide bombing is completely inadmissible. It is imperative to remember that suicide bombing did not even exist until sometime around the 1980s[136]. Although the Late Antique period witnessed massive

[136] Henry Dodd, *'A short history of suicide bombing'*, (London: AOAV, 2013) <https://aoav.org.uk/2013/a-short-history-of-suicide-bombings/> [accessed 12 November 2016].

political, religious and cultural changes [137], there weren't as many coexisting as there are today nor the extensive use of media and technology. This means that when someone was sentenced to death for refusing to denounce Christianity, there were perhaps not the same motivations as suicide bombers may have today. The glorification of suicide bombers, calling themselves martyrs, is a massive part in persuading people to offer their life. In the cases of martyrs from the Late Antique period, they would often only influence their surrounding communities at the time and in literary texts later produced, this is where they would make a permanent historic mark.

The Holy ones who trained their body and mind for their entire lives in the Late Antique period were highly sought after by those who desired to have such willpower to control their body, in turn enhancing their mind and soul – after all, the body is the instrument of virtue[138]. The ascetics were known as athletes, who managed to place practical disciplines, such as fasting, over the mind's temptations and bodily urges. A sounder mind increased the likelihood of competing at the highest levels of imitation of Christ. St. Anthony accustomed himself to a rigorous regime of self-inflicted suffering; living isolated in the desert and
limiting himself to the dietary staples of barley bread and salt[139] as he battled against the devil to achieve spiritual peace. Suicide bombers are put through training, but it is not the type martyrs, like St. Anthony, sustained for decades. It is a "noble destiny"[140] for Muslims to attain martyrdom but isn't traditionally pursued as much as in Christianity. Jihadi groups often capture young children, as young as five[141], and instil a mindset of hatred whilst convincing them that killing and self-sacrifice is necessary. Many children in Israel now believe that "the symbol of power is the martyr"[142], which shows the desire to achieve status in a society which glorifies wanting to die. Typically, these 'martyrs' belong to an organisation (such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda) and aren't individuals, like the martyrs of the Late Antiquity.

When the Western nations and media coverage coins so called Muslim martyrdom operations as 'suicide bombings', this is rejected by the Islamic State. This term labels events such as the 9/11 or 7/7 suicide bombing attacks, whereby the perpetrators were Islamic extremists declaring jihad against the supposed enemy; targeting symbolistic features of powerful, Western nations. The organizations to which these extremists belonged, would not perceive these attacks as suicide

[137] University of Oxford, '*Oxford Centre for Late Antiquity'*, (2012) <http://www.ocla.ox.ac.uk> [accessed 10 November 2016].
[138] Teresa M. Shaw, '*The Burden of The Flesh: Fasting and Sexuality in Early Christianity*', (United States of America: Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1998), pp. 27-68 (p.34).
[139]Thomas Sizgorich, *Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam* (United States of America: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), pp. 168-195 (p.192).
[140]Jack David Eller, *Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 218-246 (p.235).
[141] Nima Elgagir and Peter Wilkinson, *"Like coming back to life" says child soldier who escaped ISIS'* (London: CNN, 2016) <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/12/middleeast/isis-child-soldiers/? [accessed 15 November 2016].
[142] Eyad El Sarraj and Linda Butler, 'Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (2002), 31.4, pp. 71-76 (p.72).

missions but instead as an act of martyrdom – giving up the ultimate sacrifice of their life to glorify their God and further the spread of Islam. It is preached in Islam that those who die whilst fulfilling their religious duty will be able to reap the rewards of their martyrdom in Paradise; such as male martyrs receiving seventy-two virgins. The Koran and the Traditions make it an obligation to advance the spread of Islam[143], sometimes interpreted as encouraging the struggle with unbelievers. A radical perspective on how to expand Islam can result in violent acts to affirm war against the 'enemy'. Suicide is utterly prohibited in the Koran, perhaps why the term 'suicide bomber' is rejected. The authenticity of martyrdom in Islam has been drastically distorted and transformed into a far more militant system. This is not true for all Muslims, as it is those who believe in an extremist ideology that act belligerently. These extremists go a long way to redefine martyrdom in Islam, from a genuine and traditional way of the Islamic faith to an act of terror which creates enormous tensions between states and other religions. It is instrumental in warfare, to the extent suicide bombing may be more comparable with killing in war than suicide itself or martyrdom[144]. This concept of martyrdom has progressively developed and has gradually been adopted as a tactic in not only a religious war, but a political one; using it as not just a means, but an end[145].

The extraordinary lengths that some are willing to go to protect their beliefs, both in the past and present, is fascinating. In recent years, the Tibetan monks have used self-immolation as a means of protesting against the oppressive Chinese rule. It is an action with the intent of self-sacrifice; to protect the Dhurma and the Tibetan people's rights to freedom and democracy[146], thus making it an act of martyrdom. They act in a non-selfish way, and as individuals who are desperate to protect the Tibetan people[147]. The intertwining of moral and religious issues, with the frantic pleas against a political regime is very much apparent here. This modern-day martyrdom can be paralleled with what is written in the ancient Jataka Tales, the Buddhist text. The 'Hungary Tigress' is an account whereby the Bodhisattva, in one of his incarnations, throws himself from a cliff edge towards a tigress who was "regarding her own offspring as food"[148] to save the cubs from "dying by the teeth

[143] Ibn Warraq, *'Virgins? What virgins?'* (London: The Guardian News, 2002) <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/jan/12/books.guardianreview5> [accessed 12 November 2016] (para. 3 of 13).
[144] M. Grimland et al., 'The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing: A Review of Psychological and Nonpsychological Factors', *Crisis,* 27 (2006), pp. 107-118 (p.107).
[145] David Brooks, '*The Culture of Martyrdom: How suicide bombing became not just a means but an end.',* (United States of America: The Atlantic, 2002), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/06/the-culture-of- martyrdom/302506/> [accessed 11 November 2016].
[146] Tsering Woeser, *'Why Are Tibetans Setting Themselves on Fire?',* (New York: The New York Review, 2016), < http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/01/11/why-are-tibetans-self-immolating/> [accessed 9 November 2016].
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[148] Ancient Buddhist Texts*, 'Jātakamālā or Garland of Birth Stories: 1. The Story of the Tigress (Dāna)'* (2010) <http://www.ancient-buddhist-texts.net/English-Texts/Garland-of-Birth-Stories/01-The-Story-of-the-Tigress.htm> [accessed 11 November 2016] 13.15.

of their mother"[149]. This reflects an ancient example of Buddhist martyrdom – surrendering his life to spare the lives of the new-born cubs. These martyrdoms illustrate power by those suffering, who make the decision to end their lives. This is mirrored in the story of Perpetua. She endured excruciating pain in a deplorable way, thrown to be devoured by animals in an arena full of spectators. Despite her fate already being sealed, Perpetua took control of the culminating moment which dealt the fatal strike to her throat which ensured she was killed in the way she wished to be[150]. This acceptance in being killed for refusing to refute her faith emphasises the willingness in martyrs to achieve the ultimate goal of giving up their life to protect the word of God, therefore forging a closer union with Christ. This is similar to how the Tibetan monks willingly set themselves on fire to bring attention to and demonstrate that they will not be domineered by the Chinese.

Even in narratives of martyrdom where immense suffering is endured, a positive attitude shines through. Perpetua spoke of her feelings whilst preparing herself for her quickly approaching death. The expected feelings would be complete fear, nervousness and sadness. Her story tells of her "trembling with joy not fear"[151] as she was walked out into the amphitheatre, her face being radiant as if she was entering Heaven. Suicide bombers are usually part of an attack, meaning they have control over when they die. They die happily, having it been out of choice to kill themselves and knowing they will reap rewards afterwards. The Story of Samson describes how he possessed strength to kill a lion with his bare hands and kill thirty men for their clothes. His praying to God in his final moments is the same as Perpetua did and suicide bombers do. When his wife, Delilah, was bribed by the Philistines to discover the source of his power, she did so. She realised that his hair gave him his strength and so she cut it off whilst he slept. Consequently, Samson was drained of his power, captured and put to death. Whilst he was in-between two pillars, ready to die, he sought God's help in his time of need and managed to gather his strength to pull down the pillars which killed all of those under the roof of the Philistine Temple. He killed more Philistines than he had ever before[152]. Although he consented to kill others he sacrificed his life, as a martyr, in a fight against the oppressors of his religion, with God's support. He is portrayed in literary and visual material as a heroic figure.

The aspiration to be in Paradise with God after passing would have played a part in motivating most Late Antique martyrs, and modern-day suicide bombers boast of what they will obtain once they complete their operation. It is arguable to an extent that there is a stark difference in the

[149] Ancient Buddhist Texts, *'Jātakamālā or Garland of Birth Stories: 1. The Story of the Tigress (Dāna)'* (2010) <http://www.ancient-buddhist-texts.net/English-Texts/Garland-of-Birth-Stories/01-The-Story-of-the-Tigress.htm> [accessed 11 November 2016] 25.
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[151] '*The Passion of Saints Perpetual and Felicity*', trans. by Maureen A. Tilley ed., pp. 1-10 (XVIII. 1. p.8).
[152] Judges 16: 17-20.

interpretation of what martyrdom means and entails. Despite this subjectivity, there is a major difference in dying for a cause rather than a belief. Completing self-sacrifice to gain recognition for selfish reasons is not the same as martyring yourself out of refusal to renounce your faith, so you peacefully compromise to ensure you glorify God. It is important to highlight that a true martyr does not necessarily seek death, nor the death or destruction of others on their journey. Martyrs in the Late Antiquity, or even the recent Tibetan monks, have shown a willingness to be or act alone in their journey. Suicide bombers embark on their mission with the knowledge that they will not only most likely kill themselves (proposing it goes as planned), they will inflict great suffering or death upon others. If a martyr endures periods of torture or self-inflicted violence but does not die, they have not failed in glorifying God. They still succeed in defending their faith and imitating Christ. Unbelievable strength can be sourced from God to help the human spirit survive these ordeals[153]. Martyrs are satisfied in pushing their bodies and mind to the extreme to please God – without forcing this way of life on those who are not willing. Current-day suicide bombers seek to portray themselves as iconic martyrs who should inspire others to follow[154]. This sets a precedent for imitation, which makes it difficult to stem the spread of radicalisation and to replace it with the legitimate, original ways of Islam.

It is clear to see that martyrdom is a powerful concept which has existed for centuries and can be seen in today's modern world. Suicide bombing is a far more recent ideology which is built not only on a war of religion and culture, but a political struggle. Although there appears to be comparable aspects between these two acts, they are more dissimilar in far more respects. The stories of martyrs describe self-inflicted violence or suffering, with a sheer zeal and dedication for their religion. With suicide bombing, it has slowly changed into an action which is used mostly in the form of an attack which is politically based, opposed to something which should be intrinsically motivated by religion. Unfortunately, suicide bombing is mainly used alongside phrases such as 'suicide attack' or 'suicide terrorism' which makes it less comparable to martyrdom. Granted, the world we live in today is vastly different to the Late Antique, but religion itself doesn't change. The Holy Books remain the same and the theology is still the same. How it is interpreted and how believers allow it to be affected by external forces, determines the nature of how it is practised. Arguably, both Late Antique martyrs and current-day suicide bombers hold extreme visions towards how to best defend their faith and God. However, the methods which are used to reach these goals are wildly unlike. Martyrdom seeks peace with one's mind and body, whereas suicide bombing is a tactic of war which presents itself as detrimental to society on a global scale. Therefore, it remains a tricky task to compare these two ideologies but it would seem

[153] Richard Wurmbrand, *Tortured for Christ*, New ed. (Great Britain: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967), p. 6.
[154] Nasser Abufarha, *The Making of a Human Bomb: An Ethnography of Palestinian Resistance,* (United States of America: Duke University Press, 2009), pp. 222-240 (p.234).

more so that martyrdom is suffering or dying for one's beliefs but suicide bombing is the intent to die for a cause.

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Blood, Gold, and Genocide: The Spanish Conquest of the Aztecs

By Daniel Cullingford

Abstract

This article looks at Hernan Cortes' conquest of the Aztec people and the ongoing debate about whether the actions of the conquistadors amounted to a genocide or not. Ever since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, historians and scholars have sought to impose the modern concept of genocide upon various conflicts and conquests throughout human history. This paper seeks to break down the UN definition of genocide and apply it rigorously to the actions of the Spanish in Mexico in order to come to a firm conclusion whether Cortes' and his men can be accused of this crime.

The Spanish Conquest of Mexico, beginning in February 1519, was one of the most significant events in the Spanish colonization of the Americas and indeed in the history of the world. Following Christopher Columbus' establishment of permanent settlements in the Caribbean, the Spanish authorized expeditions for the discovery, conquest and colonization of the new territory, however it is perhaps telling that the most infamous of all these expeditions – Cortes' conquest of the Aztec Empire – was not actually authorised.[155] Over a two year period Cortes and his men would murder, pillage, steal and barter until they held sole dominion over Mexico and it's preeminent Aztec inhabitants. Whilst this was undoubtedly a pivotal moment in human history as two previously isolated cultures met for the first time, it still remains a controversial topic amongst historians and scholars until this day. The controversy is largely centred around the debate about whether the actions of the Spanish conquistadors amounted to genocide or not. With genocide being a relatively modern concept, debates about the Spanish conquest have only really taken on a life of their own following World War Two in the immediate aftermath of the most famous case of genocide – the Nazi Holocaust which eradicated the vast majority of the European Jewish population. Ever since the UN defined genocide in 1948, various parties, both left and right, with political agendas have sought to use the history of the conquest for their own purposes. All of this has led to the Spanish conquest becoming something of a historical grey-area, where a lot of what happened is either denied or generally unclear. One thing that is abundantly clear though is that millions of Native Americans died during the Spanish conquest of the Americas, however it has been hard to establish exactly how much of the native population this encompassed, as population numbers relating to the years before Columbus' 1492 voyage have been hard to establish. Most

[155] Diaz del Castillo, Bernal, *The True History Of The Conquest Of New Spain* (London: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 55-56

scholars in the nineteenth century estimated the pre-Columbian population was as low as ten million, however by the twentieth century most had gravitated to a middle estimate of around fifty million.[156] In order to consider whether the Spanish conquest can be considered a genocide or not it is important to consider a wide variety of factors. These factors include looking at proponents and opponents of the genocide discussion to ascertain the truth behind the political agendas and understand both sides, looking at the actual events of the conquest and looking at the theological debates which raged in Spain at the time. However, before looking at all this it is important to first look closely at the concept of 'genocide' before trying to apply it to a conflict that occurred some 500 years before it was even invented.

The term genocide was first coined in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, a survivor of the Holocaust. The word originated from the latin *genos (race or tribe)* and *cide (kill or killing).*[157] Genocide is defined in article two of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPG), written by Lemkin, which was adopted by the UN in 1948. The CPPG states that genocide is "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."[158] This definition of genocide is very thorough and also clarifies the two commonly accepted types of genocide. Direct genocide is taken to mean a deliberate campaign to kill all members of an ethnic group whereas indirect genocide achieves the same outcome by seizing or destroying the land, crops, livestock and other essential items needed for survival. One question that is raised by the CPPG is that of genocidal intent, this is particularly important regarding the Spanish Conquest where huge numbers of natives died from viral disease brought across the ocean by the conquistadors. The CPPG states that a party can only be guilty of genocide if they fulfil both the mental and physical element of the crime e.g. the intent followed by the attempted destruction. This would seem to imply that the Spanish were not guilty of genocide despite the huge swathe of corpses they left in their wake in the New World, however this is not the only way to think about the question of intent. In nineteenth century English common law a person was inferred to have intended the 'natural consequences' of their actions: if the result proscribed was reasonably foreseeable as a likely consequence of his or her action.[159] Looking at the Spanish Conquest through this model certainly changes things, whilst it would be harsh to imply that the Spanish were originally aware that the diseases they carried would have such a devastating effect upon the native population, certainly over time one could make a case that the

[156] Taylor, Alan, *American Colonies: The Penguin History Of The United States* (London, Penguin Books, 2002), p. 40
[157] Ishay, Micheline R, *The History Of Human Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp.217-219.
[158] Article Two, UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.
[159] Campbell, Jason J, *On the Nature Of Genocidal Intent,* (Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 2-4

'natural consequences' of continuing colonization of the Americas would be the biological destruction of much of the native population. Indeed, the historian David Stennard stated in his book *American Holocaust* that twenty-one years after Columbus' arrival in the New World in 1492 the island of Hispaniola's population had been wiped out, with some eight million deaths due to violence and disease.[160] This depopulation was complete by 1513, some six years before Cortes set sail for Mexico, so it could realistically be claimed that the Spaniards would have been well aware of the likely consequences of colonization yet they continued anyway. What this shows is that the question of genocide and indeed genocidal intent in the Americas is not an easy one. The fact that there is so much debate about pre-and post-Columbian population numbers makes it hard to ascertain the number of deaths and whether they were because of the Spanish Conquest or not. Sources from the time also tend to prove contradictory as Spanish and Aztec accounts often differ in relation to the events of the time, nevertheless it is important to look at these sources and the events they describe in the context of the CPPG in order to ascertain to what extent the Spanish Conquest can be considered a genocide.

By using the CPPG as the measuring stick of genocide it becomes necessary to not focus wholly on the impact of epidemics and more on the direct actions taken by the Spanish towards the Indians through warfare, enslavement and destruction of material resources. In this context disease can remain relevant as a consequence of the coloniser's actions. War, for example can exacerbate conditions such as impoverishment and malnourishment which increase vulnerability to pathogens. The first key element to establish is whether the Spanish at any point intended to destroy wholly or in part the Indian population. Once again, the sources in relation to this question prove contradictory. Upon first visiting Tenochtitlan Cortes spoke very positively and full of admiration about the city claiming that "I shall not attempt to describe it all, save to say that in Spain there is nothing to compare with it".[161]This admiration of the Aztec architecture and civilization seems to be at complete odds with the actions he later took however upon closer inspection it makes sense. Cortes did admire the Aztec buildings and such but he never at any point recognised the craftsmen behind these creations nor did he acknowledge them as human individuals equal to him.[162] Cortes later goes on to describe a battle where the Spaniards slaughtered some 40,000 Indians which he justifies by stating that "no race, however savage has ever practised such fierce and unnatural cruelty as the natives of these parts"[163]. This passage is particularly poignant as it presents an intention on Cortes' part to slaughter the Indians due to what he perceived as savagery, and whilst the human sacrifices of the natives would be considered abhorrent today, at this time the natives had never known any different and yet they were

[160] Stennard, David.E, *American Holocaust: The Conquest Of The New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. x
[161] Cortés, Hernán. Letters from Mexico. (New York : Grossman Publishers, 1971), p.109.
[162] Todorov, Tzvetan, *The Conquest Of America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 129
[163] Cortes, Hernan, Letters from Mexico, p.262.

slaughtered by the Spaniards due to this cultural difference. This certainly seems in relation to the CPPG to be an intent from Cortes to destroy at least partly the Indian population and culture. Having established intent, it is next necessary to determine whether the Spaniards then killed members of the group or caused serious bodily or mental harm. It seems quite well established that the Spaniards killed huge numbers of natives in the New World, writing some thirty years after the conquest the Friar Bartolomes de Las Casas stated that "at a conservative estimate, the despotic and diabolical behaviour of the Christians has, over the last forty years, led to the unjust and totally unwarranted deaths of more than twelve million souls, women and children amongst them".[164] Las Casas was an outspoken opponent of Spanish colonialism and the encomienda system, so it is necessary to take his numbers with a degree of suspicion as he was writing with the express purpose of persuading the Spanish King to rein in the worst colonial excesses. That being said, there is very little disagreement from other sources that huge numbers of natives were killed, one such example being the massacre at Tenochtitlan temple in 1520. This massacre was instigated by Pedro de Alvarado, Cortes' deputy who was left in charge of a depleted Spanish force whilst Cortes fought a battle on the coast. The common story of events is that during the Aztec festival of Toxcatl, the Spanish interrupted festivities, blocked the exits and massacred all the natives who were present. The Aztec and Spanish accounts of this incident differ in regard to the motives of the Spaniards, where the Aztec accounts reference Spanish lust for gold, the Spanish accounts emphasise an Aztec plot using the festival as a rallying call to oust the invaders. This can be seen in the work of the Spanish historian Francisco Lopez de Gomara who said that "they begged Pedro de Alavarado to give them his permission so (the Spaniards) wouldn't think that they planned to kill them".[165] The Aztec account of the massacre is much more detailed and gruesome than the Spanish equivalent highlighting the horrible crimes committed by Alvarado's men, it states how "they attacked all the celebrants, stabbing them, spearing them, striking them with their swords…some attempted to run away, but their intestines dragged as they ran; they seemed to tangle their feet in their own entrails…some tried to escape but the Spaniards murdered them at the gates as they laughed".[166] This account certainly fits into the UN definition of genocide, as it clearly shows the Spanish forces slaughtering the natives which obviously constitutes bodily harm. This massacre also probably constitutes mental harm as it would have clearly had a detrimental effect on the native psyche to see their relatives and neighbours barbarously cut down whilst their assailants "laughed". Whilst most accounts relating to the conquest are contradictory, the Aztec version of the massacre seems to be true and is corroborated by Lopez de Gomara's work which agrees that the Spaniards attacked without warning upon an unarmed crowd. It is also unlikely that Lopez de Gomara's reasoning behind the attack is correct as he was not actually present at the time, and in fact never actually visited the Americas, instead working as Cortes' secretary. As a result, much of

[164] Casas, Bartolomé de las, *A Short Account Of The Destruction Of The Indies* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. Preface
[165] De Gomara, Francisco Lopez, *Conquista De Mejico* (Barcelona: Biblioteca Clasica Espanola, 1887), pp. 238-239
[166] León-Portilla, Miguel, *The Broken Spears* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), p. Chapter Nine

his work has been derided by historians as only having one purpose – to legitimise and glorify Cortes. The historian Ward Churchill agrees that the Spanish deliberately attempted to physical and mentally harm the natives stating that "For all their devout Catholicism, the Iberians, Spanish and Portuguese alike, excelled at rape and forced concubinage…this seems to have been a grotesque psychological stratagem to affect the final degradation and disempowerment of indigenous men".[167]

Next, it is necessary to consider whether the Spaniards deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Aztecs. This can be best illustrated by the Siege of Tenochtitlan in 1521, where Cortes cut off all food supply to the city by blockading the lake and then destroying the aqueduct that carried clean water to the city.[168]This had a disastrous effect on the native population as those who had survived the smallpox epidemic were now forced to suffer from famine and were reduced to eating reptiles, tree bark, weeds, and scum from the lake, whilst drinking contaminated water.[169] Eventually, despite a valiant defence the Aztecs were forced to surrender on August 13 1621. Almost all of the nobility were dead with most of the survivors consisting of young women and even younger children.[170] Once Cortes finally took the city he wrote to Charles V sauing "so great was their suffering that it was beyond our understanding how they could endure it".[171]It is difficult to estimate with an level of certainty how many died during the siege, the Florentine Codex estimates as many as 240,000 with more conservative Spanish numbers guessing at 100,000. One thing that is clear is that Cortes' brutal siege tactics had been successful from a Spanish perspective, with Tenochtitlan ceded to the Spanish and any Aztec resistance crushed. Clearly this siege fits the modern requisite for genocide, however it is necessary to consider that at this time siege warfare was relatively common compared to modern times, and starving out one's opponents was a widely accepted method of bringing the siege to an end quickly. This is just one of the problems that can be encountered when attempting to apply modern concept's such as genocide to events that transpired a long time ago.

Next, it is important to look at whether the Spanish imposed any measures intended to prevent births amongst the native population. At first look, it would seem the Spanish did quite the opposite. Most Spanish men who travelled to the New World were unmarried and, so they often married or made concubines of the native women. Because of this, mixed race individuals known as Mestizos became the clear majority of the Mexican population in the centuries following the conquest. Marriage between Spanish settlers and the local indigenous population was actively encouraged and in some cases enforced by royal policy in the years following Columbus' arrival

[167] Churchill, Ward, *A Little Matter Of Genocide* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997), p. 105
[168] Diaz del Castillol, *The True History Of The Conquest Of New Spain*, p.359.
[169] Miller, Robert Ryal, *Mexico: A History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), p. 90
[170] Gruzinski, Serge, *The Aztecs: Rise And Fall Of An Empire* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1992), pp.102-104
[171] Cortes, Hernan, *Letters from Mexico*, p.263

right up until the conquest of Mexico.[172]Ironically, however, even as official policies encouraged Spanish-indigenous intermarriage, other priorities such as the need for labour (mainly men) in mines and other enterprises seriously undermined existing indigenous families and led to a sharply declining birth-rate which was not sufficient to replace the population being ravaged by war, disease and famine.[173] It would seem unlikely that the Spanish forced indigenous men to work in the mines for the sole purpose of limiting the birth-rate rather than increasing their own wealth and profit. However, it is interesting to look at the forced intermarriage between the two ethnicities as a possible symptom of attempted genocide. By encouraging and forcing marriage between the two groups the Spanish made sure that they diluted and gradually reduced the native population and replaced it with a much more 'acceptable' mestizo population. It is clear then that the measures imposed by the Spanish did have the effect of preventing births amongst the native population whether by forcing marriage between settlers and indigenous women or by taking indigenous men away from their families to work in the mines, once again the question that remains is one of intent.

Finally, then it is necessary to look at whether the Spanish settlers forcibly moved indigenous children from one group to another. During the initial stages of the conquest not much attention was paid by Cortes or his men to moving or capturing indigenous children even though they were often some of the only survivors that were spared by the conquistadors.[174]However, as early as 1533, just twelve years after the initial conquest and early in the colonization process, Charles V mandated the high court of Spain to take the children of Spanish men and indigenous women from their mothers and educate them in the Spanish sphere of influence.[175] This highlights a concept known as 'cultural genocide', whereby the Spanish didn't physically eliminate the native Aztecs but instead over a period of time gradually obliterated and erased their culture and customs. This has been highlighted in various sources but perhaps most vividly in Stennard's work *American Holocaust* where the author states that he Spanish routinely engaged in "the destruction of books and tablets containing millennia of accumulated knowledge, wisdom and cultural belief".[176] This evidence from Stennard seems to corroborate the theory that the Spanish engaged in an intentional attempt to wipe out Aztec culture during and in the years immediately following the conquest. Stennard also claims that not all children in the New World were moved around like the mestizos, in fact some were not so lucky. Stennard claims that "young Indian children were frequently taken from their parents and fed to the hungry animals (dogs)".[177] If Stennard is to be believed this clearly establishes that the Spanish did indeed intentionally and forcibly move

[172] Altman, Ida, "Marriage, Family, and Ethnicity in the Early Spanish Caribbean." *The William and Mary Quarterly*, vol. 70, no. 2, 2013, p.227, *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5309/willmaryquar.70.2.0225.
[173] Ibid
[174] Gruzinski, Serge, *The Aztecs: Rise and Fall of an Empire*, pp. 102-104.
[175] Mörner, Magnus, *Race Mixture in The History of Latin America* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 55
[176] Stennard*, American Holocast: The Conquest of the New World*, p.84.
[177] Ibid

indigenous children from one group to another and in some cases even killed them brutally, obviously this satisfies the UN's convention on genocide.

Having established that in respect to modern UN law the Spanish conquest meets all the necessary conditions for genocide, it is important still to look at what prominent theologians and philosophers of the time such as Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda had to say about the nature of the conquest. Las Casas and Sepulveda were ideological opposites who both tried to sway the King of Spain, Charles V, to their side during the famous Valladolid Debate of 1550-1. In their arguments we can see the beginnings of the popular historiography that still dominates the topic today. Sepulveda took the viewpoint that "their (the Indians) prodigious sacrifice of human victims, the extreme harm they inflicted on innocent persons, their horrible banquets of human flesh, and the impious cult of their idols" were unacceptable and should be suppressed by any means necessary.[178]Sepulveda also borrowed extensively from the work of Aristotle in order to assert that some Indians were subject to enslavement due to their inability to govern themselves and could be subdued by war if necessary.[179] Las Casas took a contrary viewpoint to Sepulveda arguing that Sepulveda's definition of the Indians as 'barbarians' and 'natural slaves' did not apply as the Indians were capable of logic and reason and should be brought to Christianity without force or coercion. In this debate and the works of both men we can see the development of the debate around the moral legitimacy of the Spanish Conquest, Sepulveda saw it as morally justified for the Spanish to dominate the 'barbarous and inhumane people' due to their superior culture and humane practices.[180]Whereas Las Casas, in his work *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies,* frequently railed against the excesses of Spanish colonialism claiming that the Spaniards had murdered fifteen million natives for "purely and simply, greed. They have set out to line their pockets with gold… as quickly as possible".[181]Therein lies the development of two separate narratives of the conquest, Las Casas' theses led to the development of the narrative of genocide and greedy conquistadors who murdered for sport and gold, whereas Sepulveda created the idea of the conquistadors as Catholic crusaders who were morally justified in their abhorrent actions due to the 'barbaric practices' of the native Indians.

Overall, it seems that the question of whether the Spanish Conquest amounted to a genocide remains as hard to answer today as it would have been at the time. Despite much scholarly disagreement over the number of deaths it is clear that a significant number of native Indians died either as a direct or indirect result of Spanish colonialism in Mexico, and even if a large number of these deaths were disregarded due to the unintentional nature of disease, the actions taken directly by Cortes, his conquistadors and their successors certainly match the definition of genocide set forth by the CPPG. However, it could certainly be said that even by applying the CPPG to a

[178] Sepulveda, de Gines Juan, *Democrates alter de justi belliscausis apud Indos,* in Latin American History: Select Problems. Identity, Integration, Nationhood, ed. F.B. Pike (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969) p.51.
[179] Crow, John A, *The Epic of Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 209
[180] Sepulveda, *Democrates alter de justi belliscausis apud Indos,* p.47.
[181] Las Casas, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, p. preface.

conquest from 500 years ago, scholars are applying a modern concept to an event that is outside it's parameters. This division over the conquest can be seen right back throughout history all the way to the works of Las Casas and Sepulveda. Some follow Las Casas and see the conquest as glorified ethnic cleansing driven by greed and zealotry whilst others follow Sepulveda seeing it as necessary to wage war on the Aztecs to stamp out abhorrent customs such as cannibalism and human sacrifice, whilst blaming most of the deaths on viral disease. Therefore, it seems that the answer is that when compared to our modern standards the Spanish conquest of Mexico does meet all the necessary conditions to be though of as a genocide and should be considered as such, however this conclusion should be tempered with the knowledge that is perhaps unfair to measure an early modern conquest where tactics such as starvation and enslavement were unfortunately much more common and ingrained in society than they are today.

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The Actions and Character of Man: Examining the causes of the English Civil War

By Niamh Day

Abstract

The English Civil War of the 17th Century was one of the bloodiest battles that England has ever witnessed. But what caused this atrocity to occur? King Charles I's eleven-year Personal Rule has before been held responsible. Yet this argument is by no means correct. This article provides an in-depth exploration concerning several possible causes of the War, drawing assertions from many different historians and contemporaries. Perhaps uniquely, this article maintains that there was no singular cause of the War; its outbreak was merely due to coincidental contingencies, combined with the obstinate personalities of Charles I and Parliament. These acted as short-term triggers, catapulting England into battle. This article provides a solid, persuasive explanation regarding why the actions and character of man must be held solely accountable.

The chief cause of the English Civil War, 1642-1651, has been disputed. Whig interpreters, namely S.R Gardiner and G.M Trevelyan, have asserted war as being part of an evolutionary political process. They affirm religion to be prevalent, due to Puritans being enemies of arbitrary rule. Marxist interpreters such as Christopher Hill view the war as a class struggle. Hill links religion to its social and economic substructure.[182] Contrastingly for Stone, "it has not proved possible…to identify any one cause and label it the decisive, most important cause of them all."[183] Recently there has been a movement away from long-term structural issues - a mixture of short-term contingencies and actions of individuals are argued to be responsible for war. This argument is superior to any alternatives. One can only observe Charles I's Personal Rule of 1629-1640 to be a chief cause of war, if one declares it to be a rung in the ladder of revolution. This ladder forms a sequence of inevitable actions which reach a main goal of absolutist control. Personal Rule is a non-revolutionary period of policies, whereby *no* notions of war or tyranny were considered. Personal Rule was an innocent set of measures laid out by an incompetent King. Financial and constitutional policies of the Rule will be addressed. Religion should be focussed upon, yet not as a

[182] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain 1558-1689,* (London: Collins, 2002), p233.
[183] L. Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642,* (London: Routledge, 1972), p146.

cause of war; rather, because it was the chief determiner of allegiances. The contingencies concerning Parliament and King are predominantly responsible. A series of incidental, un-inevitable events combined with uncompromising individuals are what provoked the English Civil War. Ultimately, the English Civil War was down to Circumstance, combined with Character of Man.[184]

The Personal Rule of Charles I is *not* the chief cause of the Civil War. Known by later Whig historians as the 'Eleven Years' Tyranny', the rule was far from tyrannical. Indeed, Charles lacked the military and financial capacity for a tyranny. It was never Charles I's objective to rule for a definite, or indefinite period of time without parliament. The financial and constitutional policies of the Rule will first be discussed, whilst religion will be addressed separately. The King's obsession with orderliness became apparent, as he desired an efficient and effective government. Although not responsible for war, it is indisputable that Charles' actions induced exasperation amongst MPs. This furthered conflicts which had been set in motion since the reign of James I[185]. Charles declared that he had been driven unwillingly out of his course[186] in his Declaration of 10th March 1629. The King was his own master[187], and ruling by the policy of 'Thorough', he exercised benevolent prerogative power.[188] Finance was an issue; revenue needed to be raised, yet Charles' methods of doing this were scrutinised for being arbitrary and illegal. His measures undermined the propertied classes. Tunnage and Poundage was collected without parliamentary consent; impositions, worth £200,000 a year, were enforced; Ship Money was illegally extended to *all* counties during peacetime; Forest Laws and the Distraint of Knighthood were imposed. A loophole in the 1624 Monopolies Act saw the 'Popish-soap Monopoly' bring in £29,000 a year.[189] These policies were greeted by reversal as soon as Personal Rule collapsed in 1641, portraying how many MPs saw them as arbitrary measures. Charles' obsession with order can be seen across all aspects of his rule. Lucy Hutchison's memoirs note how the style of court changed vividly from James I to

[184] H. Belloc, *Charles I,* (London: IHS Press, 2003), p25.
[185] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule of Charles I', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the English Civil War,* (London: Macmillan, 1983), p3.
[186] F. P. G. Guizot, *History of the English Revolution: From the Accession of Charles I,* (Oxford; D.A Talboys, 1838), p51.
[187] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…*, p58.
[188] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain…,* p219.
[189] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain…,* p220.

Charles I.[190] As his fears of social unrest and collapse of authority perpetuated, the King called upon the Council for the establishment and maintenance of laws. In 1631, Books of Orders were sent for distribution to Justices of the Peace. These stemmed from Charles' hopes of maintaining tight links with the localities. Additionally, the Court of the Star Chamber disciplined opponents of his policies. Thomas Wentworth's Council in the North exercised coercive power, independent of common law.[191] Consequently, Wentworth was made a target of abuse within Parliament, who characterised him and William Laud as evil councillors, leading the King astray. Charles did not resign himself to a hand-to-mouth struggle for survival.[192] In addition to the absence of Parliament, his desire for orderliness and the use of firm advisors to implement discipline aroused fears that Charles I longed for an absolutist revolution; this created opposition to Personal Rule. This alone did not provoke a Civil War. Even when the Rule collapsed in 1640, there were still hopes of reconciliation between Crown and Parliament. Charles never intended for his policies to be revolutionary; they just reflected his yearnings for tidiness and orderliness.

To further argue that Charles I's Personal Rule was *not* the chief cause of Civil War, the successes, and lack of opposition to finance and constitution during the period should be considered. To those experiencing Personal Rule during the 1630s, "the journey seemed far from a rush towards conflict."[193] Sir Edward Hyde described the period as a decade of calm and felicity.[194] Charles' government rested on co-operation due to the lack of standing army and central authority which was maintained for 11 years. Former MPs, who in the 1620s, had opposed Charles by seeking to remove the Duke of Buckingham from court, were now assisting with policies which made rule without Parliament possible. Financial policies of Personal Rule were enforced without major opposition. The compositions for Knighthood brought £173,537 to the Exchequer. No opposition prevented payment from Charles' subjects.[195] Ship Money was illegally extended to all counties in 1635, but most people paid. A breakdown in government was feared more than the levy. Only 2.5%

[190] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…,* p59.
[191] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain…,* p221.
[192] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson*, Before the…,* p63.
[193]K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson*, Before the…*, p53.
[194] B. Coward, *The Stuart Age: England, 1603-1714,* (London: Pearson Education, 2003), p163.
[195] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…,* p68.

of the sum requested failed to come in.[196] Ship Money can be regarded as one of the most successful measures of Personal Rule. As for the prerogative courts, one should be cautious when measuring how arbitrary the system was. A tyrannical image of the courts is created by contemporaries, MPs, and Whig historians. The perception of abuse was greater than the reality. The effective rule was supported by the Council, forming an efficient advisory body.[197] The proportion of Ship Money collected was superior to subsidies. When engaged and committed, the Council were capable. Charles I's genuine fears of authority collapsing, compounded with social disruption, drove him to enforce controlled policies; thus one can affirm that an absolutist revolution involving war and unrest was his last wish. Charles' passion for orderliness overrode his ability to recognise that Personal Rule would damage relationships - Charles failed to understand Parliament's reluctance to financially assist in 1640. Kings were entitled to make policy, and Personal Rule simply restored discipline and tidiness. Due to its lack of opposition, the Rule did not provoke war or enforce tyranny.

Historians such as John Morrill affirm religion to have caused the war. Morrill states "the English Civil War was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the wars of religion."[198] Yet as an additional longstanding structural issue, religion did *not* cause Civil War. Serious religious conflicts, of a similar nature to those of the 1630s, were present from Henry VIII's reign onwards. If a Civil War was going to entail from this hostility, it would have occurred sooner than 1642. Charles' predecessors had proven that it was possible to 'muddle' through, by essentially smoothing over religious disputes. Evidently, it was the King's and Parliament's contingent actions combined with individual personalities which prevented any settlement from being reached. Religion must be addressed because it worsened relations between Charles and MPs. This created a split in the political nation of 1641, as religion was the determiner of allegiances, causing huge exasperation and animosity.

William Laud aroused such feelings. Appointed as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633, the policies he ensued during Personal Rule were insensitive. Laud's single-mindedness and sincerity[199] were

[196] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…*, p70.
[197] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…*, p61.
[198] J. Morrill, *England's Wars of Religion: Revisited,* (Guildford: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.), 2013, p1.
[199] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain,* p223.

hazardous in the religious climate of the decade. It was Charles I who led, and Laud who followed. The tone of letters in the period illustrates this – "…Royal letters reflect the king's personal concern with the church, with proper maintenance of the clergy and episcopacy."[200] Yet Laud was constantly made a scapegoat by Parliament - blaming the King was treason, punishable by death. English-Arminians emphasised ceremony, fixating on the beauty of holiness. Laud endorsed this, and tightened royal control of the Church[201] via rigorous discipline of visitations. Bishops were a central focus: Laud aimed to revive the clergy, who had suffered decades of neglect. Clergy were to wear vestments; their intellectual and economic conditions were improved. Alters were moved to the East end of the Church. For Laud, they were solely a place of God's residence. This provoked controversy - for Puritans, "the Alter was a table upon which to celebrate the Last Supper."[202] Alters became inaccessible, when many believed they should be part of the Church's body. This highlighted the hierarchic structure of the Church, removing the direct link between God and the laity, causing alienation. Estrangement was caused as the educational background of bishops changed. It was now different to their parishioners' – "their world had been moulded by university and the dignity of a degree."[203] The lack of similarity in education widened the gap between the clergy and the laity, accentuating the rigid hierarchy further. Friction additionally occurred among the gentry, as clergy developed Laudian and Presbytarian claims to leadership. Their elaborate scholastic education and their ambitious, insecure nature[204] can be held accountable. Bishops regarded themselves as competitors for authority. The case of Prynne, Burton and Bastwick in 1637 portrays some opposition to Laud's glorification of bishops, yet no opposition was enough to threaten revolt, or war. Laud adjusted tithes to advance the economic position of the Church. His attempts did little apart from create alienation. "The English in the 17th century were paranoid by their fear and hatred for popery"[205], and Laud inflamed issues which dated back to Elizabeth I's reign. MPs' pride was wounded by the addition of clergymen to the bench.[206] Nevertheless, Laud

[200] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…,* p63.
[201] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain…,* p223.
[202] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain…*, p224.
[203] L. Stone, *The Causes of the…*, p118.
[204] L. Stone, *The Causes of the…,* p118.
[205] L. Stone, *The Causes of the…,* p121.
[206] L. Stone, *The Causes of the…,* p124.

did not instigate the collapse of Personal Rule, or the outbreak of war. Rather, his provocative nature stimulated the anti-Catholic feeling among Parliament and subjects, which was worsened by the Thirty Years War and Court Catholicism from Henrietta Maria, the King's wife.
Religion was far more important in determining allegiances than causing Civil War itself. Laudianism, compounded with the employment of Catholic laymen to ministerial offices, the pursuit of a pro-Spanish foreign policy, and the suspicion of a union with Rome left Charles I in an unpopular position. Yet Parliament's religious wishes were by *no* means universally appealing. Religious radicals emerged, keen to assert their Puritan proposals. Much of the radical momentum in Parliament was down to contingencies, and the uncompromising personalities of MPs such as John Pym. Nevertheless, religious differences alienated moderate members, who feared anarchy. This became more intense when Personal Rule collapsed, further asserting that the Rule was *not* responsible for any national divisions. In 1641, Iconoclasm invoked fears of lawlessness and extremism, increasing support for Charles at a time of instability. Understandably, 90 percent of Catholics were Royalists, whilst over half of Parliamentarians were Puritans.[207] Late 1641 was a significant turning point – determination to eradicate Laudianism destroyed the Long Parliament's unity.[208] Observing the voting within the House of Commons demonstrates how the split became increasingly visible. In May 1641, the Act of Attainder was passed by 204 votes to 51. In November, the motion for control over the army was carried by 151 to 110. The Grand Remonstrance was passed shortly afterwards, by 159 to 148. Evidently, the level of opposition to Parliamentary policy gradually increased, forming a direct split down the middle of the political nation. The number of Royalists in Parliament had risen from 59 to 236.[209] Religion was not responsible for the war, nor can it be held responsible for Charles' and MPs' personal reactions. However, it certainly catalysed a political divide in the nation, whereby Civil War *could* be a possibility. It was not until late 1641 that war was an option; yet, further contingencies still had to take place before it was inevitable. Religious divisions did not initiate war on their own.

[207] L. Stone, *The Causes of the...,* p144.
[208] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain...,* p230.
[209] W. L Sachse, "The Mob and Revolution of 1688", *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 4, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1964, p23.

A mixture of short-term contingencies from 1639 to 1642, stemming from individual decisions, ultimately caused the Civil War. Many take the side of either Crown *or* Parliament when determining which body was most responsible for collapse. Yet, one can assert that it was the intransigence and provocative nature of *both* sides which eventually induced war. Had even one side possessed an alternative persona or method of approach, the outcome may have been different. Nonetheless, the truth was that throughout the 16-17th centuries, Parliament were increasingly asserting their independence via the Power of the Purse, and their strong desires for a religious settlement. Parliament were fond of debate and not action, as expressed by Sir Thomas Wentworth: "the part they delight most in, is to discourse rather than suffer."[210] Combined with such a person as Charles I – obstinate, authoritative and uncompromising – this was a recipe for disaster. Civil War was purely a contingent event, because its occurrence was dependent on the irrational decisions of individuals, rather than any long-term structural issues. Had either party acted differently at any point, it would not be unreasonable to uphold that Civil War may not have materialised. Contingences concerning Parliament and Charles must be explored in order to sustain this argument.

James I had not called Parliament from 1614-1621. In 1629, Parliament was still an event, not an institution.[211] It is easy to overlook this fact when recognising how keen Parliament were to assert their independence during Charles' reign. It did not help that Charles used Henry II and Henry VIII as his examples, when the powers of the executive had been used to their maximum.[212] The resolute characters within Parliament prevailed. These included John Pym and John Hampden. However, the positions and ideas of MPs at the time were more mixed than expected. To illustrate, the Earl of Bedford was a peace-maker by temperament. He would dine with Laud, yet maintain a trustworthy relationship with Pym. Bedford was a moderate man, anxious to save Wentworth's life even though convinced of his guilt. Nevertheless, he died of smallpox in 1641. Bedford's death was a contingency in itself – had Bedford lived, he could have assisted Charles in reaching a settlement. He might have been the much needed mediator between King and Parliament. The Long

[210] G. Radcliffe, T. Wentworth, *The Earl of Strafforde's Letters and Dispatches: With an Essay Towards His Life*, vol. 2, (London: Editor, 1739), p54.
[211] K. Sharpe, 'The Personal Rule…', in H. Tomlinson, *Before the…*, p75.
[212] L. Stone, *The Causes of the…*, p51.

Parliament of 1640 posed problems which could only be settled via compromise and goodwill. Unfortunately, both sides were lacking in these attributes.[213] Parliament concentrated on reversing arbitrary actions that had been enforced during Personal Rule, whilst making their radical religious propositions known. These actions were contingent triggers, brought about by extremist attitudes in an attempt to affirm independence from the Crown. In February 1641, the Triennial Act prevented more than a three year Personal Rule; in June, collection of Tunnage and Poundage without Parliamentary consent was made illegal; Ship Money was abolished in August; monopolies, Forest Laws and prerogative courts were additionally suppressed. Laud was imprisoned and brought to trial, and alters were removed from the east end. The 1640 Root and Branch Petition proclaimed "the said government, with all its dependencies, roots and branches, may be abolished"[214]. This marked the intensification of religious radicalism within Parliament. November 1641 witnessed the establishment of the most forceful and pervasive of all Parliamentary contingencies – the Grand Remonstrance. This exhibited the extent to which relations between Crown and Parliament had deteriorated. Designed by Pym to flush out Charles' supporters[215], it consolidated the two parties. Split into three sections, the first presented conspiracy as the main problem – Catholics, courtiers and evil councillors had separated Charles from his subjects. The second listed the achievements of Parliament, most importantly its reforming of legislation. Lastly, the third section resolved to reduce the power of bishops, abolishing episcopacy. The pervasive religious demands portray how Charles' prerogative was being eroded. Moderates disagreed that it was an appropriate time to be exploiting the King's weaknesses. The Nineteen Propositions of June 1642 were uncompromising and confrontational in their tone.[216] One clause stated that Parliament was to supervise the marriages and education of royal children – a preposterous demand that overstepped Parliamentary privilege and undermined Charles' prerogative. Understandably, the Propositions were firmly rejected. The Long Parliament were, by 1642, acting outside of Parliamentary right. Their obstinacy and insensitivity towards Charles' character made them far

[213] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain...*, p228.
[214] S. C. Manganiello, *The Concise Encyclopedia of the Revolutions and Wars of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1639-1660,* (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2004), p462.
[215] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain...*, p231.
[216] D. Plant, "The Nineteen Propositions", *BCW Project,* [website], 2006, http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/first-civil-war/nineteen-propositions, (accessed 1 December 2017).

from innocent in causing war, leading them to impose unreasonable and extensive demands. Nevertheless, it is again important to highlight the contingent nature of these policies. At this point, Parliament were *not* looking to overthrow the King, so these policies were by no means revolutionary. Even when Parliament raised their army with the Militia Ordinance of March 1642, they claimed to be defending Charles. The policies that MPs desired from 1640-42 were nothing more than a list of measures, attempting to restore Parliament to its pure nature. Neither side acted as they did with the intention of a Civil War. Therefore, to view Parliament as a revolutionary body, with a Republic as their goal, is inaccurate.

The character of Charles I is hugely responsible for the contingencies that occurred from 1639-42. Charles was sensitive and single-minded, regarding himself as the undisputed head of the Church via his belief in the Divine Right of Kings. His intransigent nature is portrayed not only by his prolonged conflicts with Parliament, but with his methods of asserting his religious desires in Scotland. Disputes between the King and the Scots were present throughout Personal Rule. His introduction of the Liturgy in 1637 highlighted problems involving religion and nationality in Scotland. The new Liturgy alarmed Presbytarians, sparking rebellion in St Giles' Cathedral. In 1638, the Scots drew up a National Covenant, refusing to accept the Liturgy. Charles viewed this as a direct challenge to his authority, completely oblivious as to why Scotland would not welcome the alterations. The King's unwillingness to back down during hostility provoked the Bishops War of 1639, marking the collapse of Personal Rule. Similarly to other contingencies, if Charles had chosen to compromise and terminate his forceful imposition of Laudianism to a Presbytarian nation, battle may have been prevented. Yet his insistence triumphed. "War…provided the opportunity for the expression of discontents"[217], as the breakdown of peace in the localities prevailed. The loss of young males caused emotional disturbance and labour shortages, and a crash from financial stability to indebtedness[218] ensued. Unsurprisingly, Charles' failure to subdue the Scots resulted in his call for Parliament in 1640. This in itself illustrates the King's ignorance to the dissatisfaction that Personal Rule had caused amongst MPs. His expectations of financial support were shattered

[217] L. Stone, *The Causes of the...,* p78.
[218] L. Stone*, The Causes of the...,* p78.

when the Short Parliament instead attacked Laud. People were dismayed at the sheer incompetence of the King. The actions of Charles' predecessors in similar situations further depict his displaced determination. Charles expected to quell the Scots like Edward VI had done with the rebels of 1549. The 1549 rebellions were eventually crushed by force, yet Scotland's independency made 1639-40 far more serious. It was not a smaller-scale, contained conflict like those of 90 years before, which the King failed to recognise. In 1525, Henry VIII abruptly withdrew the Amicable Grant as soon conflict arose, realising that stability was more important. Charles failed to consider withdrawal of the Prayer Book as an option, until it was too late. The King's underestimation of Scotland's power, paired with his relentless persistence to impose orderliness upon a Presbytarian country, led to the collapse of Personal Rule. Although this event was not directly responsible for causing war, this contingency was the first of several to occur at the hand of Charles I himself.

Charles I's choice to engage in the Irish Rebellion of 1641 did him no favours. This was an occurrence which worsened the religious tensions nationally. It contributed to the precipitation of religious divisions. This was a revolt of Irish Catholics, fearing that the Long Parliament were attempting to eliminate Catholicism. Due to this Parliament being primarily made up of the King's enemies, Charles was accused of aiding the Irish rebels. Exaggerated stories of 40,000 Protestants being brutally killed[219] further aroused anti-Catholic fears. The Long-Parliament refused to supply taxes to quell the rebellion, so Charles started negotiations with the Irish gentry to raise an army in order to defeat the Scots. In return, the King promised to exercise religious toleration and land security. This was a precarious at a time when religious conflicts were at their peak. Charles' engagement with the Irish Catholics confirmed rumours he desired a purely Catholic kingdom, without any Parliamentary input. The King was unaware of the implications that his increasingly unwise decisions created. War was provoked by King *and* Parliament, yet Charles' carelessness in a bitter climate was to eventually cost him his life.

The last, and the most prominent of all contingencies, was the attempted arrest of the Five Members. January 1642 was the last straw for reconciliation. Provoked by rumours that Parliament intended to impeach the Queen, and suspicions that they were stirring up riots in London, Charles

[219] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain...*, p231.

ordered for the arrest of five members of the House of Commons. These members were Pym, Hampden, Holles, Hesilrige and Strode.[220] Charles entered the House of Commons, which was "unprecedented in Parliamentary history."[221] The King was never to enter the Commons; this intrusion breached Parliamentary privilege, and caused embarrassment. The Five Members had already fled. William Lenthal, the Speaker, refused to hand over the MPs: "I have neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak in this place but as this House is pleased to direct me."[222] This irrational decision supplied Charles' political opponents with great capital. It damaged his own cause, as the intrusion was presented as an armed assault against Parliament; anti-Catholic hysteria was aroused on a similar scale to that of 1605;[223] Charles' reputation could not be redeemed. As compromise with Parliament vanished, MPs passed the Militia Ordinance which placed the military under their control. Eventually, Charles raised his standard on 22nd August 1642. Lack of hindsight from both sides is what sparked the war. If Charles had not acted so impulsively and carelessly, serious conflict would not have occurred. Personal Rule was no more than a series of actions intended to reinforce orderliness into the kingdom. Charles' decisions in 1639-42 illustrated his character massively. Nevertheless, they were contingencies which were not steps to absolutism and war. The King *did* make concessions during this hostile period: these included signing the Triennial Act, the Tonnage and Poundage Bill, and agreeing to abolish prerogative courts. Essentially, neither side sought anarchy. It is crucial to deem actions of both Crown and Parliament, especially during 1639-42, as purely contingent. Had any person behaved differently, the Civil War may not have been an option.

To conclude, a series of un-inevitable triggers united with the unyielding intransigence of King and Parliament are what provoked the English Civil War of 1642. Holding Personal Rule, or any long-term structural issues like religion as responsible is implausible. It is fundamental to consider Personal Rule as nothing more than a reflection of Charles' desires for orderliness throughout the

[220] D. Plant, "The Five Members", *BCW Project,* [website], 2006, http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/first-civil-war/five-members, (accessed 3 December 2017).
[221] D. Plant, "The Five…", *BCW Project,* [website], 2006, http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/first-civil-war/five-members, (accessed 3 December 2017).
[222] J. Hatsell, *Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons: With Observations*, (vol. 2), (London: Luke Hansard and Sons), 1818, p242.
[223] I. Carrier, D. Murphy, E. Sparey, *Britain…,* p232.

kingdom. The King never planned to rule permanently without Parliament, and therefore any suppositions that Charles sought absolutism or war during those years should be abandoned. By blaming any longstanding matters such as religion or finance for war, one affirms that they could not be smoothed over. Arguably, this assumption is wrong; Charles' predecessors had managed to rule without a Civil War through economic and religious hostility. If either possessed the ability to cause a war, it would have occurred earlier. Contingencies that occurred at the hands of both Charles and Parliament should be held accountable. Despite neither side having revolutionary motives or intentions of bloodshed, the bold personalities of individuals resulted in a number of provocative decisions arising. Parliament's persistent insensitivity met its match with Charles' carelessness and impulsiveness. The contingent nature of events during 1639-42 cannot be emphasised enough; it is tenable to maintain that if either side had chosen to approach matters differently at any time, the Civil War may not have taken place.

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Connections Between the Military and Contemporary Visual Culture in India Under the Rule of the East India Company (1757-1858)

By Louis Jeffries

Abstract

The representation of the military in art during the eighteenth and nineteenth century has been greatly overlooked by historians, despite the abundance of works in which it is depicted. This essay seeks to re-examine art relating to the military, examining the broader meanings of pieces and their representations of certain individuals, campaigns and settings, arguing that such artworks were crucial to conceptions of the British state and British national values during the period, and ought to be considered as contemporary commentary alongside political and social accounts. Paintings functioned to aggrandise or diminish their subjects, and hold deeper meanings, with visual culture yielding a wealth of information for the historian, who is able to observe individual and collective attitudes towards conflict, the military, and British imperial policy from them.

William Michael Rosetti (1829-1919) once remarked that 'of all the phases of art, there is none so barren as the military' in British visual culture, an observation he attributed to the pervasive 'anti-militarism' of the British national character.[224] Indeed, within British visual culture across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 'reluctance to glorify war' could be observed, as military art was not considered as 'good' art, being regarded to not to require the same level of imagination and intellect that the painter may exhibit through 'great history painting', with its hallmark classical (Graeco-Roman), compositional, formal and aesthetic features.[225] One historian also argues that British painters sought to distance themselves from the 'overly propagandistic' paintings of Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825) and his school, which displayed the 'French militarism' of Napoleon I's (1769-1821) Imperial France (1804-1814), through examples such as *Napoleon Crossing the Alps* (1801).[226] However, recent scholarship has identified that 'the iconography of the British military… was widely picked up in Napoleonic-era British culture' (c. 1798-1815), and within the period, 'there was a market for the representation of military subjects', as the arts became key to

[224] William Michael Rosetti within J.W.M. Hichberger, *Images of the Army: Military in British Art, 1815-1914*, 1st edn (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1988). p. 1.
[225] Hichberger, *Images of the Army*, p. 68. And C.A. Bayly and others, *The Raj: India and the British 1600-1947*, ed. by C. A. Bayly (New York, New York, U.S.A.: Abbeville Press, 1994). p. 29.
[226] Hichberger, *Images of the Army,* p. 12. And Jacques-Louis David, *Napoleon Crossing the Alps (Also known as 'Napoleon at the Saint-Bernard Pass' or 'Bonaparte Crossing the Alps')* (Displayed at Château de Malmaison, Rueil-Malmaison: France, 1801).

the 'expression of a distinctive 'national character".[227] As argued by Holger Hoock, 'war played an important role… in the shaping of notions of national culture, the cultural nation and the cultural state', as the British government sought to present the victories of British arms, celebrate and commemorate its heroes, and define and export values perceived as fundamental to the national character.[228] However, this neglects Britain's wider evolution from 'a substantial international power but relative artistic backwater into a global superpower and a leading cultural force in Europe' across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially when considering her acquisition of a substantial territorial empire, which proliferated a visual culture containing military themes, pre-dating those created in the Napoleonic era, as indicated most prominently through the popularity of Benjamin West's (1738-1820) painting, *The Death of General Wolfe* (1770).[229] Prints and illustrations became abundant across the two centuries, and paintings are therefore a key source through which the historian can observe contemporary ideas about the function and purpose of empire, through the aesthetic justifications for British imperial ambitions and enterprises, British regard for indigenous peoples and native cultures, and the heroic celebration of notable figures that they offer.[230] Nowhere do these themes coincide more than in the paintings arising from the period of, and depicting, the East India Company's possession of India (1757-1858), and this essay will discuss the connection between the military and contemporary visual culture in this setting, through examining the depiction of the army and navy in history painting and portraiture.[231] However, it must be indicated that the artwork of this period is influenced prominently by two artistic movements, the Romantic, (whereby artists sought to convey high emotion), and the Picturesque (which focused on creating pleasing scenes of locations), and Caspar David Friedrich's (1774-1880) most famous work, *Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog* (1818) can be taken as an exemplar of both of these aspects.[232] This essay will argue for the significance of the paintings discussed, whilst also indicating that far from being 'Georgian England's least popular institution', the military proliferated in abundance in British visual culture during the period, and that analysis of military art provides a number of pertinent messages for the historian studying the EIC and the wider British Empire.[233]

The Royal Navy and the 'visual imagery of the sea' features prominently within British military painting, with Geoff Quilley arguing that there was a growth of 'a cult of the maritime' in

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[227] Adapted from Holger Hoock, *Empires of Imagination: Politics, War and the Arts in the British World, 1750-1850* (London, U.K.: Profile Books, 2010). p. 190. And Hichberger, *Images of the Army,* p. 13-14.
[228] Adapted from Hoock, *Empires of Imagination,* p. 13.
[229] Geoff Quilley, *Empire to Nation: Art, History and the Visualization of Maritime Britain, 1768-1829* (Bloomsbury, London, U.K.: Yale University Press, 2011). p. xvi, 11. And Benjamin West, *The Death of General Wolfe* (Displayed at the National Gallery of Canada, Ottowa: Canada, 1770).
[230] Quilley, *Empire to Nation*, p. 54-55. And Hoock, *Empires of Imagination*, p. 23.
[231] 'East India Company' herein referred to as 'EIC'.
[232] Caspar David Friedrich, *Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog (Also known as 'Wanderer Above the Mist' or 'Mountaineer in a Misty Landscape')* (Displayed at the Kunsthalle Hamburg in Hamburg: Germany, 1818). And Hermione de Almeida & George H. Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance: British Romantic Art and the Prospect of India* (Abingdon-on-Thames, U.K.: Routledge, 2006). p. 116.
[233] Matthew Paul Lalumia, *Realism and Politics in Victorian Art of the Crimean War*, 1st edn (Ann Arbour, Michigan, U.S.A.: UMI Research Press, 1984). p. 39.

British popular culture in the 1790s, as Britain sought to project their 'natural identity as a maritime nation', in the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, depicting the actions of their navy and sailors as heroic, and celebrating their victories.[234] This is supported by John McAleer, who argues that this period was a 'crucial formative period in the country's national and imperial identities', with the British Empire being 'bound inexorably to the sea'.[235] However, despite the idea of Britain being a maritime nation, with a focus on international trade and enjoying naval supremacy following the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) being 'axiomatic to the point of being a cliché' in this period, the work of Kathleen Wilson and Sarah Conway has demonstrated that the navy was just as popularly regarded in the eighteenth century, with naval victories such as that of Admiral Edward Vernon (1684-1757) at Porto Bello (1739) and Admiral George Rodney (1718-1792) at the Saintes (1782) sparking 'exuberant and spontaneous… public celebrations', with the navy and the victors of these battles being depicted in the popular presses and paintings as embodying the British national character.[236] Naval paintings therefore enjoyed an 'enormous public appeal' across the two centuries, and it is important to recognise the 'prominent position' of the navy in British visual culture, where it is usually 'marginalized or barely visible' in most histories of British art.[237]

A notable example of naval painting in an Indian context is Dominic Serres's (1722-1793) *Battle of Negapatam, 6 July 1782* (1786), which depicts the battle between the British East Indies squadron under Admiral Sir Edward Hughes (1720-1794), against French Admiral Pierre Andre de Suffren's (1729-1788) squadron.[238] The painting is a celebration of British victory, being commissioned by, and belonging to, Hughes, through depicting what McAleer notes is a common scene of an eighteenth-century naval engagement, with ships in line of battle, firing upon one another.[239] This is evidenced through the painting holding similar features to other examples of marine art from the period, such as Thomas Luny's (1759-1837) *HMS 'Mediator' engaging French and American vessels, 11-12 December 1782* (1783), and more strikingly, being highly similar in composition to Serres's earlier work, *Barrington's Action at St. Lucia, 15 December 1778* (1780).[240] This connection serves to highlight British naval victories as being one of the major themes of Serres's work, and assists in identifying his market; often those who were present at the actions depicted, with Serres's pictures acting as a memory aid or conversation piece when displayed in the home of the individual. British naval victory and military glory is also celebrated through the idealization of the

[234] Quilley, *Empire to Nation*, p. 3, 198, 207. And Hoock, *Empires of Imagination*, p. 120.
[235] John McAleer, 'Review: Empire to Nation: Art, History and the Visualization of Maritime Britain, 1768-1829', *The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology*, 41 (2012), 459- 460. p. 459-460.
[236] Quilley, *Empire to Nation*, p. 203. And Adapted from Kathleen Wilson, 'Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian Britain; The Case of Admiral Vernon', *Past and Present*, 121 (1988), 74-109. Page 76, 79. And Sarah Conway, '"A Joy Unknown for Years Past": The American War, Britishness and the Celebration of Rodney's Victory at the Saintes', *The Journal of the Historical Association*, 86 (2002), 180-99. General Argument.
[237] Quilley, *Empire to Nation*, p. 204, 263.
[238] McAleer, *'In Trade as in Warfare'*, p. 140. And Dominic Serres, *Battle of Negapatam, 6 July 1782* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1786).
[239] McAleer, *'In Trade as in Warfare'*, p. 140-141.
[240] Thomas Luny, *HMS 'Mediator' engaging French and American vessels, 11-12 December 1782* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1783). And Dominic Serres, *Barrington's Action at St. Lucia, 15 December 1778* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1780).

combat, which Serres achieves through conforming to the Romantic and Picturesque trends, the painting being both a depiction of exciting naval action through displaying the smoke of cannon fire, and also being a vista upon a battle that cannot realistically have been as neat or ordered as presented. Quilley however argues that the idealization of naval conflict through depictions that conformed to the Picturesque (where artists took liberties with actuality in order to present a more aesthetically pleasing image), can reveal the commentary of the artist, and Serres may be idealizing the conflict in order to indicate that Britain's navy was well-disciplined, something he himself may have believed, or that regardless is something his patron, Hughes, would have appreciated as a wider message within his commissioned painting.[241]

Other examples of naval art relating to India similarly celebrate British victories and act as commemoration pieces. Thomas Butterworth's aquatint, *The China Fleet, heavily laden, commanded by Commodore Sir Nathaniel Dance, beating off Adm. Linois and his squadron the 15th Feb 1804* (1804), depicts the Battle of Pulo Aur (1804), which McAleer argues is 'one of the most important' in the history of the EIC.[242] Limited naval resources assigned to the East Indies squadron in the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) left the theatre commander, Admiral Peter Rainier (1741-1808) unable to provide an escort to the China Fleet, a convoy of East Indiamen, the ubiquitous trade ships of the EIC, under the command of Commodore Nathaniel Dance (1748-1827), which was intercepted by the French Admiral Linois (1761-1848) near Pulo Aur, carrying a cargo of tea worth £8 million.[243] Dance however formed his ships in line of battle, imitating warships, and Linois withdrew, whereby Dance pursued him.[244] Though the action saw little fighting, and only two British casualties, the battle was widely celebrated, with 'silver vases and presentation swords… showered on the victors', from both the EIC and the British government, given that Dance's actions had preserved such a valuable economic asset for them both.[245] Butterworth's aquatint similarly celebrates the action, correlating with traditional compositions of British naval painting, with a picturesque vista of the conflict similar to earlier examples from Serres, supporting Quilley's argument that a 'cult of the maritime' proliferated in British visual culture, though across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[246]

However, what is more significant about this image is the inclusion of a key for those viewing it to identify the vessels involved.[247] This is significant when considering that this image

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[241] Quilley, *Empire to Nation,* p. 186.
[242] Thomas Butterworth, *The China Fleet, heavily laden, commanded by Commodore Sir Nathaniel Dance, beating off Adm. Linois and his squadron the 15th Feb 1804* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1804). And McAleer, *'In Trade as in Warfare',* p.141.
[243] Peter A. Ward, *British Naval Power in the East 1794-1805: The Command of Admiral Peter Rainier* (Suffolk, U.K. : Boydell Press, 2013). p.117. And C. Northcote Parkinson, *War In Eastern Seas: 1793-1815*, 1st edn (Crow's Nest, Australia: Geroge Allen & Unwin, 1954). p. 226.
[244] McAleer, *'In Trade as in Warfare',* p. 145. And Parkinson, *War In Eastern Seas,* p.226.
[245] Adaption from Parkinson, *War In Eastern Seas*, p.228, 235.
[246] Quilley, *Empire to Nation,* p. 198, 207.
[247] Key observable in reproduction available on the Collections page of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: <http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/138967.html?_ga=1.109255365.1739786183.1484648821> [accessed 15 March 2017]

was published by Edward Orme (1775-1848), whom John Maggs describes as 'the most important publisher of illustrated books during the short golden age of the coloured aquatint', and who owned a number of printing shops in London between 1800-1824.[248] This indicates that the image was intended for public consumption, and its depiction of the battle, and additional key, therefore functions as a method of popular reportage- members of the public were able to be informed regarding the battle, view a depiction of it, and note the vessels involved, and it is probable that news of the conflict could have been spread through the circulation of this image. The key is further significant as it allowed the public to monitor the actions of individual ships, which may have been pertinent to the families of current crew members, former crew members remembering their service, or merchants in London expecting shipments, along with the dockhands, construction workers and others whose personal histories intersected that of a vessel. This compounds wider arguments regarding the popularity of the navy, with the national public having either a personal, commercial, or popular interest in the actions of its vessels, or those it defended. Orme is also credited with the publication of an engraving reproducing William Marshall Craig's (died 1827) *"England expects every man to do his duty". Lord Nelson explaining to Officers the Plan of Attack previous to the Battle of Trafalgar* (1806), a popular print that circulated following the British victory at Trafalgar (1805).[249] Similarly, the print includes a key, allowing the viewer to identify the 'Gallant Heroes who commanded' vessels during the battle, and also a map of the action, commemorative features which celebrate the conflict and the individuals involved.[250] The proximity in the publications of these images, and their shared themes further suggests that the navy was widely popular in British visual culture, but also indicates how depictions of naval conflict relating to the EIC formed part of broader traditions in naval painting and depictions, and wider discourses of popular topical reportage and visual commemoration in Britain.

Although intended for private viewing, the depictions of naval figures in portraiture are also significant, and contain a number of similar messages and effects. Quilley notes that 'in his ideal evocation… the sailor was the 'pillar of the nation', and often portraitists sought to present individuals as national heroes, commemorating their individual actions and involvements in British naval victories.[251] Joseph Reynold's (1723-1792) 1784 portrait of Commodore William James (c. 1721-1783) shows him in 'the full-dress uniform of the Bombay Marine', the EIC's private navy, indicating his stature as an officer, but also depicting him holding a map of the Indian fortress at Severndroog in his right hand, a feature which commemorates his leadership of a British squadron which assisted in capturing the fortress in 1755.[252] The painting therefore functions to relay the

[248] John Maggs, 'Edward Orme', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37824> [accessed 15 March 2017]
[249] Edward Orme after William Marshall Craig, *"England expects every man to do his duty". Lord Nelson explaining to the Officers the Plan of Attack previous to the Battle of Trafalgar* (Displayed by the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1806).
[250] Ibid.
[251] Adapted from Quilley, *Empire to Nation,* p. 169.
[252] Joshua Reynolds, *Commodore Sir William James* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1784). And McAleer, *'In Trade as in Warfare',* p. 136-138.

personal history of the individual, however more significantly, conforms to Reynold's conception of the 'great style', whereby he sought to present individuals with 'no defects', arguing that where history 'shows a man by showing his actions… the painter has no other means of giving an idea of the dignity of the mind', and therefore the painter should be granted some 'poetical licence' in order to relay that his subject is a 'great man' through a singular painting.[253] A similar painting by Reynolds, which has striking similarities with that of the portrait of William James, is his 1779 depiction of Admiral Augustus Keppel (1729-1786), which shows him in a flag officer's undress uniform against a coastal setting.[254] Both paintings are highly similar in composition, and both attempt to aggrandize and commemorate their sitters. Reynold's 'grand style' came to dominate British portrait painting, with a special exhibition at the Tate Modern in London in 2005 commenting that Reynolds took 'British portraiture in striking new directions', with his military portraits especially being 'ambitious works of modern art' which 'contributed to the development of a power form of martial celebrity', and this is evident in later prominent paintings that owe influence to his school, such as Nathaniel Dance-Holland's (1735-1811) *Captain James Cook* (1776), *Robert Clive, 1st Baron Clive* (1788), and Thomas Lawrence's (1769-1830) *Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington* (c.1815-1816).[255] Through the 'great style', portraiture as a genre treats both army and navy figures similarly, celebrating their victories and presenting individuals as heroes, as indicated by the comparison of the aforementioned portrait of Robert Clive and James Cook; both men are presented in immaculate uniforms, their faces well-lit and without blemish- they appear to exude light, something which to a contemporary audience would be considered an allusion to divine status. In both portraits, the setting or items within it act to relay a narrative regarding the sitter, or indicate their character- Cook sits at a desk with a map, indicating a position upon it, a reference to his discovery of Australia in 1770, but also indicating his personal skill as a cartographer and surveyor. Clive is similarly depicted as the 'heaven-born general' he was described as by Prime Minister William Pitt the Elder (1708-1778) following his victory at the Battle of Plassey (1757), a scene of battle shown behind him, which he stands before, resolute and in control, his right hand upon his hip, indicating the battle, and more widely, the EIC/British dominion of India which followed, to have been earnt through his determination and strength in battle.[256] The British 'victors' of the aforementioned battle of Pulo Aur (1804) are treated similarly, with Joseph Raphael Smith's (1751-1812) *Sir Nathaniel Dance* (1805) depicting Dance stood at a desk full of papers and

[253] Adapted from Joshua Reynolds, 'A Discourse Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy on the Distribution of the Prizes, December 10, 1771, by the President, from Seven Discourses on Art', in *Project Gutenburg* <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2176/2176-h/2176-h.htm> [accessed 13 March 2017]
[254] Joshua Reynolds, *Admiral Augustus Keppel* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1799).
[255] Nathaniel Dance-Holland, *Captain James Cook* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1776). And Nathaniel Dance-Holland, *Robert Clive, 1st Baron Clive* (Displayed at the National Portrait Gallery: London, 1788). And Thomas Lawrence, *Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington* (Displayed at Apsley House: London, c. 1815-1816). And Tate Modern, London, 'Joshua Reynolds: The Creation of Celebrity', in *Tate* <http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/exhibition/joshua-reynolds/joshua-reynolds-creation-celebrity-room-guide-1> [accessed 15 March 2017]
[256] William Pitt within 'The Indian Papers of Colonel Clive and Brigadier-General Carnac, 1752-1774', in *British Online Archives* <https://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/9781851171859.php> [accessed 17 March 2017]

books, potentially emphasising his intellect, with a painting depicting the battle displayed behind him, indicating Dance's pride in the action.[257] However, Dance's authoritative stance and expression could befit him in either setting, and the painting therefore acts to glorify him as a victor, but also comments on his status as a gentleman, conducive with what Hoock identifies as a 'revival of chivalry' in the 'middle of the eighteenth century' and beyond, whereby British military figures were depicted to show both their 'superior courage' and masculine qualities, but also their 'compassionate restraint' and qualities that would be expected of, and elevate them, in high society.[258] This is achieved similarly, though more simplistically, in Arthur William Devis's (1762-1822) *Admiral Peter Rainier* (1805), which depicts the admiral from the waist-up, against a brown background.[259] Rainier's rank is clearly observable through the stars on his epaulettes, and he is well-lit, indicating his heroic status, however the simplicity of the portrait draws the viewer's attention to Rainier's visage and more prominently, his glasses, which indicate his intellect, although may also be allegorical for Rainier possessing foresight and insight ('vision') in his management and organisation of naval resources during the Napoleonic Wars. That both men had their portraits painted soon after the battle, and by artists of repute, from the Royal Society, indicates how their deeds were viewed in metropolitan Britain, hinting at wider, more centralised efforts of the British government to record and celebrate these deeds and create national figures. Rainier's portrait was also copied in an engraving by Charles Turner (1774-1857) in 1824 for use in Edward Pelham Brenton's *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Year 1783 to 1822* (1823), which although a controversial publication, celebrated Rainier's status as a great, British admiral, further indicating portraiture as a key medium for commemoration, and the popular circulation that such images enjoyed.[260]

Contemporary grand history paintings and landscapes are other significant mediums through which the military is depicted. Where West's *The Death of General Wolfe* (1770) popularised military painting in British visual culture, being regarded compositionally as the 'exemplar of the modern history picture' by contemporary commentators, other artists sought to present images of 'heroic death which… appealed to patriotic sentiment', in order to create 'visual exemplar[s] of military virtue'.[261] Such paintings utilise the trends of the Romantic and Picturesque for effect, and Robert Home's (1752-1834) *Death of Colonel Moorhouse at the Storming of the Pettah Gate of Bangalore* (1797) could be described as a homage to West's composition, depicting Moorhouse 'killed in the

[257] Joseph Raphael Smith, *Sir Nathaniel Dance* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1805).
[258] Hoock, *Empires of Imagination,* p. 181.
[259] Arthur William Devis, *Admiral Peter Rainier* (Displayed at the College of Optometrists: London, 1805).
[260] Charles Turner, *Peter Rainier Esqr. Admiral of the Blue from an original Picture in the possession of the Honourable Basil Cochrane, Engraved by C. Turner for Capt. Brenton's Naval History* (Displayed at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: London, 1824). And J. K. Laughton and Andrew Lambert, 'Edward Pelham Brenton', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3325> [accessed 15 March 2017] and Edward Pelham Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Year 1783 to 1822* (London: C. Rice, 1823).
[261] Adapted from Lalumia, *Realism and Politics,* p. 15-17. And Charles Mitchell, 'Benjamin West's "Death of General Wolfe" and the Popular History Piece', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 7 (1944), 20-33. p. 21, 29. And Bayly and others, *The Raj,* p. 33.

field… as he secured victory' in a highly similar manner to Wolfe, with Matthew Lalumia commenting how Home's work is 'little short of a copy', with 'the scene of… heroism… merely transferred from one distant continent to another'.[262] However, the work is significant through Home being 'specifically invited' by Governor-General Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805) to accompany the British/EIC army during the campaign against Tipu Sultan (1750-1799) during the Third Anglo-Mysore War (1790-1792), being one of the 'earliest war artists in India', and later presenting his work, a total of twenty-nine coloured prints, as 'authentic' records of 'views and places… gallantly fought and conquered' by 'our troops'.[263] Home's painting is therefore significant as propaganda, with his intentional compositional similarities to West's depiction of Wolfe being an attempt to glorify the British conquest of Mysore, and valorise the death of Moorhouse, who succeeded in capturing Bangalore, a strategically-significant city on the road to Mysore's capital, Seringapatam.

Hermione de Almeida and George H. Gilpin however indicate that Home's works form a wider narrative, arguing that 'Moorhouse's martyrdom… at the start of the campaign more than made up for the taking of Tipu Sultan's children at its end', as depicted in his painting of *Lord Cornwallis receiving the sons of Tipu Sultan as hostages, Seringapatam, 25 February 1792* (1792).[264] Depicting himself on the far left of the painting, 'cross-legged, with a portfolio of drawings under his right arm', in order to indicate his presence and support his claims of authenticity, Home depicts Cornwallis, who is foregrounded centrally in the painting for emphasis, receiving Tipu's sons among a cadre of British and Indian military figures, the exchange of hostages being part of the terms of the Treaty of Seringapatam (1792).[265] The painting similarly celebrates British military victory, though utilises the Romantic trend to create an allegory, whereby the 'childlike Indians… entrusting their fates to a kindly but powerful British father' becomes symbolic for India more widely coming under the benevolent and enlightened protection of the British, relaying the perceived 'British ideal of colonial relations'.[266] This allegory is found elsewhere in British paintings of the same event, though the most overt depiction, through use of the 'grand style' is in Mather Brown's (1761-1831) *Marquis Cornwallis Receiving the Sons of Tippoo Sultan as Hostages* (1793), which shows both of Tipu's sons looking 'upward with affection and veneration at an enormous Cornwallis bathed in light'.[267] The painting is crowded with British military figures on the right, standing tall and proud, whilst Indian figures to the left are cowed in respect. The meaning is evident; the painting marks the transition of power to Britain, with Cornwallis depicted as a 'demigod of a new era of British India', bursting with 'pride and substance, paternalism and

[262] Robert Home, *Death of Colonel Moorhouse at the Storming of the Pettah Gate of Bangalore* (Displayed at the National Army Museum: London, 1797). And Adapted from Lalumia, *Realism and Politics,* p. 21.
[263] Robert Home, Adapted from Hoock, *Empires of Imagination,* p. 303-304.
[264] Adapted from Almeida & Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance,* p. 152. And Robert Home, *Lord Cornwallis receiving the sons of Tipu Sultan as hostages, Seringapatam, 25 February 1792* (Displayed at the National Army Museum: London, 1792).
[265] Bayly and others, *The Raj,* p. 154-155.
[266] Adapted from Almeida & Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance,* p. 153.
[267] Mather Brown, *Marquis Cornwallis Receiving the Sons of Tippoo Sultan as Hostages* (Displayed at the National Army Museum: London, 1793). And Almeida & Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance,* p. 151.

benevolence', leading the Indian children toward a new and optimistic future.[268] This painting could therefore be said to contain 'orientalist' themes, supporting the arguments of Edward Said, who argues that Europeans sought to present the east and easterners in cultural works as an inferior 'other' in order to justify imperial expansion on the grounds of perceived European racial, intellectual, and technological superiority.[269]

These claims of an orientalist perspective are supported by the paintings that proliferated following the death of Tipu Sultan in 1799 during the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1798-1799), which contain similar themes, such as David Wilkie's (1785-1841) *General Sir David Baird Discovering the Body of Sultan Tippoo Sahib after having Captured Seringapatam, on the 4th May, 1799* (1839).[270] The painting is similarly triumphant, celebrating the discovery of Tipu's body by David Baird (1757-1829), through being 'a hybrid mixture of conventional portraiture and history painting', depicting Baird as 'larger than life', in 'full military dress including bearskin helmet, weaponry and decorations', and 'clothed in light from an unknown source', thereby utilizing all the aforementioned elements present within both genres to create an image of Baird as a hero.[271] Tipu's body, by contrast, is depicted as if 'without substance', appearing to have 'melted or dissipated'.[272] This contrast emphasises notions of British superiority and Indian inferiority, with Almeida and Gilpin supporting this in stating that 'Baird… stands over the vanquished sultan like a big-game hunter', with Tipu depicted with elongated limbs, resembling a 'dead cat'.[273] However, whilst these observations may evidence orientalist attitudes as being present within the painting, and thus more widely in the British mindset, this is challenged by Bayly's indication that the painting was commissioned by Baird's widow on the occasion of his death, being an attempt to create a eulogy for Baird, depicting him 'at the moment of his triumph' in order to 're-instate' his reputation against that of the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852), who had superseded Baird, despite him having served under him as a junior officer.[274] Any inference of orientalist comment from the painting is therefore questionable, as the piece is highly retroactive upon events, and functions to aggrandize Baird as a hero. This is supported by comparisons between Wilkie's painting and those deemed more 'historically accurate' and composed closer to the event, such as Devis's *The Finding of the Body of Tippoo Sahib. Major General David Baird and other British officers finding the body of Tippoo Sahib, the Sultan of Mysore, in the gateway in the north face of the fort of Seringapatam on the 4th May 1799* (1799-1802).[275] The painting is evidenced as more accurate than Wilkie's composition, given its

[268] Almeida & Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance,* p. 151.
[269] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, New York, United States: Vintage, 1979). General argument.
[270] David Wilkie, *General Sir David Baird Discovering the Body of Sultan Tippoo Sahib after having Captured Seringapatam, on the 4th May, 1799* (Displayed at the Scottish National Gallery: Edinburgh, 1839). And Baybly and others, *The Raj,* p. 34.
[271] Almeida & Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance,* p. 164-165.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Adapted from Almeida & Gilpin, *Indian Renaissance,* p. 165.
[274] Bayly and others, *The Raj,* p. 37.
[275] Arthur William Devis, *The Finding of the Body of Tippoo Sahib. Major-General David Baird and other British officers finding the body of Tippoo Sahib, the Sultan of Mysore, in the gateway in the north face of the fort of Seringapatam on the 4th May 1799* (Displayed at the National Museum of Scotland: Edinburgh, 1799-1802). And Bayly and others, *The Raj,* p. 34.

comparative non-conformance to the 'grand style', and the depiction it offers of the Duke of Wellington, who in Devis's painting is shown standing to the left, facially similar to his depiction in a portrait by John Hoppner (1758-1810) from 1795, in contrast to his depiction in Wilkie's painting, whereby he is shown as a much older man than he would have been at the time, peering over Baird's shoulder.[276] Depicting the discovery of Tipu's body as a 'dramatic tragedy', through conforming to the Romantic trend, and with compositional similarities to West's *The Death of General Wolfe* (1770), Devis's depiction is a much more 'solemn', being a darker composition, and whilst the British are well-lit and evidently victorious, they all wear dark expressions, and a British officer cradling Tipu looks up expectantly at Baird.[277] Bayly argues that the lighting of the British is allegorical to a 'light of civilization', illuminating India's 'darkest recesses', evidencing an orientalist perspective, however Bayly's argument is contradicted by the expressions of the figures and the tone of the piece, which is arguably melancholic and respectful, and indicative of notions of 'British insecurity', given the figure of the officer looking to Baird.[278] One could even see the officer as allegorical for the British Indian government looking expectantly to its London counterpart, having now come into possession of Mysore, the painting through mourning the loss of Tipu acting as an endnote to the Anglo-Mysore Wars and a eulogy to the British fallen of the conflicts.[279] This would indicate that whilst history paintings can show the 'paternalism of the British Raj' in a manner evidential of orientalism, it is more useful to consider that 'colonial encounters were informed by selective respect for the Orient, by cultural hybridity and dialogue, by British insecurities as much as by assumptions of Western superiority and imperialist exploitation', a more holistic view that accounts for orientalist and non-orientalist commentaries, and incorporates factual details relating to the composition of pieces and the contemporary perceptions of their audience, and the artist's intention.[280]

In conclusion, the examples shown indicate how the military proliferated in abundance in British art across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with depictions of the army and navy allowing artists to present and shape 'notions of national culture', creating and commemorating national heroes and British military victories, and reflecting contemporary views on imperial policy, forging a history of empire.[281] Repetitions and similarities are abundant across the period, indicating the influence of specific styles and trends, such as the 'grand style' in portraiture and history painting, but also the influence of the Romantic and Picturesque trends, which allowed artists to situate their works in wider contexts and draw parallels with those of other artists, similarly indicating the influence of specific pieces, such as West's *The Death of General Wolfe* (1770).[282] Military art is a broad and complex topic, with visual culture containing contradictory and

[276] John Hoppner, *Arthur Wesley* (Displayed in the Duke of Wellington's Collection at Stratfield Saye: Hampshire, 1795).
[277] Bayly and others, *The Raj,* p. 36. And West, *The Death of General Wolfe.*
[278] Bayly and others, *The Raj,* p. 159.
[279] Ibid.
[280] Hoock, *Empires of Imagination,* p. xvii, 285.
[281] Ibid. p. 13.
[282] West, *The Death of General Wolfe.*

competing messages, and with different interpretations of an image offering different and opposing insights into contemporary attitudes. However, visual culture can yield a wealth of information for the historian, when paintings are placed in their proper context. This essay has indicated how themes relating to the military and imperial policy intersected within art relating to the EIC's possession of India, and the circulation and display of these paintings for a public audience supports that military subjects enjoyed a strong reception, but also indicates how these paintings functioned as a method of popular reportage, with military activity relating to the EIC forming part of wider depictions of the British military, and the celebration of national figures and military events in popular culture.[283] Works composed for private audiences and depictions of individuals in portraiture are also of significance, relaying similar themes, and the historian has much to gather from the study of visual culture, being able to observe individual and collective attitudes towards conflict, the military, and British imperial policy from them, warranting further study into this area.

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[283] Hoock, *Empires of Imagination,* p. 190. And Hichberger, *Images of the Army,* p. 13, 14.

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Divisions And Definitions: How the Royal Navy defined and divided the British Atlantic Empire of the Eighteenth Century

By Pete Sturgess

Abstract

By the end of the 'long eighteenth-century' the British Empire stood unchallenged as the dominant world power; a global hegemonic state.[284] In an attempt to simplify the myriad of complexities that brought about this situation this essay will demonstrate how the Royal Navy can be described as a defining imperial institution and a totem of Britishness, by examining the interactions between citizens and empire.[285] Sarah Kinkel argues that the Royal Navy acted as a barometer for the virtue and vitality of the British Empire and that, in the eyes of its citizens at least, it represented a microcosm of the social order.[286] This essay will show how the daily interactions between citizens and empire fuelled the ideas behind this argument. It will examine the role that war played on the mindset of the British public and how the proliferation of newspapers brought the narrative into their homes. It will highlight the day to day interactions between ordinary Britons and the Empire and how these interactions are linked together by the Royal Navy; establishing the Royal Navy as the public face of empire. Finally, it will demonstrate how, as the public face of empire, the Royal Navy could be such a divisive organisation.

The most overt means by which the British Atlantic Empire was defined by the Royal Navy was war; Britain was at war for 62 years in the period. Contemporary Britons defined themselves as a "Protestant bastion against Roman ambitions"[287], primarily in opposition to the Catholic states of France and Spain.[288] While its 'Total Wars' were resolved on land, Britain primarily waged war at sea, and it is in warfare, particularly naval warfare, where the empire gained a public reputation for 'punching above its weight'. By routinely achieving victory against numerically superior odds, Britain developed a reputation of invincibility at sea.[289] So much did this concept become the norm that by the end of the period, the loss of single ship actions to frigates of the United States Navy in 1812, induced 'a sensation in the country scarcely to be equalled by the most violent convulsion of

[284] Julian Go, *Patterns of empire: The British and American empires, 1688 to the present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 44–52.
[285] Christer Petley and Jason McAleer, 'Introduction: The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic', in Christer Petley and Jason McAleer, (eds), *The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic World, c. 1750-1820*, (Palgrove Macmillan, 2017), pp. 4–8.
[286] Sarah Kinkel, 'The king's pirates? Naval enforcement of imperial authority, 1740–76', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 71.1 (2014), pp. 3–34.
[287] Jack P Greene, 'Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution' in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II, the eighteenth-century,* ed. By PJ Marshall (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 214.
[288] Douglas W. Allen, 'The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail', *Explorations in Economic History*, 39, (2002), pp. 204-205.
[289] N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815* (Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 1066-1068.

nature'.[290] In 1674 John Evelyn wrote 'whoever commands the ocean [...] commands the world itself'. The popular understanding of the essence of this argument and of naval warfare is perhaps best captured in the poem 'Rule Britannia', which held dual meaning of maritime primacy and religious and/or political freedom.[291] It is in war that the Royal Navy had the greatest impact on the public conscious, it firmly established Britain's ideological dominance protected by the invincibility of the Royal Navy, in the mindset of the people.

Public perception of Royal Navy and war was further shaped by the media; the primary means of dissemination of information in the British Empire.[292] Kathleen Wilson's case study of Admiral Vernon demonstrates the impact of social discourse, popular support and the parliamentary system, utilising Vernon's victory at Porto Bello as a vehicle.[293] In the wake of the effusion of public support that followed the publication of Vernon's dispatches, both sides of the house attempted to align the narrative with their political ideology; despite Vernon's voluble criticism of the Walpole regime.[294] The Derby Mercury, printed an account at the time of Admiral Vernon's birthday in 1740, describing the public as participating in 'all [...] demonstrations of Joy' at 4am. It went on to say that when the gentleman 'adjurn'd to Mr. Atwood's Great Room' they 'drank his Majesty's Health [...] Admiral Vernon and success to his Majesty's Arms'.[295] The association of Admiral Vernon's name with such august company, demonstrates a level of zeal among the social elites of the day. The event reveals that either there is a significant degree of popular support for the hero of the Battle of Porto Bello, or that Edward Vernon wielded sufficient influence in society to warrant the expense; it is likely to be an element of both. By engaging directly with the levers of power, the officers of the Royal Navy played an important role in establishing the policies that governed the British Empire and its citizens. The officers of the Royal Navy, including Vernon, were active members in Parliament and did much to shape government policies of the day.[296] Between 1690 and 1820 there were 320 Members of Parliament with service in the Royal Navy; many in the latter half of the century.[297] Admiral Vernon is but one example of how the realities of empire was

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[290] Douglas W. Allen, 'The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail', *Explorations in Economic History*, 39, (2002), pp. 207-208.
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[291] Suvir Kaul, *Poems of Nation, Anthems of Empire: English Verse in the Long Eighteenth Century* (University Press of Virginia, 2000), pp. 1-2.
[292] David H. Tucker, Philip Soundy Unwin, George Unwin, 'History of Publishing' in 'www.britannica.com', <https://www.britannica.com/topic/publishing/Newspaper-publishing>, 03 March 2015, [accessed 16 November 2016].
[293] Kathleen Wilson, 'EMPIRE, TRADE AND POPULAR POLITICS IN MID-HANOVERIAN BRITAIN: THE CASE OF ADMIRAL VERNON', *Past and Present*, i, 121 (1988), pp. 74–109.
[294] *The London Gazette*, 7892 (London Gazette, 1740), pp. 1-2.
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[295] *Derby Mercury,* 13 November 1740, p.1.
[296]HL Deb 18 May 1809, vol 278, cols 607-615.
D. W. Hayton, 'Accounts of Debates in the House of Commons, March-April 1731, Supplementary to the Diary of the First Earl of Egmont', in 'www.bl.uk', <http://www.bl.uk/eblj/2013articles/pdf/ebljarticle22013.pdf>, 2013, [accessed on 16 November 2016].
[297] 'www.historyofparliamentonline.org', <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/search/site/RN>, [accessed on 16 November 2016].

brought into the homes of ordinary Britons. Another, perhaps less patriotic example is the reporting of the cost of 'repairing and building' the Royal Navy in 1768 by the same paper.[298] The Salisbury Journal's reporting that the 'Government have contracted for mahogany beams for the service of the Royal Navy, which are to be brought hitherto from the Bay of Honduras,'[299] demonstrates the transatlantic influence such media could wield. Whether it was trade, finance or war the British media brought the characteristics of empire into the homes of the everyday Britons and that it was also not only the Royal Navy as an institution that established the British Empire in the minds of its citizens but also the individuals within it.

The language of the Royal Navy also permeated throughout empire. From 'learning the ropes' to going 'skylarking', there are many phrases and expressions still in use today whose origins lie amongst the lower deck of British Men of War.[300] Many of these phrases are based on events in the eighteenth century, for example, 'to turn a blind eye' relates to the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801. Horatio Nelson held a telescope to his blind eye in order to disregard the flagship's signal to withdraw and thus, continue the battle to its successful conclusion.[301] With no logical literary link between the event and pretending not to notice a transgression, it can be surmised that this phrase has made its way into language through the constant retelling of the story. Fictional literature also played a role, albeit to a lesser extent, in the proliferation of naval slang. Eric Partridge asserts that Tobias Smollett was the sole novelist of the eighteenth century with a thorough knowledge of nautical colloquialism and slang, however, he was not the only one to attempt to bring naval slang into literature.[302] Whether it was through written or spoken word, the infusion of naval activities into the English language is just another means by which the Royal Navy established the character of the British empire.

Less overt means by which the Royal Navy played an active role in the minds of the citizens of the Empire is infrastructure, industry and innovation. The Royal Navy was the single largest consumer of public funds and the simultaneous raising and spending of these funds, particularly during wartime, acted as a catalyst to the development of trade across Britain and her colonies.[303] The expansion of the Royal Navy to protect that trade led to the development of dockyard services and

[298] *Derby Mercury,* 01 January 1768, p.2.
[299] *The Salisbury and Winchester Journal*, 11 January 1768, p. 1.
[300] Martin Robson and Mark Myers, *Not enough room to swing a cat: Naval slang and its everyday usage* (US Naval Institute Press, 2010), pp. 7–295.
[301] *Oxford dictionary of word origins (Oxford paperback reference)*, Julia Cresswell (ed), 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), p. 50.
[302] David Oakleaf, 'Testing the Market: Robinson Crusoe and After', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, J.A. Downe (ed), (Oxford University Press), pp. 288-290.
[303] Rodger, *Command,* pp. 1068-1080.
Anthony Page, *Britain and the Seventy Years War, 1744-1815: Enlightenment, Revolution and Empire* (Palgrave, 2015), pp. 60-98.

support industries throughout the empire.[304] During the American War of Independence The Royal Navy purchased approximately 20% of produce sold on the agricultural market, cattle from Scotland and sheep from Wales were driven to London for use by the victualling board.[305] This necessitated the development of infrastructure, from the roads along which livestock were driven to the wharfs at which the Navy were supplied. These advances were not restricted to the metropole and there are numerous instances of measures introduced throughout the colonies to improve transportation networks.[306] The requirements to wage prolonged wars across vast tracts of ocean also led to significant developments in the administrative organisations that supported the Navy, which did much to facilitate the growth of an efficient agricultural market.[307] More tangible innovations include the work of naval surgeons such as James Lind and Gilbert Blane, whose work did much to preserve the health of mariners, particularly during long voyages.[308] In almost every aspect of British life, whether it be a drover from Porin or a merchant in Maryland, the lives of ordinary citizens were linked to the empire through the Royal Navy.

It is the Royal Navy's enforcement of government policy that was most responsible for division within the Empire. The origins of the American War of Independence demonstrate the division that the Royal Navy created within the British Atlantic Empire. It is by the very fact that the Royal Navy was the public face of empire, that it came to be the personification of authoritarian rule and a tyrannical regime.[309] When writing about the Royal Navy in his impassioned book 'Common Sense' Thomas Paine writes 'Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us'. As the 'father of the revolution' Paine's pamphlet was instrumental in eliciting popular support for rebellion; John Adams wrote 'Without the pen of the author of 'Common Sense,' the sword of Washington would have been raised in vain,'.[310] The Royal Navy was not only a means of combating the enemies of the state, but also of exercising authority internally.[311] In enforcing customs and revenue laws the Royal Navy seized ships, closed harbours and orientated its guns towards the British subjects it was charged with protecting.[312] In spite of the fact that there were a great many other factors, and indeed actors, at

[304] Patrick K. O'Brian, 'Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815', in P.J. Marshall (ed), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 1998). pp. 53-77.
[305] O'Brian, *British Empire,* pp. 53-77.
Page, *Britain and the Seventy Years War*, pp. 90-91.
[306] 'Early Roadways, 1631-1700', in 'www.roads.maryland.gov', <https://www.roads.maryland.gov/OPPEN/II-E_Rds.pdf>, [accessed on 16 November 2016].
[307] Rodger, *Command,* pp. 1068-1080.
[308] James Lind, *A Treatise of the Scurvy in Three Pars Containing An inquirey into the Nature, Causes and Cure, of that Disease* (Edinburgh, 1753).
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[309] Kinkel, *The Kings Pirates?,* pp. 3-34.
[310] Jill Lepore,'The Sharpened Quill: Was Thomas Paine too much of a freethinker for the country he helped free?', *The New Yorker,* 16 October 2006.
[311] Kinkel, *The Kings Pirates?,* pp. 3-34.
[312] Petley, *British Atlantic World,* pp. 1-19.

play, it is the British governments' increasingly authoritarian rule and interference with colonial commerce, epitomised by the Royal Navy, that is ultimately responsible for the rebellion in the 13 colonies.[313] The American War of Independence demonstrated the extreme end of division within the empire. While the strategic issues of self-determination and the British Constitution will dominate the studies of historians for years to come, it was the Royal Navy's enforcement of unpopular government policy that fostered tension, discord and division in the daily life of the colonists

The regulatory role of the Royal Navy continued to cause friction within the empire even after the Treaty of Paris. Writing in 1786 on the subject of the enforcement of the Navigation Acts Nelson states 'I looked upon the wisdom of the Legislature had directed at us, knowing that Sea Officers must be the best of judges of Vessels, and the best investigators of everything concerning them; that I felt myself not only authorized but required [to enforce the Navigation Acts].'.[314] Nelson proceeded to seize several American vessels as well as prevent others from engaging in trade with the islands; much to the consternation of the local customs office as well as the governor.[315] It is Nelson's account that best describes how the Royal Navy, so effective as a unifying factor, could cause such friction. The same factors which unified the empire were also intrinsic in its divisions. There has been little room to focus on the strategic ideas of the day, such as the symbiotic relationship between the Royal Navy and trade or the role of the agricultural revolution, urbanisation and colonisation that led to territorial gains and population growth. These subjects are certainly worth discussion and are a natural progression from the issues examined above. As the recent wave of modern populism shows, the day to day interactions between citizen and state have a profound impact on global affairs; lose the citizens, lose the state.[316] This essay has focussed on how the Royal Navy established the character of empire as its public face; the barometer of virtue and vitality. It has shown that it was an ever-present influence in the lives of British citizens throughout the empire, manifested in a variety of direct and indirect ways. It has also demonstrated that as a regulatory organisation the public face of empire was seen to be a source of division as a despotic means of exercising authoritarian control. Ultimately this essay has argued that the Royal Navy was the defining imperial institution, played out by the everyday interactions between the empire and the people within it.

[313] Stephen Conway, 'Another Look at the Navigation Acts and the Coming of the American Revolution', in Christer Petley and Jason McAleer, (eds), *The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic World, c. 1750-1820*, (Palgrove Macmillan, 2017), pp. 77–91.
[314] Nelson, *Dispatches,* p. 173.
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[316] Gideon Rose, 'The Power of Populism', *Foreign Affairs* 95 (November/December 2016), in 'foreignaffairs.com', <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-10-17/power-populism>, [accessed 17 November 2016].

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The First Suez Crisis: William Gladstone's reluctant invasion of Egypt in 1882

By James Hill

Abstract

The 1956 Suez crisis is etched on to the British consciousness as one of the final nails in the coffin of Britain's imperial decline. The crisis marked a turning point in Britain's post-war history as she rapidly decolonised. Yet this was not the first crisis to involve the Suez Canal. The Canal was barely a decade old when its wider geopolitical importance saw it precipitate a crisis. Although constructed by the French, the Canal had quickly become the British Empire's jugular vein; serving as the vital link between Britain and her colonies in the East, none more significant than India. Although British Prime Minister, William Gladstone, had been a sceptic of the Canal's importance, he and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, quickly came to see its importance. As in 1956, a threat to the Canal was a threat to Britain's imperial supremacy. Unlike Sir Anthony Eden, however, Gladstone did not actively seek the military intervention which inevitably occurred. Rather, as the author shows, he acted out of necessity and with reluctance, carried along first by French chauvinism and later by pragmatic obligation to protect the route to India.

The Suez fiasco of 1956 is often seen as the watershed moment in the British Empire's decline.[317] The humiliation of Sir Anthony Eden on the world stage was symbolic of the wider humiliation of Britain as she retreated, often unwillingly, from her colonies following the Second World War. Yet the 1956 crisis was not the first to envelop the Canal. The first occurred in 1882, on the eve of the so-called Scramble for Africa, a decade which saw Africa divided between the European powers, one of the main beneficiaries of which was Britain. Almost foreshadowing the events of 1956, the first Suez crisis stemmed from a military *coup d'état* led by Ahmed Arabi in September 1881.[318] The British annexation of Egypt occurred as a defensive measure to protect the Suez Canal, the artery between the metropole and her Imperial jewel: India.[319] Britain, and to begin with France, sought to protect their interests in Egypt they perceived were threatened by the rise of Arabi. As shall be demonstrated, Britain acted in reluctant cooperation with France lest they took the Canal for themselves.[320] The British also sought to secure Arabi's cooperation through force, though it is important to note that such threats were never intended to be carried out.[321] By using the correspondence between the Liberal Prime Minister, William Gladstone, and his Foreign

[317] John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonisation in Africa*, 2nd edn. (1988; London: Longman, 1996), pp. 168-70
[318] Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*, 2nd edn (1991; London: Abacus, 1992), p. 124
[319] Paul Knaplund, *The British Empire – 1815-1939* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1942), p. 416
[320] This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[321] This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

Secretary, Lord Granville, it shall be shown that at no point through all these crises did Britain contemplate invading Egypt; indeed, the nature of the invasion was the antithesis of British imperial doctrine up to that point and the personal dogma of Gladstone himself. As such, the events of 1882 can only be rationalised when looked upon with an appreciation that the Suez Canal was the highway between Europe and the Far East. The biggest users of this highway were British, hence when the Canal was threatened, Britain stood to lose the most and felt compelled into action in a way in which other powers were not.

Differing interpretations of the events surrounding the British intervention have developed into a rich historiographical debate. Many of the early narratives were written by those who had first-hand experience in Egypt at the time of the intervention. Two such examples are Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt* and William Scawen Blunt's *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*.[322] Milner's reading of events saw Britain's intervention as coming to save Egypt from Arabi's supposedly barbaric regime; for Milner, it was Egypt's internal chaos which had prompted Britain to act.[323] It is important to remember that prior to the rise of Arabi, excessive borrowing and financial mismanagement by the Egyptian Khedive (Viceroy) resulted in bankruptcy in 1876 and the imposition of an Anglo-French body charged with managing Egyptian finances.[324] The sizeable number of creditors the Egyptian Government had led Blunt to see the invasion occurring at the behest of the bondholders of Egyptian debt who feared their money would not be repaid.[325] Questions were raised almost immediately as to the influence the bondholders had on events; Gladstone sought to privately deny their influence as early as September 1882.[326] Subsequent proponents of the bondholder thesis have included A.G. Hopkins and the Marxist historian, V.G. Kiernan.[327]

No assessment of the historiography of the intervention could occur without discussing the contribution of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher. Over three separate works, including their *magnum opus*, *Africa and the Victorians*, Robinson and Gallagher expanded and refined their understanding of the intervention.[328] The Robinson and Gallagher narrative of the intervention is fundamentally Suez-centric. Britain intervened in Egypt, as they did elsewhere, out of necessity

[322] Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt*, 6th edn. (1892; London: Edward Arnold, 1899); Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (London: Martin Secker, 1907)
[323] Milner, pp. 12-16
[324] Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid-Marsot, 'The British Occupation of Egypt from 1882', in *The Oxford History of the British Empire – Volume III, the Nineteenth Century*, ed. by A. Porter, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 651-664 (p. 653)
[325] Blunt
[326] William Gladstone, 'Letter to Rev. Dr. E.A. Abbott', 17th September 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1883), p. 336. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[327] A.G. Hopkins, 'The Victorians and Africa: a reconsideration of the occupation of Egypt, 1882', *Journal of African History*, 27.1 (1986), 363-391; V. G. Kiernan, 'Farewells to Empire: Some Recent Studies of Imperialism', *Socialist Register*, 1.1 (1964), 259–79
[328] Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, 6.1 (1953), 1–15; Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961); Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, 'The Partition of Africa' in *The New Cambridge Modern History – Volume XI Material Progress and World-Wide Problems – 1870-1898*, ed. by F.H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 593-640

because the previous methods of informal empire had failed, threatening Britain's strategic interests.[329] If she did not act, France or later Egypt, risked taking control of the Canal to the detriment of Britain's sizeable imperial interests in the East.[330] Robinson and Gallagher's work has dominated the scholarly debate since its publication, with subsequent historians arguing both for and against their hypothesis.[331] Despite the passage of time, however, it is their work which one finds most convincing and therefore the viewpoint which one shall seek to espouse.

To understand the events of 1882 and why Britain felt obliged to intervene in Egypt, we must first assess how the Suez Canal was perceived, not only by the population of Britain but also more specifically by Gladstone himself. Until it opened in 1869, the British government had been thoroughly against the construction of the Canal, seeing it as a threat to their strategic interests.[332] Once the Canal had opened, however, the British position soon changed to one of dependence, with the vast majority of the Canal's traffic flying a British ensign; by 1882 eighty percent of the Canal's traffic was British.[333] The British reliance upon the Canal led directly to the then Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, purchasing just under half of the shares in the Canal in 1875.[334] The reason for this purchase, Disraeli told the House of Commons the following year, was so that Britain could secure her 'highway' to India.[335] The perception in the public mind that the Canal was controlled by Britain and was the key to India can be seen in two *Punch* cartoons of the period; the first one (Figure 1), shows Disraeli holding the 'key to India' whilst the second (Figure 2), shows a lion, symbolising Britain, guarding over a similar key whilst Disraeli buys the Khedive's stake in the Canal. In the British mind, the Canal was Britain's route to India and therefore any threat to the Canal was a threat to her hold on India.

In contrast with this view of the Canal was the view held by the Liberal Party leader, William Gladstone. Whilst not an anti-imperialist, Gladstone did not believe that the Empire needed to expand under his premiership, seeing it as already overextended.[336] There are two key sources from which we can deduce Gladstone's attitude to the Empire and to Egypt. The first are the speeches made by him in the lead up to the 1880 election.[337] Subsequently known as the Midlothian Campaign, these speeches were resolute in their opposition to further expansion.[338] The second

329 Robinson and Gallagher, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', p. 13

330 Ibid., pp. 13-4; Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, p. 462-3; Robinson and Gallagher, 'The Partition of Africa' pp. 593-640 (p. 599)

331 Hopkins, p. 370

332 David K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire, 1830-1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 121; M.E. Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa*, 2nd edn. (1974; London; Longman, 1999), p. 30

333 John M. Mackenzie, *The Partition of Africa 1800-1900* (London: Methuen & Co., 1983), p. 11; Chamberlain, T*he Scramble for Africa*, p. 31

334 Mackenzie, p. 11; Robert Ensor, *The Oxford History of England Volume XIV – England 1870-1914*, 19th edn. (1936; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 77; Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa*, p. 33; Fieldhouse, p. 121; Paul Knaplund, *The British Empire – 1815-1939*, p. 416; Roy Jenkins, *Gladstone* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 502

335 House of Commons, *House of Commons Debate* (21 February 1876, vol. 227 col 661) <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1876/feb/21/resolution-adjourned-debate#S3V0227P0_18760221_HOC_73> [Accessed: 24th November 2017]

336 Jenkins, p. 500

337 William E. Gladstone, *Political Speeches in Scotland, November and December 1879* (London: W. Ridgway, 1879)

338 William E. Gladstone, 'Third Midlothian Speech', 27th November 1879, in *Political Speeches in Scotland, November and December 1879* (London: W. Ridgway, 1879), pp. 96-131 (p. 116)

indication we have is a piece Gladstone contributed to the periodical *Nineteenth Century* in 1877.[339] In the article Gladstone dismisses the notion that Britain is dependent upon India and that the Canal is central to the maintenance of the Raj.[340] He reminds the reader of the of the alternative route to India via the Cape of Good Hope.[341] Indeed, Gladstone goes so far to say that an occupation of Egypt to protect the Canal would not assist Britain; to the contrary, it would be more trouble than it was worth.[342]

It is clear, therefore, that Gladstone was both dismissive of the notion of Britain's dependence upon the Suez Canal and of her need to intervene in Egypt to protect this supposed strategic interest. Having come to power following the 1880 election, Gladstone's priority was domestic; one only needs to read his diary from January to August 1882 to see his attention was predominantly upon political reforms in Ireland rather than matters Egyptian.[343] Indeed, when writing to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville in early July, Gladstone expressed his concern that Parliament was distracted away from Ireland by events in Egypt, a clear indicator as to where his priorities lay in the first half of 1882.[344]

At the dawn of 1882, it is unequivocal that Britain's eyes were firmly set upon minimal intervention in Egyptian affairs. Egypt was still technically an Ottoman province therefore military intervention should logically be Ottoman and not from another power.[345] A letter from Gladstone to Queen Victoria in early 1882 shows this to be his position on the matter.[346] Indeed, Gladstone was naturally sympathetic to the nationalist cause in Egypt; writing to Granville on 5 January 1882, he declared his support for the nationalist cry of 'Egypt for the Egyptians', stating that he believed Arabi to be a potential solution to the 'Egyptian Question' rather than a further complication of it.[347]

Despite Gladstone's convictions, it must be remembered that Britain was not the only power with vested interests in Egypt.[348] France shared many of the same concerns. Indeed, D.K. Fieldhouse has demonstrated that up to the British intervention, France was economically and culturally involved in Egypt to a far greater extent than Britain.[349] In addition to this, it was of course France who had

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[339] William E. Gladstone, *Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East. – Article contributed by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., To the Nineteenth Century in 1877.*, 2nd edn (1877; London: The National Press Agency, 1884)
[340] Ibid., p. 9
[341] Ibid., p. 13
[342] Ibid., p. 14
[343] *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 188-306
[344] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc. 741, 5th July 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 385-6. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[345] H.C.G. Matthew, *Gladstone – 1875-1898* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 130
[346] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone writes to the Queen', 2nd February 1882, in *The Scramble for Africa*, ed. by Robin Brooke-Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 14-15
[347] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc. 599, 5th January 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 326-7. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[348] This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[349] Fieldhouse, pp. 120-1

originally funded and built the Suez Canal.[350] Whilst Gladstone had a very hands-off approach towards Egypt, this was not shared by his French counterpart, Leon Gambetta, who came to power in November 1881, seeking greater aggression towards Egypt.[351] The specific reasons for Gambetta's stance are unclear, but it is likely that the French bondholders were more successful in lobbying their government than their British counterparts; indeed, Gambetta's successor as Prime Minister, Charles de Freycinet, believed this to be the case.[352]

The British approach towards Egypt at this time can best be described as reluctant cooperation. By acting together, Gladstone hoped that the two powers would create a united front of mutual interest in Egypt, thus preventing active intervention. Indeed, the primary reason Britain escalated her involvement, contrary to Gladstone's instincts, was because if Britain did not follow the French lead, there was a risk France would act unilaterally and occupy Egypt.[353] Granville wrote to Lord Dufferin, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, in October 1881, stating that Britain's cooperation with France stemmed from a desire not to allow France 'any predominance' in the country, as such a turn of events could have jeopardised the British route to India.[354] Such fears were not unfounded. The atmosphere in which these events were occurring must be remembered; the previous year the French had annexed Tunisia in similar circumstances.[355] Furthermore, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, Britain herself had threatened to block access to the Canal unless both parties guaranteed its use would not be interrupted.[356] If Britain had previously been able to act unilaterally to protect the Canal and her strategic interests, it would have been entirely reasonable for the British to assume that another power, of equal regional strength and ambition would be able to do the same. It was vital, therefore, that Britain cooperate with France lest she gain the right to grant access to the Canal which Britain relied upon.

Although Britain was unable to allow France to solve the Egyptian question on its own, dual action was, in British eyes, a compromise that was far from ideal. By cooperating, Gladstone and Granville feared that France would push for an extension of the Anglo-French control which already existed over the Egyptian finances, potentially morphing it into a condominium over Egypt; something which they both opposed.[357] Rather than wanting dual Anglo-French action, their view was that if an intervention had to occur, it should be led either by the Ottomans or by

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[350] Ibid., p. 121; Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire – Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 155-6

[351] John Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations – 1800-1953* (London: Cresset, 1954), pp. 116-7; Fieldhouse, p. 262

[352] Mahmud Y. Zayid, *Egypt's Struggle for Independence* (Beirut, Lebanon Khayats, 1965), p. 18; Pakenham, p. 124; Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt – Volume I* (London: Macmillan, 1908), p. 41; Charles de Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte* (Paris, France: Calmann-Lévy, 1905), pp. 168-9

[353] Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, p. 94

[354] Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Lord Dufferin on the position of Turkey', 15th October 1881, in *The Scramble for Africa*, ed. by R. Brooke-Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), p. 15

[355] Pakenham, pp. 117-9; Mark I. Choate, 'Identity Politics and Political Perception in the European Settlement of Tunisia: The French Colony versus the Italian Colony', *French Colonial History*, 8.1 (2007), 97-109 (p. 99)

[356] Halford L. Hoskins, 'The Suez Canal in Time of War', *Foreign Affairs*, 14.1 (1935), 93-101 (pp. 95-6). This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

[357] Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Mr Gladstone', Doc. 588, 15th December 1881, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 320-1; Fieldhouse, pp. 124-5

many European powers - the so-called 'European concert' - acting together; this approach was supported by the wider British Cabinet.[358]

The culmination of the Anglo-French cooperation was the presentation of the Joint Note to the Khedive in late January 1882.[359] Having been extensively drafted and discussed, it was hoped that the Note would reaffirm Anglo-French support for the Khedive and their desire for the *status quo* to continue.[360] As D.C.M. Platt persuasively argued, however, it must be remembered that despite being described as a Joint Note, it was the work predominantly of Gambetta, rather than of Gladstone.[361] Indeed, Robinson and Gallagher have sought to portray Gladstone as unwillingly subscribing to the note.[362] Such a claim is misleading though for the Note had been extensively discussed and approved in the Cabinet prior to its transmission.[363] One cannot excuse the British from culpability, because they were clearly complicit in its authoring. Regardless, it is clear that Gladstone did not see the Note as the first step towards any further intervention into Egyptian affairs.

Despite the intentions of Gladstone's government, the Note failed to achieve its purpose. Instead of reinforcing the authority of the Khedive, the Note only served to further undermine it, driving a wedge between himself and Arabi.[364] Cromer illustrated its effect wonderfully, comparing the Note to a candle being lit in a coal mine which was full of fire damp.[365] Likely fearful of an intervention akin to the French invasion of Tunisia the previous year, the Egyptian nationalists saw the Note as a threat rather than an olive branch from the powers.[366] The surprise in Whitehall at the Note's failure is clear. Twice in the days following its delivery, Granville wrote to Gladstone expressing shock that the Note had proven unsuccessful.[367] Egypt's nationalists were a diverse group, only united by their revulsion of foreign rule, both Ottoman and European.[368] The Joint Note debacle only served to further strengthen Arabi's legitimacy in the eyes of the nationalists who felt threatened by the powers.[369] D.K. Fieldhouse has claimed that prior to the Joint Note, Arabi was a

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358 Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Mr Gladstone', Doc. 588, 15th December 1881,; William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc. 606, 17th January 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 330-1; Cabinet Minutes, 1st February 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 205-6

359 The exact wording of the Joint Note is quoted in: Marlowe, p. 118

360 M.E. Chamberlain, 'Sir Charles Dilke and the British Intervention In Egypt, 1882: Decision Making In a Nineteenth- Century Cabinet', *Review of International Studies*, 2.1 (1976), 231–45 (p. 233)

361 D.C.M. Platt, *Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy – 1815-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 174

362 Robinson and Gallagher, 'The Partition of Africa', p. 598

363 Cabinet Minutes, 25th January 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 201

364 Al-Sayyid-Marsot, p. 654; Zayid, p. 22; Pakenham, p. 125

365 Cromer, p. 243. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

366 Chamberlain, 'Sir Charles Dilke and the British Intervention In Egypt, 1882: Decision Making In a Nineteenth- Century Cabinet', p. 233

367 Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Mr Gladstone', Doc. 601, 12th January 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 328; Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Mr Gladstone', Doc. 602, 15th January 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 328-9

368 Marlowe, pp. 112-3

369 Ibid., p. 117

moderate nationalist, willing to honour the Egyptian debts.[370] Whether this would have happened had the course of events been different is unclear; what is significant though is that following the fiasco, Arabi was staunchly opposed to the Powers.[371]

With the fall of Gambetta at the end of January 1882 came a change of French policy. His successor, Charles de Freycinet, could not have been more different to his predecessor with regards to Egypt, taking a far more Gladstonian approach and wanting to leave Egypt alone.[372] As Alexander Schölch has argued, following the fall of Gambetta, the pressure upon Britain from their allies across the Channel evaporated.[373] Britain was no longer pressed into acting out of fear that France would unilaterally. Although one may think that Gladstone could have changed his view towards Egypt in the aftermath of the joint note, we can be sure of his continued adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention; in a letter to William Scawen Blunt shortly afterwards he unequivocally stated his continued adherence to the argument he laid out in the *Nineteenth Century* piece of 1877.[374]

In the aftermath of the Joint Note, Britain and France followed two lines of diplomacy which, although different in nature, both sought to prevent intervention. On the one hand there was a joint show of force in Alexandria whilst on the other hand, a conference to solve the Egyptian question was convened in Constantinople simultaneously. The conference occurred at the suggestion of the French and was attended by the major European powers and the Ottomans.[375] It is often neglected by historians as it was eclipsed by the subsequent British intervention and arguably made little meaningful impact; in the context of this research, the Conference proves to be a backdrop to events elsewhere, yet its occurrence is still noteworthy. Indeed, the correspondence between Gladstone and Granville and the British representative at the conference, Lord Dufferin, is testament to the British desire to avoid an intervention.

The primary effort to achieve peace in Egypt was by the dispatching of British and French ships to Alexandria in May 1882.[376] Although it was alleged by Randolph Churchill in a speech in 1884 that the fleet was dispatched solely as a show of force to protect the interests of the bondholders, it is clear that its primary objective was for other reasons.[377] As early as September 1881, Gladstone signalled to Granville that Britain and France should not use force in Egypt unless ships had to be

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370 Fieldhouse, p. 264

371 Chamberlain, 'Sir Charles Dilke and the British Intervention In Egypt, 1882: Decision Making In a Nineteenth- Century Cabinet', p. 133. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

372 Zayid, p. 22; Pakenham, p. 129; Marlowe, p. 119

373 Alexander Schölch, 'The "men on the spot" and the English occupation of Egypt in 1882', *Historical Journal*, 19.1 (1976), 773-85 (p. 774)

374 William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone's Answer', 20th January 1882, in Appendix II of Blunt, pp. 385-6; William E. Gladstone, 'To W.S. Blunt', 20th January 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 199

375 House of Commons, *House of Commons Debate* (1st June 1882, vol. 269 col 1778) <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1882/jun/01/egypt-political-affairs#S3V0269P0_18820601_HOC_8> [Accessed: 26th November 2017]

376 Ensor, p. 79; Al-Sayyid-Marsot, p. 654

377 Randolph Churchill, 'Lord Randolph Churchill's speech at Blackpool, 24th January 1884', in *Speeches of Rt. Hon Randolph Churchill, Vol I, 1880-88*, ed. by L.J. Jennings (London: Longmans, 1889), p. 100

sent for the '*bona fide* [genuine] protection of [British or French] subjects'.[378] The deployment of the ships, therefore, whilst potentially appearing like a reactionary measure, was in fact part of a strategy Gladstone had set out long in advance. Granville reaffirmed this in a telegram to Dufferin in Constantinople, explicitly stating that the fleet's presence did not come from a desire to amend the wider *status quo* in Egypt.[379]

The choice of Alexandria as the location for this fleet to be dispatched to is logical when one considers that it had a sizeable European community.[380] The fleet was a show of force, as Churchill claimed, but it did not occur at the behest of the bondholders. Rather it was a wider assertion by the British and French of their many overlapping interests in Egypt, none more so than the Suez Canal. Indeed, soon after the fleet was dispatched, Lord Granville instructed the British Consul-General in Cairo, Edward Malet, to inform Arabi that he would be held culpable for any disturbances that occurred.[381] Yet this letter also asserted that should Arabi remain loyal to the Khedive, 'his acts and persons will be favourably regarded'.[382] Clearly the British vision for the path forward in Egypt was not one which necessarily excluded Arabi; in British eyes he simply needed reminding that he was subservient to the Khedive who himself followed Anglo-French orders.[383]

As was the case with the Joint Note, the display of force had the opposite effect to what had been anticipated. On 11 June, a violent riot spread across Alexandria, resulting in the death of dozens of Europeans, including the British representative in the city.[384] It is important to note the way in which the riot was reported and depicted in Britain. Although Arabi had not directly incited the riot, nor was he in Alexandria at the time, it was his followers who were responsible.[385] Despite this, *The Times* drew the distinction between the actions of Arabi and of his followers.[386] Following the riot, the front page of the *London Illustrated News* (Figure 3) depicted the contrast between the supposedly savage rioters and the calm, collected, Europeans; such a depiction is akin to the contrast between the British and the Mahdists in Joy's masterpiece *Gordon's Last Stand* (Figure 4). Similarly, the *Pall Mall Gazette* claimed that there was 'no doubt that the soldiers assisted largely in the scenes of disorder' whilst the *Daily News* claimed, in the days following the riot, 'a massacre is possible at any moment'.[387] The British response to the riots was one of horror that such an event

[378] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', 13th September 1881, in *The Scramble for Africa*, ed. by Robin Brooke-Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), p. 12
[379] Lord Granville, 'Granville explains the dispatch of ships to Alexandria', Doc. 162, 23rd May 1882, in *Foundations of British Foreign Policy – From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)*, ed. by H. Temperley and L.M. Penson, 2nd edn (1938; London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966), pp. 416-7. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[380] Jenkins, p. 504
[381] Lord Granville, 'Letter from Lord Granville', 14th May 1882, in *Egypt, 1879-1883*, ed. by E.B. Malet (London: John Murray, 1909), p. 324
[382] Ibid.
[383] The structure and content of this paragraph was considerably amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[384] Ensor, p. 79; Fieldhouse, p. 264; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion – 1688-1914* (Harlow: Longman, 1993), p. 368. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[385] Ensor, p. 79
[386] *The Times* extract quoted in: 'The Crisis in Egypt – The Khedive in Alexandria', *Pall Mall Gazette*, 14th June 1882, p. 7
[387] 'The Crisis in Egypt – The Riots of Sunday Last', *Pall Mall Gazette*, 14th June 1882, p. 7; *Daily News* extract quoted in: 'The Crisis in Egypt – The Situation Yesterday' *Pall Mall Gazette*, 14th June 1882, p. 7

could occur, and fear of further violence against British subjects. Considering Granville's previous instructions to Malet, it is understandable that the British Cabinet was afraid, perhaps not of Arabi himself but more of the movement he led and the challenge to the *status quo* it represented.[388] Indeed, the Cabinet was split over how to deal with the Egyptian question; Gladstone found himself opposed by a majority of his ministers, who were in favour of a more hawkish approach.[389] Charles Dilke, not a member of the Cabinet though a frequent attendee, claimed in his diary that he had told the Cabinet either 'Arabi must go or I will'.[390] Whether he expressed his views in such a forthright manner is unclear, but it is testament to his opinion on the matter.[391] In a manner akin to the national response to the 1884-5 Siege of Khartoum Gladstone found himself under immense pressure from his Cabinet and the public to act, contrary to his instincts.[392]

Gladstone's approach to the troubles in Egypt rested upon the notion that the Suez Canal was still not in danger. In the Cabinet meeting of the 21 June, the possibility of needing to protect the Canal from 'disruption' was discussed, but such discussions were only contingency plans.[393] Indeed, at the same meeting, the Cabinet agreed to ask at the Conference for the Ottoman Sultan to intervene in Egypt, which is indicative of how the Liberal government viewed the matter.[394] Unless British subjects or interests, of which the Canal was the largest, were threatened, any internal unrest in Egypt remained a matter for the Ottomans. Further testament to this explanation of Gladstone's approach can be seen in the response sent to Lord Dufferin after the latter informed the Government in late June, 1882, that the Sultan had offered Britain the right to administer Egypt.[395] This proposal was quickly rejected by Gladstone and Granville, the telegram they sent back reiterated Britain's commitment to the *status quo*.[396] Indeed, it was the Prime Minister who suggested that the language of the telegram be strengthened so as to make the British opposition to the proposal even clearer.[397] Although one could write off the rejection as being on the wrong terms, it is noteworthy that the terms offered by the Sultan were almost identical to the system of indirect control which emerged following the intervention. If as late as June, the British had rejected the chance to gain control of Egypt, it is difficult to rationalise the invasion which occurred a little over a month later as being anything other than a defensive action to protect the Canal.

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[388] This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[389] Jenkins, p. 504. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[390] Quoted in Chamberlain, 'Sir Charles Dilke and the British Intervention in Egypt, 1882: Decision Making In a Nineteenth- Century Cabinet', p. 236
[391] Ibid.
[392] Jenkins, pp. 500-18; William H. Rehnquist, '"All Discord, Harmony not Understood": The Performance of the Supreme Court of the United States', *Arizona Law Review*, 22.4 (1980), 973-86 (pp. 982-3)
[393] Cabinet Minutes, 21st June 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 283-4
[394] Ibid.
[395] Lord Dufferin, Telegram No. 168, 24th June 1882, in *Lord Dufferin, Mr. Wyndham. Telegrams. Despatches. 1-192. Vol. 1.*, FO 78/3397, The National Archives, Kew. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[396] Lord Granville, Telegram No. 302, 25th June 1882, in *Lord Dufferin, Mr. Wyndham. Telegrams. Drafts. 1-464. Vol. 1.*, FO 78/3395, The National Archives, Kew
[397] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc. 733, 25th June 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 382

Despite all the discussion of seeking to maintain the *status quo*, the British chose to bombard Alexandria on 11 July.[398] This occurred unilaterally as the French had ordered their ships away from Alexandria shortly beforehand.[399] This occurred, as Gladstone saw it, because of divisions within the French government.[400] The exact reasons for the bombardment are disputed. The contemporary justification was that it occurred to prevent the construction of fortifications around Alexandria; such a justification, however, is unsatisfactory.[401] A.G. Hopkins is correct in asserting that the bombardment cannot be seen as an action linked the Canal because of the distance between Suez and Alexandria; rather, as H.C.G. Matthews proposes, the bombardment occurred to reaffirm British strength following the riot.[402] What is clear is that the bombardment should not be seen as the first step to a British invasion.[403] Firstly, in a letter to Granville following the bombardment, Gladstone recounted a conversation he held that day with the Ottoman ambassador.[404] In the conversation, Gladstone had made it clear that he saw the bombardment as 'the supreme moment' for the Ottomans, implying the initiative to act now rested with them, rather than Britain.[405] Furthermore, Gladstone supported Granville's order to deploy military forces to Alexandria in the aftermath of the bombardment to restore and maintain order.[406] Gladstone was determined for this not to escalate though; writing to his Secretary for War, H.C.E. Childers, Gladstone stated that Britain 'must not be suspected of invasion', fearing that such a misinterpretation would 'entail grave complications'.[407] The bombardment was a measure intended to protect British subjects and had strict limits attached to it; Britain clearly still saw Egypt's wider problems as an issue for the Ottomans to resolve. The legality and justification of this approach is disputable, the fact it happened, though, is a clear indication of the British approach to Egypt in the lead up to the invasion. The eventual British intervention of August 1882 should not be the culmination of a linear progression of action from the bombardment; as Agatha

[398] Ensor, p. 79
[399] Pakenham, p. 133; Robinson and Gallagher, 'The Partition of Africa' p. 599; Ensor, p. 79
[400] Lord Lyons, Telegram No. 121, 5th July 1882, in *From Mr. Plunkett. Telegrams.*, FO 27/2574, The National Archives, Kew; William E. Gladstone, 'Letter to Thomas Gladstone', 25th July 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 304
[401] Cabinet Minutes, 3rd July 1882, *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 291
[402] Hopkins, p. 373; Matthew, p 134
[403] This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.
[404] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc. 757, 13th July 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 393-4
[405] Ibid.
[406] Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Mr Gladstone', Doc. 746, 15th July 2882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 396; William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc. 756, 15th July 1882, on *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 396; Lord Granville, Telegram No. 343, 15th July 1882, in *Sir E. Malet, Mr. Cartwright. Egypt. Telegram. Drafts. 1-389. Vol. 1.*, FO 78/3446, The National Archives, Kew
[407] William E. Gladstone, 'Letter to H.C.E. Childers', 15th July 1882, in *The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence – Volume X January 1881 – June 1883*, ed. by H.C.G. Matthew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 299. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

Ramm observed, it was six weeks from the bombardment to any military action taking place, clearly the bombardment was not preparing the ground for an invasion.[408]

In the aftermath of the bombardment, it is clear Gladstone's attention remained firmly fixed on the security of the Canal. When news reached Whitehall of Arabi's dismissal from the Egyptian government on 16 July, Granville wrote to Gladstone stating that he believed an attack upon Alexandria by Arabi's troops to be 'impossible' but that there was a slim chance he would be able to attack Suez.[409] Clearly, in his assessment, there was a possibility that Arabi posed a threat to British interests in the Canal. Gladstone began to prepare for an intervention against Arabi should he pose a threat, his letter to Granville on 22 July showing Gladstone was now open to the possibility of unilateral action.[410] Yet this was to be a last resort; in the same letter he said that Britain should be making 'every effort to procure collective or joint action'.[411] At the conference, the Ottoman Sultan was given twelve hours to agree to intervene; if he failed to, Britain would take matters into her own hands.[412] Although this may seem like Gladstone was manoeuvring to create a situation which justified unilateral action, he still at this stage sought support from another power. He proposed asking Italy to join the potential British intervention; such a proposal is rather unexpected as up to this point Italy had played only a minimal role in the Egyptian crisis.[413] Yet it is indicative of the lengths Gladstone was willing to go to avoid unilateral action.

Although it has been asserted by many, including A.G. Hopkins, that the British intervention occurred to serve financial interests, such a conclusion is unsatisfactory.[414] As has been shown, Britain was reluctant to act but only did so to protect the Suez Canal. This is not to absolve Britain from blame for the events which precipitated the occupation; indeed, many of the issues Britain faced, such as a hostile Arabi, were the product of their own actions. It is clear, however, that Gladstone had a principled objection to expansionist imperialist policies; in the case of Egypt first espoused these in 1877 and reasserted it through much of 1882 and it was only when pragmatic necessity forced his hand that he reluctantly took action. The beginning of events, the Joint Note, only saw Anglo-French intervention because the British were concerned that France would annex Egypt and take the Canal for herself. The British actions, however ill-applied, were all based upon

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[408] Agatha Ramm, 'Great Britain and France in Egypt, 1876-1882', in *France and Britain in Africa – Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, ed. by P. Gifford and Wm. Roger Lewis (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 73-120 (p. 110)

[409] William Cartwright, Telegram No. 239, 16th July 1882, in *Sir E. Malet, Mr. Cartwright. Egypt. Telegram. Despatches. 289-550. Vol. 2.*, FO 78/3449, The National Archives, Kew; Lord Granville, 'Lord Granville to Mr Gladstone', Doc. 767, 16th July 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 397. This sentence and footnote was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

[410] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc 777, 22nd July 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 401. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

[411] Ibid.. This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

[412] Lord Granville, Telegram No. 403, 19th July 1882, in *Lord Dufferin, Mr. Wyndham. Telegrams. Drafts. 1-464. Vol. 1.*, FO 78/3395, The National Archives, Kew; William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc 778, 22nd July 1882, in *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886 – Volume I – 1876-1882*, ed. by A. Ramm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 401-2

[413] William E. Gladstone, 'Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville', Doc 778, 22nd July 1882

[414] Hopkins

a desire to avoid an intervention in Egypt. Where necessary, as was the case with the bombardment of Alexandria, this intervention was strictly limited to protect British subjects. As Robinson and Gallagher have shown, for the Canal to be disrupted was for Britain's imperial jugular vein to India to be blocked.[415] If other readings of events are to be believed, Britain would surely have invaded months before she eventually did. The Ottomans even offered Britain control of Egypt, so one cannot say she lacked an *a priori* opportunity or an excuse to take direct control of Egypt. To the end Gladstone and Granville were reluctant to act unilaterally but eventually faced no other option. Britain had by far the most to lose from any disruption to the Canal, therefore she was eventually forced to intervene.[416]

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
[415] Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, p. 470
[416] This sentence was amended following feedback from Dr Christopher Prior.

Appendix



"MOSÉ IN EGITTO!!!"

Figure 1: "Mose in Egitto!!!", in *Punch*, 11th December 1875, p. 245. [Accessed: 16th November 2017].



THE LION'S SHARE.

"GARE À QUI LA TOUCHE!"

Figure 2: "The Lion's Share.", in *Punch,* 26th February 1876, p. 69. [Accessed: 18th November 2017].



Figure 3: "Rioters at Alexandria." In *London Illustrated News*, no. 2252 (Saturday, 1st July 1882), p. 1




Figure 4: George William Joy, *Gordon's Last Stand*, 1893, oil on canvas, 236 × 175 cm, Leeds Art Gallery, Leeds.

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Was the British intervention in Indian Culture a Positive Intervention?

By Daniel Williams

Abstract

This article looks at how Britain's imperial intervention into India drastically altered their development in culture, religion, and education. Britain attempted to impose modernity and reason onto India through new laws and policies, this article examines those actions and assesses whether their impact was more damaging than beneficial.

Britain's intervention in Indian culture was guided by the idea of the civilising mission whereby Indian customs and knowledge were to be supplanted by 'superior' Western values particularly with regards to the position of women, religion, and education. The result of this brash intervention was a clash of modernity's; some accepted the British rationalism and created a hybrid identity where others rejected it and fell back on conservative traditions. On the surface it may appear to have created positive change by forcing India to critically examine its own society and reject outdated customs and principles, however, such a Eurocentric viewpoint should be avoided as it deprives India of agency in its own development. To accept that notion would be to ignore the development that India made in the centuries before colonial intervention and their potential for change thereafter. The British suffered from their own imperialist perspective as their attempts to understand Indian society based on ancient texts led to their ill-informed attempts at development and ultimately caused regression and unnecessary struggle. No one can say how India may have developed left to its own volition but the evidence from the pre-colonial period and the known regressive impacts of Western intervention suggests they might have prospered and potentially developed their own unique modernity.

Britain's initial response to India was a desire to establish power over it and to do this they sought to understand India through the orientalist study of ancient texts.[417] India was perceived as something that could be learnt and therefore controlled, a perception that ignores the people and their ability to affect change. Said summarises this position eloquently observing Balfour's imperialist logic: he knew Egypt and so he knew that Egypt had never had and therefore could never have self-government thus justifying British assistance in development.[418] Clive's 'Speech in the Commons on India' in 1772 reflects a similar disposition using phrases such as "Indostan was

[417] Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p3.
[418] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Routledge, 1978), p34.

always"[419] and "from time immemorial"[420] to suggest that his understanding of India was complete whilst the natives had distorted what India should be and incited a period of decline. Lata Mani underlines that such a perspective was problematic when it came to intervention because their dependence on ancient texts and neglect of the contemporary world led them to reinvent traditions that had naturally faded in relevance through the years.[421] The most contentious point being widow immolation, or sati, which was limited to Calcutta and upper caste Hindus but because of the primacy of ancient texts in orientalist study was perceived as widespread and portrayed in literature as a great disgrace to humanity.[422] The British response in 1813 was to ensure that sati was only performed with willing widows to bring it more in line with ancient scripture, the problem with this was that it legitimised the practice and invented a harmful tradition that otherwise might have naturally disappeared or at least remained insignificant.[423] Later in 1829 Sati was legally abolished which may appear to be a success of British modernity in guiding India to a more liberal position, however, the legislation was ultimately unsuccessful as it led to an orthodox backlash defending an invented tradition and sati continued to be reported into the 20th Century.[424]

It is also interesting to look at the impact of the imposition of British modernity on the discourse regarding sati particularly through the Indian response. One fault with Said's theory of orientalism is that it too, ironically, overlooks Indian agency in the process of domination.[425] It suggests a one-way process whereby Western powers force their ideology upon a submissive other. However, in India there was significant support for the abolition of sati, for example, Ram Mohun Roy campaigned rigorously for its removal and argued his case persuasively. Roy represented a dual identity that was created through what Hatcher refers to as eclecticism, that is, exposure to traditional Persian, Sanskrit and Arabic literature supplemented by a fluency in English.[426] Once again Roy's supposed adoption of western reason is held up as a triumph of British intervention, however, Sumit Sarkar rightfully observes how Roy's sense of reason actually declined in response to British stimulus.[427] Roy's earlier work such as his critique of monotheism in Tuhfat is based on reason and written in Persian and Sarkar argues he comes close to the vanishing point of religion.[428] After entering the East India Company in 1805 and adopting Western education, Roy appears to ape the British insistence on ancient texts as the basis of reason and supports the idea of

[419] Robert Clive, *Speech in Commons on India: 1772,* in *English Historical Documents,* Horn and Mary Ransome, eds. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p809.
[420] Ibid.
[421] Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India* in *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History,* ed. S. Vaid and K. Sangari *History* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p90.
[422] Ibid., p88.
[423] Ibid., p96.
[424] Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p212.
[425] Dilip Chavan, *Language Politics under Colonialism: Caste, class and language pedagogy in Western India* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), p10.
[426] Brian Hatcher, *Ecclecticism and modern Hindu Discourse*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p31.
[427] Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India* in *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History,* ed. S. Vaid and K. Sangari *History* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p91.
[428] Ibid., p113.

ancient India being a 'golden age' that has since been perverted.[429] His opposition to Sati is therefore based mainly on scripture arguing that it has no basis in Manu where ascetic widowhood is preferred. Interestingly, Roy seems to be the only interlocutor who, at least initially, is concerned with the actual impact on women. The debate overall uses women as a battleground of modernity where modern nations treat their women better, however, the actual position of women in Indian society is never part of the British concern as reflected by their 1813 Act insisting simply on the closer adherence to ancient law. By contrast Roy briefly appears to have a modern feminist perspective acknowledging male dominance in society and lamenting the treatment of women as "less than inferior animals"[430]. Therefore, it is possible that the imposition of Western education prevents intellectuals such as Roy from following their own reason and potentially creating their own modernity based on India's specific traditions.

It is difficult to assess the impact of British intervention in Indian education because it was inconsistent over the century. At first due to their tenuous authority they attempted simply to stimulate pre-existing systems of education and support native languages such as Persian, Arabic, and Sanskrit. Seemingly benevolent actions were taken to win the favour of the Hindu and Muslim groups, for example, Warren Hastings founded the Madrasa for the study of Islamic law and, following a letter from Jonathan Duncan, Governor-General Cornwallis established a Hindu college in Benares.[431] These acts preserved Sanskrit learning, allowed movement of Hindus and Muslims in the Judiciary, and strengthened British control as they were supported for continuing a tradition of rulers patronising education.[432] However, once the British had established a more secure control, doubt was cast over the value of orientalist languages and it was suggested that English be taught instead. William Macaulay played on the British sense of pride in his 'Minute on Education' in 1835 where he declared "a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia"[433] despite having "no knowledge of Sanskrit or Arabic"[434]. Bentinck's Resolution in March 1835 adopted this approach and made it official policy to switch funding to English education even in the Madrassa and Sanskrit college in Calcutta.[435]

Therefore, although initially British intervention in Indian education was somewhat positive, by 1835 all pretences disappeared, and a rash transplantation policy was adopted resulting in discontent and more importantly reinforcing division in the subcontinent. There was an

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[429] Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India* in *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History,* ed. S. Vaid and K. Sangari *History* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p113.
[430] Raja Rammohun Roy, *A second conference between an advocate for, and an opponent of, the practice of burning widows alive,* in *English Works Vol II,* ed. Jogendra Chunder Ghose (Calcutta: S. K. Lahiri & Co, 1901), p179.
[431] Lynn Zastouphi, *The Great Education Debate: documents relating to the Orientalist and Anglicist controversy, 1781-1843* (London: Curzon, 1999), p77.
[432] Lynn Zastouphi, *The Great Education Debate: documents relating to the Orientalist and Anglicist controversy, 1781-1843* (London: Curzon, 1999), p77.
[433] John Marriot ed., *Britain in India,* Vol 3- Education and Colonial Knowledge (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2006), p147.
[434] Ibid.
[435] Javed Majeed, *Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's "History of British India" and Orientalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p141.

alternative 'evolution' method that Krishnaswamy highlights and was fought for at the time by William Adam and Edmund Burke.[436] Similar to the methods before 1835 they wanted to build upon the traditional education already in place with European organisations thus creating education for the masses. However, it was never Macaulay's intention to educate the masses, rather to create a new class of Brown Sahibs, "Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect"[437]. They would act as interpreters for the British and allow them to issue commands, collect taxes, and maintain order. Upper caste Hindus such as Brahmins adapted well to a Western style education seeing an opportunity to reaffirm their position in society where other castes and particularly Muslims were squeezed out creating a bitter rivalry.[438] Dilip Chavan suggests that this was a purposeful strategy of divide and rule, to fragment society along religious and class lines to prevent them from creating a united front against the British.[439] Whilst this may overestimate British foresight it is certainly the effect it had. Despite Persian being the established language of communication, it was removed from education partially because it was perceived to support Islam. Trevelyan revealed in his letter to William Bentric in 1834 that he hoped the removal of Persian would "shake Hinduism and Mohammadinism to their centre and firmly establish our language, our learning and ultimately our religion in India."[440] Anil Seal's study shows after the 1860's Muslims were forced out of Imperial employment particularly the judiciary whilst Hindu's enrolled their children in English education to reinforce their dominance.[441] Although it was not divide and rule per se and Hindu elites took full advantage it certainly had the consequence of alienating the Muslim population which some argue was the root of their separatist movement and ultimately the creation of Pakistan. As with Britain's attempts to install reason and liberty in Indian culture the backlash against an alien modernity and its unforeseen consequences resulted in division and regression in India.

A final observation that can be made about British intervention in Indian culture is its impact on the development of Hinduism. As previously mentioned it was hoped English education would Christianise India and this is embodied by Roy who began to criticise Hinduism with the values of the European Enlightenment. British intervention is often credited, for example by W. C. Smith, with creating Hinduism by introducing the idea of a single text and a "single conceptual category on a variety of separate doctrines and customs that the Hindus did not realise were related"[442]. Therefore, the British are credited with both creating the major religion of India and then helping them reform it by providing them with reason to criticise it with. However, the

[436] N. Krishnaswamy, *The Story of English in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2006), p41.
[437] John Marriot ed., *Britain in India,* Vol 3- Education and Colonial Knowledge (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2006), p158.
[438] Dilip Chavan, *Language Politics under Colonialism: Caste, class and language pedagogy in Western India* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), p8.
[439] Ibid., p3.
[440] Dilip Chavan, *Language Politics under Colonialism: Caste, class and language pedagogy in Western India* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), p69.
[441] Ibid., p70.
[442] David N.Lorenzen, "Who invented Hinduism?", *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 41(4): 630-659, p632.

evidence from the pre-colonial developments within Hinduism reveal how this explanation is simply an extension of Britain's cultural arrogance and, in fact, its intervention stifled the development of modern Hinduism. Lorenzen observes that between the 12th and 16th century, Hinduism acquired a sharper self-conscious identity based on central texts such as the Bhagavad-gita, the Puranas, and philosophical commentaries on the six Darsanas.[443] Furthermore, there was a clear distinction between what was Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, and Christian before 1800 when the colonial influence began.[444] This was caused not by using definitions but through a process of contrasting mutual definition to a Muslim other. Moreover, there were radical reform movements similar to the European enlightenment addressing problems such as caste oppression, priestly power, and individual freedom well before Western reason was introduced. The 'Hindu Renaissance' of the 19th and 20th century was focused on resisting colonial modernity and trying to show the meaningfulness of Hinduism in the context of Christian missionary polemics rather than focussing on trying to fix the problems within Hinduism and develop a modernity more suited to India.[445] To suggest that without British rule Hinduism wouldn't have developed or improved is to remove any sense of agency from the Indian people. As Purushottom Agrawal puts it "we Indians may well have been denied the capacity to solve our own problems but are we so incapable that we could not even create them on our own."[446]

In conclusion, Britain's intervention in Indian culture was ill-informed and primarily based on an inherent cultural arrogance that blinded them to India's potential for development. The result was that Western modernity was forced upon a country for over a century which changed the trajectory of their development. Intervention in the 'women's question' was ineffective and created a regressive conservative backlash that prevented any improvement of the position of women in India. The introduction of Western education deprived India's intellectuals of the ability to develop their own reasoning with the resources of their native languages, more so it critically divided Indian society contributing to violent conflicts that survive till this day. And finally, Britain altered the course of Hinduism away from improvement towards conservatism whilst taking credit for its creation and evolution. This conflict of modernity's ultimately prevented India from developing their own unique modernity based on the culture and religion of the people.

[443] David N.Lorenzen, "Who invented Hinduism?", *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 41(4): 630-659, p.631
[444] Ibid., 642.
[445] Brian Hatcher, *Ecclecticism and modern Hindu Discourse*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p13.
[446] David N.Lorenzen, "Who invented Hinduism?", *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 41(4): 630-659, p654.

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'America First'? A Historiographical Review of American Foreign Relations During the Interwar Years

By Phoebe Jeffries

Abstract

This article provides a critical evaluation of the existing scholarship on American foreign policy between 1919 and 1941, a key period within what has been termed 'the American Century'.[447] *As a time when the United States' political, economic, and cultural power was growing, historians have naturally questioned how such power shaped the behaviour and actions of the United States abroad. Alongside the central debate over internationalism versus isolationism, this paper also analyses how the changing historiography of the interwar period has been influenced by fluctuating political environments and new approaches, such as the application of economic and cultural lenses. After considering the strengths and weaknesses of various historiographical interpretations, this article concludes by highlighting the limitations of the current historiography and suggesting improvements that could be made to strengthen modern scholarship on the interwar period.* [448]

'America First' – today we might associate these words with Donald Trump's political campaigns, but this nationalistic slogan actually has much earlier origins. Indeed, it was first employed during the 1916 election campaign by Woodrow Wilson, a president famous for his internationalist principles and interventionist policies, to describe his anti-interventionist foreign policy platform which emphasised preserving American neutrality.[449] However this contradiction between isolationist foreign policy rhetoric and reality appears not to have been limited to Wilson's presidency, but persisted long into the interwar years.

American foreign relations are popularly perceived as having experienced a lull between 1919 and 1941, with scholars instead tending to focus on the wars which bookended this period. Yet this perception has been proven to be somewhat misguided; historians have revealed that underneath the assumed stability and consistency of foreign relations in this era lie considerable contradictions and conflict, exemplified by the United States' rise towards great power status at a time when it appeared to be retreating from world affairs.

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[447] The term 'the American Century' was first coined by Henry Luce in *Life* magazine in 1941. See Henry R. Luce, "The American Century", *Life*, 1941, pp.61-65. <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IokEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false> [Accessed 16 March 2018].

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[449] Chicago Tribune, "Wilson For "America First"", 12 October 1915, p.1. <http://chicagotribune.newspapers.com/image/354921942/?terms=america%2Bfirst> [Accessed 16 March 2018].

Interpretations of the interwar period have broadly followed the typical historiographical arc: traditionalist, established views are later challenged by revisionist interpretations, which are in turn developed and adapted by post revisionists. Ongoing discussions among historians about the interwar period include the debate over isolationism versus internationalism, who directed policy, and the extent to which idealism and realism informed foreign policy. Scholarship has largely focussed on American relations towards Europe, with economic interpretations becoming dominant since the 1960s thanks to the highly influential work of William Appleman Williams.[450] However, changing political backdrops and new archival evidence have helped to reshape earlier ideas and brought new narratives and foci, such as the role of culture, to the fore. Consequently, modern historiography suggests that American foreign relations between 1919 and 1941 are far more complex than they initially appear and leaves much open to debate and further study.

A key debate amongst both contemporaries and modern historians centers around whether isolationism, a policy which encouraged American non-intervention in international political affairs; or internationalism, which argued for the United States to play a larger role on the international stage and promoted international political and economic cooperation, was the leading ideology behind the foreign policy of the United States during the period 1919 to 1941. There is some consensus among scholars that during the interwar period, the United States seemed to retreat from international relations, adopting a publicly isolationist position, as evidenced by its refusal to join the League of Nations; this stance was consolidated during the 1930s through a series of Neutrality Acts.[451] However, revisionists have refuted the isolationist stereotype, highlighting evidence of internationalist initiatives led by the United States and outside of the auspices of the League of Nations, such as the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921-22.[452]

However, more recent scholarship has produced more nuanced interpretations which endeavour to move past the isolationism-internationalism binary. Joan Hoff Wilson for example, attempts to reconcile these competing ideology-based interpretations, resulting in a synthesis she terms 'independent internationalism', meaning that the United States had 'concern for international issues' but was opposed to 'direct governmental commitments'.[453] This argument is convincing and has gained strong support because it demonstrates how the United States was not wholly isolated, but rather operated on the basis of duality in its foreign policy.[454] Emily Rosenberg

[450] See William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy Of American Diplomacy*, 3rd edn (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972).
[451] Kathleen Burk, 'The Lineaments Of Foreign Policy: The United States And A 'New World' Order, 1919-39', *Journal Of American Studies*, 26.3 (1992), p.380.
[452] Ibid, p.378.
[453] Cited in Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading The American Dream: American Economic And Cultural Expansion*, 1890-1945 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1982), p.115.
[454] See Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading The American Dream: American Economic And Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1982), p.114; and Roldolfo Villarreal-Rios, 'Independent Internationalism And National Pragmatism: The United States And Mexico Relations During The 1920s' (unpublished master's thesis, University of Montana, 2008).

is more radical and has gone as far as to question the usage of labels such as 'internationalist' and 'isolationist', arguing that they encompass a diverse range of meanings and opinions, and have often been used pejoratively by contemporaries and scholars alike.[455] Calls from historians in the 1980s for a distinction to be drawn between political and economic spheres have been met positively by academics, resulting in a prevailing historiographical interpretation of the interwar period which argues that although the 'United States carefully measured its political entanglements in Europe, its economic involvement was broad and deep', a view which owes much to the work of New Left historian William Appleman Williams in the early 1960s.[456]

Williams advances a theory of 'economic determinism', asserting that expansionist economic aims were the main drivers behind American foreign policy during the interwar period, because they constituted a 'crucial element' and necessary basis for securing peace and stabilising the American domestic political economy.[457] He notes how 'not even the isolationists in the 1920s and early 1930s' advocated autarky, where a nation-state is economically self-sufficient, because the United States relied on imports of raw materials and goods; consequently, he attaches much importance to the 'Open Door' policy of the US in Asia. [458]Outlined by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899, this policy called upon Japan and the European powers to respect the equality of opportunity for all nations to trade freely with China, which financially benefitted the United States by improving access to valuable Chinese markets. Costigliola, Burk, and O'Brien concur with Williams, citing American business interests and opportunities in Europe and Latin America, and noting the economic slant applied to foreign policy initiatives. Supporting Williams' claim that 'economic expansion became both a means and an end for American policymakers', they assert that political questions were approached from a business perspective.[459] Williams has faced much criticism for ignoring the role of ideology and 'the human element' in foreign policy; nevertheless, it is easy to identify supporting evidence for his theory, and certainly he is able to apply it more successfully to the interwar period than to later periods.[460] Whether or not historians agree with William's theory, it still leads scholars to question who directed foreign policy during the interwar period.

Working with private letters and published autobiographies, historians during the late 1950s tended to advocate a 'great men' interpretation, concentrating on the role and personalities of leaders such as Woodrow Wilson in shaping policy.[461] The release of new private and

[455] Rosenberg, p.114.
[456] Frank Costigliola, 'US Cultural Expansion In An Era Of Systematic Upheaval', in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, *Major Problems In American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914*, 7th edn (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning US, 2009), p.89.
[457] Williams, p.136.
[458] Ibid, pp.128-9.
[459] Williams, p.129; see Costigliola, p.89 and Burk, p.380.
[460] Brian McKercher, "Reaching For The Brass Ring: The Recent Historiography Of Interwar American Foreign Relations", in *Paths To Power: The Historiography Of American Foreign Relations To 1941* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.183.
[461] McKercher, pp.178-9.

governmental documents however has resulted in a shift in focus away from individuals towards certain groups and factors. Burk for example, has examined how policymakers of the interwar period who wished for the United States to be 'more active' within the international arena had to rein in the pursuit of their own internationalist agendas and consider the 'predominantly isolationist' mood of Congress and the American public, noting how 'enthusiastic peace groups' drove a 'reluctant' Sectary of State Frank Kellogg to arrange the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928.[462] This observation allows us to identify a gap within existing scholarship: few historians have actually considered the gulf between state and public opinion over the direction of foreign policy during the interwar period. However, as Burk acknowledges, this may be due to considerable methodological difficulties associated with assessing public attitudes, namely a lack of contemporary public opinion polls, and with understanding how far public opinion actually mattered to policymakers.[463]

During the 1980s, a new 'corporate synthesis' interpretation led by Michael Hogan gained momentum and support among scholars including Rosenberg, Burk, and Costigliola. This interpretation proposed that foreign policy during the 1920s was essentially an expansionist economic policy, directed and enacted by private sector leaders with the government's cooperation.[464] Citing examples of expanding 'private diplomacy' in the 1920s such as the Dawes Plan, Rosenberg concludes that the United States' government used a 'chosen-instrument policy…to shape private initiative to public policy'.[465] Furthermore, she attributes the United States' ability to exert an influence internationally whilst simultaneously limiting its participation in formal international commitments to the strong manifestation and utilization of 'internationalist and expansionist impulses' within the private sector, viewing it as a political success for American foreign policymakers which in turn eventually led to 'direct governmental involvement' in economic and cultural expansion during the 1930s.[466]

Whilst the 'corporate synthesis' does lend strength to and explain the economic determinist argument, it has been subject to criticism, chiefly from John Lewis Gaddis, because it relies on the assumption that there was a unity of interests and consensus between business leaders and the government on economic policy abroad throughout the interwar period and 'downplays the role of ideals…and of individuals' in policy formulation.[467] Even Rosenberg is forced to admit that state's use of chosen instruments was problematic because it resulted in 'an inconsistent approach towards international economic problems', suggesting that this explanation

[462] Burk, p.378.
[463] Burk, p.382.
[464] See Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal", *Diplomatic History* 10 (1986), pp.377-391.
[465] Rosenberg, p.116 and p.87.
[466] Rosenberg, p.231.
[467] John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View', *Diplomatic History* 10 (1986), pp.357-362, cited in Kathleen Burk, "The Lineaments Of Foreign Policy: The United States And A 'New World' Order, 1919-39", *Journal Of American Studies*, 26.3 (1992), p.389 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021875800031121>.

should be used with caution. [468] Overall there remains much debate over who directed America's foreign policy, and it is unlikely that a definitive answer will emerge anytime soon.

Additionally, existing scholarship of the interwar period must be criticised for its strong Eurocentric focus, with scholars including Costigliola, Ninkovich, and Rosenberg paying little attention to the significant diplomatic involvement of the United States in the wider Americas and Asia during the interwar period. Notable exceptions include Mark Gilderhus, who has studied Woodrow Wilson's political and economic encroachment into Latin America, and Thomas O'Brien's examination of the American corporate presence in the 'banana republics' of Honduras and Haiti, as well as in Nicaragua and Mexico.[469] Although these studies highlight the economic interest of the United States in Latin America through so-called 'Dollar Diplomacy', they also reveal other reasons for American involvement in these areas, drawing links between the United States' corporate and civilising mission, and political motivations.

Rejecting the view that American intervention in Latin America was purely economic, O'Brien points to the deployment of American troops in Nicaragua in 1927, a time when the United States supposedly abstained from military involvement across the world; evidence which has been overlooked by many other scholars. He attributes it to the US desire to preserve not only corporate investments, but also to ensure the successful continuation of its political reform program there, whilst noting how a need to repel 'communist subversion' was used as justification.[470] Even Williams backtracks on his argument of 'economic determinism' when discussing American intervention in the Russian civil war, acknowledging that President Wilson had strong ideological motivations and thus 'resorted to force, manipulation of food supplies and economic and military aid to counter-revolutionary groups' to actively oppose the communist regime.[471] Furthermore, Williams launches a stinging attack on Cold War era scholars for suggesting 'that the United States did not intervene in Russia to over-throw the Bolshevik Revolution'. Whilst valid, this comment also reveals the heavy influence of William's own 'para-Marxist' political agenda on his work, which consequently offers a skewed perspective.[472]

By retreating to an extent from his argument, Williams illustrates a key weakness of the narrow-minded economic interpretation that has dominated the historiography of United States' interwar foreign relations since the 1960s. Put simply, a 'one size fits all' approach is evidently

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[468] Rosenberg, p.137.
[469] See Mark T. Guilderhus, *Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913-1918* (Tuscon, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1986), cited in Brian McKercher, "Reaching For The Brass Ring: The Recent Historiography Of Interwar American Foreign Relations", in *Paths To Power: The Historiography Of American Foreign Relations To 1941* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 187-190.; and Thomas F. O'Brien, "Empire by Coercion: US Corporate And Military Power In Latin America", in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, *Major Problems In American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914*, 7th edn (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning US, 2009), pp.102-109.
[470] Thomas F. O'Brien, "Empire by Coercion: US Corporate And Military Power In Latin America", in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, *Major Problems In American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914*, 7th edn (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning US, 2009), p.107.
[471] William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy Of American Diplomacy*, 3rd edn (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), p.115.
[472] McKercher, pp.181-4.

inadequate as an explanation of American foreign policy motivations in the interwar period, in that it does not account for the fact that the policy of the United States varied in both method and application in different areas. Although modern scholars are starting to investigate American interwar foreign policy on a more global scale, further study is necessary, not just to understand the full global scope of US foreign relations in this period, but also to demonstrate and account for variation in policy. In addition to expanding the geographical context of American foreign relations, post-revisionist historians have also questioned and adapted the 'economic determinist' interpretation, arguing that the nature of American foreign relations was 'more multifaceted' than revisionists have suggested.[473]

Of particular significance to the post-revisionists of the 1980s is the role of foreign policy within its cultural context, with important contributions being offered by Frank Costigliola. Like most historians of his era, Costigliola considers cultural influence as a form of foreign policy, suggesting that it was 'both a product and a contributor' to the economic and political power of the United States.[474] He highlights the attractiveness of American culture to Europeans, with its jazz music, films, and technological innovations, which was spread through the massive numbers of American tourists to Europe during and after the First World War, boldly asserting that 'most, if not all, of the [cultural] influence [flowed] eastward'; though this may be an over-exaggeration and ignores the two-way nature of cultural exchange.[475] Nevertheless, Costigliola is able to convincingly conclude that culture remained an effective form of foreign policy during the interwar period because it 'enhanced the ability of the United States to conduct its political and economic policies in Europe with minimal cost and entanglement'.[476] This view is supported by Ninkovich, who highlights the recognition and consolidation of cultural relations into policy by the United States government through the establishment of the Division of Cultural Relations in 1938.[477] However, as O'Brien has pointed out, this is not to say that all cultural influences were positive or welcomed whole heartedly; in Latin America for example, elites took on the Americans' disparaging attitudes to towards their own mixed-race population'.[478]

Building on the work of Costigliola and Ninkovich, the 'London School' presents a modified view, combining the economic determinist interpretation with political, strategic and cultural considerations within American foreign relations. This term was employed by McKercher to describe a group of historians who are interested in the 1920s , including American historians, and are strongly associated with the University of London's Institute of Historical Research.[479] Refuting the notion that a nation-state's power originates from its economic strength, this school places emphasis on American wealth, cultural strength and diplomatic leverage, arguing that

[473] McKercher, pp.203-4.
[474] Costigliola, p.90.
[475] Costigliola, pp.89-90.
[476] Ibid, p.91.
[477]; Ninkovich, pp.28-30.
[478] O'Brien, p.106.
[479] McKercher, p.204.

American foreign policy in this era was concentrated on the economic dimension, which 'although important, was not the vital one'.[480] Instead they suggest that the United States played a careful game, balancing economic, strategic and political concerns and predications, noting that it refused to 'become involved in any negotiations or agreements which might compromise American freedom'.[481] This provides a more balanced and complex picture of motivations behind interwar foreign policy that is altogether more convincing than the separate interpretations it synthesises, but also suggests that further studies should be conducted to fully unravel the interrelationships and complexities of foreign relations during the interwar period.

In conclusion, it is clear that revisionist interpretations of the interwar period continue to hold considerable sway among scholars, although efforts have been made by more modern historians to elucidate and refine such interpretations, including a reconsideration of older traditionalist interpretations. In addition to expanding the geographical scope and identifying new factors for study such as cultural relations, modern scholarship has attempted to place existing theories such as economic determinism within a broader context of contingent political, cultural, and strategic factors. The result has been increasingly sophisticated analyses which attempt to reconcile previous interpretations by drawing on the strengths of both sides. Nevertheless, there remains considerable debate, perpetuated to an extent by the political background in which many scholars of this period were writing. Thus, further study and contributions from post-Cold War era historians are necessary to build up a more balanced and comprehensive picture of American foreign relations between 1919 and 1941.

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[480] Burk, p.391.
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Holocaust Literature: French Writers and the Gaullist Narrative

By Airelle Perrouin

Abstract

The aftermath of the Holocaust and the literary responses it inspired has drawn a lot of academic interest in recent decades. It is widely argued that, in France, particularly, the Holocaust was subjected to silence for much of the twentieth century as the entire nation was understandably absorbed in a political and cultural obsession with the Occupation. Arguably, this prevailed in French literary production at the expense of a fair treatment of Holocaust experiences. Open debate within academia and the literati was overshadowed by General Charles de Gaulle's powerful presence and his glorious association with the Resistance. This led to a disproportionate representation of the Resistance preventing an honest inquiry into the realities of the Collaboration and the Holocaust. It is widely argued that it took France three generations to come to terms with the collaboration. This article seeks to probe these aforementioned assumptions by assessing the role of writers after the war. It is my contention that French writers were challenging the legitimacy of the Gaullist narrative a lot sooner than previously accepted and therefore problematize the oft-repeated assumption that France was unwilling to confront its past until forced to do so after President Jacques Chirac's apology and the potentially self-interested backdrop of E.U. community building that lingered behind it.

France had witnessed three German invasions in as little as seventy years and had lost much of its national confidence. By the 1930s, France was ripe for collaboration. Many political and cultural sympathies had been established between Paris and Weimar. Contemporary writers were actively encouraged to lend support to Weimar's burgeoning national socialist movement. In 1937, *Les Cahiers franco-allemand* established a literary reciprocity between the two nations founded on mutual anti-Semitism. The *Cahiers* 'assure la collaboration de plumes illustres, et ne manquent pas de relever les moindres signes de ce qui, déjà, reçoit le nom de « collaboration »'. [482]'Appropriate' writers, such as Jean Luchaire, were given special favours by German publishers. His monthly review, *Notre Temps*, depended on subscriptions and adverts from the German Embassy. Such preferential treatment flattered the ego of many right-leaning writers and legitimized their views. It is no surprise, then, that at the outset of war many prominent French writers were prepared to support Vichy. On the 24th October 1940, Maréchal Pétain announced 'C'est dans l'honneur et

[482] Pascal Ory, *Les collaborateurs 1940-45* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976), p.18.

pour maintenir l'unité française [...] que j'entre aujourd'hui dans la voie de la collaboration [...] Suivez-moi'.[483]Under Vichy 75,721 Jewish refugees and French citizens were deported to Nazi extermination camps. The role of writers during and following the Occupation came under intense scrutiny in both the public and academic realms. This is to be expected in a country that prides itself on the political influence of its intellectuals. From England, the literary elite looked on in astonishment. E.M. Forster stated 'we English writers have not yet been tested as French writers have been tested'.[484]This article seeks to explore to what extent French writers challenged the preponderance of a Gaullist interpretation of Vichy.

The subsequent vilification of Pétain, together with the celebration of Resistance efforts, led to a 'parenthesis' interpretation of Vichy. This approach contended that 'Vichy was not France'.[485] Theodore Zeldin, however, argues that Vichy was not so much a departure from normal French politics as an expression of it. For him 'the sudden disappearance of a government has the same effect as clothes being torn off a person, revealing in nakedness all the muscles, blemishes, scars and eccentricities that are normally concealed' and as such a 'parenthesis' interpretation of Vichy is untenable.[486]In 1987, Henri Rousso argued for 'a nation unable to work through buried trauma'.[487]A survey on French anti-Semitism, dated 1994, provides a useful indication of Vichy's confused legacy and may support his argument for repressed memory. In a paper entitled 'What do the French know about the Holocaust?' people were asked 'would you say that the French state led by Pétain between 1940 and 1944 was responsible for the deportation of Jews to the extermination camps, or not responsible', only 57 per cent of respondents answered that it was responsible. 29 per cent answered that it was not and 14 per cent pleaded ignorance either way.[488]This is surprising data given the immense literary significance of the Occupation and the Holocaust in France, and the numerous reparation trials underway in the early 1990s. In June 1993, René Bousquet, the secretary general for the Vichy police from April 1942 to December 1943, was assassinated whilst awaiting trial.[489] And, a year later, on July 16th 1995, Jacques Chirac delivered a formal apology for France's complicity in the Holocaust. The evident disparity between literary and political awareness on one hand and the French public on the other, may suggest the enduring power of the Gaullist mythology despite the manifold intellectual attacks against it.

[483] Ibid., p. 36.
[484] Michael Tilby, 'Image and Counter-Image: André Gide and the Occupation', in *France 1940: Literary and Historical Reactions to Defeat*, ed. by Anthony Cheal Pugh (University of Durham, 1991), p.108.
[485] Alexander Karn, *Amending the Past: Europe's Holocaust Commissions and Right to History* (USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), p.33.
[486]Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848-1945: Anxiety and Hypocrisy* (Reading: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 346.
[487] Claire Gorrara, *Women's Representations of the Occupation in Post-'68 France* (USA: St Martin's Press, 1998), p.2.
[488] Jennifer Golub and R. Cohen, *Working Papers on Contemporary Anti-Semitism "What do the French know about the Holocaust?"*(New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1994).
[489] Gorrara, *Women's Representations*, p. 1.

Charles de Gaulle's government was perceived as innately counter-cultural as it symbolized the triumph of the *Résistants* over the "*Collabos*". The Gaullist myth was founded on the famous appeal of the 18th June 1940 calling the French to fight on. He was thereafter remembered as 'celui qui a dit non'. In London, he had been the leader of the *Force Françaises Libres.* He returned to France in August 1944 surrounded by Anglo-American allies to stake his victory.[490] This suggested that the enemy had been conquered, when, more honestly, France had inherited a population full of collaborators and bystanders only nominally challenged by the state. The seductive image of *la France combattante* was supported by such novels as Joseph Kessel's *L'Armée des Ombres* (1963):

> Jamais la France n'a fait guerre plus haute et plus belle que celle des caves où s'impriment ses journaux libres, des terrains nocturnes et des criques secrètes où elle reçoit ses amis libres et d'où partent ses enfants libres, des cellules de torture où malgré les tenailles, les épingles rougies au feu et les os broyés, des Français meurent en hommes libres.[491]

In a great display of emotion and nationalism, de Gaulle met returning deportees from Ravensbrück with *La Marseillaise* playing behind him. This helped foster his image as father of the people and guarantor of national security. He represented the victory of good over evil and promised the restoration of national unity and dignity. This created an unhelpful 'redemption' narrative, illustrated by an iconic 1945 poster featuring a naked and emaciated man standing in front of barbed wire under which the slogan '*retour à la France, Retour à la vie*' is printed in a bold tricolour typeface. In reality, many women remember the hostile reception they encountered upon returning. Simone Rohner recalls being mistaken for a *tondeuse*, 'civilians looked at us with an air of disgust'.[492]

Early post-war French literature preferred heroic tales of Resistance. Writers such as Vercors, Louis Aragon and Elsa Triolet had denounced the moral catastrophes of Vichy. As such, they were given prominence while less glorious writers were conveniently forgotten. The courageous, if sentimental, poems of Paul Éluard and Aragon depicted the French as more than they were: 'Et derrière le nudité | De ta Pâleur de ta maigreur | Tout ce qui est humain se révèle en tes yeux | Paris ma belle | Fine comme une aiguille forte comme une épée'.[493]Such stirring words inspired a brave minority to fight for freedom, 'Ils sont la force et nous sommes le nombre'.[494] Their post-war prominence was assisted by the electoral success of the *Parti Communist Français* which

[490] Herbert R. Lottman, *The People's Anger*, p. 14.
[491] Joseph Kessel, *L'Armée des Ombres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943).
[492] Debra Workman, 'Engendering the Repatriation: The Return of Female Political Deportees to France Following the Second World War', *Journal of the Western Society for French History,* 35 (2007).
[493] Paul Éluard, *Au Rendez- Vous Allemand* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2012), p.10.
[494] Louis Aragon, *Les Yeux D'Elsa* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1942), p.74.

claimed to defend the memory of the *75,000 fusillés*. The Communists were the first to organize armed resistance. France's response to the Germano-Soviet Pact meant that they had to go underground as early as September 1939. Giving priority to these writers projected a disingenuous picture of Vichy. Claire Gorrara argues that few writers had supported the literary resistance. Claiming membership to this heroic minority, had lent many writers an authenticity that was not theirs to boast. For example, Jean-Paul Sartre and André Malraux did not commit to the Resistance until it was clear that an Allied victory was underway. In more extreme cases, 'parmi ceux qui dans mon quartier lisaient *Signal* et *Je suis partout*, certains se découvraient de soudaines sympathies pour la Résistance'.[495]

After the liberation, writers revealed the mood of despair that swept the country thus partly challenging the triumphalism of Gaullist narratives. For example, in Jean Cayrol's *Je vivrai l'amour des Autres* (1947): 'c'est drôle comme je parle ce matin, des mots sans pesanteur, des mots brouillard. Jamais je ne me suis senti aussi léger, aussi peu distinct des choses qui m'entourent.'[496]Such literature revealed a nation peopled with lost souls unable to define themselves, give shape to what they had lived in the past or could hope to achieve in the future. To counteract this despondency, the size and importance of the Resistance was consistently overstated by the government. This bolstered a convenient national ideal which elided painful truths. An overwhelmingly male and paramilitary image was projected. Some historians corroborated this view. In the 1950s, Robert Aron's *Histoire de Vichy* argued for moderate *pétainisme*. Aron promoted a simple binary between 'good' Vichy (Pétain) and 'bad' Vichy (Laval). *L'Association pour defender la mémoire du Maréchal Pétain* (ADMP) was established in 1951. Aron's interpretation curried favour with contemporary thinkers but was later cast aside when a new cohort of American historians appeared. In 1973, Robert Paxton's *La France de Vichy* spurred new enquiries into the role and ideology of the Collaboration.[497] At the same time, new voices in literature, notably from women, were coming through, and far from seeking to rehabilitate the old establishment, they wanted to hold it to account. Charlotte Delbo's *Aucun de nous ne reviendra* (1970) and Marguerite Duras' *La Douleur* (1985) replaced resistance narratives with tales of personal disaster emphasizing the Collaboration.[498]Delbo queried the reliability of personal and collective memory as illustrated in her famous assertion 'Aujourd'hui, je ne suis pas sûre que ce que j'ai écrit soit vrai. Je suis sûre que c'est véridique'.[499]By challenging authorial choices and our ability to access the past, such writing fractured monolithic interpretations.

[495] Francine de Martinoir, *La littérature occupée: les années de guerre 1939-1945* (Paris: Hatier, 1995), p.11.
[496] Jean Cayrol, *Je vivrai L'amour des Autres* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1947), p.28.
[497] Pascal Ory, *Les collaborateurs 1940-45*, p. 8.
[498]Claire Gorrara, *Women's Representations of the Occupation in Post-'68 France* (USA: St Martin's Press, 1998), p.20.
[499] Charlotte Delbo quoted in *Re-examining the Holocaust through Literature*, ed. by Aukje Kluge and Benn E. Williams (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).

There was a deep sense that the well-publicized martyrs of the Resistance obscured the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Jean Moulin and Marc Bloch were given quasi-deific importance. For the Jews living in France this spurred further anger and resentment. In the 1980s, writers sought to redress this imbalance and a vast array of extermination camp literature came into prominence (though it was often published at an earlier time). This prompted writers away from national self-determination towards a universal dialogue of Jewish persecution. Immodest images of French resistance or armed activism were hitherto replaced with more realistic depictions of squalor, death and suffering. Holocaust writers challenged the notion of 'survival', inherent to Gaullist values, with one of 'not dying'. This re-evaluation fundamentally unsettled heroic narratives. David Rousset in *L'univers concentrationnaire* (1946) describes the horrors of concentration camps in harrowing detail, 'depuis des jours, les têtes rasées vacillent, conscientes seulement d'avoir perdu un monde qui devrait être unique et qui se cache, sans doute, au-delà des réseaux électriques.'[500] Moreover, he challenged the heroic image of French prisoners of war by drawing attention to the inglorious circumstances of many deportations. He describes the negative stereotypes that were circulated around the camps about the French. He also describes the relative unimportance of political activism in Buchenwald, stating that living under such extreme circumstances, all intellectual efforts disappeared against a constant preoccupation with survival. He describes a world filled with animosity, disunity, confusion and jealousy. He does not describe scenes of friendship or solidarity. His work, similarly to that of Robert Antelme and Jorge Semprun, rerouted the national dialogue away from self-aggrandizing narratives of resistance towards disturbing and humbling reports of the Holocaust:

> Ce serait une truculente méprise que de tenir les camps pour une concentration de détenus politiques. Les politiques (et faut-il encore entendre ce mot dans sa plus grande extension, englobant les condamnes pour action militaire, les espions, les passeurs de frontière, ne sont qu'une poignée dans la horde des autres'.[501]

Charles de Gaulle had been a prisoner of war himself, and so new revelations into the ambiguity of political commitment amongst French P.O.W's went some way to question the predominant narrative.

Before then, in 1948, Marcel Aymé's controversial novel *Uranus* already critiqued a nation of fascist sympathizers:

> Dans toutes les provinces de France, dans tous les villages, dans les grandes villes et dans les petites, il voyait grouiller ces gens à double visage, reconnaissables à une attitude un peu gênée et composée, au ton doucereux de leurs propos, a l'art d'utiliser les silences dans

[500] David Rousset, *L'univers concentrationnaire* (Paris: Éditions du Pavois,1946), p.16.
[501]David Rousset, *L'univers Concentrationnaire* (Paris: Éditions de Pavois, 1947), p. 53.

> la conversation, a leurs sourires conciliants et légèrement serviles, comme s'ils étaient des inferieurs.

Marcel Aymé fervently opposed the Gaullist perspective. He was often unfairly mistaken for a Vichy apologist. He tried, in vain, to save Robert Brasillach from his death sentence. In fact, Aymé was a brilliant and subtle thinker who valued freedom of expression above all else and resented any form of censorship. For him 'France's fall from grace seems to have occurred not so much in June 1940 as in August 1944'.[502] In *Le Confort Intellectuel* (1949), he criticised a sub-genre of resistance poetry which he believed achieved little due to its deliberate bourgeois obscurantism and self-importance. In *Uranus*, Aymé draws attention to a provincial town completely destroyed by allied bombs which failed to hit enemy targets, costing 300 civilian lives. He compares the unfair arrest of ordinary civilians by communists against the freedom of a prominent collaborator made rich through the black market.[503] Aymé was concerned with the arbitrary and partisan distribution of post-war justice, which, in his mind, usually amounted to no more than grievous vendetta. He was heavily lambasted for his views and his account of the Occupation is still controversial today. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that it was only the work of spirited individuals that challenged the status quo. The Gaullist perspective was under review within the upper echelons of the French literary establishment as well. Prominent members of the *Académie Française* lamented the insulting simplifications of the political narrative. For example, *Mon village à l'heure allemande* by Jean-Louis Bory does not conform to a consensual Gaullist narrative, and yet it won the prix Goncourt in 1945. Bory highlighted the multiplicity of responses to the Occupation and thus queried both the extent of the Resistance and the remoteness of the Collaboration.

Such freedom, however, did not subsist, and soon after the Liberation writers began to feud against one another thus potentially disabling a successful offensive against the Gaullist narrative. Right-wing writers were cast out of literary circles that had previously represented both ends of the political spectrum. In a highly-charged post-war society such political heterogeneity was no longer accepted. They were persecuted, and many had to flee the country. The writers' purge created a literary vacuum in which opposing voices were no longer available. This favoured a very specific interpretation of the Occupation. Those writers who were not subjected to violent physical reprisals were blacklisted instead. One such victim was Pierre Drieu La Rochelle. In a 1989 re-edition of his 1939 novel *Gilles*, the editors include a preface in which he bemoans the violence and short-sightedness of his literary contemporaries. He commented on the apparent ease with which writers besmirched one another's characters, ended careers and took lives. He laments the tyranny of *les années noires* and defends the necessary political contradictions inherent in each of

[502] *France 1940: Literary and Historical Reactions to* Defeat, ed. by Anthony Cheal Pugh (Durham: University of Durham, 1991), p.57.
[503] Ibid., p.57.

us. He admits to vacillating between different ideas, political preferences and friendships and denigrates a society that attacks the mental freedom to do so. He committed suicide in 1945.[504] Pierre Bourdan appealed to authors to 'make a distinction between a great mind that went astray for a while and those whose motives had little to do with a crisis of confidence'.[505] Unfortunately, so many post-war writers were insensitive to such wisdom.

Résistants in the National Writers Committee (CNE) used underground papers to attack leading collaborationist writers such as Paul Morand. The CNE instigated the writers' purge. Brasillach, Paul Chack and Gorges Suarez were killed for treason. In hindsight, much of it was indefensible and misguided. Writers, it would seem, were reproducing Nazi totalitarianism. Such brutal censorship was doubly shocking from a country that had been internationally recognized as a purveyor of artistic freedom. French writers were considered morally obliged to publish and defend their political beliefs. They were placed above the expectations of ordinary citizens. Zeldin describes French writers as belonging to a self-appointed 'national consultation council'.[506] Jean-Paul Sartre was a strong advocate of *l'écriture engagée* and dismissed those writers who hesitated, or refused, to qualify their moral and political proclivities. Therefore, those who found themselves on the wrong side of the post-war status quo were heavily punished. To this one may venture to ask 'pourquoi les hommes de lettres auraient-ils été moins médiocres que le reste des Français'.[507] Some writers objected to this tyranny. Jean Paulhan, himself a member of the CNE argued that 'writers had a right to be wrong [and that] he refused to be a voluntary gendarme'.[508] Paulhan was also alarmed by the possibility of a scenario in which only former resistance writers were able to write and therefor literature would no longer exist as it would lack the vital tension of opposites that sustains it. Blacklists adding up to 158 authors' names were circulated. The backlash was becoming extreme, and even Sartre began to question either the utility or desirability of such actions. In his monthly review *Les Temps Modernes*, he published an essay entitled *La Nationalisation de la littérature* in which he warned that writing was now being judged based on the resistance effort of the author and not his literary merit. *Les Hussards*, right-wing writers, sought to undermine Sartre's prominence by producing their own paper, *la Table Ronde*, which advocated a conscious separation between literature and politics. Such writers included Roger Nimier, Antoine Blondin and Jacques Laurent. They championed art for art's sake. This can be read as a reluctance to engage with the difficulties of the recent past. Such writers did not support de Gaulle either. They were, for the most part, reactionary traditionalists or monarchists.[509]

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[504] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, *Gilles* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989).
[505] Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848-1945: Anxiety and Hypocrisy* (Reading: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.357.

[507] Francine de Martinoir, *La littérature occupée: les années de guerre 1939-1945,* p.14.
[508] Lottman, *The People's Anger*, p.241.
[509] Christopher Flood and Hugo Fray, 'Extreme Right-Wing Reactions to Charles de Gaulle's "Mémoires de Guerre": A Scene from the French Civil War', *South Central Review*, 17 (2000), 72-83.

Writers who, during the war, had depended on clandestine publishing houses such as *Les Éditions de Minuit* and the use of pseudonyms (Edith Thomas published under `Auxois`), now propagated a censored culture of their own. The painful irony of it is that, at *Les Lettres Françaises*, the head of the publisher's association put in charge of deciding on the books to be censored under Vichy was the same person who did so after the Liberation. La Rochelle notes the sacrifices that some writers made:

> Giono, lui, s'est lancé dans une féerie paysanne, une pastorale lyrique, un opéra mythique ou il a pu exprimer, sans être gêné par l'immédiate intercalation du réel, son intime aspiration à la santé et à la force.

After the war, human dignity disappeared in an angry confusion of blame-assignation. The same violence that had aided the Nazi effort was now used to avenge it. Post-liberation vigilantism was self-defeating. It suggested the impossibility of justice or forgiveness. Marguerite Duras probes this question in *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1960):

> Contre qui, la colère des villes entières ? La colère des villes entières qu'elles le veuillent ou non, contre l'inégalité posée en principe par certains peuples contre d'autres peuples, contre l'inégalité posée en principe par certaines races contre d'autres races, contre l'inégalité posée en principe par certaines classes contre d'autres classes.[510]

Lawrence Langer critiques the 'popularity of « forgiveness » and « reconciliation » as fruitful responses to the agents of atrocity' and argues that it 'confirms how little we have advanced in our journey to appreciate the nature of the beast'. This is especially true of sanctimonious Resistance poetry where one is reminded of Langer's 'invitation to literature and art to incorporate barbarism into its conscious resources without flinching'.[511] Shamefully, however, the plight of Holocaust and Occupation victims was often ignored, in contemporary literature, in favour of self-reflexive domestic concerns. The Holocaust was often committed to silence. In France, as elsewhere 'the perpetrators murdered; the victims died; a few resisted. But the bystanders were silent, and when they began to speak after 1945, their words only gave shape to the silence'.[512]Many read this silence as a continuation of society's criminal moral apathy. It can be said that 'the silence of the Holocaust exposes the complicity of language at the time and its inadequacy thereafter'.[513] Eugene Ionesco, too, conveyed the issue of incommunicability. His 1959 *Rhinocéros* can be read as a thinly-veiled critique of Nazism. The play is set in a provincial village in France which is subsequently overrun by a crash of rhinoceroses. The play considers the human response to this grotesque invasion. Confronted with these alarming events, none of the characters are able to adequately express their

[510] Marguerite Duras, *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p.31.
[511] Lawrence Langer, *Using and Abusing the Holocaust* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), p.xv.
[512]Victoria J. Barnett, *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust* (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood, 1999), p.126.
[513] Ibid., p.127.

apprehensions and all dialogue dissolves into an exchange of useless platitudes. This inevitably eviscerates all possibility of reasoned argument or resistance. Ionesco uses the Theatre of the Absurd to query the power of conformity and compliance. He explores the variegated human responses to fear and thereby undermines the simplistic and vainglorious affirmations of a Gaullist perspective.

The cultural revolution of May '68 inspired a further reappraisal of France's wartime record. This time, it gave rise to narratives of national shame and exposed a deep generational rift between those who lived the war first hand and their disenchanted children. Patrick Modiano was a major proponent of this new approach. His father had only narrowly escaped deportation. Modiano challenged his father's remembrance of the Occupation, and, behind it, the inherent paternalism of the Gaullist narrative. In *La Place de Étoile*, a frenetic stream of consciousness over-spilling with historical detail, he conveys the deep malaise of his generation. Published in 1968, the novel's uncomfortably dense and nauseating writing style urges the reader to revise their preconceptions. Modiano's numerous novels obsessively return to the Occupation. These multifarious interpretations of the same event further contradict the uniformity of a Gaullist view by highlighting the fragmented legacy of individual remembrance. Second Wave feminism also demanded a revaluation of the 'collaborationist father'. Evelyne le Garrec and Marie Chaix, for instance, explored 'the problematic heritage of the collaborating father'. This further disrupted the idealized masculinity of the Gaullist myth, and revealed a generation unwilling to glorify the Occupation. Le Garrec and Chaix were not prepared to overlook the moral ambiguities of their parents, or comply with facile interpretations of both their personal and public lives. Female writers also sought to forge new interpretations by producing different narrative techniques to their male predecessors and contemporaries. Frédérique Moret and Violette Maurice published short stories and diary novels to consciously distance themselves from the male novelistic format. Their literary consciousness had repercussions for post-war narratives at large as they highlighted the narrativity of the Occupation itself whilst also forging an independent feminine response to history not reliant on reproducing masculine motifs.[514]The development of a feminist critique of history invited other revisions as well. Gorrara notes two generations of female writers; women resisters and 'the daughters of the Occupation'. The former embellished the Gaullist narrative as it exposed the heroic sacrifices of many underrepresented female resistance fighters. Geneviève de Gaulle-Anthonioz was particularly significant. As Charles de Gaulle's niece, a key figure in the Resistance and a surviving deportee of Ravensbrück, she added credit and legitimacy to a heroic interpretation of the Occupation. The latter generation, however, attacked Gaullist sentimentality as, in their view; it martyred and dehumanized their parents by turning them into useful caricatures. Marie Gatard and Mireille Albrecht noted that their fathers were often depicted as

[514] Claire Gorrara, Women's *Representations of the Occupation in Post-'68 France* (USA: St Martin's Press, 1998), p.5.

heroes whereas their mothers were turned into martyrs.[515] Between these two extremities, there was little room for nuanced dialogue.

At this time, de Gaulle's popularity started to wane and though his party had won the 1967 election, *Le Monde* captured the nation's sentiment when it published the headline 'La France s'ennuie'. Charles de Gaulle resigned on the 28th April 1969. This prompted the literati to deepen and continue the revisionism it had started in 1968. An obsessive, iconoclastic focus on the Collaboration ensued. This movement resembled the arguably limiting polarization of the `victim versus perpetrator' model in Holocaust historiography. It did not adequately account for the bystander issue. This obsession with the Collaboration led to a nation-wide cult of guilt. This was just as self-indulgent and unhelpful as exaggerated claims about the Resistance. In *Le Sang des Autres* (1945), Simone de Beauvoir captures this uneasy cohabitation between empathy and sentimentality: 'Ce n'est pas ma mort. Je ferme les yeux, je reste immobile, mais c'est de moi que je me souviens et sa mort entre dans ma vie: moi je n'entre pas dans sa mort.[516]

In conclusion, French post-war literature went a lot further to challenge the political war record than previously accepted. It is misleading and unhelpful to accept the oft-repeated assumption that it took the French three generations to come to terms with the Collaboration. Alexander Karn argues that 'France's parenthesis theory collapsed in 1995'.[517]Whilst the Gaullist narrative of the Occupation exerted much influence over society, and did so for many years, literature challenged it significantly, and a long time before France's formal apology. Writers tried to redress the deliberate historical omissions preferred by the Gaullist agenda. Admittedly, they did not have an immediate impact on French public consciousness, but became hugely important during the May '68 revolution. It would seem, then, that it was not until de Gaulle's political influence started to wane, under the pressure of new national interests, that a serious reappraisal of the Occupation became possible. When that time came, it was often the preserve of France's finest literary figures to undertake the task. As Albert Camus puts it 'art, in a sense, is a revolt against everything fleeting and unfinished in the world'.[518]

[515] Gorrara, p.5.
[516]Simone de Beauvoir, *Le Sang des Autres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p.12.
[517] Alexander Karn, *Amending the Past*, p.40.
[518] Lawrence Langer, *The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

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
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